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One of the main problems of concept empiricism is to explain the acquisition of the 
most basic constituents of concepts, without resorting to preexisting innate elements. 
The aim of this thesis is to show that the best nativist arguments against the acquisition 
of (primitive) concepts rest on the assumption that the constituents of concepts should 
be available beforehand, as an input of the acquisition process. However, I will claim that 
there is no obligation to accept such a (precedence) assumption. In fact, I will describe a 
model where the constituents of a concept result from the same learning process by vir-
tue of which that concept is acquired. My proposal is based on a similarity space theory of 
concepts articulated by means of prototypes. I also prove that: (A) in this type of ap-
proach, two distinct notions of concept should be distinguished –which may be identi-
fied with two different facets in their life cycle (i.e., storage and instantiation)–; and that 
(B) a proposal like this brings together virtues both from the invariantist and from the 
contextualist views. I argue as well that, if concepts are context-dependent, as claimed by 
contextualism, then instantiated concepts lack minimal persistence and, consequently, 
cannot be a representation of their associated categories. 
Resumen 
Uno de los principales problemas a los que se enfrenta el empirismo es el de explicar 
cómo se adquieren los elementos más básicos de los conceptos, sin recurrir para ello a 
elementos innatos preexistentes. El propósito de esta tesis es mostrar que los mejores 
argumentos nativistas en contra de la posibilidad de aprender conceptos (primitivos) 
dependen de la asunción de que los constituyentes de los conceptos deben estar dispo-
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nibles de antemano, como entrada de los procesos de adquisición. No obstante, mostraré 
que nada obliga a aceptar esa asunción (de precedencia). De hecho, presentaré un modelo 
en donde los elementos constitutivos de un concepto resultan del mismo proceso de 
aprendizaje en virtud del cual ese concepto se adquiere. Mi propuesta está basada en una 
teoría de espacios de similaridad articulada mediante prototipos. Además pruebo: (A) 
que dos nociones distintas de concepto deben distinguirse en este tipo de aproximación, a 
saber, conceptos como almacenamiento y conceptos como instanciación; y (B) que una 
propuesta como ésta reúne virtudes tanto del ámbito invariantista como del contextualis-
ta. Argumento también que, si los conceptos son dependientes del contexto –según sos-
tiene el contextualismo–, entonces los conceptos instanciados carecen de persistencia mí-
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My purpose is to better understand human nature. My method is to 
attempt to characterize the mental resources that make possible the 
articulation of humans’ knowledge and experience of the world. – 







Achilles had overtaken the Tortoise, and had seated himself comfortably on its back1. 
“I have got to the end of my racecourse,” said Achilles. 
“That is a remarkable claim,” said the Tortoise. “Even though I do not know what a 
racecourse is.” 
“What a surprising question,” replied Achilles. “I cannot believe you do not know it. 
In fact, that is an extremely easy issue which I learned a long time ago: a racecourse is the 
course of a race.” 
“So you learned in the past what a racecourse is,” the Tortoise commented. 
“Quite so,” Achilles agreed. 
“And, if I have correctly understood, the concept of racecourse is constituted by the 
concepts of race and course, so once you know what a course is, and what a race is, you 
know what a racecourse is.” 
“That is the beauty of the compositionality principle,” Achilles assented. 
“But, if you had not known what a race is –or what a course is– then you could not 
have learned what a racecourse is,” the Tortoise wondered. 
“Undoubtedly! But, at that time, I had already learned what a race and a course are,” 
retorted Achilles. “And I am sure you know what they are too.” 
“Well, now let’s take a look at the argument,” the Tortoise interrupted. “Let’s refer 
racecourse, race and course by means of letters, A, B, and C, respectively. So, when you 
learned A you had already learned B and C.” 
“Yes, of course,” answered Achilles. 
 
1 This is the beginning of Lewis Carroll’s paper “What the Tortoise said to Achilles” (Carroll 1895), 
and the rest of the dialogue is inspired by that text. 
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“Then, I must ask you how you learned the concepts B and C,” said the Tortoise. 
“Let’s begin with the concept C.” 
“Through the same process,” Achilles replied. “I learned it at some previous time.” 
“Now I understand,” the Tortoise murmured. “You learned the concept C on the ba-
sis of other concepts, let’s call them D and E, that you knew at that time.” 
“I did!”, exclaimed Achilles. 
“But, in such a case, I wonder how you learned the concepts D and E,” the Tortoise 
said musingly. “Did you learn D and E from other concepts that you had learned at an 
earlier time?” 
“I see,” Achilles muttered; and there was a touch of sadness in his tone. 
This example illustrates the main issue I investigate in this doctoral thesis. Empiricism is 
one of the two major views on the origin of concepts. According to it, concepts are 
learned from sense experience, and few if any of them are innate. More particularly, if the 
principle of compositionality is accepted, as usual in contemporary philosophy, we arrive 
at Achilles’ position in the dialogue above. 
Unfortunately, concept empiricism faces a significant problem when trying to explain 
how the most basic constituents of concepts could have been acquired. That was the 
Tortoise’s point in the dialogue (i.e., there is a circularity threat whenever concepts and 
their constitutive elements are thought to be acquired by means of the same kind of cog-
nitive process), and the roots of Fodor’s nativist critiques against the thesis that primitive 
concepts can be learned without resorting to a preexisting innate repertoire of concepts. 
But, things might get even worse for the empiricist, since if Fodor is right when claiming 
that all available concepts are the closure of the primitive ones under a set of innate com-
binatorial mechanisms, then the expressive power of all our conceptual system could be 
innately determined. 
However, the empiricist-nativist debate is not the only great discussion in current 
philosophy regarding the nature of concepts. In fact, other significant debate is the one 
about the invariant or context-dependent character of concepts. This is the other major 
topic of this doctoral thesis. According to invariantism, concepts are stable bodies of 
knowledge about categories, which remain invariant across individuals and time. In con-
trast, the contextualist view holds that concepts are context-dependent construals pro-
duced on the fly for each particular occasion. Each one of these views accounts for several 
important kinds of phenomena. On the one hand, invariantism easily explains the accu-
mulation of knowledge –by subjects– about categories, and our ability to communicate 
with other individuals. On the other hand, contextualism accounts for our adaptive be-
havior to heterogeneous and changing environments. 
With regard to this second issue, my proposal will be that a similarity-based space 
theory of concepts articulated by means of prototypes can bring together virtues both 
from the invariantist and from the contextualist views. In particular, I will claim that an 
approach like mine allows to distinguish two different notions of concept, namely stored 
concept and instantiated concept, which may be associated with distinct facets in the life 
cycle of a concept: (a) stored concepts would contain the information needed to be persis-
tently kept by the mind about a concept for its subsequent instantiation; (b) instantiated 
concepts would be the result of those cognitive process where the concept is applied (i.e., 
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categorizations, inferences, etc.) By virtue of this, stored concepts will be able to explain 
many typically invariantist phenomena; while instantiated concepts, which are produced 
in a context-dependent way, will account for those aspects commonly explained by con-
textualism. 
In respect to the circularity threat on concept empiricism, I will show that the up-
permost nativist arguments against the acquisition of primitive concepts rely on the as-
sumption that the constituents of a concept C must be available as an input of the learn-
ing process by virtue of which the concept C is acquired. Notwithstanding, I will claim 
that there is no obligation to accept such a hypothesis. My proposal will be that a model 
where the constitutive elements of a concept result from the same acquisition process 
which leads to the learning of that concept may explain the formation of concepts in a 
non-circular way. The proposed model will consist in a three-step iterative learning sys-
tem, constituted by two general-purpose abilities (i.e., dimensional reduction and pattern 
identification), and one final stage of evaluation and readjustment of the model. First, 
the dimensional reduction will produce new reduced factors –by ruling out as much 
redundant information as possible–, which might be identified with the most basic ele-
ments of our conceptual system. Secondly, the pattern recognition stage would search for 
regularities within the reduced data; such regularities could be identified with the con-
cepts of our mental system. Finally, an iterative process is necessary since nothing guaran-
tees that the obtained factors and patterns are the most predictive ones, and that is also 
the reason for the third stage of the process, where the model is evaluated and readjusted. 
Organization of the thesis 
Chapters 1, 2, and 3 are introductory chapters. Chapter 1 describes the different theories 
on the nature, origin, internal structure, and contextual dependence of concepts. There I 
examine the distinct approaches, and the relations existing between the different views. 
In this chapter I also make explicit my presumptions on these issues, and the reasons for 
them. In particular, I will opt for an empiricist-contextualist perspective, which will not 
be committed to any specific theory on the nature of concepts. 
Chapter 2 is focused on the major possible views about the structure of concepts 
since, even for those who think that concepts have internal structure, there is controversy 
concerning which type of conceptual structure is more appropriate to characterize them. 
Those main views are theories based on definitions (classical theory), on similarities (pro-
totype and exemplar theories), and on explanations (theory theory); as well as those oth-
er approaches (i.e. atomism, hybridism, pluralism, and eliminativism) which emerged in 
response to the inability of the previous theories to provide a complete and successful 
explanation of the main empirical phenomena. 
Chapter 3 deals with the similarity-based approaches to the structure of concepts. Be-
cause there is no single way of characterizing the idea of similarity, but rather a wide 
range of possible similarity models and measures, the aim of this chapter is to examine 
the four main contemporary models of similarity (i.e., geometric models, featural models, 
alignment-based models and transformational models), in order to clarify to what extent 
they can explain the observed phenomena. 
Chapter 4 is devoted to the notion of conceptual space, understood as a framework 
for the representation of concepts and knowledge. In the first part I describe what a simi-
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larity space theory of concepts is and, in particular, I focus on Gärdenfors’ conceptual 
spaces. In the second part, I discuss the role played by convexity in this latter approach, 
and there I argue that Gärdenfors’ convexity constraint –according to which conceptual 
regions should be convex– is unnecessary from a theoretical perspective, and problematic 
with regard to some particular applications of his theory. My conclusion will be that, if 
the convexity criterion is abandoned, then Gärdenfors’ theory can be reduced to a con-
textualist geometric articulation of the prototype theory. 
Chapter 5 investigates how a prototype theory articulated by means of a similarity-
based conceptual space could bring together virtues both from invariantism and from 
contextualism. In particular, I will show that Casasanto and Lupyan’s ad hoc cognition 
framework, according to which all concepts are produced ad hoc when they are instan-
tiated –and so, there are no context-independent concepts–, may be characterized by 
means of a similarity-based theory of concepts. On this basis I will show that two dif-
ferent notions of concept should be distinguished, which may be identified with two 
distinct facets in their life cycle (i.e., storage and instantiation). Lastly, I will argue for the 
thesis that, if concepts are presumed to be context-dependent –as claimed by con-
textualists–, then instantiated concepts lack minimal persistence and, in consequence, 
cannot be a representation of their associated categories. 
Chapter 6 examines how it can be explained the acquisition of the most basic con-
stituents of concepts from an empiricist point of view, without resorting to an innate 
repertoire of elements. In this chapter I prove that the best nativist arguments against 
concept empiricism depend on what I call the precedence assumption, that is, the hypo-
thesis that the constituents of concepts must be available beforehand the beginning of 
their respective learning processes. Then, I sketch out a model which is able to produce 
both concepts and their constitutive properties as result of the same execution of the 
acquisition process. This refutes nativist arguments against empiricism because, once the 









Nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu. – 
Tomás de Aquino (1256-1259, II iii 19)1 
... excipe: nisi ipse intellectus. – 







Categorizaciones, inferencias, generalizaciones, predicciones, aprendizaje, memoria, toma 
de decisiones, comunicación, resolución de problemas son –todos ellos– fenómenos cog-
nitivos en donde la noción de concepto desempeña un papel fundamental. De hecho, en 
prácticamente cualquier actividad humana que examinemos lo que encontramos son suje-
tos categorizando, generalizando, reconociendo semejanzas, realizando inferencias o to-
mando decisiones en base a tales semejanzas y categorizaciones, etc., y todas estas activi-
dades las concebimos como soportadas por aquello a lo que llamamos conceptos. 
Conforme indica Murphy (2002), puesto que raras veces nos encontramos ante una 
misma entidad –esto es, el mismo perro o el mismo árbol–, dependemos de nuestros con-
ceptos del mundo para comprender lo que sucede a nuestro alrededor. A saber, categori-
zamos bajo categorías conocidas cosas vistas por primera vez, y atribuimos propiedades 
observadas en ejemplos conocidos de una cierta categoría a aquellas nuevas entidades a las 
que clasificamos en ese grupo. Dicho de otro modo, necesitamos los conceptos para co-
nectar experiencias pasadas con nuestra experiencia actual, para así poder determinar lo 
que algo es, y qué propiedades tiene. Aún más, no solo somos capaces de formarnos con-
ceptos acerca del mundo que percibimos de modo inmediato, sino también de entidades 
espacial o temporalmente lejanas (como el planeta Venus o Julio César), abstractas (como 
justicia o los números), e incluso sin existencia (como las hadas o el éter). 
No obstante, a pesar del importante papel atribuido a la noción de concepto, no existe 
un consenso general con respecto a su naturaleza, adquisición y estructura. Así, aunque 
en la filosofía de la mente los conceptos suelen ser presentados como los constituyentes 
 
1 Adaptación de una frase de Aristóteles. 
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últimos de los pensamientos2 (Rey 1994; Solomon, Medin y Lynch 1999; Margolis y 
Laurence 2003; 2011a), hay también ocasiones en que son concebidos como principios –
o dispositivos– de categorización, esto es, como algo que permite determinar si una cierta 
entidad pertenece o no a la categoría considerada (Price 1953; Geach 1957; Prinz 2002), 
e incluso como meros cuerpos de conocimiento sobre los miembros de una determinada 
categoría (Barsalou 1993; Machery 2009). Y no menos controvertida es la cuestión rela-
tiva a cuál puede ser la estructura interna de las representaciones mentales con que –en la 
filosofía de la mente– se identifican los conceptos (Medin 1989; Komatsu 1992), y que, 
principalmente, los conciben como definiciones, prototipos, ejemplares o teorías. 
Finalmente, casi todas las propuestas toman alguna posición en cuanto a la naturaleza 
y estructura interna de los conceptos, así como con respecto a ciertos debates principales 
–como, por ejemplo, la discusión empirista-nativista sobre el origen de los conceptos, o el 
modo en que éstos dependen del contexto–. El propósito de este capítulo es presentar las 
posturas más generales que pueden adoptarse con respecto a la estructura interna3, natu-
raleza, origen y grado de dependencia contextual de los conceptos. 
1.1. Estructura interna de los conceptos 
Una de las distinciones más básicas que suelen establecerse en el ámbito de los conceptos 
es la que diferencia entre conceptos primitivos y complejos. Los conceptos primitivos, 
también llamados conceptos atómicos, serían aquellos que no tienen estructura interna, 
esto es, que no están constituidos por otros conceptos. Por contraposición, los conceptos 
complejos serían aquellos que no son primitivos4. 
Así, por ejemplo, el concepto léxico5 complejo SOLTERO estaría constituido por otros 
conceptos más simples –tales como NO-CASADO, VARÓN y ADULTO–, los cuales estarían a 
su vez constituidos por otros conceptos aún más simples, hasta llegar a un punto en que 
esos elementos constitutivos fueran conceptos primitivos. Obviamente, esto no sería 
 
2 La visión de que los conceptos son los elementos constitutivos (building blocks) de los pensamientos se 
remonta, al menos, hasta Frege (1914, p. 225), aunque Davidson (1977, p. 252) considera que las teo-
rías de los building blocks –en el caso de la semántica– están ya presentes en el empirismo británico 
(Berkeley, Hume, Mill). 
3 El capítulo 2 estará específicamente dedicado a la cuestión de cuáles son las principales teorías sobre la 
estructura de los conceptos –a saber, teoría clásica, prototipos, ejemplares, teoría-teoría, atomismo, 
hibridismo, pluralismo y eliminativismo–, y a la discusión de sus más importantes puntos fuertes y 
débiles. 
4 Ésta es justamente la diferencia entre las ideas –o conceptos– simples y complejas del empirismo britá-
nico, según el cual las ideas complejas no proceden de la experiencia, sino que son construidas a partir 
de ideas simples que sí tendrían su origen en la experiencia (Locke 1690: II ii 1-2; Hume 1741 cap. II). 
5 Los conceptos léxicos son conceptos asociados con ítems léxicos de los lenguajes naturales (Laurence y 
Margolis 1999, p. 4) –como lo son, por ejemplo, los conceptos SOLTERO, MANZANA y ROJO– o, dicho de 
otro modo, son representaciones conceptuales codificadas y externalizadas mediante el lenguaje (Evans 
2006, p. 494). Un aspecto interesante de los conceptos léxicos es que suele considerarse que las palabras 
heredan su significado de los conceptos que expresan. 
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específico de los conceptos léxicos, sino que aplicaría también a conceptos complejos no-
léxicos. 
La distinción entre conceptos primitivos y complejos se apoya directamente en la 
asunción del principio de composicionalidad, a saber, que el significado de los conceptos 
complejos es el resultado de la estructura y significado de sus conceptos constituyentes. 
La principal ventaja de asumir que los conceptos complejos son composicionales es que 
permite explicar tanto la productividad –capacidad de un sistema para producir / recono-
cer un número infinito de elementos distintos– como la sistematicidad –propiedad que 
tiene un sistema cuando produce/reconoce elementos con patrones definidos y predeci-
bles– del pensamiento6. Así, por ejemplo, la lógica de predicados es productiva porque 
permite un número infinito de fórmulas bien formadas únicas, y es sistemática porque la 
producción/reconocimiento de la fórmula eAd (Eva ama a David) implica la capacidad de 
producir/reconocer la fórmula dAe (David ama a Eva). 
Finalmente, aunque la diferencia entre conceptos primitivos y complejos habitual-
mente se presenta para el caso de sistemas representacionales, la posibilidad de distinguir 
entre ambas es independiente de cuál se asuma que es la naturaleza de los conceptos, 
siendo una distinción válida tanto si son representaciones mentales, habilidades o incluso 
entidades abstractas (Evans 1982; Zalta 2001). 
1.2. Naturaleza de los conceptos 
Una segunda cuestión clave que se plantea es la relativa al estatus ontológico de los con-
ceptos. En este caso, la respuesta dada suele depender de cuál sea el área desde el que dicha 
respuesta se proporciona. Así, en el ámbito de la psicología –incluyendo aquí la neuropsi-
cología, inteligencia artificial, filosofía de la mente y ciencia cognitiva– suele asumirse que 
los conceptos son entidades mentales particulares que representan a una cierta clase o 
categoría (Komatsu 1992; Laurence y Margolis 1999; Murphy 2002). Ahora bien, en 
filosofía el término “concepto” también es empleado de otros modos distintos, entre los 
que destaca su uso para referir, bien a la capacidad de poder tener actitudes proposiciona-
les –creencias, deseos, etc.– con respecto a una cierta categoría (Machery 2009), bien a 
aquellas entidades abstractas con que en ocasiones se identifican los constituyentes de las 
proposiciones (Margolis y Laurence 2011a). Por consiguiente, cabe distinguir tres 
aproximaciones principales con respecto a qué son los conceptos, en función de si tales 
conceptos se conciben como representaciones mentales, capacidades/habilidades o entida-
des abstractas7. 
 
6 La justificación habitualmente dada para la asunción del principio de composicionalidad en el ámbito 
de la mente es que si la productividad y sistematicidad del lenguaje se explican mediante el principio de 
composicionalidad, entonces esa misma debe ser la explicación para el caso de la productividad y siste-
maticidad del pensamiento (Fodor y Pylyshyn 1988; Fodor 1998, 2001). No obstante, esta tradicional 
justificación de la composicionalidad –en términos de su necesidad para explicar la productividad y sis-
tematicidad del lenguaje y la cognición– ha sido recientemente puesta en tela de juicio por varios auto-
res (Werning 2005; Pagin 2012). 
7 En ocasiones estos tres tipos de aproximaciones son referidas como subjetivista, cognitivista y objeti-




1.2.1 Conceptos como representaciones mentales 
Las aproximaciones subjetivistas a la noción de concepto, conforme a las cuales los con-
ceptos son entidades mentales, se apoyan directamente en la teoría representacional de la 
mente (o TRM). Según la TRM, el pensamiento tiene lugar mediante un sistema de repre-
sentación interno que, en su versión contemporánea8, dispondría de una sintaxis (como 
la de un lenguaje) y una semántica composicional9. Esta concepción es habitualmente 
conocida como la hipótesis del lenguaje del pensamiento (Fodor 1975), y tiene como prin-
cipal ventaja que, si las representaciones mentales se consideran composicionalmente 
estructuradas (esto es, con estructura interna composicional), entonces eso permite expli-
car la productividad y sistematicidad del pensamiento. Por todo ello, la visión de los con-
ceptos como representaciones mentales es generalizada en el ámbito de la psicología, 
ciencia cognitiva y filosofía de la mente (Fodor 1998; Carruthers 2000; Millikan 2000; 
Prinz 2002; Margolis y Laurence 2007). 
Así, bajo esta aproximación, el concepto SOLTERO es la representación mental –o enti-
dad mental particular– de una determinada categoría que podría estar constituida por las 
representaciones de otros conceptos más simples (en el caso de que fuera una representa-
ción estructurada). No obstante, la aceptación de que los conceptos tienen estructura 
interna no obliga a identificar dichos conceptos con particulares mentales. O, en otras 
palabras, los conceptos bien podrían ser estructurados sin ser representaciones mentales10. 
En tal caso, una explicación alternativa sería que los conceptos son habilidades estructu-
radas de tipo psicológico o conductual –esto es, habilidades complejas constituidas por 
                                                                                                                                       
menos psicológicos presentes en la mente de los sujetos (aquí estaría también incluida la visión de que 
los conceptos son aquellas entidades mentales que nos permiten tener actitudes proposicionales). Por el 
contrario, las concepciones objetivistas identifican los conceptos con entidades abstractas cuya existen-
cia sería independiente de nuestras mentes. Finalmente, las aproximaciones cognitivistas –con su iden-
tificación de los conceptos con habilidades– están a medio camino entre el subjetivismo y el objetivis-
mo pues, aún cuando aceptan que los conceptos tienen una dimensión mental, rechazan que puedan 
identificarse con particulares mentales. 
8 La visión contemporánea contrasta frente a la de los primeros defensores de la TRM (Locke 1690; 
Hume 1739), quienes consideraban que ese sistema de representación interno estaba basado en imáge-
nes mentales a las que daban el nombre de ideas (Fodor 2003; Gauker 2011). 
9 Este punto es relevante, dado que la TRM explica la intencionalidad de los estados mentales (creencias, 
pensamientos, deseos, etc.) –esto es, el que dichos estados mentales sean sobre, o refieran a, algo– en 
términos de las propiedades semánticas de sus representaciones mentales asociadas. 
10 En este sentido va la doble crítica de Dennett (1977) a la aproximación representacional, según la cual: 
(a) Pueden tenerse actitudes proposicionales sobre algo sin disponer de una representación mental su-
ya. Por ejemplo, la mayoría de las personas cree que las cebras no visten abrigos en la naturaleza, aún 
cuando nunca lo hayan considerado activamente con anterioridad. (b) Un sistema computacional 
puede “pensar” algo aún cuando no tenga una representación explícita de su contenido. Por ejemplo, 
un programa de ajedrez puede “pensar” que es bueno sacar a la reina pronto como algo emergente a su 
programación, y no en virtud de instanciar un conjunto de símbolos que expresen tal principio. 
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otras habilidades más simples11–, lo que conduce directamente a las aproximaciones cog-
nitivistas12. 
Otra fuente de críticas a la aproximación representacional es por parte de aquellos au-
tores que consideran que el conexionismo y/o la teoría de sistemas dinámicos son pro-
gramas más prometedores que los enfoques computacionales clásicos (Rumelhart y 
McClelland 1986; Churchland 1989; Smolensky 1991; Van Gelder 1995; Elman et al. 
1996; McClelland et al. 2010). 
1.2.2 Conceptos como habilidades 
Por su parte, las concepciones cognitivistas rechazan que los conceptos puedan identi-
ficarse con particulares mentales –por ejemplo, en el sentido de elementos de un lenguaje 
del pensamiento (Fodor 1975)–, aún cuando reconocen que tienen un carácter psicológi-
co, y de ahí que los identifiquen con habilidades mentales (Geach 1957; Evans 1982; 
Dummett 1993; Kenny 2010). 
Ahora bien, ¿qué habilidades mentales se requieren para que pueda decirse que al-
guien posee un determinado concepto? En este caso, las dos principales habilidades de-
mandadas son las de reconocimiento e inferencia, esto es, se acepta que alguien posee un 
cierto concepto si es capaz de reconocer ejemplares de ese concepto, y si realiza inferencias 
específicas acerca de dichos ejemplares (que le conducen a reaccionar de manera distinta 
ante ellos que ante otras entidades del mundo). Así, por ejemplo, se diría que alguien 
dispone del concepto PERRO si tiene la capacidad para discriminar entre perros y no-
perros, y además realiza inferencias específicas sobre los perros (que le hacen comportarse 
de un modo en particular cuando está ante ellos). 
La principal motivación para los defensores de esta segunda aproximación a la na-
turaleza de los conceptos es su escepticismo sobre la existencia de las representaciones 
mentales, el cual se remota al menos al segundo Wittgenstein (1953). Ésa es la crítica de 
Searle (1992, pp. 212-214) a la teoría computacional de la mente, para quien la falacia del 
homúnculo es endémica en la ciencia cognitiva. Y también la de Dummett (1993, p. 98), 
cuando critica la posibilidad de explicar la comprensión de un primer lenguaje en térmi-
nos de un segundo lenguaje, cuya comprensión (de este segundo lenguaje) demanda a su 
vez una explicación. El problema en último término es el de cómo se evita caer en un 
círculo vicioso cuando se emplea la noción de representación mental para explicar la sig-
nificancia de los conceptos, en la medida en que para explicar la significancia del nuevo 
 
11 Tal posibilidad está en línea con las tesis de Evans (1982, p. 101), para quien los pensamientos podrían 
tener estructura en virtud de ser el resultado –complejo– de ejercer varias habilidades conceptuales (y 
no por estar compuestos de varios particulares mentales). 
12 Los enfoques cognitivistas –o visión de los conceptos como habilidades– son en ocasiones criticados 
porque, en ausencia de una teoría clara con respecto a lo que es una habilidad, podría incluso ser el caso 
que tales habilidades fuesen particulares mentales (Laurence y Margolis 1999, p. 6). Ahora bien, la no-
ción de representación solo es más clara que la de habilidad en apariencia, pues la evaluación de las 
propiedades semánticas –o estructuras portadoras de información– asociadas a una cierta representa-
ción requiere de un intérprete (esto es, de un sistema que interprete dicha información o propiedades 
semánticas). El problema es que cuando dicho intérprete es incluido en la ecuación, la noción de repre-
sentación mental se aproxima peligrosamente a la noción de habilidad mental. 
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nivel introducido –representaciones mentales– se requeriría de otro nivel de representa-
ción (y así sucesivamente). Este tipo de críticas apuntan a lo que Crane (1995) llama el 
puzle de la representación, esto es, al problema de cómo es posible que algo sirva para 
representar a alguna otra cosa. 
Por su parte, el problema de la noción de habilidad –entendida en términos de discri-
minación e inferencia– es su excesiva vaguedad, e insuficiente especificación de cómo 
funcionan los procesos psicológicos subyacentes. De hecho, sin una mayor concreción de 
cómo están articuladas esas dos capacidades, la visión de los conceptos como habilidad 
podría consistir en una aproximación basada en representaciones mentales13, siendo ésta 
una de las dos líneas de crítica recibidas desde el ámbito representacionalista. La otra es 
que, si los enfoques cognitivistas rechazasen explícitamente la existencia de representa-
ciones mentales, entonces dichos enfoques tendrían problemas para explicar la producti-
vidad del pensamiento14. 
1.2.3 Conceptos como entidades abstractas 
Esta tercera aproximación a la naturaleza de los conceptos podría ser descrita como obje-
tivista, en la medida en que considera que los conceptos son aquellas entidades abstractas 
que constituyen las proposiciones (y, por lo tanto, ontológicamente objetivas15), suscep-
tibles de ser identificadas con los sentidos –o modos de presentación– postulados por 
Frege (Bealer 1982; Peacocke 1992; Zalta 2001). Los defensores de este enfoque conside-
ran –en línea con Frege (1892)– que los conceptos (sentidos o modos de presentación) 
median entre los nombres (o signos) de los objetos y sus referentes16. 
El sentido de una expresión lingüística es su contenido cognitivo y, por ello, aquello 
que permite determinar cuál es su referente, siendo la comprensión de dicho sentido lo 
que da acceso al referente. En esta concepción distintos términos pueden referir a un 
mismo objeto (haciéndolo con modos de presentación diferentes17). Así, por ejemplo, las 
 
13 Obsérvese que los enfoques cognitivistas no son simplemente incompatibles con la existencia de repre-
sentaciones mentales –o particulares mentales–, sino con la posibilidad de identificar dichos particula-
res mentales con los conceptos. 
14 Ahora bien, esta opinión puede no ser compartida desde el ámbito cognitivista, desde donde podría ar-
gumentarse que los conceptos complejos son habilidades complejas constituidas por otras habilidades 
conceptuales más simples (Evans 1982). 
15 Frente a la naturaleza más o menos subjetiva de las otras dos aproximaciones, que de una u otra forma 
aceptaban la tesis de que los conceptos “están en la mente”. Margolis y Laurence (2007) refieren a este 
enfoque como visión semántica de los conceptos. 
16 Esto, expresado en términos del triángulo semiótico (Ogden y Richards 1923), se correspondería con 
la mediación de la mente –o pensamiento– entre el lenguaje y el mundo, en el seno de la explicación de 
cómo los sujetos (mentes) son capaces de referir a los objetos del mundo (referentes) por medio del 
lenguaje (nombres o signos). 
17 En palabras de Peacocke (1992, p. 2), dos conceptos son distintos –o, en la terminología de Frege, tie-
nen modos de presentación distintos– si y solo si (a) existen dos contenidos proposicionales completos 
que difieren entre sí solamente en que uno de ellos contiene a uno de esos conceptos substituido por el 
otro (en uno o varios lugares), y (b) uno de esos contenidos proposicionales es informativo, mientras 
que el otro no lo es. 
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expresiones “dos más cinco” y “tres más cuatro” tendrían el mismo referente (número 
siete), aún cuando sus modos de presentación (sentidos) y signos son distintos. Y, análo-
gamente, las expresiones “el autor de Waverley” y “Walter Scott” tienen el mismo refe-
rente, aunque lo expresan por medio de sentidos y signos lingüísticos diferentes. En todos 
estos casos, son las diferencias en el modo de presentación las que determinan los distin-
tos contenidos cognitivos (o conceptos) expresados. 
La motivación de los defensores de esta tercera alternativa es diferente a la de los par-
tidarios de la visión cognitivista. Aún cuando ambos se distancian de la aproximación 
representacional, unos y otros lo hacen por razones diferentes. En este caso, el principal 
problema que los objetivistas ven en la noción de representación mental es su carácter 
subjetivo, lo que impediría la existencia de una comunicación exitosa (si, como es asumi-
do por ellos, la comunicación precisa de significados compartidos que la soporten, y no de 
representaciones mentales dependientes de la experiencia subjetiva de cada uno). Obvia-
mente, los enfoques cognitivistas adolecerían de ese mismo problema, debido al carácter 
subjetivo de las habilidades mentales asumidas por ellos. 
1.3. Origen de los conceptos: nativismo vs empirismo 
Otra cuestión que habitualmente se plantea con respecto a los conceptos –y, posible-
mente, una de las más antiguas en el tiempo– es la relativa a cuál es el origen de dichos 
conceptos, en el sentido de si son innatamente heredados o aprendidos a partir de la ex-
periencia. Esta cuestión conecta directamente con el problema de si los conceptos pueden 
ser adquiridos y, de ser así, cómo puede tener lugar dicha adquisición.  
1.3.1 El debate empirista-nativista 
La cuestión de dónde vienen los conceptos no solo es uno de los grandes desafíos a los que 
se enfrenta la ciencia cognitiva actual, sino que también fue uno de los temas críticos a los 
que se enfrentaron la filosofía antigua y moderna. En este caso, dos han sido las principa-
les respuestas que ha recibido la cuestión sobre el origen de los conceptos: (a) nativista, 
como tradición que se extiende desde Platón hasta los nativistas contemporáneos (tales 
como Fodor y Carey), pasando por Kant y los filósofos racionalistas modernos, conforme 
a la cual muchos conceptos son innatos; (b) empirista, como tradición que va desde Aris-
tóteles hasta el empirismo moderno y contemporáneo, y que mantiene que los conceptos 
proceden de la acumulación de experiencia sensorial, y que muy pocos, si alguno, de ellos 
son innatos18. 
 
18 No obstante, cabría argumentar –conforme hacen Margolis y Laurence (2013)– que tanto empiristas 
como nativistas aceptan la existencia de sistemas de aprendizaje innatos, razón por la cual el nativismo 
no puede ser definido como la defensa de la tesis de que muchos conceptos son innatos (en el sentido 
de ser adquiridos mediante una base psicológica innata), puesto que el empirismo también podría 
cumplir esa condición. Y, por otro lado, dado que tanto empiristas como nativistas pueden estar dis-
puestos a aceptar que (algunos) conceptos pueden ser aprendidos de la experiencia –junto con una 
cierta base de adquisición–, el empirismo no puede ser entonces definido por la tesis de que los concep-
tos proceden de la acumulación de experiencia sensorial, puesto que el nativismo también podría acep-




Aunque nativismo y empirismo fueron durante siglos las dos principales aproxi-
maciones en pugna por explicar cómo los conceptos se adquieren, a mediados del siglo 
veinte –y tras siglos de discusión– el debate entre ellas parecía haber llegado a su término, 
con el empirismo como opción vencedora. No obstante, la discusión resurgió en la se-
gunda mitad del siglo con los trabajos de Chomsky (1959; 1965), principalmente con su 
argumento de la pobreza del estímulo y su gramática generativa. Esos nuevos argumentos 
y evidencias a favor del nativismo dejaron la pelota en el tejado empirista, desde donde se 
debía una explicación al respecto. No obstante, los problemas del empirismo no termina-
ban allí, dado que poco después tuvo que hacer frente a los argumentos de Fodor a favor 
del nativismo y en contra del empirismo, y a su tesis de que los conceptos carecen de es-
tructura interna (Fodor 1975; 1981a). Todo ello dio lugar a una reacción desde el lado 
empirista, con la aparición de nuevas propuestas que intentaban dar cuenta de los pro-
blemas y críticas esgrimidos en contra de la teoría empirista clásica. Esos esfuerzos crista-
lizaron en las tres aproximaciones actualmente más populares dentro del empirismo, a 
saber: conexionismo, teoría de sistemas dinámicos y bayesianismo. En el presente trabajo no 
profundizaré en los detalles de ninguna de estas aproximaciones, sino que me centraré en 
otra perspectiva –no dominante– dentro del empirismo. Tal enfoque consistirá en una 
caracterización del marco empirista que explique la adquisición de conceptos mediante 
un proceso iterativo, constituido por la ejecución secuencial de una reducción dimensio-
nal seguida de un proceso de reconocimiento de patrones. 
1.3.2 Argumentos nativistas 
Una de las primeras razones positivas dadas a favor del nativismo en el siglo pasado proce-
día de las investigaciones relativas a la adquisición del lenguaje natural, un ámbito en el 
que Chomsky (1959; 1967; 1975; 1980) consideraba que la gramática de un lenguaje 
natural no puede adquirirse a partir de los limitados datos de que disponen los niños que 
lo aprenden19, en lo que se conoce como el argumento de la pobreza del estímulo. Su con-
clusión era que la adquisición del lenguaje está basada en un conjunto de disposiciones 
(asentadas sobre unos principios innatos a los que Chomsky llama gramática universal) 
que constriñen el modo en que el lenguaje es aprendido20. 
Sobre esta base, una sencilla reformulación del argumento permite su aplicación al ca-
so de la mente y la adquisición de conceptos. En este ámbito, la idea es que la información 
de que disponen los sujetos no es suficiente para explicar cómo se adquieren los concep-
tos solo por medio de sistemas de aprendizaje de propósito general. Aquí, la tesis nativista 
es que la diferencia entre la entrada experiencial del sujeto y la información mínima nece-
                                                                                                                                       
al carácter aprendido o innato de los conceptos, sino en torno al carácter de los mecanismos cognitivos 
que subyacen al proceso de adquisición de dichos conceptos. Bajo ese prisma, el empirismo se caracteri-
zaría por estar soportado por mecanismos de propósito general, mientras que lo característico del nati-
vismo es que estaría soportado por mecanismos específicos de dominio (Pinker 2002; Spelke y Kinzler 
2007). 
19 La mayoría de los argumentos nativistas son, en el fondo, argumentos en contra del empirismo que, por 
exclusión, contribuyen a la afirmación de posturas de tipo innatista. 
20 Líneas de argumentación semejantes pueden encontrarse en Goodman (1967) y Putnam (1967). 
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saria –para adquirir un cierto concepto o habilidad– es provista por sistemas de aprendi-
zaje innatos y específicos de dominio. 
Ahora bien, el argumento de la pobreza del estímulo ha sido objeto de dos tipos de 
crítica. Por un lado, ciertos filósofos sostienen que no existen evidencias suficientes a 
favor de un entorno tan pobre como el asumido por los nativistas (Cowie 1999). Por 
otro lado, hay autores que consideran que la potencia de los sistemas de aprendizaje de 
propósito general ha sido subestimada, y que ese tipo de sistemas en realidad sí podría 
permitir la adquisición de conceptos generales (Prinz 2002)21. Ambas críticas han sido a 
su vez cuestionadas desde el ámbito nativista (Laurence y Margolis 2001, 2015; Margolis 
y Laurence 2013), y éstas a su vez respondidas por partidarios del empirismo, en una 
dinámica que deja a este argumento en una situación de impasse. 
Un segundo argumento contrario al empirismo –y en favor del nativismo– es el argu-
mento de los animales, según el cual la existencia de un gran número de sistemas de apren-
dizaje específicos en el reino animal22 (algunos de ellos compartidos entre especies) sugie-
re que la mente humana podría estar constituida por sistemas de aprendizaje especializa-
dos e innatos (Margolis y Laurence 2013, p. 702). En este caso el problema es que existen 
otras explicaciones alternativas que también darían cuenta de cómo esas habilidades se 
adquieren, las cuales (aún si fueran desempeñadas por sistemas de propósito específico) 
podrían no ser innatas, sino el producto de otros sistemas de aprendizaje de propósito 
general23. Esta posibilidad enlaza con las críticas al argumento de la pobreza del estímulo 
anteriormente mencionadas, pues el entorno podría no ser tan pobre como se supone y, 
además, la potencia de los sistemas de aprendizaje de propósito general podría estar sien-
do subestimada. O, dicho de otro modo, las críticas en contra del argumento de la po-
breza del estímulo son también críticas en contra del argumento de los animales, media-
das por la hipótesis de que los subsistemas –específicos de dominio– responsables del 
aprendizaje hubiesen sido previamente adquiridos por medio de sistemas de propósito 
general. 
No obstante, posiblemente una de las objeciones más serias al empirismo (y, por tan-
to, razón para abrazar las tesis innatistas) son los argumentos de Fodor a favor del nativis-
mo y en contra del empirismo (Fodor 1975; 1981a). Conforme a ellos, si los conceptos se 
adquieren mediante un proceso de formación y comprobación de hipótesis –y, en opi-
nión de Fodor, ése es el único método de aprendizaje posible–, entonces los conceptos no 
 
21 No obstante, estas dos críticas podrían ser consideradas de modo conjunto, puesto que (i) un entorno 
informacional más rico podría estar disponible para sujetos cuyos sistemas de aprendizaje de propósito 
general fuesen más potentes que lo asumido por los nativistas; y (ii) si la potencia de los sistemas de ad-
quisición hubiera sido subestimada, tal vez dichos sistemas podrían hacer uso de un mayor número de 
claves informacionales presentes en el entorno. 
22 Sistemas, por ejemplo, para elaborar mapas mentales del entorno, para elegir lugares en donde buscar 
alimento –en función de la tasa de retorno esperado–, para evitar comida venenosa, para señalar la pre-
sencia de predadores, para detectar familiares o identificar las relaciones en una jerarquía social, etc. 
23 Esto está en línea con la sugerencia de Goodman (1967) de que los subsistemas especializados respon-




se pueden aprender porque sus constituyentes deberían de estar disponibles con anterio-
ridad al proceso de aprendizaje (con objeto de poder formular la hipótesis sobre ese con-
cepto que será testeada), lo que da lugar a un regreso al infinito cuando se intenta explicar 
cómo se adquieren los constituyentes más básicos de los conceptos (esto es, los llamados 
conceptos primitivos). El argumento de Fodor es, por consiguiente, que los modelos empi-
ristas caen en circularidad cuando intentan explicar cómo se adquieren los conceptos 
primitivos los cuales, en consecuencia, deberían ser innatos. 
Cuando, como hace Fodor (1981a), se considera que los restantes conceptos (com-
plejos) resultan de la clausura del conjunto de conceptos primitivos (e innatos) bajo me-
canismos combinatorios (también considerados innatos)24, entonces resulta fácil derivar 
la tesis de que todos los conceptos están innatamente determinados. Y, aunque se han 
dado múltiples respuestas a los argumentos de Fodor25, casi todas resultan inadecuadas 
por uno u otro motivo, no siendo ninguna plenamente satisfactoria (cfr. Laurence y Mar-
golis 2002). 
1.3.3 Argumentos empiristas 
En cuanto a los argumentos en defensa del empirismo26, la mayoría de ellos están presen-
tes en mayor o menor medida en la argumentación de Locke (1690) en favor de esta pos-
tura, razón por la cual la primera parte de esta sección estará dedicada a presentar una 
revisión actualizada de los argumentos lockeanos más importantes27. Aunque en Locke 
encontramos al menos cinco argumentos en favor del empirismo, los más relevantes desde 
un punto de vista contemporáneo están asociados a las dos tesis siguientes: (i) no hay ideas 
–o conceptos– universalmente aceptadas / mantenidas; y (ii) las ideas innatas son innece-
sarias. 
 No hay conceptos universalmente aceptados, por lo que ninguno de ellos es innato: es-
te argumento daría cuenta de por qué las personas que carecen de cierto tipo de 
sensaciones también carecen de los correspondientes conceptos. Esto explicaría por 
qué las personas ciegas no tienen conceptos de colores, y las personas sordas no 
tienen conceptos de sonidos (Hume 1741, II 7). Carruthers (1992, p. 49) deno-
mina a esta crítica como argumento de los niños, dado que si existiesen conceptos o 
 
24 O, en otras palabras, si se acepta que la potencia expresiva de nuestro sistema conceptual se encuentra 
determinada por sus conceptos primitivos y los principios combinatorios que los gobiernan. 
25 Para un repaso de las diferentes respuestas dadas a los planteamientos de Fodor véanse Laurence y Mar-
golis (2002) y Carey (2015). 
26 Y, por exclusión, contrarios al nativismo (de modo análogo a como ocurría en el caso de los argumen-
tos nativistas, que también eran argumentos en contra del empirismo). 
27 Indico que será una revisión actualizada porque, en algunos casos, lo que se presentará no será el argu-
mento literal de Locke, sino una revisión del mismo que –manteniendo aquella parte válida del argu-
mento– responda a las posibles críticas de que podría ser objeto el argumento original. Y lo será, no pa-
ra todos sus argumentos, sino tan solo para los argumentos más relevantes, en el sentido de que –bien en 




habilidades innatas entonces deberían estar presentes en todo el mundo, teniendo 
que estar disponibles a la conciencia desde el nacimiento. 
Una respuesta habitual a este argumento es que los conceptos innatos podrían es-
tar latentes en los niños28, en la medida en que sabemos que existe conocimiento 
que no está accesible a la conciencia pero sí presente en la memoria. Ejemplos de 
esto serían las pérdidas temporales de memorias, en las que en un cierto momento 
no se recuerda un hecho aún cuando tal conocimiento sí está en la memoria (en la 
medida en que sea recordado en un momento posterior). 
Otra respuesta es que los conceptos innatos podrían estar latentes en el sentido de 
estar determinados a aparecer de manera innata en un cierto momento de su desa-
rrollo cognitivo normal, sin importar cuál fuera su biografía, formación o expe-
riencia. Una concepción así tendría que aceptar que una cierta cantidad de expe-
riencia es necesaria para la operación normal de la mente y que, con ello, los con-
ceptos innatos aparezcan; pero sin que una experiencia concreta fuera crítica para 
adquirir un concepto dado29. 
 Los conceptos innatos son innecesarios, pues todos nuestros conceptos se pueden expli-
car como derivados a partir de la experiencia: en efecto, si el origen de todo concep-
to pudiera explicarse recurriendo únicamente a la experiencia, entonces los concep-
tos innatos serían innecesarios por motivos de parsimonia30. 
La respuesta tradicional a este segundo argumento ha sido que el antecedente ca-
rece de base, en la medida en que el empirismo nunca ha sido capaz de pro-
porcionar una explicación adecuada de cómo todos nuestros conceptos pueden ser 
derivados a partir de la experiencia31. No obstante, esta respuesta es menos conclu-
yente cuando se define el empirismo sobre la base del tipo de sistemas de aprendi-
zaje que lo soportan –esto es, sistemas de propósito general– (Margolis and Lau-
rence 2013). 
Sin embargo, posiblemente el principal problema de este argumento empirista es el 
de circularidad. En este caso, la tesis lockeana de que derivamos los conceptos sim-
ples de la experiencia por abstracción –bajo la asunción de que podemos aislar 
aquellos rasgos comunes a esos conceptos– resulta circular, pues para saber que 
unos objetos tienen un rasgo en común es preciso disponer antes del concepto de 
 
28 Esta respuesta ya está presente en la réplica de Leibniz a Locke en sus Nuevos ensayos sobre el entendi-
miento humano, según la cual los conceptos innatos podrían existir en la mente como disposiciones, ac-
titudes o pre-formaciones hacia el desarrollo y comprensión de determinados pensamientos (Leibniz 
1765, I i 11). 
29 Esto es, bastaría con que la experiencia fuera lo suficientemente rica y variada para llegar a la formación 
de ese concepto, sin requerir una correspondencia específica entre experiencias y conceptos adquiridos. 
Carruthers (1992, p. 51) llama a esto hipótesis del desencadenamiento general del conocimiento innato. 
30 Obsérvese que el antecedente de este argumento constituye la tesis principal –y definitoria– del empi-
rismo, según la cual todo concepto proviene de nuestra experiencia. 
31 Alternativamente, si el empirista demandase aceptar el antecedente como hipótesis estaría incurriendo 




ese rasgo. Es decir, si los conceptos se adquieren por formación y comprobación de 
hipótesis, entonces se requiere poseer de antemano los conceptos que aparecen en 
la hipótesis, siendo Fodor (1975; 1980a; 2008) uno de los principales defensores 
contemporáneos de esta crítica al empirismo. 
Un tercer argumento menor en favor del empirismo es que toda aproximación nativista 
deriva en nativismo radical –tal y como sostiene Fodor (1981a)32–, siendo ésta una tesis 
que muy pocos estarían dispuestos a considerar como aceptable, en la medida en que re-
sulta incompatible con la evolución (Putnam 1988, p. 15). 
1.4. Grado de dependencia contextual: invariantismo vs contextualismo 
En cuanto a los diferentes enfoques que pueden adoptarse acerca del grado de depen-
dencia contextual que cabe atribuir a los conceptos, las dos principales –y opuestas– pos-
turas son la invariantista y la contextualista. La principal diferencia entre estas dos 
aproximaciones es que, mientras que para el invariantismo los conceptos son cuerpos de 
conocimiento estables entre individuos y tiempos (Keil 1994; Fodor 1998; Mazzone y 
Lalumera 2010; Barsalou 2012; Machery 2015), el contextualismo los identifica con cons-
tructos creados de modo específico para cada ocasión (Barsalou 1987, 1992; Sperber y 
Wilson 1995; Carston 2002; Prinz 2002; Hoenig et al. 2008; Malt 2010; Kiefer y Pul-
vermüller 2012; Casasanto y Lupyan 2015; Lebois, Wilson-Mendenhall y Barsalou 2015; 
Yee y Thompson-Schill 2016)33. 
La razón por la que existen dos aproximaciones a la noción de concepto tan distintas 
como las anteriores es que cada una de ellas da cuenta de un fenómeno cognitivo clave, 
cuya explicación resulta crucial para toda teoría sobre los conceptos34. Por un lado, los 
cuerpos de conocimiento estables –asumidos por el invariantismo– permiten explicar 
cómo es posible que acumulemos nuevo conocimiento acerca de una categoría. Por otro 
lado, la dependencia del contexto de los constructos específicos-de-uso –asumidos por el 
contextualismo– permite dar cuenta de nuestra capacidad para adaptarnos ante entornos 
cambiantes. 
 
32 Para una presentación y discusión tanto de la postura Fodor, como de sus posibles críticas, véase Lau-
rence y Margolis (2002). 
33 En cierto modo puede decirse que el contextualismo sistematiza lo que en mayor o menor medida ya 
estaba presente en el principio de contexto de Frege –el cual recomendaba “nunca preguntar por el signi-
ficado de una palabra aislada, sino solo en el contexto de una proposición” (Frege 1884, p. xxii)–, y que 
más adelante recogerá Wittgenstein en su Tractatus –cuando indique que “solo en el contexto de una 
proposición tiene el nombre significado” y “una expresión solo tiene significado en una proposición” 
(Wittgenstein 1922, §3.3 y §3.314)–. 
34 No obstante, las dos posturas aquí presentadas se corresponden con los dos extremos un espectro mu-
cho más amplio en el que, por lo general, ambos –contextualistas e invariantistas– asumen: (i) que cier-
ta información almacenada sobre una categoría se activa siempre, independientemente de cuál sea el 
contexto; y (ii) que en ocasiones se precisa de información dependiente del contexto para explicar el 
comportamiento en circunstancias no habituales (Löhr 2017). Bajo este prisma, la discrepancia surge 
con respecto a si la información siempre activada mencionada en el punto (i) es suficiente, o no, como 
para explicar nuestro comportamiento en las situaciones normales. 
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1.4.1 Enfoque invariantista 
La visión tradicional –o enfoque invariantista– identifica los conceptos con cuerpos de 
conocimiento estables entre individuos y tiempos. Sobre esta base, los partidarios del 
invariantismo consideran que un concepto es aquel conocimiento (sobre una cierta cate-
goría) que nuestro sistema cognitivo siempre recupera independientemente de cuál sea el 
contexto. Esta concepción explica de manera inmediata la estabilidad del pensamiento y 
la comunicación, a nivel tanto intrapersonal como interpersonal. O, en otras palabras, 
este enfoque da cuenta con facilidad tanto de la acumulación de conocimiento por parte 
de los sujetos, como de la capacidad de éstos para comunicarse entre ellos. Las principales 
razones dadas en su favor suelen ser las siguientes: 
 Si los conceptos no fuesen estables para un mismo sujeto S, entonces no habría nada 
que proporcionase la continuidad que un concepto C necesita para acumular nue-
va información sobre él. Esto es, el sujeto S no podría acumular nuevo co-
nocimiento sobre el concepto C pues no habría modo de reconocer nuevas ins-
tancias de C en distintos momentos de tiempo. 
 Si los conceptos no fuesen estables y compartidos entre los interlocutores de una conver-
sación, entonces la mutua comprensión de los mensajes intercambiados no sería 
posible35. El motivo de ello es que, aunque el hablante significase C con su profe-
rencia del término t, podría ocurrir que el oyente interpretase t como otro concep-
to C', distinto de C. 
No obstante, el principal problema del invariantismo es el de explicar cómo es posible la 
invariancia de los conceptos, lo que en ocasiones es referido como el problema de la es-
tabilidad conceptual. Este problema presenta dos vertientes, cada una de ellas asociada a 
una de las dos razones anteriores. Por un lado estaría la cuestión de cómo el contenido de 
un concepto puede permanecer invariante entre cambios de creencias. Por el otro está el 
problema de cómo puede ser que personas con creencias diferentes posean conceptos con 
idénticos –o similares– contenidos36, 37. 
1.4.2 Enfoque contextualista 
Frente al invariantismo, otros autores sostienen que muchos conceptos dependen del 
contexto, en el sentido de que serían constructos creados al vuelo de manera específica 
 
35 Esta condición deseada para los conceptos –como requisito para la comunicación– es también referida 
como el desiderátum de publicidad (Prinz 2002). 
36 O, si se prefiere no hablar del “contenido” de un concepto, este doble problema podría parafrasearse en 
los términos siguientes: ¿Cómo un concepto puede permanecer invariante entre cambios de creencias? 
¿Cómo personas con creencias distintas pueden poseer los mismos –o similares– conceptos? 
37 Este segundo problema se encuentra íntimamente relacionado con el problema del significado compar-
tido (en el ámbito del lenguaje), y con el problema del acuerdo/desacuerdo (en el ámbito de la epistemo-
logía), relativos –respectivamente– a cómo es posible que personas con biografías, experiencias y creen-
cias distintas compartan los mismos significados y puedan llegar a acuerdos/desacuerdos. 
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para cada ocasión38. Dicho esto, no hay un único modo en que el contextualismo puede 
concebirse. Por un lado estaría la corriente dominante, según la cual la información acti-
vada / recuperada / accedida sobre un concepto siempre depende del contexto (Barsalou 
1987; Casasanto y Lupyan 2015). No obstante, en ocasiones se sostiene incluso que la 
información almacenada en los conceptos cambia constantemente con el contexto (Löhr 
2017). En todo caso, todas estas diversas posturas consideran –de uno u otro modo– que 
los conceptos están indisolublemente ligados al contexto en el que aparecen, razón por la 
cual sería imposible distinguir completa y claramente entre un concepto y su contexto. 
Los contextualistas respaldan estas afirmaciones en evidencias empíricas que mues-
tran que los conceptos dependen de nuestra experiencia –tanto de corto como de largo 
plazo–, de la situación, de los objetivos del sujeto, del paso del tiempo, etc. (Barclay et al. 
1974; Roth y Shoben 1983; Barsalou 1987, 1993; Yee y Thompson-Schill 2016)39. En 
esta misma línea, la ventaja principal de la concepción contextualista es que explica la 
adaptación de nuestro comportamiento ante contextos / entornos / circunstancias cam-
biantes (lo cual sería difícil de explicar si los conceptos fueran invariantes)40. 
En cuanto a los problemas a los que se enfrenta contextualismo, es muy posible que el 
mayor de ellos sea el hecho de que prácticamente nadie proporciona una definición de lo 
que es el contexto, ni de cómo podría estar operacionalmente articulado (Bloch-Mullins 
2015), lo que hace que el contextualismo tan siquiera esté completamente especificado. 
En este caso la dificultad estriba en que es necesaria una definición (del contexto) en la 
que cada nueva situación se corresponda con un nuevo contexto y, al tiempo, resulte lo 
bastante potente como para explicar todos los distintos fenómenos de dependencia con-
textual observados41. 
     
Finalmente, aún a pesar de los argumentos y evidencias esgrimidos por una y otra parte 
para confirmar o rechazar la posibilidad de que pueda haber cuerpos de conocimiento 
estables sobre las categorías, ninguna de ellas ha sido crucial para decidir el debate, por lo 
que a día de hoy sigue sin existir un consenso al respecto.  
 
38 Barclay et al. (1974) comprobaron que los rasgos relevantes del concepto PIANO dependen del contex-
to: en un contexto de producir música lo serán sus propiedades musicales, mientras que en uno de mo-
ver mobiliario lo será su peso. Similarmente Barsalou (1993) muestra que al considerar el concepto PE-
RIÓDICO en un contexto habitual, inflamable no es uno de sus rasgos asociados, pero sí que lo es en un 
contexto de hacer fuego. Por otro lado, estudios recientes basados en imágenes por resonancia magnéti-
ca funcional (IRMf) y potenciales relacionados con eventos (ERPs) confirmarían el carácter flexible de 
los conceptos, y su constitución por elementos modales obtenidos en función del contexto (Hoenig et 
al. 2008; Kiefer y Pullvermüller 2012). Para una revisión de la creciente evidencia empírica en favor de 
que el procesamiento de los conceptos depende del contexto véase Yee y Thompson-Schill (2016). 
39 Este tipo de evidencias son, por lo general, investigaciones realizadas mediante el estudio de tareas / 
comportamientos cognitivos de alto-nivel –tales como reconocimiento de objetos y realización de infe-
rencias–, los cuales resultan ser altamente dependientes del contexto. 
40 En ocasiones el invariantismo es puesto en correspondencia con la visión amodal de los conceptos, 
mientras que al contextualismo se lo identifica con la embodied cognition (Kiefer y Pullvermüller 2012; 
Bloch-Mullins 2015), lo que refuerza el contraste entre ambas posturas. 
41 Obviamente, la caracterización del contexto queda fuera del alcance de la presente tesis doctoral. 
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1.5. Relaciones cruzadas entre debates: ¿qué alternativas son viables? 
Ahora bien, los dos debates anteriores –a saber, nativismo frente a empirismo, e inva-
riantismo frente a contextualismo– no son independientes entre sí. De hecho, el pro-
pósito de la presente sección es revisar las relaciones existentes entre esas cuatro posturas, 
y determinar qué combinaciones son teóricamente viables42. 
Para ello, únicamente consideraré las dos posturas extremas en ambos debates, sin te-
ner en cuenta otras posiciones intermedias que podrían adoptarse43. Esto es, asumiré que 
empirismo y nativismo son aproximaciones disjuntas y que cubren al completo el domi-
nio de explicaciones posibles sobre el origen de los conceptos; y que invariantismo y con-
textualismo también son aproximaciones disjuntas y que cubren al completo el dominio 
de grados de dependencia contextual que pueden mostrar los conceptos. Estas dos asun-
ciones pueden expresarse formalmente mediante las siguientes relaciones de equivalencia: 
Empirismo    ¬ Nativismo 
Invariantismo    ¬ Contextualismo 
1.5.1 Invariantismo implica nativismo 
La primera relación que puede establecerse entre el grado de dependencia contextual de 
los conceptos –en el lugar del antecedente– y el origen de tales conceptos –en el con-
secuente–, es la relación de implicación entre invariantismo y nativismo, esto es: 
Invariantismo    Nativismo 
En este caso, el argumento en favor de la implicación anterior –al que daré el nombre de 
ARGUMENTO IiN– podría articularse en los términos siguientes: 
(1) Los conceptos son invariantes entre individuos y tiempos. (Invariantismo) 
(2) Para cada categoría, el mismo concepto es compartido por todo individuo. 
(3) Cada individuo tiene una biografía y experiencia distintas, obtenidas a partir de di-
ferentes entornos y contextos. 
(4) Aceptando (3), resulta altamente implausible que distintos individuos –expuestos 
a experiencias y ambientes diferentes– hayan aprendido el mismo e idéntico con-
cepto a partir de una pluralidad de experiencias distintas de una categoría. 
(5) La explicación más parsimoniosa es que los sujetos comparten el mismo concepto 
de una cierta categoría porque dicho concepto es idénticamente heredado por to-
dos ellos. 
(6) Por consiguiente, todos los conceptos serían innatos. (Nativismo) 
 
42 La Tabla 1.1 presenta resumidamente cuáles son esas alternativas teóricamente viables. 
43 Con respecto a esto, y aún cuando existirían argumentos tanto a favor como en contra de una asunción 
como la anterior –así, por ejemplo, Fodor (1981a) sostiene que toda postura innatista deriva en inna-
tismo radical, y Cappelen y Lepore (2005) defienden que todo contextualista moderado tendría que 
adscribir las tesis del contextualismo radical–, dejaré la discusión de tales argumentos fuera del ámbito 
del presente trabajo. 
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Por lo tanto, la conclusión es que si el concepto de una determinada categoría es inva-
riante para todo individuo, entonces también debe ser innato. 
Obsérvese que lo que ha permitido formular un argumento como el anterior ha sido 
una inferencia hacia la mejor explicación realizada en base a la experiencia de compren-
sión mutua. De hecho, la motivación que subyace al invariantismo se podría resumir de 
manera esquemática del modo siguiente: 
[1] Los sujetos son capaces de acumular conocimiento sobre una categoría. 
[2] Los sujetos son capaces de comunicarse exitosamente44. 
[3] Ni [1] ni [2] son posibles si los conceptos no fueran invariantes45. 
[4] Por inferencia hacia la mejor explicación, los conceptos son invariantes. 
No obstante, este último esquema de argumentación –puntos [1] a [4]– no pretende ser 
un argumento a favor del invariantismo, sino tan solo un esbozo que muestre una de las 
posibles motivaciones que puede guiar al invariantista cuando éste asume la tesis de que 
los conceptos son invariantes entre individuos y tiempos (esto es, la premisa (1) del ARGU-
MENTO IiN). Por ello, las posibles críticas que pudieran realizarse a este esquema de moti-
vación no supondrían un problema para el ARGUMENTO IiN, el cual funciona igualmente 
tomando simplemente como punto de partida la premisa (1) –como tesis principal asu-
mida por el invariantista–. 
1.5.2 Empirismo implica contextualismo 
Por otro lado, cuando se pone el origen de los conceptos en el lado del antecedente y el 
grado de dependencia contextual en el del consecuente, lo que encontramos es una rela-
ción de implicación entre empirismo y contextualismo, esto es: 
Empirismo    Contextualismo 
El argumento en favor de esta implicación –al que llamaré ARGUMENTO EiC– se podría 
articular como sigue: 
(1) Los conceptos son adquiridos a partir de la experiencia. (Empirismo) 
(2) Para cada categoría, su concepto será aprendido por los distintos individuos sobre 
la base de las experiencias y ambientes a que hayan estado expuestos en sus biogra-
fías. 
(3) Pero las biografías de individuos distintos son diferentes, por lo que también lo 
serán las experiencias que hayan tenido con respecto a esa categoría46. 
 
44 Claramente, el punto [2] supone un compromiso del invariantista con la intersubjetividad. No obstan-
te, éste no es un compromiso inesperado, en la medida en que si el invariantismo no explicara cómo es 
posible la comunicación, perdería entonces una de sus dos principales razones de ser. 
45 Esta premisa, no obstante, puede ser cuestionada –tal y como se hace de modo habitual desde el ámbito 
contextualista–. 
46 Con respecto a este punto (3) y el siguiente punto (4) cabría replicar que es necesario asegurar [i] que 




(4) Sobre la base de (3), resulta implausible que distintos individuos –con biografías y 
experiencias diferentes– hayan adquirido el mismo concepto de una categoría so-
bre la base de una pluralidad de experiencias –potencialmente muy distintas–47. 
(5) La explicación más parsimoniosa es que los conceptos no son invariantes entre in-
dividuos48, sino que dependen –al menos– de cuáles hayan sido la biografía y expe-
riencias de tales sujetos. 
(6) En consecuencia, todo concepto dependería del contexto. (Contextualismo) 
Aquí la conclusión es que, si el concepto de una categoría resulta de un proceso de apren-
dizaje basado en la experiencia, entonces ese concepto no es invariante para todo indivi-
duo, por lo que depende del contexto. 
En este caso el punto de partida del ARGUMENTO EiC es la tesis básica del empirismo 
–o premisa (1) del argumento–, cuya motivación podría estructurarse como inferencia 
hacia la mejor explicación, en los términos siguientes49: 
[1] Los seres humanos (como especie) han cambiado a lo largo del tiempo. 
[2] El entorno en el que los seres humanos han vivido también ha sufrido cambios. 
[3] Si las categorías en el mundo han cambiado, ¿cómo es posible que sus conceptos 
asociados fueran innatos?50 
                                                                                                                                       
rrectores (por ejemplo, el uso de un lenguaje común) que –aún para biografías distintas– permitan ali-
near las categorías consideradas. 
En relación con esta objeción, podría decirse que la lectura que Kripke (1982) hace de la paradoja witt-
gensteiniana de seguir una regla (Wittgenstein 1953: §201) constituye: [a] un argumento en contra de 
la posibilidad de que tales mecanismos correctores puedan existir (en la medida en que el lenguaje no 
permitiría dicha alineación de categorías pues, en último término, todo lenguaje es privado); y, por lo 
tanto, [b] un argumento en favor de que toda diferencia biográfica es una potencial fuente de desigual-
dad entre los conceptos adquiridos. (Obsérvese que la lectura de Kripke está en línea con las críticas de 
Fodor y Lepore (1992) a la visión conexionista, debidas a la imposibilidad de estar seguros de que los 
espacios de activación ocultos asociados a un cierto concepto son los mismos para los distintos indivi-
duos, lo cual no es un problema específico del enfoque conexionista sino un fenómeno general suscep-
tible de alcanzar a todos los enfoques –como incapacidad para explicar cómo diferentes sujetos com-
parten los mismos conceptos–.) 
47 Obsérvese que los argumentos a favor de que invariantismo implica nativismo, y de que empirismo im-
plica contextualismo, comparten una misma tesis nuclear –punto (4) de ambos argumentos–, a saber, 
que sin experiencias comunes (o, en el extremo, sin las mismas experiencias) sobre una cierta categoría, 
no es posible aprender un mismo e idéntico concepto. Y, aunque podría intentar rechazarse esta tesis, 
en ese caso la carga de la prueba caería del lado de quien lo hiciera, dado que tendría que mostrar cómo 
el mismo concepto puede adquirirse a partir de experiencias distintas y no conjuntamente equivalentes. 
48 En la medida en que este argumento puede extrapolarse a la comparación entre diferentes momentos 
de tiempo en la vida de un sujeto (en los que su biografía y experiencias sean distintas), este punto se 
puede generalizar afirmando que los conceptos no son invariantes ni entre individuos ni entre tiempos. 
49 Debo insistir en que el esquema siguiente (esto es, puntos [1] a [4]) no debe ser entendido como un ar-
gumento en favor del empirismo, sino como una explicación de uno de los motivos que conducen al 
empirista a asumir la premisa (1) del ARGUMENTO EiC –a saber, la tesis de que los conceptos son adqui-
ridos a partir de la experiencia–. 
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[4] Luego, por inferencia hacia la mejor explicación, los conceptos son aprendidos. 
Obviamente, este esquema de motivación podría ser puesto en cuestión. Por ejemplo, 
podría se replicar que aunque el mundo y las categorías presentes en él hubiesen cam-
biado –punto [2]–, es perfectamente posible que nuestros conceptos sobre tales cate-
gorías no lo hayan hecho, y sigan siendo los mismos. Esto es lo que parece que sucede en 
el caso de los peligros del mundo, que han cambiado aún cuando nuestras fobias y temores 
no lo hayan hecho. No obstante, ésta u otras críticas al esquema de argumentación [1]-
[4] no resultan algo crítico para el ARGUMENTO EiC, en la medida en que el propósito de 
este esquema es únicamente explicar cuál podría ser el origen de la motivación del empi-
rista quien, sin embargo, también podría simplemente asumir la premisa (1). 
1.5.3 Invariantismo y empirismo son difícilmente compatibles 
En las dos secciones anteriores he defendido la existencia de las dos relaciones de impli-
cación siguientes entre los extremos de los debates nativismo vs empirismo e invarian-
tismo vs contextualismo: 
Invariantismo    Nativismo 
Empirismo    Contextualismo 
No obstante, cuando se examinan en detalle los argumentos allí empleados se observa que 
ambos hacen uso en sus puntos (4) de las dos relaciones de equivalencia asumidas al co-
mienzo de esta sección 1.5. De hecho, la estructura “completa” de tales argumentos (in-
cluyendo ese paso intermedio) sería la siguiente: 
( Invariantismo    ¬ Empirismo )  ( ¬ Empirismo    Nativismo ) 
( Empirismo    ¬ Invariantismo )  ( ¬ Invariantismo    Contextualismo ) 
Ahora bien, si consideramos por separado el primer coyunto de cada una de las expre-
siones anteriores apreciamos que en realidad son equivalentes51: 
( Invariantismo    ¬ Empirismo )    ( Empirismo    ¬ Invariantismo) 
Aún más, ambas expresiones son a su vez equivalentes a una tercera, a saber: 
( Invariantismo    ¬ Empirismo )    ¬ ( Invariantismo  Empirismo ) 
Conforme a esta última expresión, invariantismo y empirismo (en sus versiones extre-
mas52) serían aproximaciones difícilmente compatibles, en la medida en que no parece 
posible adoptar de manera consistente una postura que las combine a ambas53. 
                                                                                                                                       
50 O, dicho de otro modo, ¿cómo es posible que sean innatos conceptos de categorías que solo han existi-
do en un pasado reciente? (Una cuestión que, conforme avanzamos hacia atrás en el tiempo, se extien-
de a un número creciente de categorías –potencialmente, a todas ellas–.) 
51 Ésta es la razón por la cual decía que los puntos (4) de ambos argumentos comparten la misma tesis nu-




1.5.4 Postura nativista-contextualista 
Llegados a este punto queda únicamente una última cuarta postura por examinar, a saber, 
la combinación de nativismo y contextualismo. Anteriormente (en las secciones 1.5.1 y 
1.5.2) se ha sugerido cuáles podrían ser las motivaciones empiristas e invariantistas –cada 
una de ellas por separado–. Veamos ahora cuáles serían las motivaciones del nativista y 
del contextualista, y en qué medida éstas les conducen a posiciones más o menos compa-
tibles. 
En primer lugar, puede decirse que el nativista fundamenta su postura en la incapa-
cidad mostrada por el empirismo para proporcionar una explicación no-circular de cómo 
los conceptos se adquieren. Por su parte, la motivación del contextualista podría decirse 
que surge en torno a la evidencia empírica de que nadie haya sido nunca capaz de propor-
cionar una definición de nada54 –o, alternativamente, de que nadie haya sido capaz de 
indicar en qué podría consistir “seguir una regla” (Kripke 1982)–. 
Dicho lo anterior, las motivaciones de ambas posturas –nativista y contextualista– pa-
recen compatibles, esto es, pudiera ocurrir que todos los conceptos fueran innatos y de-
pendientes del contexto. No obstante, se trata de una combinación complicada, pues 
implica asumir que toda dependencia contextual es innata (en tanto en cuanto que dicha 
dependencia contextual no es más que una parte de los conceptos, los cuales en este caso 
son concebidos como innatos). El principal problema de esto es que con ello se estaría 
asumiendo que el sistema cognitivo del sujeto anticipa de modo innato todo posible con-
texto, en la medida en que pueda anticipar el modo en que los conceptos dependerían de 
tales contextos. 
En consecuencia, aún cuando la combinación de nativismo y contextualismo es una 
posibilidad teóricamente viable, resulta una opción mucho menos natural que las com-
binaciones invariantismo-nativismo y empirismo-contextualismo antes discutidas. 
1.5.5 Recapitulación 
Sobre la base de lo indicado en los apartados anteriores, las tres combinaciones de pos-
turas compatibles en los debates nativista-empirista e invariantista-contextualista, serían 
las que se muestran en la Tabla 1.1. 
                                                                                                                                       
52 Conviene realizar esta salvedad, en la medida en que un invariantismo meramente intrasubjetivo sí po-
dría ser compatible con el empirismo, en la medida en que para dicho tipo de invariantismo no es pre-
ciso que sujetos distintos compartan el mismo concepto C. No obstante, tal compatibilidad lo sería a 
costa de una de las dos principales ventajas del invariantismo sobre el contextualismo –a saber, su capa-
cidad para explicar de manera fácil la comunicación exitosa entre dos individuos–. 
53 Es por esto que la casilla de la Tabla 1.1 (con las alternativas teóricamente viables en los debates nativis-
ta-empirista e invariantista-contextualista) correspondiente a la combinación de empirismo e invarian-
tismo se encuentre vacía. 
54 Sobre la base de esta evidencia el contextualista sostendría que eso es debido a que los conceptos de-
penden de (o cambian con) el contexto en que se aplican. Esto último –a saber, que en muchas ocasio-
nes los conceptos dependen del contexto– estaría a caballo entre ser una consecuencia de que no exis-
ten definiciones, y ser una evidencia empírica per se. 
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 Invariantismo Contextualismo 
Empirismo   
Nativismo  ? 
Tabla 1.1. Alternativas viables para la combinación de debates nativista-empirista (sobre el origen de los con-
ceptos) e invariantista-contextualista (sobre su grado de dependencia contextual). Las dos combi-
naciones “naturales” han sido marcadas con una aspa (); mientras que la tercera combinación 
compatible, aunque con mayor dificultad, ha sido marcada con un signo de interrogación (?). 
1.6. Resumen 
En este capítulo he repasado cuáles son las diferentes posturas que pueden adoptarse 
acerca de la estructura interna, naturaleza, origen y grado de dependencia contextual de 
los conceptos. El propósito de la presente sección es hacer explícitos los presupuestos que 
asumiré como punto de partida, lo que permitirá acotar el alcance de mi trabajo. En cual-
quier caso, a la hora de adoptar una u otra postura, partiré siempre del hecho de que lo 
único que observamos de los conceptos es aquello que nos permiten hacer, y eso es, en 
primera instancia categorizar (Harnad 2005), y en segundo término realizar inferencias. 
En cuanto a su estructura interna, se ha visto que la distinción entre conceptos primi-
tivos y complejos permite explicar, sobre la base del principio de composicionalidad, 
tanto la sistematicidad como la productividad del pensamiento. En este caso, asumo la 
postura mayoritaria en filosofía de la mente y ciencia cognitiva, según la cual la mayor 
parte de los conceptos son complejos, y se encuentran constituidos por otros más simples 
–en último término, por conceptos primitivos/atómicos–. 
En lo relativo a cuál podría ser su naturaleza, se han presentado las tres principales 
posturas existentes al respecto, las cuales conciben los conceptos, bien como represen-
taciones mentales, bien como habilidades, bien como entidades abstractas. En relación a 
este punto, no doy por sentado que puedan existir, ni representaciones mentales, ni habi-
lidades mentales, sino que me limitaré a subscribir aquella postura que proporcione una 
mejor explicación de los fenómenos considerados55. Finalmente, en el capítulo 5 de esta 
tesis me inclinaré hacia la conveniencia de optar por una visión de los conceptos como 
habilidades mentales, en el sentido de herramientas cognitivas empleadas por nuestra 
mente en tareas de categorización. 
Con respecto al origen y grado de dependencia contextual de los conceptos, se ha mos-
trado que las dos posturas extremas que cabe adoptar en sus respectivos debates (a saber, 
nativismo-empirismo para el caso del origen de los conceptos, e invariantismo-contextua-
lismo en cuanto a su grado de dependencia contextual) no son independientes entre sí, 
 
55 El hecho de que las dos primeras aproximaciones (conceptos como representaciones y como habilida-
des) sean compatibles con todas las distintas posturas que cabe adoptar con respecto al origen y grado 
de dependencia contextual de los conceptos, y el hecho de que incluso la tercera aproximación (con-
ceptos como entidades abstractas) pueda reinterpretarse –aunque, eso sí, renunciando a algunos de sus 
compromisos objetivistas– de un modo parcialmente compatible con la visión de los conceptos como 
habilidades mentales, es lo que no obliga a adoptar ninguna posición de antemano con respecto a ellas. 
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sino que presentan relaciones cruzadas relevantes. En primer lugar, con respecto al debate 
invariantista-contextualista, encuentro bastante implausible la idea de que pueda haber 
conceptos invariantes, por lo que en este caso la postura que asumiré será de tipo contex-
tualista, y será en su marco en el que articule mi propuesta en esta tesis. En segundo lugar, 
creo que en la dialéctica entre empirismo y nativismo existe la posibilidad de asumir el 
empirismo. Por un lado, las evidencias existentes no deciden por sí mismas el debate, por 
lo que parece prudente no asumir que existan elementos innatos salvo que se disponga de 
buenos argumentos para sostenerlo. En este sentido, el mejor argumento del innatismo es 
de tipo negativo –esto es, un argumento en contra de la posibilidad de que los conceptos 
puedan aprenderse56–, por lo que mi primer paso será evaluar (en el capítulo 6 de esta 
tesis) dicho argumento sobre la base de una asunción empirista. Si, como intentaré mos-
trar en ese capítulo, el empirista es capaz de proporcionar una respuesta satisfactoria a la 




56 O, más en particular, en contra de la posibilidad de que pueda haber una explicación no-circular de 















¿Pues de qué modo está cerrado el concepto de juego? ¿Qué es 
aún un juego y qué no lo es ya? ¿Puedes indicar el límite?. – 






En el anterior capítulo 1 indicaba que –en el ámbito de la filosofía de la mente y ciencia 
cognitiva– se suele aceptar la tesis de que los conceptos (complejos) son estructuras consti-
tuidas por otros conceptos más básicos. También suele asumirse, en virtud del principio 
de composicionalidad, que todo concepto complejo hereda su significado de sus concep-
tos constituyentes. La aproximación alternativa sería el atomismo conceptual, conforme al 
cual: (i) los conceptos carecerían de estructura interna, y (ii) su contenido estaría fijado 
por las relaciones causales que mantienen con las cosas del mundo (Fodor 1998; Margolis 
1998; Millikan 2000). En todo caso, aún dentro de la corriente para la cual los conceptos 
tienen estructura interna, existe una considerable controversia con respecto a qué 
aproximación a esa estructura interna de los conceptos resulta más adecuada para caracte-
rizarlos (Margolis y Laurence 2011a). 
Primeramente está la teoría clásica, según la cual la mayoría de los conceptos pueden 
concebirse como definiciones que codifican las condiciones necesarias y conjuntamente 
suficientes para su aplicación. No obstante, a pesar de las ventajas de la teoría clásica (a 
saber, su simplicidad y potencia explicativa a la hora de dar cuenta de fenómenos tales 
como adquisición de conceptos, categorización, inferenciación, justificación epistémica, 
entre otros), la teoría presenta importantes objeciones en su contra como, por ejemplo, su 
incapacidad para proporcionar definiciones exitosas de casi nada (Wittgenstein 1953; 
Gettier 1963; Fodor 1981a), los problemas de la noción de analiticidad (Quine 1951) o 
la existencia de fenómenos de tipicalidad (Rosch y Mervis 1975), además de otros pro-
blemas más generales –y compartidos por algunas otras teorías sobre la estructura de los 
conceptos–, como el problema de la ignorancia y el error, o los debidos a la vaguedad con-
ceptual. 
Debido a todos estos problemas han ido surgiendo teorías alternativas a la clásica, con 
el propósito de explicar cuál es la naturaleza interna de los conceptos sin caer en los pro-
blemas mencionados. Por un lado está la teoría de prototipos, que concibe a los conceptos 
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como representaciones complejas con estructura probabilística, en base a las que un cierto 
objeto cae dentro de un determinado concepto si satisface un suficiente número de pro-
piedades asociadas a dicho concepto (Wittgenstein 1953; Rosch y Mervis 1975; Rosch 
1978; Hampton 1979). En todo caso, la teoría de prototipos comparte con la teoría clási-
ca la asunción de que los objetos se clasifican bajo una cierta categoría en virtud de su 
similaridad –esto es, atributos compartidos– con alguna especificación de esa categoría, 
razón por la cual en ocasiones se las describe –juntamente con la teoría de ejemplares– 
como enfoques basados en similaridades (Medin 1989; Komatsu 1992). Ahora bien, las 
aproximaciones basadas en similaridades se enfrentan a lo que Machery (2009, p. 85) 
llama el “problema de selección” –que no es otro que la séptima objeción de Goodman 
(1972)–, consistente en que, en ausencia de unos principios que determinen qué propie-
dades cuentan como relevantes y cuál es la importancia de cada una de ellas, los modelos 
basados en similaridades resultan inútiles1. Con respecto al resto de las objeciones a la 
teoría de prototipos, algunas ya estaban presentes en la teoría clásica –como el problema 
de la ignorancia y el error–, mientras que otras son específicas suyas, tales como la exis-
tencia de fenómenos de tipicalidad inesperados (Armstrong et al. 1983), la ausencia de 
juicios de tipicalidad para ciertos conceptos (Fodor 1981a), o la dificultad que presenta la 
teoría para explicar el fenómeno de la composicionalidad (Osherson y Smith 1981). 
Una tercera aproximación dentro de los enfoques basados en similaridades es la co-
nocida como teoría de ejemplares, según la cual un concepto no es más que un conjunto de 
ejemplares o, dicho de otro modo, el cuerpo de conocimiento sobre las propiedades de los 
miembros individuales de tal concepto (Medin y Schaffer 1978). En tal caso, la determi-
nación de si algo cae, o no, bajo una cierta categoría tendrá lugar por medio del cálculo de 
su similaridad con respecto a todos los ejemplares previamente encontrados, y su poste-
rior asignación a la categoría asociada al ejemplar más próximo. En cuanto a sus proble-
mas, la teoría de ejemplares adolece del mismo problema de selección que la teoría de 
prototipos –ambas son aproximaciones basadas en similaridades–. Por otro lado, entre las 
críticas específicas de esta teoría destacan la necesidad de explicar la presencia de infor-
mación sobre las tendencias centrales de las categorías –en el caso de que los conceptos 
fuesen meros conjuntos de ejemplares– (Komatsu 1992). o la dificultad de aceptar (desde 
un punto de vista computacional) que para clasificar un objeto haya que computar su 
similaridad con todos los ejemplares previamente observados. 
Otra aproximación alternativa es la conocida como teoría-teoría, la cual caracteriza los 
conceptos en términos de las relaciones que esos conceptos mantienen entre sí (Carey 
1985, 2009; Murphy y Medin 1985; Keil 1989; Gopnik y Meltzoff 1997), de un modo 
similar a cómo los términos de una teoría científica se relacionan entre sí. De nuevo, esta 
concepción presenta problemas, algunos compartidos con otras concepciones –como el 
de la ignorancia y el error–, y otros específicos suyos como, por ejemplo, la pobre com-
prensión que tenemos de cómo ocurre la emergencia de nuevas teorías (o la transición de 
una teoría a otra). 
 
1 La cuestión de por qué los conceptos tan solo representan algunas de las numerosas propiedades pre-
sentes en los miembros de sus categorías es algo en lo que, desde el ámbito de la psicología, se ha insisti-
do de manera recurrente (Goodman 1972; Smith y Medin 1981; Medin 1989). 
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Finalmente, el hecho de que ninguna de las teorías anteriores haya sido capaz de for-
mular un modelo que proporcione una explicación a la formación y aplicación de todo 
concepto ha conducido a muchos autores a aceptar que ninguna de esas teorías por se-
parado podrá nunca proporcionar una explicación exitosa de todos estos fenómenos. Este 
“nuevo consenso” –así referido por Bloch-Mullins (2017)– con respecto al hecho de que 
las diferentes teorías anteriores (prototipos, ejemplares y teorías) no tienen por qué ser 
incompatibles entre sí, ha cristalizado en tres aproximaciones principales, a saber, plura-
lismo, hibridismo y eliminativismo. Las dos primeras sostienen que los conceptos tienen 
múltiples estructuras asociadas, bien como clases de conceptos distintas operando de 
manera específica en cada tarea cognitiva –pluralismo– (Piccinini y Scott 2006; Weis-
kopf 2009a), bien como diferentes partes de un mismo concepto que operarían de modo 
simultáneo en toda tarea cognitiva –hibridismo– (Smith et al. 1974; Osherson y Smith 
1981; Nosofsky et al. 1994; Anderson y Betz 2001). Por su parte, el eliminativismo (Ma-
chery 2009) acepta la tesis pluralista de que las categorías tienen asociadas diferentes 
clases de conceptos con pocas propiedades en común, que cumplirían distintas funciones 
cognitivas, pero –a diferencia del pluralismo– concluye de ello que la noción de concepto 
es inútil, por lo que la ciencia cognitiva debería eliminarla de su vocabulario teórico y, ya 
sin ella, dedicarse al estudio de los prototipos, ejemplares y teorías. 
En los apartados siguientes presentaré los principios, motivación y principales puntos 
fuertes asociados a cada una de estas teorías, tras lo cual repasaré las más importantes 
críticas y objeciones recibidas por cada una. 
2.2. Enfoques basados en definiciones 
El primer gran grupo de teorías sobre la estructura de los conceptos podría describirse 
como perspectiva definicional, o teorías basadas en definiciones2, que incluiría tanto a la 
teoría clásica, como a aquellas variaciones de la teoría clásica original surgidas con objeto 
de dar respuesta a algunos de sus principales problemas –y que, siguiendo a Laurence y 
Margolis (1999), aquí serán referidas como teorías neo-clásicas–. 
2.2.1 Teoría clásica 
La teoría clásica se remonta a la antigua filosofía griega, encontrándola en los diálogos 
platónicos Eutifrón, Lisis y Laques –cuando Sócrates investiga la naturaleza de conceptos 
tales como la piedad, la amistad y el valor–, y mantuvo su hegemonía en filosofía y psico-
logía3 hasta la segunda mitad del siglo XX. Y, aunque en la actualidad haya perdido buena 
parte de su dominancia histórica, la teoría clásica sigue presentando un gran interés en la 
medida en que todas las otras teorías sobre la estructura de los conceptos son –de una u 
otra forma– reacciones o extensiones a la teoría clásica. 
 
2 Los enfoques basados en definiciones a veces son también referidos como teorías basadas en reglas 
(Smith y Sloman 1994; Ashby et al. 1998). 
3 Véanse, por ejemplo, los trabajos de Hull (1920) y Bruner et al. (1956) –en psicología– y de Katz y 
Fodor (1963) –en filosofía–. 
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Para la teoría clásica la mayoría de los conceptos tienen una estructura definicional, 
razón por la cual esta aproximación también recibe el nombre de perspectiva definicional. 
La idea es que un concepto codifica las condiciones necesarias y conjuntamente suficien-
tes para su aplicación que, para el caso de los conceptos complejos, estarían determinadas 
por los conceptos más simples (o rasgos) de que tales conceptos complejos se componen. 
Bajo este enfoque, el concepto SOLTERO podría decirse compuesto de los conceptos 
VARÓN, ADULTO, y NO-CASADO, en la medida en que cualquier cosa que satisfaga esas con-
diciones sea un soltero. 
La ya mencionada hegemonía que ha mantenido históricamente la teoría clásica ha si-
do debida a su gran simplicidad y potencia explicativa con respecto a un gran número de 
cuestiones clave: 
 Adquisición de conceptos: si los conceptos complejos no fuesen más que constructos 
compuestos de otros más simples (que son las condiciones necesarias y suficientes 
para su aplicación), entonces la adquisición de un concepto se reduciría al ensam-
blaje de los rasgos que constituyen su definición. Esto conduce, en último término, 
a la posibilidad de sostener que todo concepto complejo puede definirse en base a 
un repertorio relativamente pequeño de conceptos sensoriales, tal y como ha sido 
defendido tradicionalmente desde el empirismo (Locke 1690; Carnap 1932). 
 Categorización: la categorización de algo bajo un cierto concepto se reduciría a la 
comprobación de que ese algo satisface los rasgos que definen ese concepto. Y, si 
los constituyentes últimos de los conceptos expresasen propiedades sensoriales, esa 
verificación debería resultar poco problemática. 
 Inferenciación analítica: puesto que toda inferencia analítica está basada en el sig-
nificado de sus elementos constituyentes, de atribuir un concepto C a un objeto o 
se podrá inferir la atribución –al objeto o– de todos los rasgos que constituyen la 
definición de C. 
 Justificación epistémica: un sujeto estará justificado epistémicamente para pensar 
que algo cae bajo una cierta categoría tras comprobar que los rasgos que definen 
ese concepto son satisfechos por el objeto considerado. 
 Determinación de referencias: trivialmente, los conceptos refieren a aquellas cosas 
del mundo que satisfacen sus definiciones. 
Ahora bien, aún a pesar de los puntos fuertes anteriores, existen importantes dudas con 
respecto a si la teoría clásica constituye una aproximación adecuada para caracterizar de 
manera exitosa la noción de concepto. La razón es que existen significativas críticas y 
objeciones a esta teoría, entre las que destacan las siguientes4: 
 
4 En ocasiones también se plantea en contra de la teoría clásica la crítica de que la estructura definicional 
que asume no se manifiesta en una variedad de contextos experimentales en donde sí que cabría espe-
rarla –problema de la realidad psicológica–. O, dicho de otro modo, la complejidad que manifiestan los 
conceptos en psicología experimental (en términos de carga de procesamiento) no parece depender de 
la complejidad de sus definiciones asociadas (Kintsch 1974; Fodor et al. 1980). No obstante, ésta es 
una objeción menor, en la medida en que los resultados de esos experimentos pueden explicarse sin te-
ner que recurrir al abandono de la perspectiva definicional (Laurence y Margolis 1999, p. 18). 
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(1) Contra la existencia de definiciones: la principal crítica contra la teoría definicional 
es que no tenemos una definición para casi ningún concepto –sobre todo si, con-
forme a los principios empiristas, tales definiciones deben estar fundadas en ele-
mentos perceptuales–. En ocasiones esta objeción es referida como el “problema de 
Platón” (Laurence y Margolis 1999), pues éste en sus diálogos ya puso de manifies-
to la dificultad para encontrar definiciones de casi cualquier cosa. Desde entonces, 
y aún a pesar del esfuerzo de muchos filósofos por encontrar definiciones para 
conceptos tales como CONOCIMIENTO, BONDAD, VERDAD, etc., ninguna de ellas re-
sulta convincente e incontrovertible5. Aún peor, el problema para encontrar defi-
niciones se extiende más allá de conceptos “filosóficos” como los anteriores, alcan-
zado también a los conceptos “comunes”, conforme mostraron Wittgenstein 
(1953) y Fodor (1981a) con sus discusiones relativas a la posibilidad de definir, o 
no, los conceptos JUEGO y PINTAR, respectivamente6. Y, aunque podría pensarse 
que la falta de definiciones admisibles se debe a que la tarea resulta mucho más 
difícil de lo que se había supuesto, la situación se parece más a la retratada por 
Platón en sus diálogos, en el sentido de que las definiciones propuestas nunca pa-
recen estar exentas de contraejemplos, lo que conduce a la sospecha de que nues-
tros conceptos carecen de estructura definicional. 
(2) Contra la noción de analiticidad: en este caso la cuestión es que, sin ejemplos de de-
finiciones concretas ni evidencias psicológicas que ofrecer, el principal sustento de 
la teoría clásica es su capacidad para explicar la inferenciación analítica. No obs-
tante, la crítica de Quine (1951) a la noción de analiticidad, y su conclusión de que 
la confirmación de las afirmaciones tiene lugar de manera holista7 y, por consi-
guiente, no hay condiciones de confirmación que puedan establecerse a priori, 
constituye una seria dificultad para el segundo apoyo de la teoría clásica. En este 
caso el problema es doble, puesto que acabar con la distinción analítico-sintético 
supone, no solo acabar con la noción de inferenciación analítica, sino también con 
el uso de la noción de analiticidad –en el sentido neo-positivista– en el ámbito de 
la justificación epistémica. 
(3) Existencia de fenómenos de tipicalidad: la idea de parecido de familia introducida 
por Wittgenstein (1953) en su discusión de si es posible definir o no el concepto 
JUEGO arrojaba dudas –desde una perspectiva teórica– acerca de la posibilidad de 
que los conceptos fuesen definiciones. Dos décadas después, en la década de 1970, 
dichas dudas fueron confirmadas cuando desde el ámbito de la psicología empírica 
se identificó la existencia de efectos de tipicalidad en un gran número de concep-
tos, entre los que cabe destacar los siguientes:  
 
5 Incluso, la prometedora definición de CONOCIMIENTO como CREENCIA VERDADERA y JUSTIFICADA pre-
senta significantes problemas, tal y como mostró Gettier (1963) con sus conocidos problemas. 
6 Incluso la definición de un concepto en apariencia tan claro como SOLTERO –a saber, como VARÓN, 
ADULTO, y NO-CASADO– no se encuentra libre de contraejemplos (Fillmore 1982; Lakoff 1987). 
7 En contra de la asunción neopositivista de que las relaciones analíticas son tautologías originadas en las 
convenciones del lenguaje (Carnap 1947), lo cual permitiría su conocimiento a priori mediante el me-
ro análisis lingüístico de las condiciones que verifican cada afirmación. 
Capítulo 2 
34 
 Las personas ordenan sin dificultad –y de modo consistente– un conjunto 
de objetos en términos de cuán buenos son como ejemplos de una cierta ca-
tegoría (Rosch 1973). Por ejemplo, la clasificación de tipicalidad de los 
miembros de la categoría FRUTA produce una ordenación muy concreta 
(manzana - ciruela - piña - fresa - higo - aceituna), que no depende tan si-
quiera de la familiaridad de los sujetos con los objetos considerados. 
 Las personas juzgan que un miembro de una categoría es tanto más típico o 
representativo cuantos más rasgos tiene en común con otros miembros de 
esa categoría y menos rasgos comparte con los miembros de otras catego-
rías8 (Rosch y Mervis 1975). Por ejemplo, en la categoría PÁJARO, la tipicali-
dad de gorriones, águilas y pollos es distinta y decreciente. 
 Las personas categorizan más rápido y con menos errores los objetos más 
típicos de una categoría, que aquellos otros menos típicos (Rosch 1973; 
Smith et al. 1974). 
El problema es que la teoría clásica, con su definición de concepto en términos de 
condiciones necesarias y suficientes, era incapaz de explicar la presencia de este ti-
po de fenómenos9. O, dicho de otro modo, si los conceptos fuesen definiciones en-
tonces todo objeto que cayese bajo una cierta definición debería ser un ejemplo 
igual de “bueno” que cualquier otro miembro de esa categoría, justo en contra de 
lo que sugieren los fenómenos de tipicalidad (a saber, que no todos los miembros 
de una categoría son igualmente representativos de esa categoría). 
Finalmente, la teoría clásica comparte algunas de las dificultades que encontramos tam-
bién presentes en muchas de las otras teorías sobre la estructura de los conceptos que se 
han propuesto como alternativa a la teoría clásica, y entre los que destacan el problema de 
la ignorancia y el error, así como el debido a la vaguedad conceptual. Con respecto al 
primero –problema de la ignorancia y el error–, los argumentos planteados por Putnam 
(1970) y Kripke (1980) en contra de la teoría descriptivista de la referencia socavaban –
cuando se aplicaban al caso de nombres propios y términos de género natural– la teoría 
clásica sobre la estructura de los conceptos, en la medida en que ésta no era más que des-
criptivismo aplicado a los conceptos. Por un lado, es posible tener un concepto y, al mis-
mo tiempo, estar equivocados sobre las propiedades atribuidas a sus instancias, en cuyo 
caso esas propiedades no podrían ser parte de la definición de ese concepto. En esta situa-
ción aceptamos que, aun pudiendo estar equivocados con respecto a dichas propiedades 
(y, por ello, no disponiendo de la definición correcta de ese concepto), tenemos el con-
cepto en cuestión –argumento desde el error–. Por otro lado, podemos ignorar muchas de 
las propiedades de un determinado concepto (tal y como ha ocurrido en el pasado, y se-
guramente sigue ocurriendo en el presente, para muchas categorías), y aún así estar dis-
puestos a aceptar que tenemos dicho concepto –argumento desde la ignorancia–. Estos 
 
8 Como ocurre, por ejemplo, con la categoría PÁJARO, en donde la tipicalidad de gorriones, águilas y pollos 
es distinta y decreciente. 
9 Tal incapacidad dio lugar –como reacción– a la primera formulación de la teoría de prototipos (Rosch 
y Mervis 1975; Rosch 1978). 
Teorías sobre la estructura de los conceptos 
35 
dos argumentos (desde el error y la ignorancia) constituyen razones de peso para sostener 
que podemos tener un concepto aún sin disponer de las condiciones necesarias y suficien-
tes para su aplicación –es decir, su definición–, lo que explicaría la posibilidad de realizar 
categorizaciones erróneas en base al mismo (esto es, clasificar bajo él cosas que no son 
miembros de esa categoría, y no incluir otras cosas que sí lo son). 
En cuanto al segundo –problema de la vaguedad conceptual–, la teoría clásica consi-
dera que los conceptos tienen extensiones determinadas, pues la definición de un con-
cepto conduciría a unas categorizaciones definidas. Sin embargo, muchos de nuestros 
conceptos son borrosos o inexactos (en el sentido de que contienen siempre una cierta 
cantidad de indeterminación). Considérese, por ejemplo, el caso del concepto MOBI-
LIARIO y el dilema de decidir si las alfombras pertenecen o no a él (Medin 1989); o el caso 
de los tomates y el debate de si deben clasificarse bajo la categoría FRUTA (Smith y Medin 
1981). El hecho de que la teoría clásica busque rasgos definidores no ambiguos constituye 
un problema a la hora de explicar este tipo de fenómenos10. 
2.2.2 Teorías neo-clásicas 
Muchas de las anteriores objeciones a la teoría clásica han intentado responderse desde el 
propio marco definicional, lo que ha dado lugar a propuestas que podrían calificarse co-
mo teorías neoclásicas. Por ejemplo Jackendoff (1983), sin renunciar a la existencia de 
unas condiciones necesarias, estaría dispuesto a aceptar (i) condiciones graduadas y (ii) 
condiciones estereotípicas con excepciones –que permitirían explicar tanto los fenó-
menos de tipicalidad, como las objeciones de Wittgenstein en contra de la posibilidad de 
proporcionar definiciones–. Por su parte Pinker (1989) considera que las definiciones 
podrían consistir en estructuras híbridas que combinasen elementos universales y recu-
rrentes –condiciones necesarias–, con conocimiento sobre el mundo real. Nosofsky y 
colaboradores (1994) plantean una propuesta similar, basada en la combinación de reglas 
–condiciones necesarias– y excepciones a esas reglas que operarían sobre la base de ejem-
plares específicos almacenados en la memoria; y Sloman (1996) argumenta a favor de la 
existencia de dos sistemas de razonamiento, a saber, uno basado en reglas y otro de tipo 
asociativo –este último en base a relaciones de similaridad y contigüidad temporal–. Fi-
nalmente, también cabe destacar un cierto renacimiento bayesiano de los enfoques basa-
dos en reglas, de la mano de Tenenbaum y Griffiths (2001), cuando unifican en un mis-
mo marco bayesiano (a) una caracterización del modelo de similaridad de Tversky (b) 
por medio de la teoría de conjuntos. 
Ahora bien, dejando de lado las diferencias entre cada variante en particular, puede 
decirse que la teoría neo-clásica se caracteriza por sostener que los conceptos tienen de-
finiciones parciales que codifican el conjunto de condiciones necesarias que algo deberá 
 
10 En ocasiones la teoría clásica responde a esta dificultad introduciendo en las condiciones de aplicación 
de los conceptos ese carácter borroso. Ahora bien, con ello queda abierta a la primera de las críticas re-
feridas, a saber, la no-existencia de definiciones, en la medida en que unas condiciones de aplicación 
no-definidas no constituyen una definición. 
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satisfacer para caer bajo su extensión pero que, no obstante, dichas condiciones no son 
suficientes para que ocurra la clasificación bajo ese concepto11. 
En todo caso, la motivación de quienes se adscriben a los enfoques neo-clásicos no 
suele ser tanto la de rescatar o preservar la teoría clásica, como sí la de recurrir a las de-
finiciones parciales por su capacidad para explicar ciertos fenómenos lingüísticos pre-
sentes en construcciones causativas12, polisemias, alternancias sintácticas y adquisición 
léxica (Laurence y Margolis 1999, p. 53). 
Para terminar, las teorías neo-clásicas no están libres de problemas, algunos de ellos 
compartidos con la teoría clásica (como, por ejemplo, el problema de la ignorancia y el 
error), y otros específicos de ella. En cuanto a estos últimos, posiblemente el más relevante 
sea el problema de incompletitud de las definiciones parciales, las cuales deben ser rellenadas 
con algún tipo de “completador” cuando esas definiciones parciales son aplicadas en ta-
reas de categorización, determinación de la referencia, etc. Sin embargo, al considerar 
cómo puede tener lugar la compleción de la definición parcial, ninguna de las alternativas 
está libre de problemas dado que: (i) si la compleción da lugar a la conversión de la defini-
ción parcial en una definición completa, caeríamos de nuevo en todos los problemas pro-
pios de la teoría clásica; pero, (ii) si tras su compleción la definición sigue manteniendo 
un carácter parcial, entonces no está claro cómo una definición parcial podría producir 
una categorización o fijación de la referencia concretas. O, dicho de otro modo, para 
explicar cómo tienen lugar fenómenos tales como los de categorización o determinación 
de la referencia las definiciones parciales de la teoría neo-clásica han de convertirse en 
definiciones completas, lo que supone una vuelta a la teoría clásica y, por consiguiente, a 
todos sus problemas. 
2.3. Enfoques basados en similaridades 
Frente a los enfoques basados en definiciones (o reglas), el segundo gran tipo de teorías 
sobre la estructura de los conceptos se encuentra basado en la noción de similaridad, e 
incluiría tanto a la teoría de prototipos como a la teoría de ejemplares13. Las aproximaciones 
basadas en similaridades se caracterizan por sostener que la clasificación de un objeto bajo 
una cierta categoría tiene lugar en virtud de los rasgos que ese objeto comparte con el 
 
11 Obsérvese que la mera aceptación por parte de ciertos tipos de pluralismo de la noción de definición 
como una de las múltiples estructuras de conceptos que pueden operar en los distintos dominios (Pin-
ker y Prince 1996; Ashby et al. 1998) no las convierte per se en aproximaciones neo-clásicas. 
12 Por ejemplo, Jackendoff (1989) considera que construcciones causativas tales como x persuadió a y de 
que P dan lugar a inferencias del tipo y llegó a creer que P porque uno de los conceptos presentes en la 
primera (PERSUADIR, en este caso) tiene una estructura en la que PROVOCAR UNA CREENCIA es una defi-
nición parcial suya. Dicha definición parcial constituiría una condición necesaria –que no suficiente– 
para la aplicación del concepto PERSUADIR, razón por la cual la inferencia anterior es posible. 
13 Aunque algunos autores también incluyen a la teoría clásica dentro de los enfoques basados en simila-
ridades (Medin 1989; Komatsu 1992), en este trabajo se ha optado por la práctica habitual de incluir 
en estos enfoques únicamente a las teorías de prototipos y ejemplares (Machery 2009; Bloch-Mullins 
2017). 
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concepto asociado a dicha categoría. (Cuanto mayor sea el número de atributos compar-
tidos, tanto más fácil será que el objeto sea clasificado bajo la categoría.) 
La principal motivación de los enfoques basados en similaridades es caracterizar la no-
ción de parecido de familia (Wittgenstein 1953) mediante la formulación de modelos que 
la articulen y, con ello, permitir explicar los fenómenos de tipicalidad identificados por 
Rosch y Mervis (1975), lo cual no era posible desde el ámbito de las teorías basadas en 
definiciones. 
2.3.1 Teoría de prototipos 
La teoría de prototipos fue la primera propuesta que surgió con objeto de conciliar los 
resultados empíricos que demostraban la existencia de efectos de tipicalidad, y su apa-
rición supuso el fin de la hegemonía de la teoría clásica14. No obstante, y puesto que no 
existe una sola versión de esta teoría, el propósito de la presente sección será el de pre-
sentar el principal núcleo común de sus diferentes versiones. 
La teoría de prototipos –también llamada perspectiva probabilista (Medin 1989) o vi-
sión de parecidos de familia (Komatsu 1992)–, sobre la base de la evidencia empírica que 
muestra que las categorías son borrosas o imprecisas, sostiene que éstas pueden or-
ganizarse en torno a conjuntos de atributos correlacionados. Esos rasgos –relacionados de 
manera estadística– conformarían una representación ideal (por ejemplo, por medio de 
una tendencia central15) que resume las propiedades características de ese concepto, y a la 
cual se da el nombre de prototipo. Por tanto, para la teoría de prototipos los conceptos son 
estructuras estadísticas que codifican los atributos que sus miembros acostumbran a te-
ner16. 
Dado el carácter probabilístico de la teoría será posible –e incluso habitual– que al-
gunos miembros de una categoría no presenten –o instancien– una o varias de las pro-
piedades representadas por el concepto asociado a esa categoría. Con ello, los rasgos de los 
conceptos dejan de tener el carácter necesario que tenían en la teoría clásica, y mientras 
en que aquélla la categorización de algo exigía la satisfacción de todas las condiciones 
suficientes, en el caso de la teoría de prototipos bastará con exigir la satisfacción de un 
número suficiente de esos atributos (Rosch 1978; Hampton 1979). Se trata, por lo tanto, 
de un enfoque en el que la pertenencia de los objetos a las categorías no se encuentra de-
 
14 En todo caso, y aún cuando la propuesta de concebir los conceptos por medio de prototipos –como al-
ternativa a la teoría clásica, con objeto de explicar los fenómenos de tipicalidad– nace del trabajo de 
Rosch (1975); la idea de prototipo, en el sentido de un esquema que es abstraído de un conjunto de 
ejemplos, es previa, tal y como muestran los trabajos de Attneave (1957) y, sobre todo, los de Posner y 
colaboradores (Posner y Keele 1968; Posner 1969). 
15 No obstante, la media –o tendencia central– no es el único modo en que puede caracterizarse la noción 
de prototipo. De hecho, otras alternativas serían el uso de: (a) una caricatura idealizada –o estereotipo– 
que distinga máximamente la categoría considera del resto de categorías; (b) la moda, esto es, el ejem-
plar –o combinación de ejemplares– más frecuente; o (c) los rasgos modales (es decir, rasgos más fre-
cuentes) en el conjunto de instancias consideradas (Kruschke 2005, p. 187). 
16 La idea de fondo es que las personas –en base a su propia experiencia– abstraen las tendencias centrales 
de los ejemplares observados de una cierta categoría, a partir de las cuales se formarían los prototipos 
que aglomeran toda esa información. 
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terminada –en el sentido de bien definida–, lo que ha llevado a hablar tanto de la inde-
terminación de la pertenencia a categorías (Mervis y Rosch 1981), como de una estructura 
graduada de los conceptos (Barsalou 1983; 1987), con objeto de referir tanto al fenómeno 
de que esa pertenencia no es una cuestión de todo o nada (sino graduada), como al hecho 
de que la contribución de cada atributo a esa pertenencia también es algo graduado. 
Todo ello permitía a la teoría de prototipos, no solo explicar gran parte de las evi-
dencias empíricas relativas a los efectos de tipicalidad17 sino, además, dar cuenta de mu-
chas más inferencias que las que permitía la teoría clásica pues, mientras que la teoría 
clásica únicamente permitía inferencias demostrativas, con la teoría de prototipos se abre 
la puerta a la posibilidad de inferencia fiables pero falibles. Por otro lado, relaciones de 
pertenencia graduadas también explicarían por qué las fronteras de muchos conceptos 
parecen ser borrosas (Kamp y Partee 1995), de manera que la teoría de prototipos estaría 
libre del problema de la vaguedad conceptual del que adolecían las propuestas clásicas 
basadas en definiciones. 
En cuanto a cómo ocurrirían los fenómenos de categorización, las representaciones 
ideales con que se identifican los prototipos determinarán la clasificación de un cierto 
objeto bajo una u otra categoría. Esto tendría lugar mediante un proceso de comparación 
entre ese objeto y los prototipos de los conceptos tentativos considerados, tras lo cual 
dicho objeto se clasificaría bajo la categoría a cuyo prototipo fuera más similar (Hampton 
1998, 2006). Esto supone el paso de las condiciones necesarias y suficientes de la teoría 
clásica, a una concepción holista del significado, en donde la función de clasificación –
aún siendo determinista (como también lo era en el caso de las definiciones)– no solo 
dependerá del prototipo de la propia categoría, sino también de los prototipos de cuales-
quiera otras categorías relevantes. 
No obstante, y aún a pesar de sus ya mencionadas ventajas frente a los enfoques ba-
sados en definiciones, la teoría de prototipos tampoco está libre de objeciones. Por un 
lado, comparte con las teorías clásicas el problema de la ignorancia y el error que, aunque 
puede ser respondido diciendo que si algo no encaja con el prototipo de una categoría 
entonces es que no cae bajo dicho concepto, el precio a pagar por ello es no dejar espacio a 
la posibilidad de que un concepto sea mal aplicado (Laurence y Margolis 1999, p. 34). 
Por otro lado, en cuanto a las objeciones planteadas específicamente en contra de la teoría 
de prototipos cabe destacar las siguientes:  
 Existen conceptos bien definidos que presentan efectos de tipicalidad: conforme he-
mos indicado, la teoría de prototipos concibe a los conceptos como estructuras es-
tadísticas que explicarían los efectos de tipicalidad que se han identificado em-
píricamente en muchos conceptos. Por ello, se esperarían fenómenos de tipicali-
dad en toda aquella categoría cuyo concepto estuviera codificado en términos de 
relaciones probabilísticas, pero no en las categorías cuyos conceptos estuviesen 
 
17 Como, por ejemplo, los siguientes: (a) existencia de juicios graduales sobre la tipicalidad de los miem-
bros de una cierta categoría; (b) correlación entre la tipicalidad atribuida a un ejemplar, y la frecuencia 
de los rasgos presentes en él –y asociados a esa categoría–; (c) distintos tiempos de respuesta en tareas 
de categorización en función de la frecuencia de los rasgos presentes en los ejemplares considerados; (d) 
correlación inversa entre errores de clasificación y tipicalidad del objeto clasificado. 
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bien definidos. El problema es que eso no es así, pues tales efectos de tipicalidad 
también han sido identificados en conceptos con buenas definiciones (Bourne 
1982; Armstrong et al. 1983) como, por ejemplo, ABUELA o NÚMERO-PAR18. Esto 
constituye un serio punto débil en la principal evidencia a favor de la teoría de 
prototipos, pues abre la puerta a la posibilidad de que los fenómenos de tipicalidad 
se deban a cómo los sistemas de categorización operan, y no a la estructura de los 
conceptos (Osherson y Smith 1981). 
 Existen conceptos que no tienen asociados juicios de tipicalidad: esta objeción es la 
inversa de la anterior, pues supone no encontrar fenómenos de tipicalidad allí en 
donde sí son esperados. El problema tiene su origen en el hecho de que muchos 
conceptos no tienen asociados juicios de tipicalidad, pues las personas no son ca-
paces de determinar cuáles son sus tendencias centrales. Por ejemplo, aún cuando 
puede haber un prototipo de  CIUDAD –como Roma o Londres– e incluso de CIU-
DAD-AMERICANA –como Nueva York o Los Ángeles–, en cambio seguramente no 
exista un prototipo de CIUDAD-AMERICANA-EN-LA-COSTA-ESTE-AL-SUR-DE-
TENNESSEE19 (Fodor 1981a). Además, también parece posible tener un concepto 
aún cuando no se conozca ningún rasgo suyo estadísticamente significativo. 
 Existen efectos de tipicalidad en conceptos derivados de objetivos asociados, no con el 
prototipo de tales categorías, sino con ideales que maximizan el logro de esos objetivos: 
en este caso el problema es debido a la identificación de efectos de tipicalidad en las 
categorías derivadas de objetivos (propuestas por Barsalou (1983) para explicar 
cómo las personas construyen categorías instrumentales, por ejemplo  COSAS-PARA-
VENDER-EN-UN-GARAJE) para el logro de ciertos objetivos. En principio, si tales 
conceptos tuvieran un prototipo20, la tipicalidad de sus miembros debería deter-
minarse con respecto a dicho prototipo. Sin embargo, los estudios de Barsalou 
(1983; 1985; 1987) mostraban que las categorías derivadas de objetivos presenta-
ban efectos de tipicalidad basados en similaridades relativas, no a una tendencia 
central o prototipo, sino al ideal que mejor permite alcanzar esos objetivos. Así, 
por ejemplo, para el caso del concepto COSAS-QUE-COMER-EN-UNA-DIETA la proxi-
midad (esto es, similaridad) entre los ejemplos considerados y el ideal de cero ca-
lorías era lo que determinaba las puntuaciones de tipicalidad. 
 Dificultad para explicar la composicionalidad de los conceptos: una de las principales 
objeciones en contra de la teoría de prototipos es su aparente incapacidad para ex-
 
18 En este último caso, aún cuando los sujetos objeto de estudio respondían negativamente a la cuestión 
de si la categoría NÚMERO-PAR tenía grados, en cambio sí tendían a ordenar sus miembros diciendo que 
algunos eran mejores ejemplos de la categoría que otros (por ejemplo, que el número 8 era un mejor 
número par que el número 34), e identificaban –como números pares– con mayor rapidez a aquéllos a 
los que habían atribuido una mayor tipicalidad. 
19 Entre los conceptos que carecen de prototipo se encontrarían todos los conceptos sin instancias (como, 
por ejemplo, FILÓSOFOS-DEL-SIGLO-XXII), y también los conceptos con extensiones demasiado heterogé-
neas (como LIBRO-O-PUERTA o NO-MESA). 
20 Y no cayeran en el problema descrito en el punto anterior (esto es, en el problema de no disponer un 
prototipo por tratarse de conceptos con extensiones demasiado heterogéneas). 
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plicar cómo se pueden componer conceptos, razón por la cual suele llamárselo pro-
blema de composicionalidad de los prototipos. Según indicábamos en el capítulo 
anterior, el principio de composicionalidad resultaba clave para explicar tanto la 
productividad como la sistematicidad del pensamiento. Las primeras propuestas 
sugerían que las extensiones graduadas podían caracterizarse mediante conjuntos 
borrosos (Rosch y Mervis 1975; Oden 1977), pero pronto surgieron casos que 
mostraban que los conceptos así compuestos no siempre equivalían a lo que cabría 
esperar (Osherson y Smith 1981). Por ejemplo, el concepto conjuntivo MANZANA-
RAYADA no equivale a la intersección de las extensiones de sus dos conceptos aso-
ciados21. Otra crítica relacionada es la de que no siempre el prototipo de un con-
cepto complejo es una función de los prototipos de sus conceptos constituyentes. 
Ése es el caso del concepto PET FISH (en inglés), cuyos rasgos –los de los peces dora-
dos– no resultan de la combinación de los rasgos de PET y FISH, en la medida en 
que el prototipo de PET FISH tiene poco que ver con los prototipos de sus partes 
constituyentes (Fodor 1998, pp. 102-108). Y, a pesar de que se han propuesto 
múltiples respuestas que intentan compatibilizar el principio de composicionali-
dad con la teoría de prototipos (Smith y Osherson 1984; Hampton 1987, 1991, 
1997a; Smith et al. 1988; Kamp y Partee 1995; Costello y Keane 2000), eso no ha 
servido para cerrar un debate que a día de hoy continúa aún abierto entre aquellos 
que esgrimen evidencias y argumentos en contra que de que los prototipos puedan 
componer (Fodor y Lepore 1996; Connolly et al. 2007; Gleitman et al. 2012; Ma-
chery y Lederer 2012), y quienes sostienen que ambos –prototipos y composi-
cionalidad– sí son compatibles o que, en caso de no serlo completamente eso no 
supone una limitación explicativa para la teoría (Prinz 2002, 2012; Jönsson y 
Hampton 2007; Schurz 2012; Del Pinal 2016). 
 Dificultad para explicar cómo se determinan las propiedades relevantes: ésta es, junto 
con el problema de composicionalidad, uno de los dos problemas más graves a los 
que se enfrenta la teoría de prototipos. La cuestión hunde sus raíces en la noción 
de similaridad, y el hecho de que ésta se evalúe con respecto a un conjunto concre-
to de propiedades. El problema es que, en ausencia de un conjunto de principios 
que determinen cuáles son las propiedades relevantes –así como, cuál es su im-
portancia relativa–, no puede determinarse la similaridad entre ningún par de en-
tidades, y los modelos basados en similaridades resultan inútiles22. De hecho, con-
forme indica Medin (1989, p. 1474), buena parte del trabajo explicativo en la teo-
ría es desempeñado, no tanto por la noción de similaridad, como sí por los princi-
 
21 En este caso, lo que predice la teoría es que la extensión borrosa del concepto MANZANA-RAYADA satisfa-
ce la regla del mínimo (Zadeh 1965), consistente en que los objetos que pertenezcan a esa extensión 
han de cumplir en un cierto mínimo grado el ser tanto una cosa –MANZANA– como la otra –RAYADA–. 
El problema es que un muy buen ejemplo de MANZANA-RAYADA será un mal ejemplo de MANZANA, lo 
que viola la regla del mínimo antes mencionada. 
22 Por lo tanto, ésta es una dificultad no solo de la teoría de prototipos, sino de todo enfoque basado en 
similaridades y, en consecuencia, también de la teoría de ejemplares. 
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pios que guían la selección de propiedades23. Sin esos principios las aproximaciones 
basadas en similaridades se enfrentan a lo que algunos llaman (Machery 2009) –y 
yo referiré en este trabajo como– el problema de selección24. Los enfoques basados 
en similaridades acostumbran a responder a esta cuestión indicando que las pro-
piedades relevantes pueden inferirse del contexto (Torgerson 1965) –entendido 
como el conjunto de objetos considerados–, sobre la base de su mayor validez 
(Rosch et al. 1976; Rosch 1978) o diagnosticidad (Tversky 1977; Tversky y Gati 
1978; Goldstone et al. 1997). 
Con respecto a estos dos criterios, la validez –o cue validity– de una propiedad p, 
como indicador de una cierta categoría C, no es más que la probabilidad con-
dicionada ( | )P C p  –es decir, la probabilidad de que un objeto o pertenezca a la ca-
tegoría C sabiendo que o tiene la propiedad p–. Dada la forma de la probabilidad 
condicional, a saber, P (x | y) = P (x ∩ y)/P (y), la validez de una cierta propiedad p 
aumenta conforme lo hace la frecuencia con la que la propiedad p aparece junta-
mente con la categoría C –esto es, P (C ∩ p)–, y disminuye conforme aumenta la 
frecuencia con la que la propiedad p aparece asociada con otras categorías distintas 
de C –pues eso aumenta P (p) sin que se incremente P (C ∩ p)–. O, dicho de otro 
modo, una propiedad p será tanto más válida como indicadora de la categoría C 
cuanto más esté presente en los miembros de C, y cuanto más específica –o dife-
rencial– sea de dichos miembros (esto último equivale a decir que cuanto menos 
esté presente esa propiedad en no-miembros de C)25. 
 
23 Por ello, si el criterio para determinar cuáles son las propiedades relevantes es que tales propiedades in-
tervengan como entradas de sus procesos de categorización asociados (Smith y Medin 1981, p. 16), en-
tonces la explicación de dichos procesos de categorización en términos de meras similaridades resulta 
circular. 
24 El problema de selección continúa el camino marcado por la séptima objeción de Goodman a la noción 
de similaridad (a saber, que "[l]a similaridad no puede se puede equiparar con, o medir en términos de, 
la posesión de unas propiedades en común" (Goodman 1972, p. 443)). Recordemos que Goodman ba-
saba su argumento en los tres modos en que puede responderse a la cuestión "¿cuándo son dos cosas 
similares?": (i) cuando tienen al menos una propiedad en común, en cuyo caso cualquier cosa sería si-
milar a cualquier otra, pues todas tienen algo en común; (ii) solo cuando tienen todas sus propiedades 
en común, en cuyo caso nada sería similar a nada, pues ningún par de cosas tienen todas sus propieda-
des en común; y (iii) cuando tienen propiedades importantes en común, lo que conduce directamente 
a la cuestión de cuáles son tales propiedades importantes y, por consiguiente, al problema de selección. 
25 Sobre esta base puede definirse la validez de una categoría al completo como la suma de las valideces de 
todas y cada una de las propiedades atribuidas a dicha categoría. Dado que la validez de una categoría 
no es una probabilidad, podrá tomar valores superiores a 1. En todo caso, una categoría con un valor al-
to de validez se distinguirá más que categorías que tengan un valor de validez menor. Esto es lo que lle-
va a Rosch a sostener que, si las categorías básicas (como MESA o MANZANA) son las más inclusivas –en el 
sentido de que sus propiedades están presentes en la mayoría de sus miembros–, entonces son también 
las que presentan una mayor validez, frente a las categorías superordinadas (como MOBILIARIO o FRUTA) 
cuyos miembros comparten menos propiedades, y también frente a las categorías subordinadas (como 
MESA-DE-COCINA o MANZANA-REINETA) muchas de cuyas propiedades se solapan con las de otras cate-
gorías (Rosch et al. 1976, p. 384). 
Capítulo 2 
42 
Por su parte, Tversky (1977, p. 342) define la diagnosticidad de una propiedad26 
como su importancia a efectos de clasificación –o significancia clasificatoria–, de-
terminada ésta como la prevalencia de las clasificaciones realizadas a partir de esa 
propiedad. De este modo, si una propiedad estuviera presente en todos los objetos 
considerados, entonces dicha propiedad carecería de diagnosticidad, en la medida 
en que no aporta nada a la hora de clasificar tales objetos en categorías. Por ejem-
plo, la propiedad real tendría diagnosticidad cero en el contexto de las personas 
existentes, pues está presente en todos sus miembros; sin embargo, sí tendría un 
valor de diagnosticidad si el universo considerado se extendiera a las personas de 
ficción. 
Volviendo a la cuestión del problema de selección, éste presenta otra dificultad de-
rivada, asociada con la cuestión de si las creencias que mantienen distintos sujetos 
acerca de una misma realidad suponen diferentes conceptos de dicha realidad por 
el mero hecho de distinguirse en algunos de sus elementos (aún cuando la mayor 
parte de tales perspectivas sea compartida). Por ejemplo, si las creencias que dos 
sujetos tienen acerca de la categoría HOMBRE difieren en la atribución, o no, de al-
ma inmaterial a sus miembros, ¿tienen ambos sujetos el mismo concepto HOMBRE? 
Esta cuestión ha sido tradicionalmente referida como el problema de la estabilidad 
de los conceptos (Rey 1983; Smith et al. 1984), y deriva del problema de selección 
porque, en la medida en que no existen unos principios para determinar cuáles son 
las propiedades relevantes de los conceptos, siempre podrá haber diferencias entre 
las creencias que distintos sujetos mantienen acerca de una misma categoría. Fi-
nalmente, otra cuestión derivada es la de si los conceptos permanecen estables a 
través de los cambios que una persona experimenta en sus creencias a lo largo de la 
vida, y su relación con el debate entre invariantismo y contextualismo presentado 
en el capítulo 1. 
 Otras críticas también realizadas a la teoría de prototipos han sido su dificultad 
para explicar que, en ocasiones, la variabilidad de los miembros de una determi-
nada categoría es importante –tal y como mostró Rips (1989) en tareas de cate-
gorización para los conceptos PIZZA y CUARTO-DE-DÓLAR–; y el hecho de que los 
prototipos suponen una pérdida de información acerca de ejemplos específicos de 
las categorías27. 
 
26 Tversky presenta la noción de diagnosticidad en el seno de su discusión acerca de qué determina la 
prominencia de una cierta propiedad, cuando la concibe en términos de dos componentes, a saber, in-
tensidad y diagnosticidad. (La intensidad estaría asociada a aquellos factores que incrementan la relación 
señal/ruido, como por ejemplo el volumen de un tono o el tamaño de una letra.) 
27 No obstante, conforme se indica en la nota al pie 33 de este capítulo, tal pérdida sería subsanable si el 
sistema cognitivo también almacenase –además de la localización del prototipo– información sobre los 
principales ejemplares observados de cada categoría, los cuales serían empleados, no en tareas de infe-
rencia o categorización, sino únicamente por ciertos procesos de ajuste conceptual. 
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2.3.2 Teoría de ejemplares 
Poco tiempo después de la aparición de la teoría de prototipos surge un segundo enfoque 
basado en similaridades, conocida como teoría de ejemplares (Brooks 1978; Medin y 
Schaffer 1978). Frente a su teoría “hermana” –la de prototipos–, la teoría de ejemplares 
rechaza que exista una única representación que resuma toda la información sobre una 
cierta categoría y, en vez de ello, sostiene que las categorías se encuentran representadas 
por medio de ejemplos. Bajo esta aproximación, los conceptos serían conjuntos de ejem-
plares o, en otros términos, cuerpos de conocimiento sobre las propiedades de los miem-
bros individuales de cada categoría. Así, mientras que la teoría clásica representaría el 
concepto PÁJARO mediante una definición como «animal con pico que vuela y pone hue-
vos», y la teoría de prototipos lo representaría como algo similar a un gorrión, la teoría de 
ejemplares lo haría por medio de un conjunto de ejemplos de esa categoría, tales como { 
gorrión, jilguero, águila, gallina, avestruz, etc. }. 
En este caso la clasificación de algo bajo una categoría se determinaría calculando su 
similaridad con respecto a la información almacenada sobre los ejemplos individuales 
previamente encontrados de cada categoría relevante, y asignándolo a aquella cuya si-
milaridad total sea mayor28. De este modo, en la teoría de ejemplares algo sería clasificado 
como PERRO no por su semejanza a la tendencia central de todos los perros previamente 
observados –representada bajo la forma de un prototipo–, sino por la suma total de sus 
semejanzas con todos los perros encontrados. Así, por ejemplo, el modelo de contexto 
generalizado de Nosofsky (1988a; 2011) define la probabilidad de que un estímulo (o 











n s a i
P a







En donde ( , )s i j  representa la similaridad entre los estímulos i y j; la expresión CI re-
presenta al conjunto de ejemplares pertenecientes a la categoría I, siendo K el conjunto de 
todas las categorías; y ni expresa la frecuencia relativa del ejemplar i.  
Ahora bien, no está absolutamente claro en qué debería consistir la representación de 
un ejemplar (Hampton 1997b), siendo posibles dos aproximaciones claramente dife-
renciadas, a saber, multi-prototipo y de instancias (Komatsu 1992). En el primer caso –o 
aproximación multi-prototipo– los ejemplares serían representaciones que abstraen los 
 
28 Estas dos asunciones (a saber, que la única información almacenada en la memoria son las tendencias 
centrales asociadas a cada categoría –en el caso de la teoría de prototipos–, y que nuestra memoria re-
cuerda a todos los miembros de cada categoría encontrados en el pasado–para el caso de la teoría de 
ejemplares–) constituyen dos requisitos muy distintos, tanto en términos de espacio de almacenamien-
to en la memoria, como de capacidad de procesamiento necesaria para computar las similaridades en 
tareas de categorización, inferencia, etc. 
29 Obviamente, esta fórmula presenta el problema de que para su evaluación hay que determinar la simi-
laridad entre el estímulo a considerado, y todos los ejemplares de todas las categorías almacenadas por 
la mente del sujeto. 
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atributos (bajo la forma de tendencias centrales) de distintos grupos de instancias parti-
culares de una categoría, de modo similar a lo que ocurría en el caso de los prototipos30. 
En este caso, el concepto PERRO consistiría en un conjunto de representaciones individua-
les asociadas a los prototipos de galgos, pastores, mastines, sabuesos, caniches, terriers, etc. 
En el segundo caso –o aproximación de instancias– los ejemplares no abstraerían infor-
mación sobre los miembros individuales de una categoría, sino que se corresponderían 
directamente con las instancias individuales. Bajo esta aproximación, el concepto PERRO 
consistiría en el conjunto de representaciones de todos los perros concretos encontrados 
por el sujeto (por ejemplo, su propio perro, el perro de su vecino, el perro de su hermano, 
etc.). De estos dos enfoques ha sido el segundo el que tradicionalmente ha recibido más 
atención, y con el que habitualmente se identifica la teoría de ejemplares, razón por la 
cual ésa será la aproximación a la que por defecto me estaré refiriendo en este trabajo. 
Finalmente, aún dentro de la aproximación de instancias caben diferentes asunciones con 
respecto a cuáles y cuántos ejemplares de cada categoría se almacenan, a saber: todos ellos, 
la mayoría de ellos, los más frecuentes, o los más típicos31. 
Entre las ventajas de la teoría de ejemplares destaca el que, siendo una aproximación 
basada en similaridades –como lo era la teoría de prototipos–, permite dar cuenta de 
fenómenos no explicados por ésta, como el que los sujetos categorizan más rápidamente 
objetos similares a otros anteriormente encontrados que objetos nuevos32 (Medin y 
Schaffer 1978). Además, la teoría de ejemplares resulta consistente con el hecho de que la 
precisión en tareas de clasificación mejore cuando aumenta el tamaño de las categorías 
(Homa et al. 1981; Hintzman 1986). En último lugar, la teoría de ejemplares, al igual que 
la teoría de prototipos, también puede explicar los fenómenos de tipicalidad identificados 
en muchos conceptos. Sin embargo, en este caso existe una importante diferencia entre 
ambas pues, mientras que la teoría de prototipos consideraba que la abstracción identifi-
cadora de tendencias centrales tiene lugar en el momento de la formación del concepto 
(prototipo, en este caso), en cambio para la teoría de ejemplares esa abstracción entre 
instancias ocurriría, no en el momento de la adquisición del concepto, sino cuando ese 
concepto es empleado por procesos cognitivos que realicen juicios de tipicalidad o hagan 
uso de ellos33. 
 
30 En esta misma línea, varios han sido los autores que han sugerido que prototipos y ejemplares pueden 
colapsar en un modelo único, en el cual los prototipos fuesen empleados de manera general en tareas de 
categorización, salvo en situaciones con pocos ejemplares (Knapp y Anderson 1984) o con casos atípi-
cos (Love et al. 2004), en los que la categorización tendría lugar sobre la base de ejemplares. 
31 Todo esto contribuyó a que, además del modelo de contexto inicialmente propuesto por Medin y Schaf-
fer (1978), pronto surgieran muchas otras propuestas con modelos alternativos que podrían articular la 
teoría de ejemplares (Brooks 1978; Hintzman y Ludlam 1980; Nosofsky 1984, 1986, 1992a; Estes 
1986a, b; Hintzman 1986; Medin 1986; Kruschke 1992; Nosofsky y Palmeri 1997; Lamberts 1998, 
2000; Nosofsky y Zaki 2002). 
32 El menor tiempo de procesamiento de objetos previamente vistos –frente a objetos nuevos– podría ex-
plicarse asumiendo que los sujetos recuerdan categorizaciones pasadas de objetos concretos, para los 
cuales no precisan rehacer el proceso de clasificación para cada nueva ocasión. 
33 Esta diferencia es significativa, pues convierte a la teoría de ejemplares en mucho menos eficiente desde 
un punto de vista computacional –tanto en términos de almacenamiento, como de procesamiento de 
la información almacenada– que la teoría de prototipos. En cuanto al almacenamiento, ambas teorías 
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En cuanto a sus problemas, la teoría de ejemplares adolece del mismo problema de se-
lección que la teoría de prototipos (Machery 2009; Bloch-Mullins 2017), puesto que 
ambas son aproximaciones basadas en similaridades y ninguna es capaz de explicar cómo 
se determinan las propiedades relevantes de las categorías. Además, otra dificultad que 
comparten ambas teorías es el problema de composicionalidad, no estando tampoco en este 
caso claro cómo la teoría de ejemplares podría dar cuenta de nuestra capacidad para clasi-
ficar nuevas combinaciones de conceptos (Hampton 1997b). 
Por otro lado, la teoría de ejemplares ha sido criticada porque su mayor informati-
vidad (frente a la teoría de prototipos) se logra a costa de la introducción de un signifi-
cativo problema de economía y coherencia en la teoría. Con respecto al primero –pro-
blema de economía–, si toda instancia encontrada se almacenase dentro de su respectivo 
concepto, entonces no habría ningún tipo de economía cognitiva, tanto en términos de 
almacenamiento como de procesamiento34 de esa información almacenada. La alternativa 
es considerar que no todo ejemplar sea almacenado, pero eso requiere que determinadas 
instancias, bien no se registren, bien se olviden con el paso del tiempo, con el problema de 
que la teoría no proporciona un modelo sistemático de cómo esto podría ocurrir (Ko-
matsu 1992). En cuanto al segundo –o problema de coherencia–, la teoría no explica cómo 
se forman las categorías, y no aclara tampoco por qué personas con experiencias cotidia-
nas diferentes no acaban teniendo sistemas conceptuales significativamente distintos 
(Medin 1989; Hampton 1997b). 
                                                                                                                                       
realizan asunciones muy distintas con respecto a los requisitos de memoria. Por un lado, la teoría de 
ejemplares considera que nos formamos recuerdos de todos los miembros de una cierta categoría, para 
emplearlos después en tareas de categorización, inferencia, etc. Por el otro, la teoría de prototipos sos-
tiene que la memoria de largo plazo almacena solamente el prototipo asociado a cada categoría, para su 
posterior uso en dichos procesos cognitivos. Con respecto al procesamiento, la teoría de ejemplares re-
quiere que se compute la similaridad entre cada uno de los miembros del conjunto de ejemplares recu-
perados de la memoria y el objeto evaluado (es decir, requiere de un cálculo de similaridad por cada 
ejemplar recuperado); mientras que en el caso de la teoría de prototipos basta con el cálculo de una 
única similaridad, a saber, entre el prototipo de la categoría y el objeto evaluado. 
No obstante, constituye un error pensar que un modelo de prototipos almacena sobre cada categoría –
en la memoria de largo plazo– únicamente la localización del prototipo asociado a esa categoría. La 
razón es que si solo el prototipo fuera registrado en memoria, entonces muchos procesos de modifica-
ción de la estructura conceptual de un sujeto no podrían llevarse a cabo. Obviamente, el reajuste de la 
localización del prototipo como resultado de la exposición a una nueva instancia de esa categoría siem-
pre sería posible (si el sistema cognitivo hubiera almacenado el número de ejemplos previos de esa cate-
goría a los que ha estado expuesto el sujeto). Sin embargo, transformaciones más generales del sistema 
conceptual asociadas, por ejemplo, al cambio de ejemplares de una a otra categoría, o a la producción 
de conceptos nuevos –o más específicos que los anteriores–, no serían posibles sin las localizaciones de 
los principales ejemplos de cada categoría que fueron empleados en el pasado por el sujeto para formar-
se sus prototipos asociados. Tales ejemplares no serían recuperados a efectos de categorización (por lo 
que en términos de procesamiento la teoría de prototipos seguiría siendo más eficiente que la de ejem-
plares), pero sí en algunos procesos de reajuste conceptual. 
34 En este caso, la teoría de ejemplares tendría que explicar cómo es posible que, siendo los conceptos me-
ros conjuntos de instancias, los sujetos utilicen de manera habitual información sobre las tendencias 
centrales de las categorías. 
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Otra limitación de la teoría de ejemplares es su reducida capacidad –salvo excepciones 
muy concretas como, por ejemplo, el modelo de Kruschke (1992)– para atribuir pesos 
diferenciados a las distintas propiedades de los conceptos (Hampton y Passanisi 2016), lo 
que constituye una dificultad a la hora de explicar por qué las personas acostumbran a 
ponderar diferentemente sus distintas propiedades (a la luz de las diferentes importancias 
que las atribuyen). 
Finalmente, también se ha argumentado que, en la medida en que los ejemplares no 
dan cuenta de un amplio número de fenómenos en psicología de los conceptos (tales 
como su estructura jerárquica, la inducción o la representación y almacenamiento del 
conocimiento), no existiría –en realidad– una teoría de los conceptos como ejemplares, 
sino que lo único que hay es una teoría de categorizaciones basada en ejemplares (Murp-
hy 2016). 
2.4. Enfoques basados en explicaciones 
De modo análogo a lo ocurrido en el caso de las aproximaciones basadas en similaridades 
–a saber, que surgieron por la incapacidad de la teoría clásica para explicar los efectos de 
tipicalidad–, años después surgirán, con objeto de acomodar fenómenos aparentemente 
no explicados por las teorías de similaridad35, los enfoques basados en explicaciones, tam-
bién llamados enfoques basados en conocimiento (Medin 1989), enfoques basados en teorías 
o, simplemente, teoría-teoría. 
2.4.1 Teoría-teoría 
Una de las primeras propuestas fue la de Murphy y Medin (1985)36, para quienes los 
conceptos deberían concebirse en términos de conocimiento teórico o, cuando menos, 
deberían encontrarse incorporados en el seno de una teoría sobre el mundo. Sobre esta 
base, las categorías estarían determinadas por unos principios –explicativos y causales– 
comunes a todos los elementos de cada categoría, principios que determinarán qué co-
rrelaciones entre atributos son relevantes para los miembros de esa categoría. Por lo tan-
to, la categorización de algo bajo un cierto concepto dependería de que los atributos de 
ese algo encajen con los principios que ese concepto exige a los atributos de sus miembros. 
O, dicho de otro modo, la clasificación algo bajo un concepto no se limita a una mera 
comprobación de –o chequeo con– las propiedades asociadas a ese concepto, sino que 
requiere que el objeto considerado tenga la relación explicativa correcta con la “teoría” 
que actúa como marco organizador del concepto en cuestión (Medin 1989). Así, bajo 
 
35 Obsérvese, por ejemplo, la dificultad que tienen las aproximaciones basadas en similaridades para re-
presentar relaciones causales y explicativas, en la medida en que dichos enfoques se limitan –por lo ge-
neral– a representar atributos, sin codificar información con respecto a cómo tales atributos coocurren 
entre sí (Prinz 2002, p. 77). 
36 En ese mismo año Carey (1985) publica su propio planteamiento, desarrollado independientemente 
del de Murphy y Medin, aunque en este caso centrado en el ámbito de la psicología del desarrollo. 
Otros relevantes trabajos pioneros fueron los de Lakoff (1987), Keil (1989) y Gopnik y Wellman 
(1994). 
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este enfoque, la categoría SALTAR-VESTIDO-A-LA-PISCINA, aún no estando directamente 
relacionada con el concepto EBRIO, podría llevar a clasificar a alguien como tal en la medi-
da en que la propiedad EBRIO, en  las circunstancias adecuadas, puede actuar como princi-
pio explicativo de que alguien haya saltado vestido a la piscina. 
No obstante, los principios de la teoría-teoría están mucho menos definidos que los de 
los enfoques basados en definiciones o similaridades, en la medida en que se pueden con-
cebir de maneras muy diferentes (Laurence y Margolis 1999; Prinz 2002; Machery 
2009). Por un lado, cabe considerar que los conceptos son teorías mentales, en el sentido 
de conjuntos de estructuras causales que determinan el conocimiento que el sujeto tiene 
acerca de una cierta categoría. En este caso, algo cae bajo un concepto cuando sus atribu-
tos son –o pueden ser– el resultado de la estructura causal que caracteriza a los miembros 
de esa categoría (Rehder y Hastie 2001; Rehder 2003a, b). Por otro lado, se puede soste-
ner también que los conceptos son términos teóricos (esto es, elementos de las teorías y no 
teorías mentales completas), determinados / afectados por el papel que esos conceptos 
juegan en sus correspondientes teorías (Murphy y Medin 1985; Gopnik y Meltzoff 
1997), lo que encuentra mejor encaje con la hipótesis de que los conceptos son los consti-
tuyentes de los pensamientos. En este segundo caso, los conceptos se relacionarían entre 
sí del mismo modo a cómo lo hacen los términos de una teoría científica, y su contenido 
teórico estaría determinado por el papel que cada uno cumple en su teoría asociada. 
Sin embargo, todas las aproximaciones a la teoría-teoría comparten la tesis de que los 
conceptos almacenan conocimiento explicativo de tipo diverso –a saber, nomológico, 
causal, funcional o genérico– sobre los atributos de los miembros de las categorías. Ese 
conocimiento contendría información sobre cómo los objetos pertenecientes a cada cate-
goría interactúan con los miembros de otras categorías, a partir del cual podrían realizarse 
predicciones, explicaciones e interpretaciones37. En ambos casos (esto es, con indepen-
dencia de que se considere que los conceptos son teorías o términos teóricos), sus teorías 
mentales asociadas constituirían esquemas explicativos de clasificación que permitirían 
determinar cuándo algo cae bajo una cierta categoría. No obstante, aún a pesar de la fun-
ción explicativa y predictiva atribuida a las teorías, éstas no tendrán que ser siempre sofis-
ticadas, pudiendo consistir meramente en tener la impresión general de que hay algo 
causalmente relevante en una categoría que ocasiona algunas o todas las restantes propie-
dades comunes a sus miembros (Gelman 2005; Carey 2009). 
Las evidencias que respaldan este tipo de enfoques surgen de la observación de que en 
ciertos casos los sujetos categorizan e infieren de modos incompatibles con los principios 
de los enfoques basados en similaridades. Por un lado, en muchas ocasiones los niños 
hacen inferencias inductivas sobre la base de pertenencias a categorías, aún cuando dichas 
inferencias entran en claro conflicto con las apariencias perceptuales como, por ejemplo, 
cuando consideran que los tiburones respiran como los peces tropicales (y no como los 
delfines) en virtud de que ambos –tiburones y peces tropicales– son peces, aún cuando su 
 
37 Algunos autores describen el modo en que se podría adquirir y almacenar ese conocimiento causal en 
términos de redes bayesianas (Gopnik y Schulz 2004), como formalismo basado en modelos gráficos 
capaz de representar las relaciones causales existentes entre un conjunto de variables (Cooper, 1999; 




similaridad es menor que la existente entre tiburones y delfines (Gelman y Markman 
1986). Por otro lado, algunos atributos parecen mostrar un carácter “esencial” (u obliga-
torio) en virtud de las relaciones explicativas existentes entre ellos y otros rasgos de sus 
respectivos conceptos, de normas que los constriñen, etc. Ejemplos de ello es que las per-
sonas, aún cuando atribuyen a la propiedad CURVADO una tipicalidad semejante para el 
caso de los conceptos BOOMERANG y PLÁTANO, consideran que un objeto recto será –
mucho más probablemente– un plátano que un boomerang (Medin y Shoben 1988); o 
que las personas afirmen que, aún cuando un objeto (imaginado) de tres pulgadas de diá-
metro es más similar a un cuarto de dólar que a una pizza, lo más probable es que sea una 
pizza y no un cuarto de dólar porque este último debería tener unas dimensiones unifor-
mes (Rips 1989)38. En relación a todos estos casos, la ventaja de la teoría-teoría es su capa-
cidad para incorporar la tendencia que parecen mostrar las  personas hacia el pensamien-
to esencialista39, en el sentido de que la pertenencia de algo a un grupo es, no tanto una 
cuestión de presentar un cierto conjunto de atributos, como sí de tener una cierta estruc-
tura o propiedad interna conectada de manera explicativa y causal con sus restantes pro-
piedades relevantes. 
Conforme ocurría en todas las aproximaciones anteriores, la teoría-teoría tampoco 
está libre de objeciones. En este caso, la teoría-teoría ha sido criticada porque, bajo la 
asunción de que toda teoría está hecha de conceptos, si tales conceptos se conciben como 
teorías entonces la propuesta es circular –pues las teorías están constituidas por unos 
conceptos que, a su vez, son concebidos como teorías–, en cuyo caso la teoría-teoría no 
estaría explicando lo que los conceptos son. Por otro lado, concibiendo los conceptos 
como términos teóricos se evita el problema de circularidad, pero a costa de no explicar 
cuál es la estructura de los conceptos40 ni, por consiguiente, qué es lo que dichos concep-
tos son. 
Además, la teoría-teoría comparte también algunas de las dificultades ya presentes en 
los enfoques previos, tales como: (a) el problema de la ignorancia y el error, presente desde 
el momento en que los sujetos pueden tener teorías incompletas y/o erróneas acerca de 
los conceptos; (b) el problema de selección en la determinación de los rangos para propie-
dades continuas causalmente relevantes; (c) el problema de estabilidad, dado que el con-
tenido de los conceptos no permanecería invariante ante cambios en sus teorías mentales 
asociadas; y (d) el problema de composicionalidad en la explicación de cómo las teorías 
asociadas a diferentes conceptos pueden combinarse41. 
 
38 Y, aunque existen estudios que cuestionan la generalidad de estos experimentos (Malt 1994; Smith y 
Sloman 1994; Hampton 1995), ninguno de ellos constituye una evidencia decisiva en contra, en la 
medida en que existen otras explicaciones alternativas a sus resultados (Prinz 2002, p. 85). 
39 Este esencialismo psicológico es lo que nos permitiría distinguir, por ejemplo, entre un perro de verdad 
y un perro artificial (o robot-perro), aún cuando ambos fueran externa y funcionalmente idénticos. 
40 Si los conceptos se conciben como términos teóricos se necesita explicar lo que es un término teórico. 
¿Es una definición? ¿Un prototipo? ¿Una teoría? En los dos primeros casos –definición y prototipo– se 
estaría recurriendo a otra teoría sobre la estructura de los conceptos; mientras que en el tercero se ape-
laría de nuevo a la teoría-teoría, lo que nos devuelve al ya mencionado problema de circularidad. 
41 Aunque la formulación de estos cuatro problemas (a saber, ignorancia-error, selección, estabilidad y 
composicionalidad) ha sido expresada para el caso de la identificación de los conceptos con teorías, to-
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Sin embargo, el problema de la ignorancia y el error unido al problema de selección 
resultan mucho más graves en el caso de la teoría-teoría, en la medida en que sin poder 
estar seguros de que no ignoramos o estamos equivocados sobre la teoría asociada a un 
cierto concepto y, no disponiendo de unos criterios que determinen sus propiedades 
esenciales, queda en el aire la cuestión de qué es lo que convierte a la teoría asociada a un 
determinado concepto, en una teoría sobre los miembros de su categoría. En otras pala-
bras, la teoría-teoría deja sin explicar cómo los conceptos tienen contenido intencional 
(Prinz 2002) o, si lo explica, lo hace en términos de esencias circulares. (Esto último es lo 
que sucedería, por ejemplo, en una teoría para el concepto PATO que identificara a los 
patos como aquellos animales cuyos padres son patos.) 
2.5. Otras aproximaciones 
Como hemos visto en las secciones anteriores, ninguna de la teorías allí presentadas ha 
sido capaz de proponer una explicación –que no adolezca de problemas significativos– a 
la formación y aplicación general de conceptos en tareas de categorización, inferencia, etc. 
El resultado ha sido la aparición de múltiples propuestas alternativas basadas, bien en la 
combinación de un subconjunto de las teorías anteriores (lo que ha dado lugar a distintas 
formas de pluralismo e hibridismo); bien en el rechazo de algunas de sus asunciones gene-
rales, tal y como ocurre cuando se considera que la noción de concepto no es un género 
natural –eliminativismo–, o que no pueden existir conceptos complejos constituidos por 
otros conceptos más simples –atomismo–. El propósito de la presente sección es repasar 
cuáles son las características, virtudes y sombras de todas esas posturas alternativas. 
2.5.1 Atomismo conceptual 
Aún cuando todas las teorías hasta aquí presentadas discrepaban acerca de la estructura 
que tienen los conceptos, todas ellas coincidían en aceptar que dichos conceptos deben 
tener una estructura interna. Tal estructura interna permitiría articular el principio de 
composicionalidad que, aplicado al caso de los conceptos, explicaría la productividad y 
sistematicidad del pensamiento. Ahora bien, frente a ellas, los defensores del atomismo 
conceptual (Fodor 1990, 1998; Margolis 1998; Millikan 1998, 2000) consideran que la 
mayoría de nuestros conceptos son atómicos, esto es, carecen de estructura interna. 
La motivación del atomismo conceptual procede de la dificultad para alcanzar defi-
niciones por parte de las aproximaciones definicionales, y los problemas para explicar la 
composicionalidad tanto por parte de los enfoques basados en similaridades como de los 
basados en explicaciones. Siguiendo en esta misma línea, la amenaza del holismo es uno de 
los principales argumentos esgrimidos en contra de la tesis de que los conceptos tienen 
estructura y que –por ello– están determinados por sus relaciones (de tipo mereológico o 
inferencial) con otros conceptos. La idea es que, si unos conceptos dependiesen de otros, 
entonces no estaría claro cómo delimitar qué profundidad en el conjunto de relaciones 
                                                                                                                                       




conceptuales debería considerarse en la aplicación de cada concepto, hasta el punto de 
que –potencialmente– podrían aplicar todas ellas42 (Fodor y Lepore 2002). 
Frente a esta amenaza, los partidarios del atomismo sostienen que los conceptos no 
tienen constituyentes, razón por la cual el contenido conceptual de un concepto no es-
taría determinado por unos elementos constituyentes y estructura (que aquí se niegan), 
sino por la información portadora de las relaciones causales entre cada concepto y sus 
referentes. Bajo este enfoque el contenido conceptual sería mera referencia, en base a lo 
cual diríamos que alguien posee un cierto concepto si dispone de una entidad mental 
capaz de establecer las relaciones causales adecuadas entre ese concepto y sus referentes. 
O, dicho de otro modo, el significado –o identidad– de un concepto no estaría deter-
minado por sus relaciones con oros conceptos, sino por las relaciones causales que ese 
concepto mantenga con las cosas del mundo, las cuales actuarían como conexión (en el 
sentido de correlación fiable) entre tal concepto y las propiedades que representa. Así, 
por ejemplo, el concepto CABALLO no estaría en relación con otros conceptos, tales como 
ANIMAL, PEZUÑAS, etc., sino que expresaría la propiedad CABALLO mediante una ley causal 
que uniría dicho concepto con la propiedad ser un caballo, que es lo que garantizaría la 
existencia de una relación correcta entre la mente y el mundo. Por consiguiente, en esta 
propuesta desaparece el problema de la ignorancia y el error, dado que no importa lo que 
se crea sobre los caballos, en tanto en cuanto el concepto CABALLO y la realidad del mun-
do caballo estén conectadas del modo adecuado. 
Finalmente, el atomismo conceptual también ha recibido objeciones, principalmente 
debidas a su debilidad explicativa cuando –bajo la asunción de que los conceptos no tie-
nen estructura– se intenta dar cuenta de: (i) fenómenos psicológicos tales como cate-
gorizaciones o inferencias; (ii) cómo conceptos no-atómicos –esto es, complejos– pueden 
componer; (iii) las intuiciones que tienen los sujetos acerca de que ciertas relaciones entre 
conceptos son analíticas; y (iv) los ya mencionados fenómenos de tipicalidad. El proble-
ma en todos estos casos es que sus fenómenos asociados son difíciles de explicar en ausen-
cia de relaciones entre conceptos, que es justamente lo que los atomistas conceptuales 
rechazan que exista. 
No obstante, el mayor problema del atomismo es la cuestión de si conlleva la acep-
tación del nativismo radical y, por consiguiente, las dificultades asociadas a esta postura ya 
vistas en el capítulo anterior. Ésa es la conclusión que se deriva de los argumentos nativis-
tas contra la tesis de que los conceptos primitivos –y, por tanto, atómicos– puedan ser 
aprendidos (Fodor 1975, 1980a, 1981a; Jackendoff 1989; Carey 2009), el cual se podría 
resumir del modo siguiente: 
(1) Todo mecanismo de aprendizaje se reduce a la formación y testeo de hipótesis. 
(2) Las hipótesis que juegan un papel en la adquisición de un nuevo concepto deben 
formularse en términos de los conceptos disponibles y el principio de composi-
cionalidad. 
 
42 Una posible respuesta a este argumento es la de adoptar un planteamiento de tipo localista, conforme 
al cual únicamente serían relevantes algunas –que no todas– de las relaciones mantenidas por los con-
ceptos (Weiskopf 2009b). 
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(3) Los conceptos primitivos no pueden expresarse en términos de otros conceptos. 
(4) Luego los conceptos primitivos no pueden aprenderse y, por tanto, son innatos. 
Con el problema de que quien acepte la anterior conclusión tendrá que enfrentarse a la 
implausible consecuencia de que son innatos también candidatos tan improbables como 
los conceptos de XILÓFONO, HÉLICE o ELECTRÓN. 
En todo caso, no todos los defensores del atomismo aceptan que el carácter atómico 
de los conceptos conduce necesariamente a que éstos deban ser innatos. Así, por ejemplo, 
Margolis (1998) argumenta a favor de la tesis de que los conceptos pueden ser –a la vez– 
atómicos y aprendidos, en cuyo caso el atomismo no tendría que enfrentarse a los pro-
blemas que afrontan los nativistas radicales. 
2.5.2 Teorías híbridas 
Una de las propuestas surgidas como reacción al problema de que ninguna de las princi-
pales teorías sobre la estructura de los conceptos sea capaz de explicar de modo general los 
diversos fenómenos cognitivos asociados a la noción de concepto, han sido las teorías 
híbridas –también llamadas hibridismo conceptual– (Smith et al. 1974; Osherson y Smith 
1981; Nosofsky et al. 1994; Keil et al. 1998; Anderson y Betz 2001; Vicente y Martínez-
Manrique 2016). Frente a las propuestas “puras”, los defensores del hibridismo concep-
tual sostienen que, aún cuando cada categoría estaría representada por un único concepto 
(lo que diferencia a las teorías híbridas de las posturas de tipo pluralista43), tales conceptos 
estarían divididos en partes, las cuales tendrían asociadas distintas clases de conocimien-
to, articuladas mediante estructuras conceptuales diferentes. 
No obstante, existen múltiples versiones de hibridismo, en función de qué elementos 
se entienda que constituyen los conceptos, y cómo se piense que esos elementos se conec-
tan y coordinan. Por un lado, algunos consideran que los conceptos están constituidos 
por un procedimiento de identificación, basado en similaridades y empleado para clasifica-
ciones rápidas, y un núcleo de tipo definicional que intervendría cuando razonamos sobre 
los conceptos (Smith et al. 1974; Miller y Johnson-Laird 1976; Osherson y Smith 1981; 
Smith y Medin 1981; Landau 1982)44. Otros sugieren, en cambio, que los conceptos 
pueden combinar una parte basada en reglas con excepciones basadas en ejemplares (No-
sofsky et al. 1994; Anderson y Betz 2001). Otra posibilidad –no incompatible con las 
anteriores– es que los conceptos combinen los dos enfoques basados en similaridades, a 
saber, una parte prototípica con las tendencias centrales encargada de la identificación de 
nuevas instancias no-atípicas (lo cual sería útil en términos de economía y coherencia), y 
otra parte que almacenara ejemplares particulares de esa categoría empleados en etapas 
tempranas o intermedias del proceso de aprendizaje (Homa et al. 1991). Finalmente, otra 
 
43 Esto no es óbice para que no puedan articularse propuestas que combinen hibridismo y pluralismo 
(Laurence y Margolis 1999; Margolis y Laurence 2010; Rice 2016). 
44 De modo similar Neimark (1983) distingue –para el caso de las clasificaciones– entre modelos de com-
petencia (de tipo clásico), que actuarían cuando se dispone de un algoritmo clasificador, y modelos de 
rendimiento (basados en prototipos), como aproximación heurística por defecto en ausencia de reglas 
de clasificación. Por su parte, Rosch (1983) caracteriza al razonamiento lógico de modo clásico, frente 
al razonamiento analógico por puntos de referencia, que es concebido en términos de prototipos. 
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opción a considerar es la integración de un enfoque basado en similaridades con otro 
basado en explicaciones (Medin 1989) lo cual, de nuevo, es perfectamente compatible 
con todas las aproximaciones antes mencionadas. 
Ahora bien, las teorías híbridas son en ocasiones criticadas porque las clasificaciones 
que resultan de las diferentes partes que, supuestamente, constituyen los conceptos pue-
den ser inconsistentes entre sí. De hecho, eso es a lo que apuntan los estudios de Malt 
(1994), cuando las personas categorizan un líquido como AGUA atendiendo, no solo a su 
composición química (porcentaje de H2O) –característica de su concepción esencialis-
ta/definicional–, sino también a su origen, uso y localización. En este caso el problema 
estriba en que los juicios sobre la concentración de H2O en un líquido no predicen bien si 
ese líquido será considerado AGUA o no, razón por la cual sus clasificaciones (basadas, bien 
en definiciones, bien en similaridades) en muchas ocasiones se contraponen entre sí. Por 
ejemplo, el líquido de una taza de té puede ser considerado un ejemplo de NO-AGUA, aún 
cuando el porcentaje de agua en él –un 91%– sea mucho mayor que en otros líquidos que 
sí son considerados AGUA, conforme ocurre en los casos del agua de una piscina o del agua 
de mar –cuyas concentraciones de H2O son del 81% y 78,7%, respectivamente–. 
Por otro lado, las teorías híbridas también han sido criticadas porque la condición de 
coordinación entre las diferentes partes de un concepto parece contradecir el hecho de 
que muchos usos de las palabras asociadas a esos conceptos resultan ambiguos. Así, Ma-
chery (2009) sostiene que las distintas partes de un concepto no solo deberían estar conec-
tadas (de manera que una clasificación positiva por parte de cualquiera de ellas hiciera 
que el resto estuviera disponible para otros procesos cognitivos), sino también coordina-
das entre sí (para que las distintas partes de un concepto no generen resultados –por 
ejemplo, categorizaciones– inconsistentes). No obstante, argumenta Machery, el hecho 
de que afirmaciones como “Tina Turner es una abuela” tengan dos lecturas –una verda-
dera y otra falsa–, en función de si el término abuela se aplica en un sentido definicional o 
prototípico45, podría ser indicativo de que la coordinación entre las distintas partes de un 
concepto no opera del modo que necesitan los defensores del hibridismo. 
Finalmente, el hibridismo también ha sido criticado por los defensores del pluralismo 
conceptual (Weiskopf 2009a), bien por asumir que lo que interviene en toda tarea cogni-
tiva es el concepto “completo” –o unión de todas las diversas partes asumidas por el hibri-
dista, esto es, prototipos, ejemplares, teorías, etc.– por la inflación representacional que 
eso supone; bien, si únicamente se emplearan algunas partes del concepto en cada oca-
sión, por no explicar cómo tales partes relevantes se seleccionan. En el primer caso la 
objeción consiste en que los conceptos “completos” son demasiado grandes para su em-
pleo por la memoria de trabajo. En el segundo, el hibridismo es criticado por no propor-
cionar un criterio que individúe qué información de la categoría será empleada en cada 
caso, sin caer al hacerlo en planteamientos de corte pluralista46. 
 
45 Este mismo problema puede ser extrapolado a otros casos similares de ambigüedad o polisemia, con 
combinaciones de estructuras conceptuales diferentes en donde, por ejemplo, los conceptos tuvieran 
una parte basada en teorías y otra en prototipos (Machery y Seppälä 2011). 
46 Ambas objeciones han recibido respuestas desde el ámbito hibridista. Con respecto a la primera se ha 
indicado que los constituyentes de los pensamientos presentes en la memoria de trabajo no serían los 
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2.5.3 Teorías pluralistas 
Las teorías pluralistas –o pluralismo conceptual– constituyen una segunda posibilidad a la 
hora de defender que los conceptos pueden tener múltiples estructuras asociadas. En este 
caso, esas diversas estructuras no deberían identificarse con distintas partes de un mismo 
concepto –conforme sostiene el hibridismo–, sino con diferentes tipos de conceptos que 
operarían de modo específico en cada tarea o competencia cognitiva. 
La idea subyacente a este planteamiento es que los conceptos no constituyen un gé-
nero natural único, sino se dividen en géneros distintos, en la medida en que no existe 
ninguna representación individual que pueda explicar todos los fenómenos empíricos de 
los que los conceptos son responsables (Piccinini y Scott 2006; Weiskopf 2009a)47. 
Y, aunque similares, pluralismo e hibridismo son propuestas diferenciadas. Por un la-
do, el hibridismo consideraría que el concepto asociado a una determinada categoría –
por ejemplo, la categoría perro– puede tener asociadas diversas estructuras conceptuales 
(a saber, definiciones, prototipos, ejemplares o teorías), no siendo éstas conceptos distin-
tos, sino las partes constitutivas de un único concepto PERRO. En cambio, para el plura-
lismo no hay tal cosa como el concepto PERRO, sino muchos conceptos-perro, cada uno de 
ellos con una estructura conceptual diferente. Así, por ejemplo, podría haber un concepto 
PERRO1 –con estructura prototípica– que explicase algunos casos de categorización e infe-
rencia, otro concepto PERRO2 –basado en ejemplares– que diera cuenta de otras categori-
zaciones e inferencias diferentes, y un tercer concepto PERRO3 –de tipo definicional– que 
explicara cómo razonamos sobre los perros. 
Ahora bien, uno de los retos a los que se enfrenta el pluralismo es el de explicar qué 
unifica a toda esa pluralidad de conceptos, y los convierte a todos ellos en conceptos de 
una misma categoría. O, dicho de otro modo, por qué todos esos diferentes conceptos 
PERROi deben ser considerados conceptos de perro. Y, aunque una posible respuesta sería 
decir que aquello que los unifica es que todos refieren a la misma categoría, no está claro 
que eso resulte evidente, en la medida en que ninguno de ellos fija la misma referencia 
(siendo ésta precisamente una de las virtudes de las aproximaciones pluralistas). 
Sin embargo, posiblemente el mayor problema para el pluralismo es que las mismas 
consideraciones que conducen a su adopción (a saber, que los conceptos cumplen múl-
tiples funciones cognitivas, y que diferentes tipos de conceptos –con estructuras con-
ceptuales diversas– pueden intervenir en cada una de ellas), pueden llevar a adoptar tesis 
de corte eliminativista, que consideran que el motivo por el que ninguna estructura con-
ceptual es capaz de explicar todos esos fenómenos cognitivos es porque los conceptos no 
constituyen un género natural. 
                                                                                                                                       
conceptos completos, sino versiones reducidas suyas. En cuanto a la segunda, Vicente y Martínez Man-
rique (2016) consideran una coactivación funcional estable permitiría explicar cómo cada concepto se 
individúa –o, bajo el enfoque de Machery, cómo sus diferentes partes pueden coordinarse–. 
47 Adicionalmente, Machery (2009) distingue dos tipos de pluralismo. Por un lado estaría el pluralismo 
de alcance, para el cual los diversos tipos de concepto están asociados a distintos tipos de entidades, 
eventos, substancias, etc. Por el otro estaría el pluralismo de competencia, cuando los distintos tipos de 




Desde la perspectiva del eliminativismo, si los conceptos fuesen un género natural en-
tonces deberían presentar un conjunto de elementos en común relevantes, susceptibles de 
ser identificados con métodos empíricos, por lo que el hecho de que esos elementos en 
común no estén presentes en los diferentes tipos de concepto (asociados a distintas es-
tructuras conceptuales) sería indicativo de que esos conceptos no son un género natural. 
En consecuencia, la recomendación del eliminativista es que la noción teórica de “con-
cepto” debería ser abandonada (Machery 2005, 2009; Malt 2010), tras lo cual la psicolog-
ía se debería dejar de dedicar al estudio de los conceptos, pasando a centrarse en el estudio 
de prototipos, ejemplares, teorías, etc. 
No obstante, el eliminativismo ha recibido muy diversas críticas. En primer lugar, al-
gunos consideran que el criterio exigido por Machery a los géneros naturales resulta de-
masiado exigente, y que deja fuera casos de géneros naturales de utilidad tanto para la 
psicología (Margolis y Laurence 2010; Prinz 2010) como para la ciencia (Gonnerman y 
Weinberg 2010)48. Otros han sostenido que, aun aceptando el criterio de Machery para 
los términos de género natural, el eliminativismo conceptual no se sigue de él, puesto que 
los conceptos podrían ser géneros naturales conforme a ese criterio (Samuels y Ferreira 
2010; Weiskopf 2010). Finalmente, algunos autores sugieren que el criterio empleado 
por Machery es demasiado fuerte, y que –aún a pesar de las críticas de Machery– la no-
ción de concepto, bien en un sentido funcional (Lalumera 2010; Strohminger y Moore 
2010), bien como elemento integrador de alto nivel (Hampton 2010), continúa siendo 
de utilidad en el ámbito de la ciencia cognitiva49. 
2.6. Recapitulación 
En el presente capítulo han sido presentadas las principales teorías sobre la estructura de 
los conceptos, junto con sus más importantes puntos fuertes y débiles. También se ha 
visto que ninguna de las teorías “puras” –a saber, enfoques basados en definiciones, simi-
lares o teorías– era capaz de dar cuenta de todos los fenómenos empíricos relevantes. O, 
dicho de otro modo, no parece que en la mente opere una única teoría de conceptos, sino 
que intervienen elementos procedentes de distintas teorías. 
Por consiguiente, en mi opinión la solución pasa por una aproximación de tipo hí-
brido o pluralista pues, como hacen muchos otros autores, me inclino hacia el rechazo de 
planteamientos eliminativistas como el de Machery, dado que no veo justificada su acep-
tación en la medida en que (i) la noción de concepto sigue siendo útil en el ámbito de la 
psicología, y (ii) pluralismo e hibridismo constituyen alternativas muy plausibles al res-
pecto. No obstante, y aunque en principio me inclino más por una aproximación hibri-
 
48 Considérese, por ejemplo, el caso de los términos de género natural módulo, computación o representa-
ción –en la psicología–, o algoritmo, partícula subatómica o nutriente –en la ciencia–. 
49 Para conocer la respuesta eliminativista a todas estas –y otras– objeciones véase Machery (2010a, 
2010b). 
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dista, en mi trabajo no argumentaré en su favor frente al pluralismo, puesto que las tesis 
que aquí defenderé resultan compatibles con cualquiera de estos dos enfoques. 
Por último, de entre los diferentes enfoques a la estructura de los conceptos, el pre-
sente trabajo asumirá de manera general una aproximación basada en prototipos –que 
podría estar embebida en el seno de una teoría hibridista o pluralista más amplia (por lo 
que no supone un rechazo de ninguna de las otras teorías alternativas)–. La razón es que, 
además de sus ya mencionados puntos fuertes (como, por ejemplo, su mayor economía 
cognitiva en términos de memoria y procesamiento, frente a otras teorías como la de 
ejemplares), una teoría de prototipos basada en espacios de similaridad permite dar res-
puesta a uno de los principales problemas del empirismo, a saber, la cuestión de cómo los 
conceptos primitivos se adquieren sin caer en circularidad –tal y como mostraré en el 
capítulo 6–. 
Finalmente, a pesar de que la noción de prototipo no es crucial –desde un punto de 
vista teórico– para el desarrollo de las principales tesis defendidas en los capítulos 5 y 6 –
en donde la única condición crítica es la asunción de un marco contextualista–, su adop-
ción general como teoría-base en este trabajo facilitará la presentación de los problemas 
enfrentados, en la medida en que éstos serán ejemplificados y discutidos en primera ins-
tancia para una aproximación basada en la teoría de prototipos (aún cuando las conclu-
















From causes, which appear similar, we expect similar effects. – 
David Hume (1741, IV ii 20) 
 
For surely there is nothing more basic to thought and language 
than our sense of similarity; our sorting of things into kinds. – 





Conforme indiqué al final del capítulo anterior, en este trabajo asumiré una aproxima-
ción a la noción de concepto basada en la teoría de prototipos, y articulada por medio de 
espacios de similaridad conceptual. En consecuencia, mi enfoque se enmarca dentro de 
los modelos de similaridad de tipo geométrico. No obstante, los modelos geométricos no 
son la única forma en que puede caracterizarse la idea de similaridad, razón por la cual el 
presente capítulo tiene como propósito realizar un repaso de los más relevantes modelos 
contemporáneos de similaridad, de sus principios y motivaciones, así como de las princi-
pales ventajas e inconvenientes de cada uno de ellos. Para ello seguiré la habitual distin-
ción entre modelos geométricos, de rasgos, basados en alineamientos y transformaciona-
les (Goldstone y Son 2005). 
Con ese objeto, y tras realizar –en la primera sección– una sucinta introducción de la 
noción de similaridad, y de las razones de su importancia en filosofía, psicología y ciencia 
cognitiva, efectuaré un breve repaso –segunda sección– de cuál ha sido la historia de esta 
noción a lo largo del pasado siglo XX, comenzando con su papel en el Aufbau de Carnap 
(1928) y terminando con las matizaciones y críticas a la misma realizadas por Quine 
(1969) y Goodman (1951; 1972). 
Tras ello presentaré las distintas formas en que puede modelarse un enfoque basado 
en similaridades, como es la teoría de prototipos1. Comenzaré en la sección tercera con la 
caracterización contemporánea del modelo geométrico que, en cierto modo, da conti-
nuidad a propuestas como las de Carnap y Quine. Buena parte de dicha sección estará 
 
1 Aunque mi trabajo estará centrado en la teoría de prototipos, los modelos estudiados en este capítulo 
son modelos de similaridad en general, por lo que serían válidos tanto para la teoría de prototipos como 
para la teoría de ejemplares, en la medida en que ambas son aproximaciones basadas en similaridades. 
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dedicada a los tres axiomas métricos asumidos por este tipo de modelo (a saber, mini-
malidad, simetría y desigualdad triangular), así como a las críticas recibidas por parte de 
aquellos que consideran que existe evidencia empírica de la violación de esos axiomas, y a 
los argumentos de quienes sostienen que tales aparentes violaciones se pueden explicar 
recurriendo a la noción de contexto. 
A continuación –sección cuarta– presento el modelo de rasgos, como primera pro-
puesta alternativa surgida en respuesta a los problemas del modelo geométrico relativos a 
la violación de sus axiomas. No obstante, el hecho de que ni el modelo geométrico, ni 
tampoco el modelo de rasgos, sean capaces de caracterizar adecuadamente cómo los atri-
butos de los objetos se encuentran organizados ha dado lugar a la aparición de otras 
aproximaciones a la noción de similaridad (a saber, modelos basados en alineamientos y 
modelos transformacionales) que sí tienen en cuenta esas relaciones estructurales. En la 
sección quinta presentaré los modelos de alineamiento, cuyo principal elemento carac-
terístico es que no solo evalúan el encaje (en un objeto) de un conjunto de atributos con-
creto, sino que también comprueban si los atributos presentes están organizados del mo-
do adecuado. Finalmente, en la sección sexta estudiaré el caso de los modelos transforma-
cionales, en los que la similaridad entre dos objetos se encuentra determinada por la dis-
tancia transformacional –que no geométrica– existente entre sus representaciones. 
3.1. Noción de similaridad 
Los términos similaridad, similitud y semejanza se emplean indistintamente para referir a 
la relación existente entre dos entidades cuando éstas no son ni idénticas, ni iguales, ni 
distintas, sino que tienen a un mismo tiempo algo igual y algo diferente (Ferrater Mora 
1994, p. 636). A pesar del carácter aparentemente vago de esta descripción, la similaridad 
desempeña un papel clave en muchas teorías del conocimiento y comportamiento, en las 
que actúa como principio organizador mediante el cual los sujetos clasifican los objetos, 
se forman conceptos y realizan generalizaciones (Tversky 1977, p. 327). En esos casos, la 
evaluación de la similaridad es fundamental para la cognición, pues revela el mundo 
cuando lo concibe como un lugar lo suficientemente ordenado como para que objetos y 
eventos similares (esto es, clases de objetos/eventos2) se comporten de modo parecido en 
sus aspectos importantes. 
La idea de similaridad resulta básica para aprender, conocer y pensar, y han sido pocos 
los epistemólogos empiristas que se han resistido al empleo de esta noción a la hora de 
explicar cómo los conceptos se forman y aplican. Así, por ejemplo, Quine (1969, pp. 117 
y 133) sostenía que tenemos expectativas razonables cuando en circunstancias similares 
 
2 Esto ha llevado a sostener que las nociones de similaridad y tipo –categoría o género natural– son, en 
último término, una misma noción (Quine 1969, p. 119). Y, aún cuando Quine no lo consideraba po-
sible, podría intentar argumentarse que cada de ellas es definible en términos de la otra, en la medida en 
que (i) son similares aquellas cosas que pertenecen a una misma categoría, y (ii) una categoría está cons-
tituida por aquellas cosas similares entre sí (o, en términos comparativos, por aquellas cosas más simila-
res entre sí que a cosas pertenecientes a otras categorías). Y, aunque no es mi propósito defender en este 
trabajo tal identificación, lo que sí resulta poco cuestionable es que ambas nociones se encuentran fuer-
temente interrelacionadas. 
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anticipamos que causas parecidas provocarán efectos semejantes, razón por la cual fun-
damenta predicciones, inferencias y categorizaciones3, siendo una fuente de información 
general. Además, la idea de similaridad también ha sido invocada para dar cuenta de la 
creatividad humana –tanto científica como de otros tipos–, siendo una explicación habi-
tual que los actos de creatividad tienen lugar por medio de analogías entre dominios co-
nocidos y nuevos (esto es, mediante la identificación de elementos similares en ambos 
dominios). Y, en virtud de esta función unificadora de objetos semejantes, la similaridad 
ha sido descrita como “la quilla y columna vertebral de nuestro pensamiento” (James 
1890, vol. I, p. 459). 
Además, la atribución de un papel a la similaridad en funciones cognitivas tales como 
categorización, inferencia, predicción, resolución de problemas, etc., encuentra respaldo 
en un amplio número de estudios de psicología experimental. Así, por ejemplo, efectua-
mos categorizaciones sobre la base de similaridades (Nosofsky 1986; Smith et al. 1998) –
y lo hacemos incluso cuando disponemos de caracterizaciones detalladas de las categorías 
(Smith y Sloman 1994)–; generamos nuevas categorías de objetos en función de su simi-
laridad (Nosofsky 1984; Estes 1986b); inferimos entre categorías en base a la similaridad 
existente entre ellas –razonamiento deductivo– (Sloman 1998), y esas inferencias son 
más fuertes cuando los ámbitos/dominios de la similaridad y la inferencia coinciden 
(Heit y Rubinstein 1994); hacemos predicciones sobre casos nuevos en base a su similari-
dad con otros conocidos –inferencia inductiva– (Smith 1989; Osherson et al. 1990; Slo-
man 1993); aplicamos la similaridad a la toma de decisiones (Smith y Osherson 1989); 
intentamos resolver problemas similares a otros encontrados en el pasado aplicando prin-
cipios similares a los que funcionaron en estos últimos (Ross 1987); e incluso hay quien 
sostiene que toda representación es representación de –que no por medio de– si-
milaridades (Edelman 1995, 1998). 
Por consiguiente, el estudio de la similaridad resulta necesario para comprender las 
entidades mentales y los procesos que operan sobre ellas, así como para clarificar el papel 
jugado por la similaridad (a caballo entre la percepción y la cognición de alto nivel) en la 
formación de conceptos. 
3.2. Breve historia de la similaridad 
En este punto, y antes de proceder con el estudio de los principales modelos contempo-
ráneos de similaridad, efectuaré un breve repaso de la historia de esta noción. Aunque las 
ideas de semejanza y similaridad han desempeñado un papel muy relevante desde el mis-
mo origen de la filosofía –recuérdese, por ejemplo, la semejanza por participación4 de 
Platón, o la asociación por semejanza de Aristóteles5–, en esta sección me centraré en la 
historia de la similaridad a lo largo del pasado siglo XX. 
 
3 Esto se apoya en la asunción de que al aumentar la similaridad entre dos ítems a y b aumenta la proba-
bilidad de inferir correctamente que b presenta la propiedad F a partir del hecho de que a presente di-
cha propiedad F (Tenenbaum 1999). 
4 Platón, Parménides 129a. 
5 Dentro de los tres tipos de asociaciones distinguidas por Aristóteles, a saber, por semejanza, por conti-
güidad y por contraste (Aristóteles, Acerca de la memoria y de la reminiscencia, 451b 18-22). 
Capítulo 3 
60 
Así, en el primer cuarto de siglo Carnap, en su intento por reconstruir la estructura 
completa de las propiedades del mundo sobre la base de una única relación fenoménica6, 
consideraba que esa relación básica era el recuerdo de semejanza, a partir de la cual se po-
drían definir todos los otros conceptos y relaciones (Carnap 1928, §78). Allí, en el Auf-
bau, Carnap había previamente definido la similaridad como una relación reflexiva y 
simétrica7 sd(a,b) entre dos experiencias elementales8 –esto es, objetos o eventos– (ib., 
§11). Sobre esta base Carnap sostenía que dos objetos eran similares en caso de que tu-
vieran alguna propiedad en común, y no lo serían si no tuvieran ninguna propiedad com-
partida (ib., §70). A partir de esta definición de similaridad se puede examinar el mundo 
y determinar qué objetos son similares a qué otros lo que, en la terminología de Carnap, 
da lugar a la producción de círculos de similaridad identificados con las extensiones de las 
clases de objetos que son similares por pares (es decir, de todos aquellos elementos tales 
que, tomados de dos en dos, sus pares comparten alguna propiedad). 
Ahora bien, la idea de similaridad postulada por Carnap no está libre de problemas, 
tal y como pronto ilustró su discípulo Quine. Con respecto a esto Quine (1969), tras 
mostrar que la similaridad entre dos cosas postulada por Carnap equivale a que dichas 
cosas pertenezcan a una misma clase9, observó que una noción binaria de similaridad10 –
como la de Carnap– presentaba dificultades cuando se consideraban los conjuntos de 
cosas COLOREADAS y de cosas ROJAS. El problema era que si las cosas COLOREADAS son una 
clase, entonces todo par de cosas coloreadas serían similares, por lo que el conjunto de 
cosas ROJAS sería demasiado estrecho como para ser una clase, lo cual resulta inadecuado. 
De modo alternativo, si las cosas ROJAS fueran una clase entonces no todo par de cosas 
coloreadas serían similares, por lo que el conjunto de cosas COLOREADAS sería demasiado 
amplio como para ser una clase, lo cual también es inadecuado11. 
Por otro lado Quine, en su crítica de la similaridad de Carnap, también anticipa el 
problema de selección –luego explicitado en la séptima objeción de Goodman (1972)– 
cuando señala los problemas de definir la idea de similaridad a partir de la idea de pro-
piedad, lo cual obliga a saber previamente qué es una propiedad. Aquí la dificultad surge 
cuando se considera cómo puede definirse la idea de propiedad sin recurrir a las nociones 
 
6 Relación fenoménica entendida en el sentido de relación entre experiencias elementales. 
7 Frente a la relación de equivalencia que –a diferencia de su concepción de la relación de similaridad–, 
además de reflexiva y simétrica, tiene que ser también transitiva. Y también frente al recuerdo de seme-
janza, el cual era una relación de tipo asimétrico. 
8 En esta sección referiré con el subíndice d a la noción de similaridad diádica de Carnap, y con el sub-
índice t a la idea de similaridad triádica postulada por Quine. 
9 Esta idea había sido previamente anticipada por Leibniz en A64 107 (1678?) cuando mostraba que las 
oraciones con la forma “Pedro es similar a Pablo” pueden reducirse a oraciones con la forma “Pedro es 
A y Pablo es A”, lo cual equivale a sostener que dos objetos son similares en caso de que compartan –al 
menos– una propiedad (esto es, en caso de que caigan bajo un mismo concepto –o clase–). 
10 Binaria en el sentido de ser una cuestión que solo admite los valores sí y no. 
11 Recientemente, Mormann (1994, 2009) y Leitgeb (2007) han desarrollado una formulación matemá-
tica precisa de muchos de los problemas planteados por Quine y Goodman, junto con una posible res-
puesta a los mismos. 
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de clase o similaridad, lo cual excluye la posibilidad de decir que una propiedad es aquello 
compartido por un cierto grupo –o clase– de objetos, y también la de decir que una pro-
piedad es aquello compartido por cosas similares. La conclusión de Quine (1969, p. 117) 
era que definir la idea de similaridad sobre la noción de propiedad equivalía a dejar sin ex-
plicar lo que la similaridad es. 
La propuesta de Quine consiste en substituir la similaridad diádica –y absoluta– de 
Carnap por una similaridad st(a,b,c) de tipo comparativo, basada en la relación triádica “a 
se parece más a b que a c”, cuya ventaja es que admite relaciones de inclusión entre clases / 
propiedades. Así, por ejemplo, con una relación de similaridad triádica tanto el conjunto 
de cosas ROJAS como el de cosas COLOREADAS podrían ser clases, lo cual sería posible si la 
similaridad entre los elementos del conjunto de cosas ROJAS fuese mayor que su similari-
dad con respecto al resto de cosas COLOREADAS. La similaridad triádica de Quine rompe –
o, cuando menos, desdibuja– la identificación entre las nociones de similaridad y clase12. 
Por su parte Goodman (1972), en su renombrado artículo en contra de la idea de si-
milaridad, planteará siete objeciones en contra de esta noción, siendo las dos últimas 
(asociadas a la relación entre la similaridad y las propiedades de los objetos) las más in-
teresantes. Con respecto a la objeción sexta, en ella Goodman (ib., p. 441) sostiene que 
una similaridad diádica entre objetos no es suficiente para definir propiedades. En este 
caso su punto es que no basta con que los elementos de una clase tengan –dos a dos– al 
menos una propiedad en común, pues eso no garantiza que exista una propiedad común a 
todos los elementos de dicha clase13. Así, por ejemplo, dados tres discos a, b y c divididos 
en dos mitades, cada una pintada de un color distinto, y tales que sus colores fuesen rojo-
azul (disco a), azul-amarillo (disco b) y amarillo-rojo (disco c), cada par de objetos de este 
grupo tiene una propiedad en común, aún cuando no hay ninguna propiedad común a 
 
12 Obsérvese que la noción de similaridad de Carnap y, sobre todo, la de Quine constituyen un claro an-
tecedente de los modelos de tipo geométrico. Por un lado, un círculo de similaridad sería, para Carnap 
(1928, §70, §80 y §111), aquella clase C de objetos tales que cada par de elementos en C son similares 
(es decir, comparten alguna propiedad) y ningún elemento fuera de C es similar a ningún elemento de 
dicha clase. Y, aunque el cuasi-análisis de Carnap no se limita a estructuras de similaridad en espacios 
métricos, el modo de construcción que propone produce –cuando se considera el caso de un espacio 
geométrico– círculos o esferas de cualidades, esto es, propiedades con forma esférica. 
Por su parte, la similaridad comparativa de Quine también produce conjuntos de cualidades esféricas 
cuando se considera el conjunto de cosas que difieren menos de “algo” con respecto a una cierta norma 
central (Quine 1969, p. 119). En este caso, bastaría con distinguir un objeto a que actúe como caso pa-
radigmático –o norma central– de la clase, y otro objeto b que actúe como caso límite; y luego definir la 
clase “con paradigma a y límite b” como el conjunto de aquellas cosas que son más similares a a que lo 
que a lo es a b, lo cual produciría espacios de cualidades esféricas. 
13 Este problema ya había sido presentado anteriormente por Goodman, y referido como el problema de 
la comunidad imperfecta, en su discusión de las dos principales razones en contra de la posibilidad de 
que las propiedades puedan definirse mediante la noción de similaridad carnapiana (Goodman 1951, 
pp. 162-164). La otra dificultad sería el llamado problema de la compañía, asociado al hecho de que si 
las propiedades son conjuntos maximales de objetos –en el sentido de que incluyen a todos los objetos 
similares en ese aspecto– entonces una propiedad que aplique solo a un subconjunto de los objetos que 
presenten otra propiedad no podría ser recuperada por medio del cuasi-análisis (ib., pp. 157-161). En 
todo caso, ambas dificultades habían sido ya identificadas por el propio Carnap (1923) antes de que 
Goodman las señalara como problemas relevantes para el método del cuasi-análisis. 
Capítulo 3 
62 
todos ellos. No obstante, tanto el modelo de rasgos de Tversky como los modelos geomé-
tricos contemporáneos parecen capaces de sortear esta dificultad. 
En cuanto a su séptima objeción, Goodman (ib., pp. 443-446) sostiene que la simi-
laridad no equivale a, ni puede ser medida en términos de, la posesión de propiedades 
comunes. En este caso Goodman estudia los distintos modos en que puede definirse la 
similaridad en términos de propiedades, y concluye que ninguno es satisfactorio sobre la 
base de las razones siguientes14: 
 Similaridad como coincidencia en todas las propiedades: esta definición de simila-
ridad no sirve, puesto que no hay ningún par de cosas que tengan todas sus pro-
piedades en común, por lo que –en caso de aceptarla– ningún par de objetos serían 
similares. 
 Similaridad como coincidencia en alguna propiedad: esta definición tampoco sirve, 
pues todo par de objetos coinciden en alguna propiedad (es decir, la similaridad es 
una relación universal), por lo que cualquier par de objetos serían similares entre sí 
y, por consiguiente, la noción de similaridad sería vacía15,16. 
 Similaridad como relación triádica basada en propiedades: la formulación triádica 
de similaridad de Quine –o, la más general definición tetrádica considerada por 
Goodman, del tipo “a y b son más similares que c y d”– tampoco serviría si esa ma-
yor similaridad se explica en términos de propiedades. En este caso, la razón esgri-
mida por Goodman es que, dado que para un universo de n elementos cada par de 
ellos comparten 2n–2 propiedades, cuando el universo es infinito todo par de ele-
mentos de dicho universo compartirían el mismo –e infinito– número de propie-
dades17. 
 Similaridad como coincidencia en propiedades relevantes (o, similaridad en términos 
de la importancia general de las propiedades compartidas): Goodman considera que 
esta definición tampoco es adecuada, pues la relevancia –o importancia– de las 
distintas propiedades depende del contexto y los intereses del sujeto. No obstante, 
como veremos en la sección 3.3.4, los defensores de los enfoques geométricos han 
argumentado justamente en el sentido contrario, sosteniendo que la similaridad sí 
 
14 Goodman también rechaza el posible empleo de una noción intensional de propiedad. No obstante, 
dado que no proporciona argumentos al respecto, he preferido no incluir dicha crítica en esta enume-
ración. 
15 Estas dos primeras dificultades –asociadas a la posibilidad de definir la similaridad, bien como coinci-
dencia en todas las propiedades, bien como coincidencia en alguna propiedad– constituyen una crítica 
directa a las nociones de similaridad de Leibniz y Carnap. 
16 Para una discusión de las dos asunciones subyacentes a esta crítica y la siguiente (a saber, [i] que toda 
propiedad puede caracterizarse mediante un conjunto de objetos, y [ii] que todo conjunto de objetos 
determina una propiedad) véase Decock y Douven (2011, pp. 68-69). 
17 En este punto Goodman aplica el teorema del patito feo –en inglés, ugly duckling theorem– de Watana-
be (1969), por medio del cual éste mostraba que un patito feo y un cisne son tan similares entre sí co-
mo lo son dos cisnes, y cuya conclusión era que los juicios de similaridad siempre conllevan asunciones 
con respecto a las propiedades relevantes. Para un repaso de esta relatividad pragmática de la relación 
de similaridad, junto de posibles respuestas a la misma véase Niiniluoto (1987, pp. 35-38). 
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puede ser sensible al contexto e intereses del sujeto, en la medida en que las pro-
piedades relevantes puedan serlo18. 
3.3. Modelos geométricos 
En el último siglo el modelo geométrico ha sido una de las aproximaciones a la noción de 
similaridad que más influencia ha tenido –cuando no el enfoque dominante– (Carnap 
1928; Coombs 1954; Shepard 1957, 1958; Torgerson 1958; Schreider 1975), estando 
implícito tanto en el trabajo de Quine (1969) como en las críticas de Goodman (1951, 
1972). El propósito de los modelos geométricos es representar la semejanza entre objetos 
por medio de proximidades espaciales. En cierto modo los modelos geométricos contem-
poráneos actualizan propuestas previas que –en mayor o menor medida– también carac-
terizaban los estímulos mediante puntos localizados en un espacio (Shepard 1980). Así, 
por ejemplo, Newton (1704, I ii 6) representaba los colores del espectro visible sobre un 
círculo; Drobisch (1855 II §24) ubicaba los tonos puros –en acústica– sobre una hélice; 
Helmholtz (1867) y Schrödinger (1920) representaban los colores en una variedad rie-
manniana; y Henning (1916, pp. 94 y 506) localizaba olores y sabores dentro de un pris-
ma y un tetraedro, respectivamente. 
3.3.1 Distancia y axiomas métricos 
Conforme se ha indicado, los modelos geométricos (también llamados modelos espaciales) 
representan las relaciones de similaridad mediante distancias en un espacio métrico. La 
definición matemática de espacio métrico es la de un conjunto de puntos que tiene aso-
ciada una función distancia (también llamada métrica), de modo tal que la distancia entre 
cualquier par de puntos a y b de ese conjunto se encuentra determinada por esa función. 
Formalmente, un espacio métrico queda definido por un par M,d, en donde M es el 
conjunto de puntos y d es la métrica –o función distancia19– sobre M (esto es, d: 
MM, siendo  el conjunto de los números reales20). Finalmente, para que un espa-
cio sea considerado métrico su función distancia ha de satisfacer las tres condiciones si-
 
18 Los partidarios de enfoques alternativos al modelo geométrico también han sostenido que sus propues-
tas de similaridad pueden ser sensibles al contexto. Así, por ejemplo, desde el modelo de rasgos se ha ar-
gumentado que las propiedades relevantes pueden determinarse tanto en base a su tipicalidad en los 
objetos / conceptos considerados, como en función de su diagnosticidad (Tversky 1977). Por su parte, 
desde el ámbito de los modelos de alineamiento y transformacionales se ha apelado, para explicar la de-
terminación de las propiedades y relaciones relevantes, tanto a su sistematicidad –o capacidad para 
formar parte de sistemas de relaciones más amplios– (Gentner 1983), como a su capacidad para produ-
cir analogías exitosas (Medin et al., 1993). 
19 La función distancia entre dos puntos a y b –denotada como d(a,b)– también puede ser interpretada 
como la disimilitud existente entre esos puntos (o, alternativamente, como la disimilitud entre los ob-
jetos por ellos representados). 
20 En realidad la función distancia es una aplicación del producto cartesiano MM en 0+ (esto es, en el 
conjunto de los números reales positivos, incluyendo el cero), en la medida en que la condición de posi-
tividad –a saber, que toda distancia es mayor o igual que cero– se demuestra trivialmente a partir de las 
condiciones de minimalidad, simetría y desigualdad triangular. 
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guientes (Blumenthal 1953, p. 15) –también conocidas como axiomas métricos o axiomas 
de distancia21–: 
 ( , ) 0  syss  d a b a b  (minimalidad) 
( , ) ( , )d a b d b a  (simetría) 
 ( , ) ( , ) ( , )d a b d b c d a c  (desigualdad triangular) 
En consecuencia, minimalidad, simetría y desigualdad triangular son las tres asunciones 
básicas en un modelo geométrico estándar. El requisito de minimalidad exige que todo 
objeto sea mínimamente disimilar –o, alternativamente, máximamente similar– a sí 
mismo, y que lo sean todos ellos por igual22. La condición de simetría indica, por su parte, 
que el orden de los objetos considerados no afecta a la (di)similaridad existente entre ellos 
(esto es, que el objeto a es tan similar a b como el objeto b lo es a a). En último lugar, la 
 
21 Junto con los axiomas métricos, los modelos geométricos también aceptan la aditividad de segmentos, 
además de las asunciones dimensionales –a saber, dominancia, consistencia y transitividad–. Con res-
pecto a la aditividad de segmentos, esta condición exige que las distancias a lo largo de un segmento sean 
aditivas, lo que equivale a que dado un segmento con extremos a y c, y siendo b un punto interior de di-
cho segmento, entonces d(a,b) + d(b,c) = d(a,c) (Beals et al. 1968). 
En cuanto a las asunciones dimensionales, su carácter no-métrico permite definirlas no solo en términos 
de una función distancia métrica d, sino también en términos de una medida ordinal de distancia d. Di-
cho esto, las asunciones dimensionales –que permiten calificar de monótona a una estructura de proxi-
midad, por lo que también son llamados axiomas de monotonicidad– pueden definirse como sigue 
(Tversky y Gati 1982, p. 124): 
 Dominancia: una distancia bidimensional excede sus componentes unidimensionales, esto es: 
d(x1y1,x2y2)>d(x1y1,x1y2)  y  d(x1y1,x2y2)>d(x1y2,x2y2) 
 Consistencia: el orden de los intervalos en un atributo no depende de los valores del otro atributo: 
d(x1y1,x2y1)>d(x3y1,x4y1)  syss  d(x1y2,x2y2)>d(x3y2,x4y2) 
d(x1y1,x1y2)>d(x1y3,x1y4)  syss  d(x2y1,x2y2)>d(x2y3,x2y4) 
 Transitividad: la relación “estar entre” es transitiva (o no-circular). Si decimos que, para tres 
puntos alineados a, b y c, el punto b está entre a y c (relación denotada como abc) cuando 
d(a,c)>d(a,b) y d(a,c)>d(b,c), entonces que la relación “estar entre” sea transitiva equivale a: 
abc  y  bcd    abd  y  acd 
En el caso particular de la métrica de Minkowski, las asunciones dimensionales son condiciones nece-
sarias y suficientes para las que esa métrica cumpla las propiedades de subtractividad intradimensional 
(esto es, que la contribución de cada componente sea el valor absoluto de sus diferencias) y aditividad 
interdimensional (es decir, que la distancia sea una función de la suma de sus contribuciones compo-
nentes) (Tversky y Krantz 1970). De hecho, para el caso de un espacio n-dimensional euclidiano (que 
no con métrica euclidiana), las únicas métricas con segmentos aditivos que satisfacen la subtractividad 
intradimensional son las métricas generales de Minkowski (ib., p. 589). Finalmente, para una explica-
ción de las relaciones jerárquicas existentes entre todas estas asunciones y propiedades véase Borg y 
Groenen (1997, pp. 293-294). 
22 En este punto conviene indicar que la condición de minimalidad indicada es ligeramente más fuerte 
que la exigida por Tversky (1977, p. 328), y referida por él con el mismo nombre. De hecho, la condi-
ción de minimalidad de Tversky, a saber, d(a,a) = 0, no garantiza que el espacio/distancia sea métrico –
en contra de lo sostenido por Tversky–, sino tan solo pseudo-métrico (Kelley 1955, pp. 118-119). 
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desigualdad triangular exige que la disimilitud –o distancia– entre dos objetos a y c no 
pueda ser mayor que la disimilitud entre a y un tercer objeto b más la disimilitud entre b y 
c. En términos geométricos esto equivale a decir que el camino más corto entre dos obje-
tos es el segmento de recta que conecta los puntos que representan tales objetos. 
Sobre esta base, los modelos geométricos representan las entidades como puntos de un 
espacio métrico organizado en dimensiones, construido a partir de juicios de similaridad 
(o disimilitud), matrices de confusión, coeficientes de correlación, etc. El resultado de 
esta construcción es un espacio representacional en donde los puntos representan obje-
tos, y la similaridad entre dos objetos –a y b, por ejemplo– es inversamente proporcional 
a la distancia d existente entre ellos. Así, Shepard describe23 la similaridad entre dos obje-
tos –o estímulos– a y b en términos de una función exponencial negativa de la distancia 
existente entre ellos24: 
( , ) exp[ ( , )]s a b k d a b    
En donde k es un parámetro que determina cómo de deprisa disminuye la similaridad 
entre dos objetos con la distancia existente entre ellos. 
Finalmente, la distancia entre dos objetos a y b es normalmente computada como una 
distancia de Minkowski25 la cual, en un espacio n-dimensional donde xi[u] representara la 













d a b x x  
La métrica p de Minkowski –también referida como métrica de potencias o métrica Lp 
(Tversky y Krantz 1970)– define una familia de funciones (una para cada valor del pará-
metro p  1) que expresan la distancia entre dos objetos por medio de las potencias de las 
diferencias entre sus componentes. Con ello, el valor del parámetro p determina el tipo de 
métrica y distancia: si p=1 estaríamos ante una métrica city-block (o Manhattan); si p=2 
la métrica sería euclidiana. 
 
23 Sobre la base de un conjunto de estudios empíricos que le condujeron a proponer su ley universal de 
generalización para la ciencia cognitiva (Shepard 1980, 1987). 
24 El empleo de una función exponencial negativa hace que la variación de la similaridad –con respecto a 
la distancia– aumente conforme las distancias disminuyen. 
25 Para una presentación de las métricas de Minkowski, junto con muchas de sus propiedades formales 
véase Busemann (1955, pp. 94-104). 
26 Churchland, en su respuesta a las críticas de Fodor y Lepore (1992) en contra de la posibilidad de que 
un modelo neuronal pueda dar cuenta de nociones tales como identidad o similaridad conceptual (da-
da la gran diversidad estructural y funcional que –argumentan– puede esperarse encontrar en las redes 
neuronales constituyentes del cerebro de los distintos sujetos), plantea una interpretación “geométrica” 
análoga para los modelos de cognición basados en redes neuronales. Bajo dicha interpretación, los pa-
trones de activación de una red neuronal pueden ser concebidos como puntos en un espacio (privado) 
n-dimensional, cuyas dimensiones (privadas) fuesen los niveles de activación de cada una de las n neu-
ronas intervinientes (Churchland 1998, p. 6). 
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3.3.2 Escalamiento multidimensional 
Históricamente, ha sido el escalamiento multidimensional (EMD) –en inglés, multi-
dimensional scaling (MDS)– la aproximación preferida para caracterizar los modelos 
geométricos27 (Torgerson 1952, 1965; Shepard 1962a, 1962b, 1980). El propósito del 
EMD es, sobre la base de las similaridades –o disimilitudes– observadas entre cada par de 
elementos pertenecientes a un cierto conjunto de objetos, encontrar una representación 
de dichos objetos mediante unas pocas dimensiones, de modo tal que las distancias entre 
cada par de objetos en el nuevo espacio encajen lo más posible con las distancias existen-
tes entre ellos en el espacio original. 
Dado un conjunto O de n objetos, la entrada del EMD será una matriz n-por-n de 
proximidades –o distancias– que describa cómo de cerca está cada objeto de O del resto 
de objetos pertenecientes a O. Dicha matriz de entrada representará a los n objetos por 
medio de n(n–1)/2 valores –o distancias–. Por su parte, la salida del EMD es una matriz 
n-por-m que constituye una representación geométrica de cada uno de los n objetos en 
un espacio m-dimensional, en este caso mediante nm valores. Sobre esta base, el EMD 
constituye un método para la compresión de información –al representar los datos de 
entrada por medio de un conjunto menor de dimensiones (dado que m<n)–. Además, la 
reducción dimensional revela los factores subyacentes a los datos de entrada, y facilita el 
poder dar –a dichos factores constituyentes del espacio representacional reducido– una 
interpretación psicológica28. 
Por ejemplo, si dispusiéramos de los siguientes valores de similaridad29 entre China, 
Japón y Corea del Norte: 
 Similaridad (China, Japón) = 3 
 Similaridad (China, Corea del Norte) = 7 
 Similaridad (Japón, Corea del Norte) = 1 
El EMD intentaría construir un espacio tal que, cuando se ubiquen estos tres países en él, 
aquellos países juzgados más similares estuvieran más próximos entre sí que aquellos otros 
considerados menos similares. Obviamente, conforme aumente el número de dimen-
siones empleadas, aumentará la bondad de ajuste del modelo, pudiéndose alcanzar un 
ajuste perfecto si la dimensionalidad del modelo resultante es lo suficientemente alta. 
Para ello el modelo debería agotar el número de grados de libertad –o, parámetros que 
 
27 En todo caso, los algoritmos de agrupamiento –también llamados de clustering– son también una op-
ción muy versátil a la hora de articular de este tipo de modelos. 
28 No obstante, uno de los problemas del EMD es que los juicios de similaridad (o datos de proximidades 
/ distancias) entre los objetos no son un input disponible en el aprendizaje de los sujetos. Por esta 
razón, aún cuando el EMD puede ser útil a la hora de realizar un análisis –o reconstrucción– racional 
de cuál es la estructura del espacio conceptual de un sujeto, no constituiría un modelo válido de cómo 
opera realmente ese aspecto de la cognición (es decir, de cómo los conceptos se adquieren). 
29 Dados en una escala del 1 al 10, en donde 1 fuera baja similaridad y 10 fuera alta similaridad. 
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pueden variar de modo independiente– de los datos de entrada, por lo que el ajuste per-
fecto de un conjunto con n objetos precisaría de un espacio con n–1 dimensiones30. 
3.3.3 Puntos fuertes y débiles 
La principal ventaja del modelo geométrico es que da perfecta cuenta de la noción de 
similaridad, tanto de los juicios de similaridad absolutos propios de la perspectiva clásica, 
como de la concepción comparativa de similaridad que Quine (1969) concebía en torno 
a relaciones de tipo triádico. En el primer caso –similaridad absoluta– dos objetos se con-
siderarán similares si la distancia entre ellos cumple una cierta condición (por ejemplo, si 
no supera un determinado umbral). En el segundo caso –similaridad comparativa– dados 
tres objetos a, b, y c diríamos que a es más similar a b que a c si la distancia entre a y b es 
menor que la distancia entre a y c. En ambos casos el modelo geométrico proporciona una 
caracterización formal de las relaciones consideradas. 
Por su parte, los métodos de EMD tienen tres aplicaciones, o ventajas, principales. 
Primero, permiten identificar las dimensiones subyacentes a un conjunto inicial de datos 
(en este caso, a los juicios de similaridad –o disimilitud– de entrada). En segundo lugar, 
permiten producir espacios conceptuales con una dimensionalidad mucho menor que la 
de las descripciones perceptuales iniciales, lo cual resulta cognitivamente eficiente en 
términos de codificación, memoria y procesamiento. En tercer lugar, el modelo resultante 
puede emplearse para caracterizar funciones cognitivas tales como categorizaciones, infe-
rencias, memoria, etc. 
No obstante, uno de los problemas del EMD es que, aún cuando puede ser un enfoque 
válido a la hora de intentar caracterizar la forma/organización de nuestros espacios con-
ceptuales (sobre la base de un conjunto de juicios de similaridad/disimilitud obtenidos 
preguntando a los sujetos), resulta más cuestionable si se pretende emplear para explicar 
 
30 El motivo por el que un espacio con dimensionalidad n–1 permite una caracterización perfecta de las 
distancias entre n objetos es simple. Por un lado, el número de grados de libertad es igual al número de 
distancias existentes entre los objetos considerados. Así, el número de grados de libertad para un con-
junto de n objetos será un número triangular dado por la fórmula n(n–1)/2. La razón es que si k obje-
tos tienen nk grados de libertad, la adición de un nuevo objeto añadirá k grados de libertad (sobre nk), 
asociados a las distancias entre el nuevo objeto y los k objetos anteriores, por lo que la serie de números 
de grados de libertad no es otra que la serie de números triangulares. 
Sobre esta base puede razonarse como sigue. Dados dos objetos a y b es posible situar al objeto a sobre 
una recta, y al objeto b a la distancia adecuada d(a,b) sobre dicha recta. La adición de un tercer objeto c 
obliga, para su caracterización perfecta, a añadir una segunda dimensión. Los dos primeros objetos a y b 
se situarían del modo ya indicado sobre la recta (o hiperplano unidimensional), y el tercer objeto c se 
ubicaría –fuera de esa recta– en la intersección de las circunferencias centradas en a y b y con radios 
d(a,c) y d(b,c), respectivamente. La adición de un cuarto objeto d obliga, para una caracterización per-
fecta, a añadir una tercera dimensión. Los tres primeros objetos a, b y c se ubicarían sobre un plano (o 
hiperplano bidimensional) del modo antes indicado, y el cuarto objeto d se situaría –fuera de ese pla-
no– en la intersección de las superficies esféricas centradas en a, b y c y con radios d(a,d), d(b,d) y 
d(c,d), respectivamente. Como ya debería ser obvio, los k nuevos grados de libertad introducidos por 
cada nuevo objeto con respecto al conjunto de k objetos previos situados en un hiperplano (k–
1)dimensional, obligan a introducir una nueva dimensión k en donde la localización del nuevo objeto 
quedará determinada por sus k distancias con respecto a los objetos anteriores. 
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cómo los sujetos adquieren los conceptos, o cuál es el origen de sus elementos constituti-
vos más básicos (esto es, cuál es el origen de las dimensiones que constituyen esos espacios 
conceptuales). En este caso la cuestión crucial es que la matriz de similaridades –o disimi-
litudes– es una entrada necesaria para que el EMD pueda producir un modelo, razón por 
la cual dicha matriz deberá estar disponible al inicio del proceso de análisis. Sin embargo, 
aún cuando esa matriz es un input no problemático en estudios psicológicos (en los que 
se pregunta a los sujetos sobre sus juicios de similaridad acerca de un cierto conjunto de 
objetos), tal no es el caso cuando se considera –por ejemplo– cómo un sujeto determina 
las dimensiones constitutivas de uno de sus espacios conceptuales pues, en este segundo 
caso, la asunción de que la matriz de similitudes es un input disponible para el sujeto en 
su proceso de aprendizaje resulta mucho más controvertida. 
Y, ya de modo general, otra objeción que –en ocasiones– se hace a los modelos geo-
métricos es que los juicios de similaridad a menudo dependen del contexto, razón por la 
cual las circunstancias podrían alterar las similaridades percibidas/evaluadas para un 
mismo conjunto de objetos (Goodman 1972, p. 445). En este caso, la crítica es doble. Por 
un lado, pone en cuestión que los modelos de tipo geométrico dispongan de parámetros 
que los hagan sensibles al contexto. Por el otro, y lo que es más grave, el carácter relativo 
de la similaridad –con respecto a un contexto o propiedades relevantes– la convierte en 
una noción vaga si no se concreta cuál es el contexto del discurso (esto es, con respecto a 
qué propiedad(es) son dos objetos similares). Pero, si a la afirmación de que dos cosas son 
similares le añadimos la especificación de la propiedad que comparten, entonces –en 
opinión de Goodman– la afirmación de su similaridad se convierte en superflua31. Frente 
a esta crítica, Goldstone y Son (2005) consideran que hay buenas razones para rechazar la 
conclusión de Goodman –de que la similaridad es bien vaga o innecesaria–, en la medida 
en que (i) no siempre podemos dar cuerpo a la cláusula “con respecto a la propiedad i” 
mediante una única propiedad32, y en esos casos el empleo de la similaridad resulta natu-
ral y primitiva (Smith y Kemler 1978; Smith 1989); y (ii) los adultos pueden tener impre-
siones generales de similaridad sin atender a propiedades específicas (Ward 1983; Smith 
y Kemler 1984). 
3.3.4 Violación de los axiomas: contraejemplos y réplicas 
En todo caso, posiblemente el mayor problema del modelo geométrico estándar son los 
tres axiomas métricos en los que se apoya pues, desde el trabajo de Tversky (1977), se ha 
sostenido que existen evidencias empíricas en contra de todos ellos: 
 Minimalidad: en cuanto a la condición de minimalidad, su problema es que im-
plica una misma similaridad reflexiva para todos los objetos. O, dicho de otro mo-
 
31 A esto es precisamente a lo que luego apuntará Medin cuando indique que la similaridad resulta útil 
únicamente en la medida en que pueda concretar (a) los principios que determinan lo que es una pro-
piedad relevante, y (b) los principios que determinan la importancia de cada propiedad particular 
(Medin 1989, p. 1474). Además, considerado esto, el trabajo explicativo recaería, no tanto en la noción 
de similaridad, como sí en los principios que determinan las propiedades relevantes y su importancia, 
por lo que la idea de similaridad sería más bien una variable dependiente que independiente. 
32 Este fenómeno resulta especialmente evidente en el caso de los niños. 
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do, implica que la similaridad de un objeto a con respecto a sí mismo deba ser igual 
a la similaridad de cualquier otro objeto b con respecto a sí mismo. En este caso el 
problema es que existen estudios empíricos –basados en el tiempo empleado para 
reconocer dos objetos como similares– que muestran que los sujetos identifican 
más rápidamente la similaridad entre dos ejemplares iguales de la letra S, que entre 
dos ejemplares iguales de la letra W (Podgorny y Garner 1979, p. 41). Y, aún peor, 
que la similaridad entre un ejemplar de la letra C y un ejemplar de la letra O es 
mayor que la similaridad entre dos ejemplares iguales de la letra W (ib., p. 47); e 
incluso que la letra M es más reconocida como una H (p=39.1%) que como una 
M (p=11%) (Gilmore et al. 1979, p. 427). 
 Simetría: con respecto al axioma de simetría Tversky ya demostraba que los juicios 
de los sujetos muchas veces no son simétricos, tal y como sucedía en el caso de 
China y Corea del Norte en donde la mayoría de los sujetos asentían a la afir-
mación “Corea del Norte es similar a China”, mientras que muy pocos de ellos 
asentían a la afirmación simétrica “China es similar a Corea del Norte” (Tversky 
1977, p. 334; Tversky y Gati 1978, pp. 84-85). En este caso Tversky y Gati ar-
gumentaban que las asimetrías eran debidas a la distinta importancia que tienen 
los países en ambas oraciones33. Otras violaciones semejantes de la condición de 
simetría también han sido observadas en contextos de tipo social, en los que –por 
ejemplo– los sujetos juzgan que sus amigos son más similares a ellos mismos que lo 
que ellos lo son con respecto a esos mismos amigos (Holyoak y Gordon 1983). 
 Desigualdad triangular: el problema de este tercer axioma es que Tversky y Gati 
(1982) realizaron una serie de estudios empíricos en los que mostraban que esta 
condición no era compatible con la condición de segmentos aditivos. La condición 
de aditividad de segmentos exige que las distancias a lo largo de un segmento sean 
aditivas –esto es, dado un par de puntos a y c, y siendo b un punto perteneciente al 
segmento ac, entonces d(a,b) + d(b,c) = d(a,c)– (Beals et al. 1968)34. Ahora bien, la 
combinación de la desigualdad triangular con la aditividad de segmentos para el ca-
so de un triángulo rectángulo con vértices a, e y c, cuya hipotenusa (segmento ac) 
contuviese un cuarto punto b, permite obtener la desigualdad d(a,e) + d(e,c)  
d(a,b) + d(b,c), o desigualdad de esquina (ver Fig. 3.1). Esta desigualdad se cumple 
si el camino de esquina excede el camino central, lo cual ocurrirá si d(a,e)  d(a,b) y 
d(e,c)  d(b,c), o si d(a,e)  d(b,c) y d(e,c)  d(a,b); y no se cumple si el camino central 
es mayor que el camino de esquina, lo cual sucede si se satisface una condición igual 
a la anterior pero con desigualdades opuestas35. El problema es que la investigación 
 
33 Su tesis era que en estas afirmaciones el sujeto es el país menos prominente, mientras que el otro actúa 
como referente en la evaluación de la similaridad. Debido a ello el segundo país (esto es, el más promi-
nente) establecería el contexto en el que la similaridad se evalúa y, siendo contextos distintos, no es ex-
traño que sus similaridades asociadas también difieran. 
34 Véase nota al pie 21 de este capítulo. 
35 Estas dos condiciones no agotan los casos en los que la desigualdad de esquina se cumple –o no se cum-
ple–, aunque sí aquellos en los que su cumplimiento –o incumplimiento– puede comprobarse con di-
similaridades puramente ordinales. 
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de Tversky y Gati (1982, pp. 131-132) mostraba violaciones sistemáticas de esta 
desigualdad (en donde el camino central era significativamente mayor que el ca-
mino de esquina) lo que no solo refutaba la desigualdad de esquina, sino que –con 






Fig. 3.1.  Triángulo rectángulo y esquema de puntos considerados en la desigualdad de esquina. 
Por su parte, los defensores de los modelos geométricos han respondido a las anteriores 
violaciones de los axiomas métricos apelando a la noción de contexto. Este tipo de res-
puestas parten de la asunción de que los juicios de similaridad tienen lugar siempre en el 
seno de un contexto, sin el cual no podrían evaluarse. O, en otras palabras, la similaridad 
entre objetos únicamente podría determinarse con respecto a ciertos aspectos (o propie-
dades), y esos aspectos relevantes pueden variar de contexto en contexto36. Ahora bien, 
conforme veremos a continuación no existe un único modo de caracterizar la influencia 
del contexto sobre la similaridad, sino múltiples propuestas alternativas al respecto. 
Comenzando con la violación de los axiomas de minimalidad y simetría37, las prin-
cipales respuestas a ellas recurren, bien a la noción de densidad (Krumhansl), bien a la de 
sesgo (Holman y Nosofsky). Así, Krumhansl (1978) considera que la disimilaridad entre 
dos estímulos es una función creciente, tanto de la distancia entre los puntos que los 
representan, como de la densidad de estímulos en torno a cada uno de esos dos puntos, los 
cuales en este caso actuarían como contexto. Aquí “estímulos” debe entenderse en el 
sentido de puntos representando objetos del mundo a los que el sujeto haya estado ex-
puesto, por lo que “densidad de estímulos” refiere a la concentración de puntos en una 
cierta región del espacio representacional. Sobre esta base, la función distancia modifica-
da d*(a,b) considerada por Krumhansl adoptaría la forma siguiente: 
d*(a,b) = d(a,b)+ad (a)+bd (b) 
En donde d (x) es una medida de la densidad espacial en el entorno del punto x, y los 
parámetros a y b serían los pesos dados a las densidades d (a) y d (b), respectivamente. En 
este modelo dos pares de puntos (a,b) y (c,d) situados a igual distancia –esto es, tales que 
 
36 Esta respuesta –a saber, una concepción contexto-dependiente de la similaridad– permite a los mode-
los geométricos, no solo dar cuenta de las violaciones de los axiomas de distancia, sino también satisfa-
cer la dependencia del contexto –o circunstancias– puesta de manifiesto por Goodman (1972, p. 445). 
37 Para un repaso completo de las aproximaciones y modelos de similaridades –o proximidades– asimétri-
cas véase Zielman y Heiser (1996). 
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d(a,b) = d(c,d)– pero localizados en regiones con distintas densidades de estímulos (por 
ejemplo, a y b en una región más densa, y c y d en una región menos densa) tendrían simi-
laridades distintas, y tales que s(a,b) < s(c,d). La ventaja de este enfoque es que da cuenta 
del hecho de que los sujetos hagan discriminaciones más finas de similaridad en regiones 
más densas que en aquellas otras menos densas. Así, si en el ejemplo antes presentado de 
violación del axioma de minimalidad, la letra W estuviera situada en una región más 
densa que la letra S, la similaridad entre dos ejemplares iguales de la letra W sería menor 
que la similaridad entre dos ejemplares iguales de la letra S, lo cual explicaría por qué estos 
últimos –letras S– son identificados más rápidamente (como similares) por los sujetos 
que los dos primeros –letras W–38. Por tanto, el hecho de que en el modelo de Krum-
hansl la auto-similaridad (o similaridad de un objeto consigo mismo) sea mayor para 
objetos representados por puntos localizados en regiones poco densas, que para objetos 
representados por puntos en regiones más densas, explicaría la violación del axioma de 
minimalidad. 
Además, debido al carácter direccional de los juicios de (di)similaridad, en donde uno 
de los objetos actúa como sujeto y el otro como referente (Tversky 1977, p. 328) (por 
ejemplo, en el juicio “a es similar a b”, el objeto a sería el sujeto, y el objeto b sería el refe-
rente), la contribución a la disimilaridad de la densidad en torno a cada objeto podría 
estar diferentemente ponderada para el sujeto y el referente, lo que daría lugar a la exis-
tencia de similaridades asimétricas y, por consiguiente, explicaría la violación del axioma 
de simetría. Así, por ejemplo, en el caso de la similaridad entre China y Corea del Norte, 
si sus densidades espaciales fuesen d (China)=4 y d (Corea del Norte)=1, y sujeto y refe-
rente recibiesen pesos distintos a =3 y b =1, el modelo de Krumhansl explicaría por qué 
los sujetos asienten más frecuentemente al juicio “Corea del Norte es similar a China”, 
que al juicio “China es similar a Corea del Norte”. 
Por su parte, las respuestas de Holman (1979) y Nosofsky39 (1991) a la violación del 
axioma de simetría se basan en una función de sesgo o, por comparación con el modelo de 
Krumhansl, consideran que la similaridad entre dos estímulos es función, tanto de la 
distancia entre los puntos que la representan, como del sesgo de cada uno de esos estímu-
los40. En este caso los dos estímulos considerados serían el factor que actúa como contex-
to, el cual estaría asociado al hecho de que un cierto estímulo pueda ser más prominente 
en percepción o memoria, más fácilmente atendido, más rápidamente codificado41, etc. 
Tal y como ocurría en el modelo de Krumhansl, el carácter direccional de los juicios de 
similaridad permite concebir que el sesgo de cada estímulo pueda depender de su rol en el 
juicio de similaridad, lo que permitiría la existencia de similaridades asimétricas y, con 
 
38 Razonamientos análogos explican el resto de violaciones del axioma de minimalidad antes menciona-
das. 
39 Algo más recientemente, Johannesson (2000) ha propuesto un modelo de prominencias relativas, que 
no es más que una versión logarítmica del modelo basado en sesgos de Nosofsky. 
40 Este “sesgo del estímulo” en ocasiones también ha sido llamado “peso del estímulo” (Shepard 1957). 
41 O, en otras palabras, el sesgo de un estímulo sería una medida de cómo de bueno es ese estímulo, en 
donde la bondad del estímulo es indicativa de la eficiencia del sujeto al procesarlo (Garner y Clement 
1963; Garner 1970). 
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ello, la violación del axioma de simetría. Por otro lado, el sesgo de estímulo también po-
dría explicar las violaciones del axioma de minimalidad, en la medida en que los tiempos 
necesarios para el reconocimiento de similaridades podrían variar en función de los sesgos 
asociados a los estímulos considerados. Una propuesta similar a los modelos basados en 
sesgos es la de Takane y Sergent (1983), quienes definen la disimilaridad entre dos estí-
mulos como una función de la distancia que los separa y la complejidad de cada uno de 
ellos, la cual también permitiría explicar la violación del axioma de minimalidad42. 
En cuanto a las violaciones de la desigualdad triangular, en este caso se ha argumen-
tado que el contexto podría no activar todas las dimensiones asociadas al conjunto de 
conceptos considerado o, alternativamente, que tales dimensiones pueden tener pesos  
distintos en función del contexto (Krumhansl 1978; Holman 1979; Nosofsky 1991). En 
ambos casos, la función de similaridad resultante podría no cumplir la desigualdad trian-
gular. Finalmente, otra posible explicación de la violación de la desigualdad triangular es 
la propuesta por Nosofsky (1992b) –aunque ya tácitamente presente en Tversky y Gati 
(1982, p. 150)–, según la cual el valor p < 1 obtenido por Tversky y Gati para el modelo 
de potencias de Minkowski (y en virtud del cual concluían el no cumplimiento de la 
desigualdad triangular) podría explicarse –o interpretarse– como que los sujetos propor-
cionan sistemáticamente más atención (es decir, ponderan más) a aquellas dimensiones 
en las que los estímulos son más similares43. 
3.4. Modelos de rasgos 
Todas las anteriores aparentes deficiencias del modelo geométrico condujeron a Tversky 
(1977) a proponer una caracterización de la similaridad en términos de un proceso de 
emparejamiento –en inglés, matching– de rasgos. El modelo de rasgos de Tversky (tam-
bién llamado, modelo de contraste) es una aproximación a la similaridad basada en la teo-
ría de conjuntos, en donde las entidades (objetos y conceptos) se representan por medio 
de conjuntos de rasgos –o atributos– constitutivos44. 
3.4.1 Axiomas y teorema de representación 
Tversky presentaba su propuesta en los términos siguientes. Sea un dominio de objetos o 
estímulos   { , , , }a b c ; sean A, B, C, etc., los conjuntos de rasgos asociados con los obje-
tos a, b, c, etc., respectivamente; y sea s(a,b) la medida de la similaridad entre los objetos a 
 
42 Otra explicación alternativa de cómo el contexto puede dar cuenta del no cumplimiento del axioma de 
minimalidad puede encontrarse en Ashby y Perrin (1988, pp. 133-134). 
43 Esta interpretación sería consistente con la sospecha de Sjöberg y Thorslund (1979) de que los sujetos 
buscan activamente modos en que los estímulos de entrada generen clases de objetos altamente simila-
res. En el caso de la explicación de Nosofsky, la mayor ponderación de las dimensiones en las que los 
estímulos son más similares contribuiría precisamente a ese propósito. 
44 Por ejemplo, el concepto PLÁTANO podría tener como atributos constitutivos los pertenecientes al con-
junto { amarillo, falcado, dulce, tamaño-medio }; mientras que un cierto plátano concreto, en cambio, 
podría estar representado por el conjunto de rasgos { verde, falcado, amargo, tamaño-medio }. 
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y b. Sobre esta base, el modelo de rasgos se articula en torno los siguientes tres axiomas 
principales: 
(1) Emparejamiento: la similaridad entre los objetos a y b es función (i) de los rasgos 
comunes entre a y b (A∩B ); y (ii) de sus rasgos distintivos, a saber, de los rasgos de 
a que no son rasgos de b (o diferencia entre los rasgos de a y b, esto es, A–B ), y de 
los rasgos de b que no son rasgos de a (o diferencia entre los rasgos de b y a, esto es, 
B–A ). Esto suele expresarse del modo siguiente: 
s(a,b) = f (A∩B, A–B, B–A) 
Los componentes –o factores– de la función f (a saber, A∩B, A–B y B–A) no son 
más que subconjuntos del conjunto de todos los rasgos asociados a los objetos del 
dominio , denotados como X, Y y Z (donde X=A∩B, Y=A–B y Z=B–A). 
(2) Monotonicidad: según la cual la función de similaridad aumenta con la inclusión 
de rasgos comunes y con la supresión de rasgos distintivos. Esta condición puede 
formularse de la manera siguiente45: 
s(a,b)  s(a,c)    si    A∩C ⊆ A∩B   y   A–B ⊆ A–C   y   B–A ⊆ C–A 
Cualquier función f que cumpla los axiomas de emparejamiento y monotonicidad 
es llamada por Tversky (ib., p 330) función de emparejamiento, pues permite de-
terminar el grado en que dos objetos –concebidos en términos de conjuntos de 
rasgos– encajan entre sí. 
(3) Independencia: el axioma de independencia sostiene que el orden del efecto con-
junto de cualesquiera dos componentes de la función f es independiente del valor 
fijo del tercer factor. Esto equivale a que, si suponemos que los pares (a,b) y (c,d), y 
los pares (a´,b´) y (c´,d´) comparten las mismas dos componentes –sean éstas cua-
les sean–; y que los pares (a,b) y (a´,b´), y los pares (c,d) y (c´,d´) comparten la res-
tante tercera componente; entonces: 
s(a,b)  s(a´,b´)    syss    s(c,d)  s(c´,d´) 
A partir de estos axiomas46, Tversky prueba su teorema de representación, según el cual 
existe una escala de similaridad S y una escala no-negativa F tales que, para cualesquiera 
cuatro objetos a, b, c y d del dominio , se cumplen las tres condiciones siguientes: 
 
45 En esta expresión la desigualdad no-estricta  puede substituirse por la desigualdad estricta > si al me-
nos una de las tres relaciones de inclusión ⊆ es una relación de inclusión propia . 
46 Además de los tres axiomas principales (de emparejamiento, monotonicidad e independencia), el modelo 
de rasgos de Tversky asume otros dos axiomas de tipo instrumental. El cuarto axioma –o solubilidad– 
precisa que el espacio de rasgos sea lo suficientemente rico como para que ciertas ecuaciones de simila-
ridad puedan resolverse. Por su parte, el quinto axioma –o invariancia– garantiza que la equivalencia 
de intervalos se preserva a través de las distintas componentes (o factores). Para una presentación deta-
llada de la formulación axiomática del modelo de rasgos, junto con la prueba de su teorema principal, 
véase Tversky (1977, pp. 350-351). 
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S(a,b)  S(c,d)    syss    s(a,b)  s(c,d) 
S(a,b) = q F(A∩B )–a F(A–B )–b F(B–A ), con q, a, b  0 
F y S son escalas de intervalo 
Lo que el teorema de representación dice es que existe una escala de similaridad S que 
preserva el ordenamiento de similaridad observado, y que dicho orden se puede expresar 
como una combinación lineal –o contraste (de ahí que este enfoque también se conozca 
como modelo de contraste47)– de sus rasgos comunes y distintivos. En la expresión ante-
rior los parámetros q, a y b son los pesos de los factores comunes y distintivos, en función 
de la importancia dada a cada uno de ellos por el sujeto en los diferentes contextos. 
Por tanto, el modelo de rasgos opera mediante un proceso de encaje –o empareja-
miento– de rasgos basado en la diferente ponderación de los rasgos comunes (A∩B ) y los 
dos tipos de rasgos distintivos (A–B  y B–A ), siendo habitual dar mayor peso a los rasgos 
comunes –parámetro q–, que a los distintivos –parámetros a y b–. 
3.4.2 Ventajas frente al modelo geométrico 
Originalmente los modelos de rasgos presentaban48 dos ventajas principales frente a los 
modelos geométricos, a saber, (i) eran capaces de explicar la dependencia contextual de 
los juicios de similaridad, y (ii) predecían la existencia de similaridades asimétricas. En 
cuanto a la dependencia del contexto, los modelos de rasgos representan los objetos en un 
dominio mediante un subconjunto de todas las propiedades que cada objeto tiene –esto 
es, mediante sus propiedades relevantes según los intereses y propósitos del sujeto (los 
cuales variarán de contexto en contexto)–. Además, incluso dado un cierto conjunto de 
propiedades relevantes, la importancia de cada una de ellas podría variar de un contexto a 
otro. Finalmente, la propia selección del dominio podría ser sensible al contexto; así, por 
ejemplo, si todos los objetos considerados compartiesen un mismo rasgo, ese rasgo tende-
ría a convertirse en neutral –Tversky lo llama efecto de extensión–y, por lo tanto, el domi-
 
47 No obstante, el modelo de contraste no es el único modelo de rasgos posible, en la medida en que la fun-
ción S puede adoptar otras formas alternativas, distintas de la considerada por Tversky en su teorema 
de representación. Así, por ejemplo, si la función de similaridad estuviese normalizada (de manera que 
variase entre 0 y 1) conforme a la expresión siguiente, nos encontraríamos ante un modelo de rasgos di-
ferente –al que Tversky (1977, p. 333) da el nombre de modelo de proporción–: 
S(a,b) = F(A∩B ) / [ F(A∩B )+a F(A–B )+b F(B–A ) ], con a, b  0 
Con respecto a esto, existen múltiples antecedentes similares al modelo de contraste que caracterizan la 
similaridad en base a sus componentes comunes y distintivas. Así, por ejemplo, Bush y Mosteller 
(1951) definen la similaridad como F(A∩B )/F(A ); por su parte, Ekman y colaboradores la conciben 
como F(A∩B )/(F(A )+F(B )) –bajo la asunción de estímulos unidimensionales en donde la magnitud 
de A es menor que la de B– (Eisler y Ekman 1959; Ekman et al. 1964); mientras que Sjöberg la define 
como F(A∩B )/F(A∪B ) (Sjöberg 1972; Sjöberg y Thorslund 1979). Obviamente, todas estas aproxi-
maciones caracterizan la similaridad como un ratio entre los rasgos comunes y distintivos (y no como 
una combinación lineal suya, tal y como hace el modelo de contraste), por lo que serían variaciones del 
modelo de proposición, que no del modelo de contraste. 
48 Digo que “presentaban” pues, como se ha visto en la sección anterior, es posible introducir variaciones 
en el modelo geométrico original –o estándar– que permiten incluir la influencia del contexto. 
Medidas y modelos de similaridad conceptual 
75 
nio no lo incluiría dentro de su conjunto de propiedades relevantes (Tversky 1977, p. 
343; Medin et al. 1993). 
El segundo y más importante punto fuerte de los modelos de rasgos es su capacidad 
para dar cuenta de la violación de la condición de simetría en los juicios de similaridad. 
Nada en el modelo de contraste exige que los parámetros a y b sean iguales, ni tampoco 
que las componentes F(A–B ) y F(B–A ) tengan que serlo, lo que explicaría tanto las vio-
laciones del axioma de simetría, como el carácter direccional de los juicios de similaridad. 
Así, por ejemplo, en la comparación entre China –sujeto, u objeto a– y Corea del Norte 
–referente, u objeto b–, si China tuviese más rasgos relevantes que Corea del Norte, y el 
parámetro a fuese mayor que b, eso explicaría que los sujetos juzguen que Corea de Norte 
es más similar a China que lo que China lo es a Corea del Norte. 
Finalmente, el modelo de contraste también explica el carácter no especular de los jui-
cios de similaridad y diferencia. En este caso, y bajo la asunción de que el peso dado a la 
componente común fuese mayor en los juicios de similaridad que en los de diferencia, y 
que los pesos de las componentes distintivas fuesen mayores en los de diferencia, entonces 
un par de estímulos podría ser percibido al mismo tiempo como más similar y más dife-
rente entre sí que otro par de estímulos dado (Tversky 1977, p. 340; Medin et al. 1993). 
Esto era justamente lo que sucedía para los países Alemania Occidental y Alemania 
Oriental, los cuales eran considerados por una mayoría de sujetos como más similares 
(67% de los sujetos) y más diferentes (70% de los sujetos) entre sí que los países Ceilán y 
Nepal. En este caso, la explicación dada por Tversky es que el número de rasgos, en 
común y distintivos, conocidos por los sujetos para el caso de Alemania Occidental y 
Oriental es mayor que el número de rasgos comunes y distintivos conocidos para el caso 
de Ceilán y Nepal. 
3.4.3 Problemas y limitaciones 
No obstante, el modelo de rasgos no se encuentra libre de problemas, y el primero de ellos 
está asociado a cómo este enfoque representa las propiedades de los objetos, a saber, me-
diante conjuntos de rasgos (frente a los modelos geométricos, que las representaban como 
coordenadas en un espacio métrico). En este caso la dificultad surge al considerar cómo 
representar las propiedades continuas de los objetos mediante atributos binarios (que son 
los que emplea Tversky). Y, aunque los defensores del modelo de rasgos han planteado 
propuestas con respecto a cómo podrían caracterizarse con rasgos binarios variables tanto 
nominales –mediante el recurso a variables tipo dummy– como ordinales/continuas –
bajo la forma de cadenas o anidamientos de rasgos– (Tversky y Gati 1982), conforme 
indican Hahn y Chater (1997) dichas respuestas resultan artificiosas e introducen un 
gran número de rasgos adicionales e innecesarios. 
Otro problema de los modelos de rasgos, también mencionado por Hahn y Chater, es 
que, dado que la similaridad entre dos objetos es una función creciente del número de 
rasgos considerado, eso conduce al resultado de que la auto-similaridad –es decir, la simi-
laridad de algo consigo mismo– de un objeto podrá variar en función del número de 
rasgos elegido. Esto, cuando se considera la evaluación de la auto-similaridad de un mis-
mo objeto en circunstancias distintas, resulta una conclusión bastante implausible. 
Finalmente, el modelo de rasgos comparte con los modelos geométricos una misma 
limitación, asociada al hecho de que en ambos casos sus representaciones son relativa-
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mente poco estructuradas (puesto que son meras colecciones de rasgos o coordenadas, 
respectivamente), lo cual constituye un problema cuando se considera el hecho de que en 
muchos casos es necesario que tales propiedades estén organizadas conforme a una cierta 
estructura (Hahn y Chater 1997; Goldstone y Son 2005). Esto es, una criatura con pico, 
ojos, alas y cola –si éstos fuesen los atributos del concepto PÁJARO–, pero que los tuviera 
colocados en la posición equivocada, difícilmente sería llamada pájaro. 
3.5. Modelos de alineamiento 
Los modelos basados en alineamientos surgieron con objeto de superar las dificultades 
que presentaban el modelo geométrico y el de rasgos a la hora de dar cuenta del modo en 
que los atributos de los objetos están interrelacionados y organizados. La captura de este 
tipo de relaciones requería de representaciones estructuradas, que tuvieran en con-
sideración cómo las distintas partes –o elementos– de los objetos se relacionan, corres-
ponden o alinean entre sí. Esto dio lugar a la aparición, en primera instancia, de los mo-
delos de alineamiento (Markman y Gentner 1993a, 1993b; Goldstone 1994a; Gentner y 
Markman 1994, 1997) y, posteriormente, de los modelos transformacionales (de los que 
me ocuparé en la sección siguiente). 
3.5.1 Noción de alineamiento 
Los modelos de alineamiento estructural, a diferencia de los modelos geométricos y de 
rasgos, no se limitan a evaluar el encaje (en un cierto objeto) de un conjunto de atributos 
dados, sino que también comprueban si esos atributos se encuentran organizados del 
modo adecuado. O, dicho de otro modo, comprueban que los rasgos alineados (de los 
objetos y/o conceptos considerados) encajan, en el sentido de que desempeñen papeles 
similares dentro de sus respectivas entidades49. En tal caso, el correcto encaje de rasgos 
alineados aumentaría el peso de tales rasgos en el cómputo de la similaridad existente 
entre los objetos considerados. Así, por ejemplo, un camión con una rueda blanca, y un 
coche con una puerta blanca, comparten ambos el atributo BLANCO; no obstante, dado 
que los elementos de esos objetos que comparten ese atributo –a saber, rueda y puerta– 
no se encuentran alineados, entonces dicho rasgo compartido (esto es, el encaje del atri-
buto BLANCO) no contribuiría a aumentar la similaridad entre los objetos considerados o, 
alternativamente, no contribuiría tanto como si estuviera asociado a dos elementos ali-
neados50, 51. 
 
49 Los modelos de alineamiento se inspiran en –o derivan de– los enfoques de razonamiento analógico, y 
su funcionamiento basado en mapeos estructurales que maximizan las correspondencias relacionales 
entre los elementos de los objetos comparados (Gentner 1980, 1983; Gentner y Toupin 1986; Holyo-
ak y Thagard 1989, 1995). 
50 Otro posible ejemplo sería el puesto por Markman y Gentner (1993b, p. 434), en relación con los dos 
pares de objetos (Sol, Júpiter) y (Júpiter, Io). En este caso, si a un sujeto se le pidiera que identificase en 
el segundo par, (Júpiter, Io), el elemento más similar a Júpiter en el primer par, la respuesta trivial –en 
base a la similaridad de sus atributos– es que ese elemento es Júpiter (pues no hay nada más similar a 
Júpiter que él mismo). No obstante, cuando se pone de manifiesto la relación presente en ambos pares 
–a saber, que la causa por la que un elemento del par orbita alrededor del otro es que este último tiene 
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Probablemente, los dos modelos más importantes para la identificación de alinea-
mientos estructurales sean el motor de mapeo de estructuras –en inglés, Structure Map-
ping Engine, o modelo SME– desarrollado por Falkenhainer, Forbus y Gentner (1986, 
1989), y el modelo de mapeo y activación interactivos –en inglés, Similarity as Interactive 
Activation and Mapping, o modelo SIAM– planteado por Goldstone (1994a)52. 
3.5.2 Modelo SME 
En cuanto al primero, el modelo SME es una extensión directa de la teoría de mapeo de 
estructuras por analogía propuesta por Gentner (1980, 1983). El modelo SME almacena 
la información –o representa el conocimiento– con una notación similar a la del cálculo 
de predicados, y distingue tres tipos de constructos principales (Falkenhainer et al. 
1989): (a) entidades –u objetos–, que serían individuos y constantes; (b) predicados, que 
podrían ser funciones, atributos o relaciones; y (c) D-grupos –o descripciones de grupos–, 
que serían representaciones jerárquicas de conjuntos de entidades –o de hechos sobre 
ellas– tomados como una unidad. Sobre esta base, el motor recibiría como entrada para la 
comparación dos D-grupos (referidos como fuente –o base– y objetivo), tras lo cual cal-
cularía sus correspondencias y buscaría el mejor encaje estructuralmente consistente. Así, 
por ejemplo, para el caso de la analogía utilizada por George Bush en 1991, los grupos 
fuente y objetivo podrían representarse como sigue53: 
FUENTE: 
Führer-de (Hitler, Alemania) 
ocupar (Alemania, Austria) 
mal (Hitler) 
causa [mal(Hitler), ocupar (Alemania, Austria)] 
primer-ministro-de (Churchill, Gran Bretaña) 
                                                                                                                                       
más masa que el primero–, eso abre la puerta a otra posible identificación, a saber, la de Júpiter (en el 
primer par) con Io (en el segundo). 
51 Con respecto a las evidencias en favor de los modelos basados en alineamientos, cabe enumerar las si-
guientes: (a) El estar expuesto a múltiples ejemplos de una misma estructura –o esquema– de alinea-
miento ayuda a los sujetos a identificar y aplicar esa estructura en el futuro (Gick y Holyoak 1983; Ca-
trambone y Holyoak 1989). (b) La comparación explícita de ejemplos facilita la identificación de es-
tructuras de alineamiento comunes, más que la mera presentación de los mismos ejemplos (Loewens-
tein y Gentner 2001, 2005). (c) Los sujetos realizan alineamientos de modo progresivo; así, por ejem-
plo, la tasa de éxito con que los sujetos identifican un alineamiento entre objetos disimilares aumenta si 
antes han realizado dicho mismo alineamiento para otros objetos más similares (Gentner, Loewenstein 
y Hung 2007). 
52 Otros modelos destacados para la determinación de alineamientos estructuralmente consistentes, aun-
que –en este caso– basados en mapeos de analogías, serían el modelo ACME de Holyoak y Thagard 
(1989), el proyecto Copycat de Hofstadter y Mitchell (1994), el modelo LISA de Hummel y Holyoak 
(1997) y el modelo IAM de Keane y colaboradores (1994). Para una más completa revisión de los mo-
delos computacionales de analogías véase French (2002). 
53 Este ejemplo ha sido tomado de Holyoak (2005, p. 132). 
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causa [ocupar (Alemania, Austria), contraatacar (Churchill, Hitler)] 
OBJETIVO: 
presidente-de (Hussein, Irak) 
invadir (Irak, Kuwait) 
mal (Hussein) 
causa [mal(Hussein), invadir (Iraq, Kuwait)] 
presidente-de (Bush, Estados Unidos) 
En el ejemplo anterior encontramos individuos (tales como Hitler o Churchill), atributos 
(o predicados unarios, tales como mal) y relaciones (de primer orden, como por ejemplo 
presidente-de u ocupar, y de segundo orden, como causa). 
El subsiguiente proceso de encaje de atributos se encuentra gobernado por dos res-
tricciones globales, que garantizan que la colección de hipótesis de encaje resultante es, 
además de maximal, estructuralmente consistente: 
(1) Correspondencias uno-a-uno: las correspondencias identificadas por el proceso de 
encaje entre los distintos elementos (a saber, entidades o predicados) deben ser 
uno-a-uno, esto es, cada elemento en uno de los grupos puede ponerse en corres-
pondencia –como máximo– con uno de los elementos del otro grupo. 
(2) Conectividad paralela54: esta condición se cumple cuando los argumentos de los 
predicados puestos en correspondencia pueden, a su vez, ponerse en correspon-
dencia entre sí. Esta asunción es clave, pues garantiza que el mapeo obtenido no 
está solamente basado en la similaridad de esos rasgos, sino en el papel que cum-
plen en la estructura relacional de sus grupos. 
Finalmente, el proceso de encaje consistiría en un algoritmo que avanza en la dirección 
de-local-a-global, pasando por cada una de las cuatro etapas siguientes: (i) identificación 
de encajes locales entre todos los predicados que sean similares (por ejemplo, Führer-de y 
presidente-de; u ocupar e invadir); (ii) integración de los encajes locales identificados en 
núcleos –o clusters– estructuralmente consistentes; (iii) unión de esos núcleos en un 
reducido número de conjuntos que mantengan las correspondencias uno-a-uno y sean 
estructuralmente consistentes, al tiempo que maximales en tamaño; y (iv) selección de 
uno de dichos conjuntos en función de la métrica escogida (por ejemplo, la métrica podr-
ía favorecer mapeos profundos que pusieran en correspondencia relaciones de orden 
superior). 
3.5.3 Modelo SIAM 
El modelo SIAM (Goldstone 1994a), por su parte, constituye una aproximación de tipo 
conexionista a los modelos basados en alineamientos. En este caso el modelo consiste en 
una red neuronal cuyos nodos representan hipótesis con respecto a las correspondencias 
 
54 Aunque Falkenhainer y colaboradores (1989, §3.2.2) utilizan el término soporte, considero preferible la 
expresión conectividad paralela empleada por Hodgetts para referir a la segunda condición (Hodgetts 
et al. 2009, p. 64). 
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entre los rasgos u objetos constituyentes de dos escenas. La asunción básica del modelo es 
que la similaridad se puede determinar mediante un proceso dinámico de activación 
interactiva de correspondencias entre rasgos, objetos y roles. Sobre esta base, el modelo 
SIAM opera siguiendo el proceso de búsqueda siguiente55: 
(1) Correspondencias entre rasgos (CeR): identificación de correspondencias entre los 
rasgos de las dos escenas consideradas. 
(2) Correspondencias entre objetos (CeO): búsqueda de correspondencias entre objetos 
que sean consistentes con las CeR previamente obtenidas. 
(3) Realimentación y ajuste: después, un proceso de activación realimenta al sistema, 
favoreciendo el encaje –o no-encaje– de rasgos en función de su consistencia con 
los alineamientos de objetos ya encontrados. 
Así es como tendría lugar la influencia mutua entre las CeO y las CeR, a saber: las CeO 
promueven la activación de CeR y, al mismo tiempo, las CeR influyen en la activación de 
las CeO. O, en otras palabras, el proceso de búsqueda que subyace al modelo SIAM opera 
de modo tal que, cuando un cierto rasgo –de un objeto c– es puesto en correspondencia 
con otro rasgo –de otro objeto d–, a partir de entonces el modelo favorece la identifica-
ción de otras CeR que sean consistentes con el alineamiento entre los objetos c y d56. En 
este modelo, la activación de los nodos de la red neuronal estaría guiada por las dos direc-
trices siguientes: (i) los nodos consistentes se excitan entre sí; y (ii) los nodos inconsisten-
tes se inhiben los unos a los otros. 
En último lugar, los alineamientos obtenidos aumentan la contribución a la similari-
dad –entre dos escenas– de los rasgos puestos en correspondencia por cada nodo. Por 


















55 Obsérvese que el modelo SIAM tiende tácitamente hacia las mismas restricciones globales que asumía 
el modelo SME –a saber, correspondencias uno-a-uno y conectividad paralela–. Por un lado, promueve la 
búsqueda de correspondencias consistentes, y considera que dos nodos son inconsistentes si crean ali-
neamientos de uno-a-varios (esto es, si varios elementos de una escena pueden ponerse en correspon-
dencia con un solo elemento de la otra). Por otro lado, el proceso de búsqueda del modelo SIAM favo-
rece tanto la identificación de CeR pertenecientes a objetos ya alineados, como el alineamiento de obje-
tos (u obtención de CeO) con CeR consistentes. 
No obstante, el modelo SIAM se diferencia de modelo SME en que no se compromete estrictamente 
con ninguna de estas condiciones. Así, por ejemplo, el hecho de que no se adhiera de modo estricto a la 
restricción de correspondencias uno-a-uno permite que existan –en el modelo SIAM– grados de corres-
pondencia (lo cual no era posible en el enfoque de “todo o nada” propio del modelo SME). Por esta 
razón, en el modelo SIAM los encajes desalineados también tienen influencia sobre la similaridad (aun-
que menor que la que tienen los encajes alineados). 
56 Un rasgo de una CeR asociado a un objeto alineado sería un encaje en su lugar –en inglés, match in pla-
ce, o MIP–; mientras que un rasgo de una CeR asociado a un objeto desalineado sería un encaje fuera 
de lugar –en inglés, match out of place, o MOP–. 
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En donde n es el número de nodos del sistema; Ai es el nivel de activación del nodo i; wi es 
la importancia dada a la dimensión i –pudiendo definirse como wi = wia + wib, siendo wix la 
importancia de la dimensión i en la escena x–; y los valores encajei variarán entre 0 y 1 en 
función de la similaridad existente entre los rasgos puestos en correspondencia por el 
nodo i. 
3.5.4 Puntos fuertes y débiles 
Como ya se ha indicado, la principal ventaja de los modelos de alineamiento es que dan 
cuenta del carácter estructurado de muchas de nuestras representaciones. Con ello, los 
modelos basados en alineamientos proporcionan una explicación a los estudios empíricos 
que muestran que los rasgos en correspondencia para objetos correctamente alineados (de 
dos escenas) contribuyen más a la similaridad entre esas escenas que los rasgos puestos en 
correspondencia para objetos con una alineación más pobre (Goldstone 1994a; Love 
2000). Además, el modo en que operan los procesos de búsqueda de alineamientos expli-
caría que la contribución a la similaridad de los rasgos alineados y no alineados –esto es, 
MIPs y MOPs (véase nota al pie 56 en este capítulo)– aumente con el tiempo de proce-
samiento (Goldstone y Medin 1994); que un mismo rasgo u objeto contribuya más a la 
similaridad cuando aumenta la claridad de los alineamientos entre las escenas (Goldstone 
1994a); y que en ocasiones la introducción de nuevos rasgos pobremente alineados no 
contribuya a aumentar la similaridad, sino que la reduzca –en la medida en que dicho 
nuevo rasgo puede interferir en el proceso de búsqueda de alineamientos adecuados 
(Goldstone 1996)–. 
Y, en lo que respecta a las principales dificultades y problemas de este enfoque, Ho-
lyoak (2005) considera que uno de los retos más importantes a los que se enfrentan los 
modelos basados en la identificación de alineamientos estructurales57 es que en ellos el 
conocimiento sobre las representaciones –y, en particular, sobre su estructura– debe ser 
introducido a mano por el creador del modelo, mientras que en el caso de los seres huma-
nos la formación de dicho conocimiento tiene lugar de modo autónomo. 
3.6. Modelos transformacionales 
Una cuarta aproximación a la noción de similaridad son los modelos transformacionales 
(también llamados modelos de distorsión representacional), en los que la similaridad entre 
dos objetos se encuentra determinada por la distancia transformacional entre sus repre-
sentaciones. La noción de distancia transformacional difiere de la de distancia geométrica 
en que en ella la medida de distancia refiere a (o es proporcional a) la complejidad de las 
transformaciones necesarias (o, alternativamente, a la cantidad de distorsión requerida) 
para pasar de una representación a otra (Chater y Hahn 1997; Hahn y Chater 1997; 
Chater y Vitányi 2003; Hahn, Chater y Richardson 2003; Hahn, Close y Graf 2009)58. 
 
57 Aunque la discusión de Holyoak se centra en el caso de los modelos de analogía, sus conclusiones son 
de perfecta aplicación al caso de los modelos basados en alineamientos. 
58 Para una generalización de la noción de distancia transformacional más allá de la comparación entre 
dos objetos individuales véase Bennett et al. (1998). 
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Así, cuanto más simple sea la transformación requerida para convertir la representación 
de un objeto a en la representación de un objeto b, mayor será la similaridad entre los 
objetos a y b. 
3.6.1 Mapeos y transformaciones 
Los modelos transformacionales abordan la cuestión de cómo se puede transformar –o 
mapear– una representación sobre otra. Obviamente, en caso de que exista una relación 
estructural entre ambas representaciones el mapeo será más simple (y, por ello, su simi-
laridad mayor), puesto que la transformación conjunta de elementos por bloques será 
más eficiente que su transformación paso a paso. 
El hecho de que estos modelos busquen correspondencias –o mapeos– entre los obje-
tos evaluados (para luego, a partir de ellas, transformar un objeto en otro) es el motivo 
por el que los modelos transformacionales pueden ser vistos como un cierto tipo de enfo-
que basado en alineamientos. En un caso (modelos de alineamiento) las correspondencias 
estarían explícitamente dadas en los alineamientos estructurales, mientras que en el otro 
(modelos transformacionales) los mapeos serían implícitos a las transformaciones utiliza-
das59. En consecuencia, no resulta extraño que algunas de las primeras propuestas de tipo 
transformacional surgieran en paralelo a enfoques basados en analogías y/o alineamien-
tos. Así, por ejemplo, Alvin Goodman (1986, p. 242), en su estudio de las analogías entre 
particiones y jerarquías, sostiene que el contenido de dos representaciones es similar en la 
medida en que el contenido de una se pueda derivar del contenido de la otra por medio 
de substituciones, inversiones u otras operaciones similares60. 
Esta misma línea había sido anticipada en los estudios de Imai (1977) con respecto a 
cómo los sujetos evalúan la similaridad entre objetos que se diferencian en una o varias 
transformaciones. En particular, Imai presentaba a los sujetos secuencias de elipses blan-
cas y negras, y les pedía que evaluaran su similaridad. A continuación procedía a ca-
racterizarlas en términos de su distancia transformacional en base a las cuatro operaciones 
siguientes: 
 Imagen especular (E):  ○●○●○○○●●○○●  ●○○●●○○○●○●○ 
 Desplazamiento de fase (F):  ○●○●○○○●●○○●  ●○●○○○●●○○●○ 
 Inversión (I):    ○●○●○○○●●○○●  ●○●○●●●○○●●○ 
 Cambio de longitud de onda (O): ○○●●○○●●○○●●  ○●○●○●○●○●○● 
Sobre esta base, la distancia transformacional entre las secuencias ●●●○●●●○●●●○ y 
○○●○○○●○○○●○ sería igual a dos, dado que estas dos secuencias se pueden igualar me-
 
59 No obstante, el foco de atención en ambas aproximaciones es distinto pues, mientras que en los mode-
los de alineamiento el objetivo era establecer correspondencias consistentes entre las escenas considera-
das, en el caso de los modelos transformacionales el interés principal es la codificación óptima de la 
transformación en un lenguaje –en base a la cual la complejidad de la misma pueda determinarse– 
(Hodgetts et al. 2009, p. 65). 
60 Más adelante Ullman (1996, pp. 97-104) sostendrá que el alineamiento entre objetos tridimensionales 
se puede realizar –sin necesidad de descomponer los objetos en partes– mediante transformaciones ta-
les como traslaciones, rotaciones, cambios de escala, y torcimientos topográficos. 
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diante una inversión y un desplazamiento de fase. La investigación de Imai probaba que 
la similaridad entre dos secuencias era tanto mayor cuanto menor fuera su distancia trans-
formacional en términos de las operaciones anteriores61,62. Además, su estudio también 
probaba que la similaridad entre secuencias transformables en un solo paso era tanto 
mayor cuanto mayor fuese el número de operaciones que permitiesen esa transformación. 
Por ejemplo, la similaridad entre las secuencias ○○●●○○●●○○●● y ●●○○●●○○●●○○ 
–las cuales son mutualmente transformables en un paso mediante tres operaciones distin-
tas (E, F o I)– era mayor que la similaridad entre las secuencias ○○○○○○○○○○○○ y 
●●●●●●●●●●●● –también mutuamente transformables en un solo paso, pero ahora 
solamente con una operación posible (a saber, I)–. 
Por último, otro posible enfoque transformacional sería el de Palmer (1983), quien 
caracterizaba la similaridad –de formas, movimientos, agrupamientos, etc.– en torno a la 
noción de invariancia bajo el grupo de transformaciones de similitud (a saber, trasla-
ciones, rotaciones, reflexiones y cambios de escala), esto es, para transformaciones en las 
que se mantiene invariante la forma, pero no el tamaño ni la posición de los elementos 
considerados. 
3.6.2 Complejidad de Kolmogorov 
La complejidad de una transformación –o cantidad de distorsión necesaria – puede ser 
calculada por medio de la teoría de la complejidad algorítmica (Li y Vitányi 2008), tam-
bién llamada teoría de la complejidad de Kolmogorov (1963, 1965)63. Conforme a esta 
teoría, la complejidad K de un objeto, cadena o representación x es igual a la longitud del 
menor programa –en un cierto lenguaje de computación– capaz de producir dicho obje-
to. O, en otras palabras, es una medida de la cantidad de recursos informacionales necesa-
rios para generar una determinada representación. Por ello, las representaciones produci-
das por programas cortos son consideradas más simples que aquellas generadas por pro-
gramas más largos. Así, por ejemplo, una serie de un billón de 1s, a pesar de su gran longi-
tud, puede ser producida por un programa muy corto, por lo que su complejidad es muy 
baja. Solo un poco mayor sería la complejidad de una serie de un billón de 0s y un billón 
de 1s alternos, y algo mayor aún la de los términos de la serie de Fibonacci menores o 
iguales que un billón. La siguiente sería la codificación en lenguaje C de los menores pro-
 
61 De modo similar, los experimentos de Wiener-Ehrlich et al. (1980) también confirmaban la existencia 
de correlaciones entre los juicios de similaridad de los sujetos y el número de transformaciones necesa-
rias para convertir un estímulo en otro. 
62 Años después Hahn, Chater y Richardson (2003) confirmaron –con un diseño experimental basado 
en el trabajo de Imai– la significancia estadística de las correlaciones existentes entre similaridad y dis-
tancia transformacional para este tipo de secuencias. 
63 Para profundizar en la importancia y justificación de la simplicidad –y, por consiguiente, de la medi-
ción de la complejidad– en computación y ciencia cognitiva, así como de sus aplicaciones, véanse Wa-
llace y Boulton (1968), Rissanen (1978, 1989), Quinlan y Rivest (1989), Chater (1996, 1999), así co-
mo Wallace y Dowe (1999). 
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gramas capaces de producir las cadenas anteriores, junto con sus complejidades de Kol-
mogorov asociadas en ese lenguaje64, 65: 
 Serie de un billón de 1s (S1): 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 … 
main(){for(long long i=1;i<=pow(10,12);i++){printf("1 ");}} 
KC(S1)=58 
 Serie de un billón de 0s y 1s alternos (S01): 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 … 
main(){for(long long i=1;i<=pow(10,12);i++){printf("01 ");}} 
KC(S01)=59 
 Serie de Fibonacci con términos menores o iguales que 1 billón (SF): 
0 1 1 2 3 5 8 13 21 34 55 89 … 
main(){long long i=0,j=1,a;while(i<=pow(10,12)){printf("%d ",i); 
a=j;j=j+i;i=a;}} 
KC(SF)=80 
En cambio, el texto de El Quijote, aunque mucho más corto que un billón de caracteres66, 
no puede ser generado por un programa sencillo como los anteriores, razón por la cual su 
complejidad es mucho mayor. Finalmente, la complejidad de una cadena de números 
aleatorios es la mayor posible –e igual a la longitud de la propia cadena–, pues su menor 
descripción en este caso es una mera copia literal de la cadena aleatoria67. 
Ya de manera general, la complejidad de Kolmogorov puede definirse del modo si-
guiente. Sea A el conjunto de palabras que pueden formarse con un cierto alfabeto A, en 
cuyo caso {0,1} representará el conjunto de toda posible cadena binaria68; y sea una fun-
ción recursiva parcial φ : {0,1}  , donde  ⊆ {0,1}. La cadena y es una descripción de 
la cadena x si se cumple que φ (y) = x, esto es, si la función φ produce como resultado x 
cuando se le introduce como entrada la cadena y. Sobre esta base, puede definirse la com-
plejidad de Kolmogorov (Kφ :   ) de una cierta cadena x con respecto de φ, de la 
manera siguiente: 
  ( ) min{| |: ( ) }K x p p x ,    (o si p no existe) 
 
64 Los programas considerados separan cada uno de los elementos de estas series por medio de espacios. 
65 En todos estos programas las variables empleadas necesitan ser definidas como tipo long long –y no 
meramente como tipo int– con objeto de que puedan soportar números enteros hasta el billón. 
66 La longitud aproximada de El Quijote son dos millones de caracteres. 
67 Obsérvese que ése no era el caso para el texto de El Quijote, cuya longitud (debido a la redundancia y 
diferente frecuencia de las letras y palabras del castellano) puede reducirse –mediante algoritmos de 
compresión de texto– a menos de setecientos mil caracteres. 
68 El conjunto {0,1} es, por tanto, susceptible de poder ser identificado con el conjunto de los números 
naturales , conforme a la correspondencia siguiente: (0,ϵ), (1,0), (2,1), (3,00), (4,01), (5,10), etc., en 
donde ϵ representa la cadena vacía. 
Capítulo 3 
84 
En donde | p | representa la longitud de la cadena p. 
La expresión anterior puede interpretarse del modo siguiente. Si p es un programa, φ 
es una estructura capaz de ejecutar programas (por ejemplo, φ podría ser la combinación 
de un lenguaje de programación, más su compilador, más el hardware preciso para ejecu-
tar sus programas compilados69,70), y φ (p) es la salida generada por la ejecución del progra-
ma p –siendo  el conjunto de todas las salidas posibles–; entonces, para una cierta ca-
dena x, la complejidad de x con respecto a φ (esto es, Kφ (x)) es igual a la longitud del 
programa más corto p que permite computar x en φ (esto es, φ (p)=x).  
La complejidad de Kolmogorov se puede extender al ámbito del cálculo de similarida-
des entre dos objetos a y b mediante lo que se conoce como complejidad condicional de 
Kolmogorov, la cual se define como la longitud del menor programa p capaz de trans-
formar la representación de a en la representación de b (o, dicho de otro modo, capaz de 
generar la cadena a utilizando la cadena b como información auxiliar de entrada71): 
  ( | ) min{| |: ( , ) }K a b p p b a ,    (o si p no existe) 
Por consiguiente, la similaridad entre dos cadenas a y b estaría determinada por el nú-
mero y longitud de las instrucciones necesarias para transformar la una en la otra, siendo 
tanto mayor –la similaridad– cuanto menos compleja resulte la transformación. Así, por 
ejemplo, las secuencias 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 y 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 serían muy similares, en la medida 
en que se requiere de una sola instrucción simple (a saber, añadir/substraer 1 a cada dí-
gito) para transformar la una en la otra. Por la misma razón, las secuencias 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
y 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 serían igualmente similares (en este caso la instrucción sería multi-
plicar/dividir por 2 cada dígito). En cambio, la similaridad entre las secuencias 1 2 3 4 5 6 
7 8 y 3 7 9 11 13 15 17 sería ya menor, pues la transformación de la una en la otra precisa 
de dos operaciones (a saber, multiplicar por 2 y sumar 1, y restar 1 y dividir por 2, respecti-
vamente). A continuación se presenta la codificación en Bash Shell de los tres pares de 
transformaciones anteriores, junto con sus correspondientes complejidades (condiciona-
les) de Kolmogorov en ese lenguaje: 
 Transformación 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 (a) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (b): 
for i in $1;do echo $((i+1));done   KBS(ab) = 33 
for i in $1;do echo $((i-1));done   KBS(ba) = 33 
 Transformación 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 (a) 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 (b): 
for i in $1;do echo $((i*2));done   KBS(ab) = 33 
for i in $1;do echo $((i/2));done   KBS(ba) = 33 
 Transformación 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 (a) 3 7 9 11 13 15 17 (b): 
for i in $1;do echo $((i*2+1));done   KBS(ab) = 35 
 
69 En mis anteriores ejemplos he referido a todo esto abreviadamente como “lenguaje C”. 
70 De manera general, φ podría ser cualquier máquina de Turing. 
71 Obviamente, Kφ (x) es un caso particular de complejidad condicionada, en donde la información auxi-
liar de entrada es la cadena vacía, esto es, Kφ (xϵ). 
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for i in $1;do echo $(((i-1)/2));done  KBS(ba) = 37 
3.6.3 Ventajas del enfoque transformacional 
La principal ventaja de los modelos basados en transformaciones es que, como ya se ha 
visto, permiten dar cuenta de fenómenos no explicados por los otros modelos de simi-
laridad. Por un lado, los modelos transformacionales explican por qué las personas con-
sideran que dos objetos son tanto más similares cuanto menor es el número de trans-
formaciones necesarias para convertir el uno en el otro (Imai 1977; Wiener-Ehrlich et al. 
1980; Hahn, Chater y Richardson 2003; Hodgetts 2011). O, dicho de otro modo, la 
distancia transformacional explica la puntuación de similaridad dada por los sujetos. 
Además, este tipo de enfoques también permite explicar el hecho de que para pares de 
series transformables en un mismo número de pasos n, la similaridad entre ellas varíe y lo 
haga inversamente al número de operaciones que permiten dicha transformación (Imai 
1977). En este caso la idea es que, cuanto mayor sea la variedad de transformaciones que 
conducen de un objeto a otro, más fácil –y rápido– será que el sujeto encuentre una de 
ellas y, por ello, mayor será la similaridad entre ese par de secuencias. 
Por último, el hecho de que las propuestas transformacionales modelen la similaridad 
entre dos objetos como una medida inversa de la complejidad de la transformación preci-
sa para convertir el uno en el otro72, explica la variación de la similaridad en función de lo 
complejas que sean las operaciones intervinientes en la transformación, así como su posi-
ble carácter asimétrico –en caso de que la complejidad de las operaciones precisas para las 
transformaciones en uno y otro sentido sea distinta– (Hahn, Close y Graf 2009). En este 
último caso, las asimetrías en la complejidad de las transformaciones explicarían la exis-
tencia de asimetría en los juicios de similaridad. Asimismo, esta relación entre compleji-
dad y similaridad estaría respaldada por estudios que muestran la existencia de una corre-
lación positiva entre la complejidad de una transformación y el tiempo necesario para su 
reconocimiento73 (Tarr y Pinker 1989; Cave et al. 1994; Tarr 1995). 
3.6.4 Problemas y limitaciones 
En cuanto a las limitaciones de los modelos transformacionales, uno de sus puntos débiles 
es que se trata de propuestas que han sido casi exclusivamente aplicadas al caso de estímu-
los perceptuales, estando en el aire su capacidad para emplearse también para estímulos 
conceptuales –o, cuando menos, su capacidad para hacerlo sin convertir en el proceso al 
modelo transformacional en un modelo de alineamiento– (Goldstone y Son 2005, p. 27). 
Esto, unido al hecho de que los modelos de alineamiento hayan sido aplicados –ante 
 
72 Esto era una extensión natural de la asunción –común en los modelos transformacionales– de que el 
número de operaciones necesarias para convertir un objeto en otro resulta indicativo de la complejidad 
de la transformación. Obsérvese que, bajo dicha asunción, una vez postulado un cierto repertorio ope-
racional –esto es, el conjunto de transformaciones básicas–, la complejidad transformacional permite 
predecir las similaridades evaluadas (Hahn, Chater y Richardson 2003). 
73 A lo que acompaña una relación inversa entre el tiempo de respuesta y la práctica, lo que sugiere que la 




todo– a inputs conceptuales (y que no sean capaces de explicar algunos fenómenos sí 
explicados transformacionalmente) apunta a que una prometedora línea de investigación 
sería la combinación de ambos enfoques, tal y como hace la arquitectura Copycat (Mit-
chell, 1993; Hofstadter y Mitchell 1994; Hofstadter 1995). 
Otra dificultad de las propuestas basadas en transformaciones es que la articulación 
psicológica de estos enfoques requiere que se especifique un cierto lenguaje que codifique 
las transformaciones, y en el cual la longitud del código del menor programa capaz de 
realizar una cierta transformación determine la complejidad de la misma. El problema es 
que la opción por un lenguaje concreto para las transformaciones es una decisión que 
nunca estará libre de controversia. 
Finalmente, estos modelos asumen una relación entre la similaridad entre dos objetos 
y la complejidad de la transformación que convierte al uno en el otro que, en algunas 
ocasiones, presenta un comportamiento indeseado. En este caso el problema es que al 
aumentar la complejidad de los objetos considerados aumentará la complejidad de la 
transformación que los relaciona (por el mero hecho de ser objetos más complejos) y, por 
consiguiente, la distancia transformacional entre ambos. La consecuencia es que, a igual-
dad del resto de factores, pares de objetos más complejos serán considerados más disi-
milares entre sí –que otros pares de objetos que fuesen más simples– por el simple hecho 
de que su complejidad de Kolmogorov sea mayor (Hahn, Chater y Richardson 2003, p. 
4). No obstante, a pesar de lo anti-intuitivo que resulta este efecto, su impacto sobre este 
tipo de modelos es limitado, pues se podría evitar normalizando la complejidad de las 
transformaciones por la complejidad de los objetos considerados (Bennett et al. 1998; 
Vitányi et al. 2009). 
3.7. Recapitulación 
En el capítulo anterior ya comenté las principales objeciones planteadas a los enfoques 
basados en similaridades, y entre las que destacaban los problemas de composicionali-
dad74 y selección. Allí también se apuntaba a que ciertos investigadores sugerían que la 
noción de similaridad no era lo suficientemente flexible como para explicar la cognición, 
razón por la cual se proponían modelos alternativos, basados en reglas (Smith y Sloman 
1994) y en teorías (Murphy y Medin 1985). No obstante, y aún cuando –conforme indi-
caba al final del capítulo 2– en mi opinión es necesario considerar otros elementos (tales 
como teorías y definiciones) a la hora de explicar muchos fenómenos cognitivos, eso no 
significa que la similaridad no tenga un papel siempre presente, tal y como muestra el 
hecho de que los sujetos tengan problemas para ignorar patrones similares aún cuando 
disponen de reglas de categorización absolutamente precisas (Palmeri 1997). 
Por otro lado, una crítica indirecta a los modelos de similaridades sería la de Fodor 
(2000) cuando, sobre la base de que la cognición humana se caracteriza por su sensibi-
lidad al contexto –siendo ésta una tesis comúnmente aceptada–, se muestra escéptico en 
cuanto a que dicha sensibilidad pueda explicarse mediante las actuales teorías com-
 
74 Para una discusión de cómo las similaridades podrían componer para un sistema de “conceptos natura-
les” –en el sentido dado por Gärdenfors (2000) a la noción “concepto natural”– véase Leitgeb (2005). 
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putacionales de la mente. En este caso Fodor entiende que un sistema representacional 
con estructuras causales fijas no puede operar de modo sensible al contexto, lo cual pone 
en cuestión la posibilidad de que se pueda explicar computacionalmente la sensibilidad al 
contexto de la cognición (y, por consiguiente, de la similaridad)75. En respuesta a esta 
objeción se ha argumentado que es posible implementar sistemas computacionales sim-
ples que muestran que la estructura de similaridad de una representación puede cambiar 
con el contexto, para redes neuronales tanto simples (Thomas et al. 2012) como comple-
jas (Thomas y Mareschal 2001; Rogers y McClelland 2004). La idea en todos estos casos 
es que la cognición puede operar sobre un mecanismo de modulación conceptual que 
permitiría que representaciones invariantes al contexto generen representaciones sensi-
bles a ese mismo contexto. 
No obstante, y a pesar de todas esas objeciones, los modelos de similaridades tienen 
como principal ventaja el que gozan de una gran capacidad explicativa sobre la base de 
una asunción naturalista básica. O, en otras palabras, las teorías de similaridad consti-
tuyen un medio para explicar fenómenos tales como la adquisición de conceptos, pro-
ducción de generalizaciones, categorización de objetos, realización de inferencias, etc., y 
lo hacen en base a la asunción de que los objetos y eventos similares se comportan de 
modo similar en circunstancias semejantes. El principal punto fuerte de esta asunción es 
que resulta poco controvertida, en la medida en que hay buenos motivos evolutivos para 
su aceptación pues, si entidades similares no se comportasen de modo semejante –en 
contextos parecidos– sería difícil concebir, no solo cómo ninguna especie podría haber 
llegado a adquirir concepto alguno, sino incluso sobre qué base podrían operar los mis-
mos procesos de selección natural. 
En este capítulo he presentado cuáles son los principales modelos contemporáneos de 
similaridad, junto con sus principales puntos fuertes y débiles. También he puesto de 
manifiesto que ninguno de tales modelos es individualmente capaz de explicar todos los 
distintos fenómenos empíricos identificados, lo que apunta a la posible conveniencia de 
una postura de tipo pluralista, abierta a la inclusión de elementos de los diferentes mode-
los (tal y como ocurría para el problema de la estructura de los conceptos). En todo caso, 
de entre las distintas teorías de similaridad presentadas me inclino porque sea un enfoque 
de tipo geométrico el que actúe como núcleo en torno al que luego desarrollar una pro-
puesta pluralista más amplia. Por ello, el resto del presente trabajo asumirá una aproxima-
ción geométrica a la idea de similaridad. 
Conforme se ha visto en este capítulo, los modelos geométricos conciben la simila-
ridad entre objetos como proximidades espaciales, esto es, como una función inver-
samente proporcional a las distancias en un espacio métrico. Sobre esa base, los modelos 
de tipo geométrico representan los objetos –o entidades– como puntos localizados en un 
espacio organizado en dimensiones y construido, por ejemplo, a partir de juicios de 
(di)similaridad. En cuanto a esto, el escalamiento multidimensional ha sido histórica-
 
75 Aunque el problema de la sensibilidad al contexto ha sido presentado en este capítulo para algunos mo-
delos concretos de similaridad, esas críticas específicas ya vistas se diferencian de la objeción de Fodor 
en que ésta resulta mucho más general, en la medida en que no cuestiona un modelo de similaridad con-




mente la aproximación preferida para la construcción de modelos geométricos a partir de 
las (di)similaridades observadas entre cada par de elementos de un cierto conjunto de 
objetos, dada su capacidad para encontrar representaciones del conjunto de objetos ini-
cial en espacios con dimensionalidad reducida (esto es, con un menor número de dimen-
siones que el espacio original), y en los que las distancias entre cada par de objetos encajan 
lo más posible con las distancias originalmente existentes entre ellos. Finalmente, aún y a 
pesar de las críticas recibidas por la violación de sus axiomas, este tipo de modelos presen-
taba notables ventajas, entre las que destaca (a) su capacidad para identificar las dimen-
siones subyacentes a un conjunto inicial de datos, (b) la producción y manejo de espacios 
con dimensionalidad reducida –lo cual era muy conveniente en términos de codificación, 
memoria y procesamiento–, y (c) su posible uso para caracterizar funciones cognitivas 
tales como categorizaciones, inferencias y memoria, etc. 
En mi caso, la razón que justifica mi preferencia por los modelos geométricos es su 
carácter concreto e integrador, pues constituyen un planteamiento que integra de modo 
coherente en una única teoría los principales elementos y problemas presentes en las 
discusiones relativas a la naturaleza y formación de conceptos. En primer lugar, el modelo 
geométrico proporciona el mismo marco para la representación de objetos y conceptos en 
el que, además, los atributos –o dimensiones– se integran de modo natural (esto es, como 
un elemento propio del modelo). Por otro lado, explica cómo los conceptos pueden for-
marse a partir de objetos –o eventos– particulares, pudiendo dar cuenta también de 
cómo puede tener lugar la adquisición de conceptos a partir de información perceptual, 
aún cuando la cuestión de cuál es la naturaleza y origen de esas primeras dimensiones siga 
siendo problemática. 
Además, como veremos en los capítulos siguientes, un modelo geométrico articulado 
mediante espacios de similaridad conceptual facilita la explicación de importantes proce-
sos cognitivos, tales como: (a) memoria –en el sentido de almacenaje– la cual es más fac-
tible cuando se la concibe operando sobre espacios con dimensionalidad reducida como 
los producidos por los modelos geométricos de similaridad; (b) aprendizaje, entendido 
como subdivisión –o composición– recurrente de regiones del espacio de similaridad, lo 
que da lugar a la producción de conceptos más –o menos– específicos que los existentes; 
y (c) inferencias, tanto deductivas, cuando la representación de un cierto objeto/concepto 
está incluida en la región asociada a otro concepto, como inductivas, cuando la formación 
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The notion of conceptual space –as a framework for the representation of concepts and 
knowledge– has been highly influential over the last decade or more, as a way of articu-
lating the geometric model of similarity that avoided the difficulties besetting the geo-
metrical perspective. The first half of this chapter is devoted to showing what a similarity 
space theory of concepts is and, in particular, to describing Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces 
and the role played by convexity in this latter approach. In the second part I will argue 
that Gärdenfors’ convexity constraint on the shape of regions is both unnecessary –from 
a theoretical perspective– and problematic –with regard to some particular aspects of 
how the conceptual space theory works–. Lastly, I conclude that if the convexity condi-
tion is abandoned, then Gärdenfors’ theory of conceptual spaces is equivalent to a 
contextualist geometric characterization of the prototype theory of concepts. 
As said in the previous chapter, the standard geometric model of similarity is subject 
of criticism for its inability to explain the context-sensitivity of similarity judgments, and 
in particular, for the violations of the metric axioms (i.e., minimality, symmetry, and 
triangle inequality) assumed by this sort of model. One possible way of responding to this 
set of objections was to adopt a contextualized geometrical notion of similarity, and that 
is precisely the perspective embraced by the conceptual space theories here discussed. 
With this goal in mind, the first section of this chapter aims to describe the (simi-
larity-based) space theories of concepts. There I introduce the main notions and prin-
cipal theses of the theory, together with the major approaches to the theories of con-
ceptual spaces (i.e., connectionist versus geometrical). I also recap how the notion of 
similarity is characterized within the geometrical approach, and outline the distinction 
between standard and non-standard distances. Then, after introducing the notion of 
Voronoi partition, I sketch out the most significant strengths of the geometric view on 
conceptual spaces. 
In the second section I expound the main features of Gärdenfors’ theory of concep-
tual spaces, focusing on his definition and characterization of properties and concepts 
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(Gärdenfors 2000, 2014). One of the basic theses of Gärdenfors’ approach is that the 
conceptual regions associated with properties, concepts –or object categories–, verb 
meanings1, etc. are convex. At that point I will explain the role played by the convexity 
requirement in the theory, as opposed to other possible criteria that could be imposed on 
the geometry of regions. Lastly, I also summarize some of the most remarkable ap-
plications and extensions of Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces. 
My aim in the third section is to show that the convexity constraint –according to 
which the geometry of conceptual regions should be convex– is questionable. On the one 
hand, I will show that all the direct arguments given by Gärdenfors in favor of the con-
vexity of conceptual regions rest on controversial assumptions. Additionally, I will hold 
that his argument in support of a Euclidean metric –based on the integral character of 
conceptual dimensions– is weak, and under non-Euclidean metrics the structure of re-
gions may be non-convex. Furthermore, I will prove that, even if the metric were Euclid-
ean, the convexity constraint could be not satisfied if concepts were differently weighted. 
On the other hand, I will claim that Gärdenfors’ convexity requirement is brought into 
question by some applications of the conceptual spaces theory: (i) several of the allegedly 
convex properties of concepts are not convex; (ii) the conceptual regions resulting from 
the combination of convex properties can be non-convex; (iii) convex regions could co-
vary in a non-convex way; and (iv) his definition of changes –linguistically expressed by 
means of verbs– is incompatible with a definition of properties in terms of convex re-
gions. Then I claim that once the convexity constraint is given up to, the conceptual 
space theory may be viewed as a contextualist geometric articulation of the prototype 
theory of concepts. 
Consequently, even though the rest of my thesis will be based, to a greater or lesser ex-
tent, on the conceptual space theory, I will diverge in significant ways from Gärdenfors’ 
view. First of all, I bring into question the mandatory character of the convexity require-
ment for the geometry of regions in a similarity space theory of concepts, and I do not 
adhere to any other compulsory condition on the shape of conceptual regions. Secondly, 
my starting point for chapters 5 and 6 will be, not Gärdenfors theory of conceptual spac-
es, but a contextualist geometric view of the prototype theory. On this basis, and in order 
to respond to some important critiques to the theory, in chapter 5 I will delve into issues 
rarely addressed by the conceptual spaces literature. There, and after shifting the focus 
from conceptual regions to prototypes2, I claim that two different notions of concept 
should be distinguished (i.e., stored concept and instantiated concept), which has conse-
quences both for the cognitive/computational architecture presumed by the theory, and 
for the ontological status attributed to the idea of concept. Those ontological implica-
tions are discussed when I argue that, if concepts are assumed to be context-dependent, 
then concepts lack persistence and do not have representational character –that is, can-
not be a representation of their associated categories–. Lastly, in chapter 6, I will deal 
 
1 Given that since his initial proposal, Gärdenfors (2014) has tried to extend his framework both to the 
modeling of actions and events, and to the semantics of verbs, prepositions and adverbs. 
2 This is again an explicit movement away from Gärdenfors’ theory, since he uses to identify properties 
and concepts with (convex) regions. 
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with the circularity problem, which threatens, not only the conceptual space theory, but 
also any empiricist theory of concepts when trying to explain how the most basic ele-
ments of concepts can be acquired. 
4.1. Similarity space theories of concepts 
The prototype theory of concepts also called probabilistic view (Medin 1989) or family 
resemblance view (Komatsu 1992), already introduced in chapter 2, maintains that con-
cepts may be organized around sets of correlated attributes that shape an ideal rep-
resentation called prototype which sums up the characteristic properties of the con-
sidered category. By virtue of this, it is usually said that prototypes are representations 
or bodies of knowledge whose structure encodes information about the properties 
that the members of a given category tend to have. However, there are distinct ways in 
which the prototype theory can be articulated (Smith and Medin 1981): 
(a) Featural models: an object o is classified under a concept C if it possesses a suffi-
cient number of the properties associated to C. 
(b) Dimensional models: an object o is classified under a concept C if it possesses to some 
degree a sufficient number of those properties3. 
In both cases an object o will be categorized or not under a particular concept C in func-
tion of the similarity between o and the prototype of C, which will be determined by 
virtue of their shared properties. If, for the more general case of dimensional models, the 
objects and the prototypes of concepts were represented in a geometrical space whose 
dimensions were the constitutive properties of those concepts in the relevant context, 
then that would be what is commonly called a similarity space theory of concepts. In these 
theories, concepts are located within similarity spaces where distances between concepts 
and/or objects are inversely proportional to the similarity existing between them 
(Churchland 1990; Gärdenfors 2000). 
4.1.1 Main notions and principal thesis 
In general terms, a similarity space theory of concepts can be described by one fundamental 
thesis (Gauker 2007): the mind is a representational hyperspace within which (a) dimen-
sions or factors fi represent ways in which objects can differ, (b) points pj represent ob-
jects, (c) regions RK represent concepts, and (d) distances du,v are inversely proportional to 
similarities between objects or concepts. Consequently, an object o will belong to a 
concept C if and only if the values of o in every dimension of that similarity space pro-
duce an n-tuple that lies inside the region associated with the concept C. 
For instance, Fig. 4.1 shows a conceptual similarity space constituted by n dimensions 
fi, where the concepts A and B are represented by the regions RA and RB. The points pj 
represent distinct objects, three of which (p1 to p3) are categorized under the concept A, 
while the other four (p4 to p7) are categorized under the concept B. The similarity be-
 
3 In fact, featural models are nothing more than a particular case of dimensional models. 
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tween two objects p3 and p7, for example would be inversely proportional to the dis-












Fig. 4.1.  Illustrative example of a conceptual similarity space. 
The prototypes of concepts4 would result from a process of maximization of similarities 
or, alternatively, minimization of distances between the evaluated objects, and the 
tentative prototypes. The set of final prototypes will be the one which maximizes intra-
group similarity and minimizes inter-group similarity. Thence, the prototype of a con-
cept arises as the generalization of the properties of the objects chosen as tentative mem-
bers of its associated category for instance, by means of the average of the values in each 
dimension of the considered objects (Reed 1972; Hintzman 1986; Nosofsky 1986). 
Thus, the prototype of a concept would be the most typical member of that category, and 
would be represented by a point pp which may correspond or not with a real instance of 
such category. Lastly, as I will show in section 4.1.3, the shape and boundaries of the 
conceptual regions may result from a Voronoi tessellation of the conceptual space, whose 
input are the prototypes of the set of relevant concepts5. 
Inasmuch as distances or similarities are a function of variables and parameters 
which might depend on context (e.g., the relevant concepts, the kind of metric, or the 
importance of dimensions and concepts), each new instantiation of a concept in a par-
ticular context may be different. On this basis, a prototype theory of concepts con-
 
4 In regard to the expression “prototypes of concepts”, it might be understood as that “concepts are pro-
totypes” or as that “concepts have prototypes”. The first reading is common between those cognitive 
scientists in favor of the prototype theory of concepts (Rosch and Mervis 1975; Smith et al. 1988; 
Smith and Minda 2002). The second interpretation may be attributed those who think that, although 
concepts have prototypes, they are other kind of thing as happens in the case of Gärdenfors, when he 
identifies concepts with sets of convex regions. For my part, I postpone further discussion of this is-
sue until section 5.2.2, where this question will be examined in detail. 
5 Nevertheless, prototypes and conceptual regions are two very different things and, as I argue in chapter 
5, concepts should be identified with the prototypes and not with the conceptual regions, due to 
two main reasons: (a) what results from the generalization of a set of tentative examples of a given cat-
egory is a prototype not a region; and (ii) in order to categorize an object only the locations of the 
relevant prototypes are needed (Hernández-Conde 2017a). 
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ceived in terms of similarity-based spaces can provide a successful characterization of 
the contextualist approach to cognition and concepts6. 
4.1.2 Two possible approaches: connectionist versus geometrical 
As explained by Gauker (2011), the similarity space theory of concepts emerged from the 
methods of multidimensional scaling developed by Torgerson (1952) and Shepard 
(1962a) in order to represent data in terms of their comparative similarity. This kind of 
techniques were later applied to semantics, as a method used for the identification and 
modeling of concepts characterized as regions within a similarity space, and in catego-
rization research (Nosofsky 1986; Shepard 1987), which finally led to the identification 
of concepts with regions in a mental space. 
However, the first greatly detailed development of a similarity space theory of con-
cepts had to wait until the work of Churchland (1990), which happened with the turn of 
cognitive science towards connectionism. Ten years later Gärdenfors (2000) proposed a 
non-connectionist conceptual space theory free from the specific criticisms received by 
Churchland’s proposal due to its connectionist character. Thus, at least two main 
streams may be distinguished within the similarity-based space theories of concepts: 
 Connectionist approach: under this view the mind is conceived as a three-layered 
network, whose associated conceptual spaces are determined by the dimensions 
which represent the activation levels of the hidden units of the network (Church-
land 1990, 1995). Those hidden units constitute the second level of a connection-
ist network, whose activation levels allow to classify external stimuli codified by 
the input units in the first level of the network into a particular concept or cate-
gory7 determined by the output units in the third level of the connectionist net-
work (see Fig. 4.2). 
This approach to similarity space theories was severely criticized by Fodor and 
Lepore (1992), who held that there was no reason in Churchland’s proposal for 
thinking that the hidden unit activation spaces where Churchland placed con-
cepts were the same for each particular subject. Or, in other words, Fodor and 
Lepore’s criticism was that the connectionist approach cannot explain the likeness 
between the same concept C for two different subjects S1 and S2, since it is not 
possible to be sure that the activation spaces of S1 and S2 are the same, nor conse-
quently that C has the same position or proximate positions in them8. Howev-
er, Fodor and Lepore’s challenge is not a specific problem of the connectionist 
view, but a general phenomenon that also applies to other subsequent characteri-
zations of the similarity space theory of concepts, like that of Gärdenfors9. 
 
6 All the issues mentioned in this paragraph will be explained in detail in chapter 5. 
7 These concepts or categories could be identified with the regions of the conceptual hyperspace consti-
tuted by the activation spaces of the hidden nodes. 
8 In order to know Churchland’s response to Fodor and Lepore’s critique see Churchland (1998). 
9 Ultimately, since the internal configuration of a neural network is the result of training from a set of 




Another problem for the connectionist view is that, in a three-layered network, 
the structure of the hidden-layer can only be determined or discovered by an 
external observer10, so that representational level is not accessible for other mental 
processes, which poses significant problems for the characterization of high-level 
cognition (Halford 2005, p. 536). Finally, another related difficulty of the con-
nectionist approach associated with how the neural networks codify conceptual 
information is its low explanatory capacity regarding the ordinary descriptions of 





























Fig. 4.2.  Illustrative example of a simple connectionist network. 
 Geometrical approach: in contrast, Gärdenfors (2000, 2014) proposes a non-con-
nectionist similarity space theory of concepts, based on the hypothesis that con-
cepts can be located through the combination of quality dimensions (i.e., sensorial 
properties, which play the role of innate features of our cognitive system) and oth-
                                                                                                                                       
therefore their associated concepts could differ from one individual to another. Anyhow, as said in 
chapter 1, this kind of difficulty (i.e., that distinct experiential inputs and biographies surely produce 
different concepts) has to be faced by any empiricist approach to concepts. 
10 By means of, for instance, other analysis techniques such as data clustering (Elman 1990a). 
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er learned dimensions. According to Gärdenfors’ view11, concepts result from the 
partition of the similarity space into convex regions, which are identified with con-
cepts, constituted by the sets of points representing those objects which exhibit 
the key sensory properties associated to each considered region (see Fig. 4.1). 
One significant advantage of the geometrical perspective over the connectionist 
view, possible the main one, is that its codification of conceptual information is 
far more easily interpretable than the results of an approach based on artificial 
neural networks12 (as is the case of Churchland’s proposal). 
Additionally, Gärdenfors also seems to think that his conceptual spaces are free 
from the threat of Fodor and Lepore’s objection regarding the inability of this sort 
of theories to explain how different subjects may share the same concepts. Accord-
ing to him, the reasons why distinct individuals are able to agree on projectible 
properties are (i) that those properties are closely tied to the information provided 
by our senses; and (ii) that many of those (sensorial) quality dimensions are innate 
(Gärdenfors 2000, pp. 26-30). However, such a conclusion is questionable, since 
nothing guarantees the non-existence of learned factors in the set of dimensions 
that constitute a given projectible property. And, if other learned factors existed, 
then those projectible properties might depend on the personal experience and 
biography of each particular subject, so Fodor and Lepore’s challenge would also 
apply to the geometrical view (see footnote 9 in this chapter). 
Once made the observations above, the rest of my thesis will be mainly focused on the 
geometrical approach and, in the particular case of the present chapter, on Gärdenfors’ 
conceptual spaces. 
4.1.3 Similarity measures and Voronoi diagrams 
Since in a similarity-based space theory of concepts similarities are computed through 
distances, and the classification of an object under a particular category is determined by 
the partition of a conceptual space into Voronoi cells, the aim of this subsection is to 
briefly introduce the notions of similarity measure and Voronoi diagram. 
 
11 Although Gärdenfors’ theory of conceptual spaces is the most notable and developed geometrical 
model within the similarity-based approaches, it is not the only game in town. For instance, other simi-
larity-based geometrical proposals are the quality spaces stood by Austen Clark (1993, 2000) based on 
the work of Goodman (1951), and the sensory similarity spaces suggested by Matthen (2005). Any-
how, there are significant reasons why Gärdenfors’ view is preferable to Clark’s and Matthen’s ones. 
First, Gärdenfors’ approach is more explicitly contextual, and as said in chapter 3 context is critical 
in order to explain a high number of cognitive phenomena. Second, Gärdenfors’ view is centered in the 
case of concepts, in contrast with those of Clark and Matthen which are focused on the sphere of sen-
sation-perception. (Or, in other words, Gärdenfors’ spaces are conceptual, while Clark’s and Matthen’s 
spaces are sensorial-perceptual.) 
12 The difficulty of interpreting (artificial) neural networks is the reason why they are commonly de-
scribed as black box models. 
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DISTANCES AS SIMILARITY MEASURES 
As said above, conceptual space theories define similarity as a measure that is inversely 
proportional to distance (i.e., between objects and/or the prototypes of concepts), that is 
usually determined according to a Minkowski metric. Let me recall the expression for the 
distance (in a generic Minkowski metric) between two objects (and/or prototypes of 













d a b w f f  
where fi[o] (or fi[C]) represents the value of the i-th dimension of the object o (or concept 
C); wi represents the weight assigned to the contribution of the i-th dimension; and the 
value of the parameter p determines the kind of metric (e.g., if p=1 the metric is city-
block or Manhattan; if p=2 the metric is Euclidean). 
The expression above applies to the standard/ordinary Minkowski distance. How-
ever, those distances might be weighted differently according to various criteria. For 
instance, the weight could be a function of the number of examples (i.e., instances or 
concrete cases) on which a particular concept is based. In such a case, the distance-of-
comparison ( , )C Cd o P  between an object o and a concept C represented within the 
conceptual hyperspace by the prototype PC may be expressed under a multiplicatively 
weighted scheme13 as follows14: 
( , ) ( , )C C C Cd o P u d o P  
where uC represents the weight assigned to the distances from the prototype of C (i.e., 
PC) to any other point of the conceptual space15. In section 4.3.5 below, I will show the 
implications of non-standard weighting for the convexity requirement in Gärdenfors’ 
conceptual spaces. 
VORONOI DIAGRAMS (OR DIRICHLET TESSELLATIONS) 
In a similarity-based space theory of concepts, the categorization of an object o under a 
particular concept is the result of a mental process that (i) evaluates the distances from o 
to the prototypes of all the relevant concepts within the considered context, and (ii) 
classifies o under the closest concept that is, under the concept C whose prototype PC is 
the most similar to o. Once a given similarity measure is adopted, a similarity-based 
 
13 For a detailed review of weighting approaches that are distinct from the multiplicative one, see Okabe 
et al. (1992, pp. 119-134). 
14 Ordinary distances use to be called simply distances or standard distances, and that is what I will do 
in my thesis. In addition, I will use the terms weighted distance and non-standard distance indistinctly. 
15 Under this kind of weighting, similarity in a conceptual space resembles to the force of gravity in a 
gravitational field, where gravity or similarity is not only inversely proportional to distances, but al-
so directly proportional to the mass of the attracting body or to the size (measured in terms of the 
number of examples) of the considered concept, respectively. 
Conceptual space theories 
97 
conceptual space can be characterized by means of Voronoi diagrams, inasmuch as con-
cepts may be conceived as the cells resulting from a Voronoi tessellation of the conceptu-
al hyperspace (see Fig. 4.3), whose input are the prototypes of the relevant concepts. 
Voronoi diagrams date back to mid-nineteenth century16, in particular to the theory 
of quadratic forms and its interpretation by means of Voronoi partitions (Gauss 1840), 
that led Dirichlet (1850) to prove the unique reducibility of quadratic forms. Then, at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, Voronoi (1908) generalized Dirichlet’s result to 
higher dimensions. In order to honor their work, this kind of construct receives the 
name of Voronoi diagrams or Dirichlet tessellations17. 
A Voronoi diagram is a partition of an n-dimensional space into regions, based on the 
distances between each point and the points belonging to a particular subset G of that n-
dimensional space. The points belonging to G are commonly called seeds or generators 
and, in a prototype-based approach, those points are the prototypes of concepts18. The 
general idea is that for each generator gi there is a region constituted by those points 
nearest to gi than to any other seed belonging to G. The points equidistant from their 











Fig. 4.3. Boundaries of the conceptual regions resulting from the tessellation of a Euclidean conceptual hyper-
space, by means of a maximization process following the principles of the prototype theory of con-
cepts. The final prototypes Pj are represented by the four black dots with coordinates (1.5,1), 
(1.8,2.7), (2,1.5) and (3,1). The boundaries of the conceptual regions are represented by means of 
grey dotted lines. 
 
16 Nonetheless, to the extent that Voronoi cells (i.e., the regions resulting from a Voronoi tessellation) 
are commonly identified with convex polytopes, Voronoi diagrams might be traced back at least to 
Descartes (1644), so are known to mathematicians since that time (Gruber 2007). 
17 For a review of the Voronoi diagrams history, algorithms and applications, see Aurenhammer (1991). 
18 This set of prototypes is not static, but dynamic, given that their locations are updated after the sub-
ject’s exposure to new examples of those categories. 
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For instance, Fig. 4.3 shows a Voronoi tessellation of the conceptual space with a set G 
constituted by the points Pj representing the prototypes of four concepts A, B, D and E 
(i.e., the points Pj are the generators gi of the Voronoi partition). If the standard Euclide-
an metric is taken where p=2, and both concepts and dimensions are equally 
weighted, then the boundaries of regions will be determined by the bisectors of the 
segments connecting each pair of prototypes, as displayed in Fig. 4.3. 
4.1.4 Strengths of the geometric conceptual space theory 
As claimed in previous chapters, even with violations of the metric axioms (i.e., mini-
mality, symmetry and triangle inequality)19, the geometric approach to similarity models 
has remarkable advantages, such as its ability to identify the underlying dimensions in a 
particular data set, the production and handling of spaces with reduced dimensionality 
what is quite convenient for coding, memory and processing, and its application in 
categorizations and inferences20, 21. On this basis, it may be said that the main strengths of 
a geometric similarity-based space theory of concepts are the following: 
(1) Same explanatory framework for objects, concepts and properties: the first reason for 
the geometric approach is its unifying character, since it can coherently integrate 
in a unique theory the principal elements (i.e., objects, concepts and properties) 
present in any discussion about the nature and structure of concepts. The idea is 
that the geometric view locates objects and concepts in the same representational 
framework, namely the conceptual hyperspace, in which properties play a natural 
structural role as a proper element of the model more concretely, as the constitu-
tive factors of that conceptual hyperspace22. 
 
19 Recall that, as was explained in section 3.3.4, the defenders of the geometrical approach to similarity 
resorted to context in order to account for why the metric axioms were sometimes violated. The idea 
was that in similarity judgments (i.e., in the evaluation of similarity between two objects and / or con-
cepts), context-dependent factors may intervene, which would convert those similarity judgments into 
directional ones, what would explain the potential violation of the axioms. And although a char-
acterization of context is advisable, such a question is well beyond the scope of my thesis. 
Thus, in geometric models like the one described in section 4.1.3 (which used a similarity measure 
based on multiplicatively-weighted distances-of-comparison ( , ) ( , )C C C Cd o P u d o P ), similarity judg-
ments have directional character that is, they are sensitive to the direction of comparison, and this 
would explain the violation of both the axiom of symmetry, and the inequality triangle. Anyhow, this 
is not the only available explanation for the geometrical view. Indeed, another possible account is that 
some parameters of the model (e.g. the relevant dimensions, their weighting, the kind of metric, etc.) 
depend on the term of the comparison that acts as referent, which would make the similarity judgment 
into directional and, consequently, explain the violation of the axioms. 
20 Let me remind that another benefit of the similarity-based geometrical view was that, given that it is 
based on the prototype theory, it can easily explain typicality effects (see chapter 2). 
21 And, even though it would be useful to analyze how a geometric model might explain or be compati-
ble with the empirical evidence concerning structural and transformational similarities (see sections 
3.5 and 3.6), such study lies beyond the scope of my present work. 
22 Hence, by contrast to the connectionist approach where properties are not explicitly represented, 
the geometric models do represent properties in an explicit way. 
Conceptual space theories 
99 
(2) Empiricist explanation of concept acquisition: additionally, the geometric view al-
lows to clarify how concepts could be acquired from empirical evidence about par-
ticular objects and/or events, even though the issue of the nature and origins of 
the most basic dimensions still remains problematic23. As said above in section 
4.1.1, concepts or, more concretely, the prototypes of concepts could result 
from an optimization process that, taking as starting point the locations of objects 
within a dimensional space, maximized the similarities or, alternatively, mini-
mized the distances between the points that represent objects belonging to the 
same category. Therefore, an approach like this explains how concepts can be ac-
quired or transformed from experience about objects in the external world. 
(3) Easy account of memory, learning, categorization and inference: a similarity-based 
geometric model of concepts also has great explanatory power, since it provides 
easy accounts for significant cognitive phenomena24: (a) Categorization is possibly 
the most direct application of the geometric view since, as explained in section 
4.1.1, an object is said to belong to a given concept if and only if the values of that 
object produce an n-tuple that lies inside the region associated with the consid-
ered concept25,26. (b) Memory in the sense of storage is more feasible when con-
ceived as operating on low-dimensionality spaces, like those produced in these 
models (through techniques such as multidimensional scaling or factor analysis)27, 
28. (c) Learning beyond concept acquisition that is, in the sense of generalization 
/ specification of previously learned concepts, which can be conceived as the un-
ion/separation, respectively, of the regions associated to other already existing 
concepts. (d) Inference, both inductive which occurs when a new concept is pro-
duced from the information about particular objects, as described in the prior 
point, and deductive29 which comes about when the representation associated 
 
23 Chapter 6 will be precisely devoted to this question, namely to the issue of how the formation of prim-
itive concepts (i.e., the most basic elements of a conceptual system) can happen. This issue is directly 
related with the need of reliable ontogenetic models that explain how those primitive conceptual con-
stituents may be acquired. 
24 Additionally, Voronoi tessellations can easily explain other phenomena, such as conceptual change 
(Gärdenfors and Holmqvist 1994) and conceptual vagueness (Douven et al. 2013; Douven 2016). 
25 Consequently, it could be said that categorizations are a straight consequence of the main thesis of this 
type of models. 
26 Additionally, I will assume that in this kind of approach reference determination can be reduced to cat-
egorization tasks. In this case my point is that, under a contextualist perspective like the one in this the-
sis, concepts always depend on context, so there is no normativity of meaning that may be appealed in 
order to fix reference. Thence, according to this view what determines the extension of a concept in 
our cognitive system would be the execution of a particular categorization algorithm. 
27 The lower the memory resources required to store the same information, the higher the global amount 
of information that can be stored. Similarly, the lower the number of variables required to characterize 
a particular concept/property, the faster the access to that concept/property. 
28 Nevertheless, in order that categorization and memory are computationally efficient, concepts must be 
conceived as prototypes, and not as conceptual regions. For more on this, see section 5.2.2. 
29 For a study of how the conceptual space theory can explain deductive inferences see Hautamäki (1992). 
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to a particular object/concept is completely included in the region associated to 
another concept. 
(4) Cognitive economy: additionally, an approach based on Voronoi partitions sup-
ports in a cognitively efficient way many of the aforementioned psychological 
processes like memory, concept learning, and categorization30: (a) Memory in the 
sense of storage is more efficient since only the locations of the prototypes have 
to be stored. (b) Concept learning can be carried out from a small number of par-
ticular examples of the considered category. (c) In categorization tasks, the only 
distances evaluated are those between the considered object and the prototypes as-
sociated with the relevant categories. Consequently, it is fair to say that a Voronoi-
based articulation of the geometric model of similarity is highly efficient from a 
cognitive point of view. 
(5) Ability to operate autonomously on the basis of elementary processes: finally, another 
virtue of the geometric approach is that it can be articulated in a way such that it is 
based on very simple processes, that may even be independent of any other con-
ceptual information or background knowledge stored by the mind. The idea here 
is that the two main basic processes which will be proposed in the following chap-
ters (i.e., processes of dimensional reduction and data clustering) can plainly work 
on raw or slightly processed perceptual data. The strong point of an empiricist 
model like this is that higher level cognitive capabilities (such as pattern recogni-
tion, learning of new concepts and properties, etc.) can emerge from such a simple 
characterization of the processes which underlie our conceptual system. 
4.2. Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces 
Gärdenfors’ approach to the similarity-based space theories of concepts or, more suc-
cinctly, Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces is undoubtedly the most important and influential 
geometrical framework in the current debate. His proposal was initially characterized in 
his book Conceptual Spaces (2000), and fourteen years later clarified and extended in The 
Geometry of Meaning (2014). 
Nevertheless, although Gärdenfors’ approach is the best-known version of the con-
ceptual space theory, there are relevant differences between his proposal and the general 
framework as we will see in the following subsections. In the first place, according to 
Gärdenfors (natural) properties are convex regions of a given domain (CRITERION P), and 
are typically associated to the meaning of adjectives. This contrasts with the general 
framework, where properties are either the constitutive factors of the conceptual hyper-
space, or (convex or non-convex) regions in a particular conceptual space. Secondly, 
(natural) concepts are said to be bundles of properties or, alternatively, sets of convex 
regions in a number of domains, together with the salience weights of those domains 
and information concerning how their regions are correlated (CRITERION C), typically 
representing the meaning of nouns. Finally, although in Gärdenfors’ view the notion of 
 
30 Concept storage and categorization i.e., points (a) and (c) will be addressed in chapter 5 of this the-
sis, while concept acquisition i.e., point (b) is the topic of chapter 6. 
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domain defined as a set of integral dimensions that are separable from all other dimen-
sions is critical, such a notion plays no role in the general approach to the conceptual 
space theory. 
The aim of this section is to provide a detailed introduction of Gärdenfors’ con-
ceptual spaces, as well as of his main assumptions, thesis and applications. 
4.2.1 Motivation 
In order to understand Gärdenfors’ reasons for developing his theory of conceptual spac-
es, it is convenient to begin with his conception of meaning within the cognitive seman-
tics framework. According to Gärdenfors (1996; 1999), if semantics is defined as the 
relation between linguistic expressions and mental structures, then conceptual spaces 
constitute an appropriate framework for those cognitive structures, since they can pro-
vide a suitable ontology for such a semantics (Gärdenfors 2000, p. 159). This approach 
to cognitive semantics is based on the following six tenets which are openly admitted by 
Gärdenfors (1996; 1999; 2000): 
(I) Cognitivist conception of meaning: the first and main principle is that meanings are 
conceptual structures in cognitive models and not truth conditions in possible 
worlds. And, given that cognitive semantics is conceived as a mapping between 
language and mind, on Gärdenfors’ view no reference to reality is needed to de-
termine the meaning of a linguistic expression31. Additionally, truth as a relation 
between the mind and the world is considered by Gärdenfors to be subsequent to 
and, consequently, independent of meaning. 
(II) Meanings are perceptually grounded: since the conceptual structures in the mind 
depend partially on perception, then meaning is tied to body-experience. Based on 
this, Gärdenfors argues that the constitutive dimensions of his conceptual spaces 
can be grounded on perception. (But, as said in footnote 31 of this chapter, this 
second tenet is not completely compatible with a strong interpretation of the first 
one.) 
(III) Cognitive structures have a geometrical character: in Gärdenfors’ view, meaning is 
constituted by conceptual elements whose nature is essentially geometrical, and it 
is not identified with symbols related by a system of rules. 
(IV) Cognitive structures are not essentially propositional, but image-schematic32: in this 
case the geometrical character of the conceptual structures proposed by 
 
31 Nonetheless, this latter claim might not be the case. Indeed, this point in tenet (I) is hardly compatible 
with tenet (II), since while the first holds that meaning is independent of reality, the second maintains 
that meaning is a function of perception. Of course, Gärdenfors could argue that once the physical ex-
perience has been integrated in the cognitive system, such information may be thought to be part of 
the conceptual structure. However, that seems to be a quite weak and vague argument. Anyhow, 
this issue could be explained in a better and more concrete way: since in Gärdenfors’ approach 
meaning is a function of the dimensions associated to a certain domain, and given that the domain 
may depend on context, then meaning will be a function of that context and, in consequence, depend-
ent on reality. 
32 Tenets (IV) and (V) are possibly the most controversial ones. 
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Gärdenfors allows to explain metaphors or at least some of them as geometric 
transformations of those mental structures, in line with the spatialization of form 
hypothesis proposed by Lakoff (1987, p. 283), according to which concepts can be 
understood as spatial image schemas modulated by metaphorical mappings33. 
(V) Semantics has (temporal) primacy over syntax: on Gärdenfors’ view semantics has 
temporal precedence over syntax, since perceptual representations are conceived 
as previous to the development and intervention of language. Indeed, he even ac-
cepts that the cognitive structures constrain the syntax employed to express the 
semantic elements34. 
(VI) Conceptual spaces are compatible with the prototype theory of concepts: Gärdenfors’ 
conceptual spaces provide a natural explanation for the typicality effects identified 
by Rosch (1973; 1975; 1983) in many concepts, which could not be done from 
the standpoint of the classical theories of concepts (see chapter 2), given that: (a) 
the centres or centroids of the regions associated with each concept in a con-
ceptual space may be identified with the most representative members in a proto-
type theory; and (b) prototypicality can be characterized as a measure inversely re-
lated with the distance from an object to any of those centres. 
4.2.2 Gärdenfors’ geometric approach 
With regard to the main elements present in Gärdenfors’ geometrical approach, some of 
them are identical to their corresponding notions in the general framework (e.g. distances 
and regions), while others either have relevant differences (e.g. dimensions, properties and 
concepts), or are specific of Gärdenfors’ proposal (e.g. domains). The present section will 
be focused on these two latter groups. 
DIMENSIONS 
According to Gärdenfors, conceptual spaces are built up of or constituted by (quality) 
dimensions, on which objects, properties and concepts will be represented. Thence, the 
major role of dimensions is to represent the different qualities of objects (Gärdenfors 
2000, p. 6). Possible examples of dimensions include time, temperature, pitch, size and 
weight. 
Those dimensions will be the coordinate axes that constitute the underlying con-
ceptual hyperspace. For instance, the dimension of weight would be a one-dimensional 
 
33 In particular, Lakoff distinguishes six kinds of conceptual structures which are identified with the fol-
lowing schemas: (i) categories would correspond with CONTAINER-schemas; (ii) hierarchical structures 
with PART-WHOLE and UP-DOWN-schemas; (iii) relational structures with LINK-schemas; (iv) radial 
structures with CENTER-PERIPHERY-schemas; (v) foreground-background structures with FRONT-BACK-
schemas; and (vi) linear quantity scales with UP-DOWN and LINEAR ORDER-schemas. 
34 On my view, this is the most controversial thesis since, although semantics has to be phylogenetically 
prior to syntax (i.e., before having the means to express something, it is necessary to have something to 
be expressed), it not so clear that the same remains valid once syntax is developed. In fact, it might be 
the case that the same mutual influence recognized by many between semantics and pragmatics, also 
took place in the case of the relationship between syntax and semantics. 
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linear structure that takes values from the positive real line. By contrast, although the 
dimension of time also has linear structure, it takes values from the whole real line, where 
“present” corresponds to the point zero, and “past” and “future” to the negative and posi-
tive real lines, respectively35. 
Therefore, in Gärdenfors’ view properties should not be confused with dimensions, 
and this is a relevant departure from the general conceptual space theory. On the one 
hand, sometimes both notions collapse in Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces. That occurs in 
the case of one-dimensional domains (e.g. domains of time, temperature, pitch and 
weight), whose properties are also one-dimensional. But, on the other, in most of the 
cases domains will be multi-dimensional (e.g. the domain of size, which is constituted by 
the three spatial dimensions, namely height, width and depth; or the domain of color, 
which is conceived as constituted by three dimensions, i.e. hue, saturation and brightness) 
by virtue of which, in Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces, properties cannot be identified 
with the basic dimensions of their associated domains36. 
Finally, Gärdenfors holds that these (quality) dimensions should be seen, not in sci-
entific terms (i.e., not as elements of a scientific theory), but as cognitive entities or 
constructs through which a plausible interpretation of the world is provided. 
DOMAINS 
Gärdenfors utilizes a quite specific notion of domain. According to him, dimensions are 
involved in stable groups (i.e., a dimension like hue does not appear alone but together 
with the dimensions of saturation and brightness). Those stable sets of related dimensions 
are called domains. On this basis, Gärdenfors defines a domain as “a set of integral di-
mensions that are separable from all other dimensions”37 (Gärdenfors 2000, p. 26). Thus, 
for instance, the color domain would be constituted by the dimensions of hue, saturation 
and brightness (see Fig. 4.4); and the domain of space by the dimensions of height, width 
and depth38. As said above, domains can be one-dimensional, in which case they would be 
constituted by only one dimension. 
 
35 And with regard to the issue of dimensional structure, Gärdenfors is also disposed to accept coordi-
nates systems different from the Cartesian in particular, polar coordinates for the representation of 
locative prepositions (Gärdenfors 2014, pp. 205-217). 
36 Obviously, it could be argued that maybe properties based on multi-dimensional domains might be re-
duced to one-dimensional domains. For example, even though the size domain is constituted by three 
dimensions, once such a domain is built up and sizes are determined, those size values can be rear-
ranged over only one dimension. In this case Gärdenfors uses to reply that such a one-dimensional re-
arrangement is not possible for the case of color. Nonetheless, and independently of whether that rear-
rangement is possible either directly, or through dummy variables, perhaps Gärdenfors’ excessive 
focus on the color domain led him to turn an exception (i.e., the domain of color) into a rule (i.e., his 
distinction between the notions of dimension and property). 
37 Gärdenfors’ motivation for splitting cognitive structures into domains seems to be the possibility that 
properties in one domain (e.g. the color of an object) may be characterized independently of the prop-
erties belonging to other domains (e.g. the size or weight of that object) (Gärdenfors 2014, p. 22). 
38 Nevertheless, not every domain considered by Gärdenfors is as clear-cut as the color and space domains. 




An important distinction for this definition of domain is the one between separable 
and integral dimensions. At this point Gärdenfors relies on the work in cognitive psy-
chology, which claims that integral dimensions are those processed in a holistic and 
unanalyzable way, where the assignation of a value to a particular dimension requires a 
value to be given to the others (Garner 1974; Maddox 1992; Melara 1992). By exclusion, 
if dimensions are not integral, then they are separable39. For instance, in the color domain 
the dimensions of saturation and hue are integral because perception does not seem to 
give a saturation value without also assigning a value to the dimension of hue; in the 
sound domain, the dimensions of pitch and loudness are said to be integral because the 
interaction between them is so strong that subjects do not usually distinguish them. By 
contrast, the dimensions of shape and color are called separable, since their stimuli use to 















Fig. 4.4. Representation of the domain of color and its constitutive dimensions (i.e., hue, saturation and bright-
ness) (adapted from Churchland 2005, p. 536): (a) hue has circular structure, so it is represented by 
an angular coordinate; (b) saturation or intensity has linear structure with only positive values, 
and it is represented by the radial coordinate (i.e., by the distance from the vertical or longitudi-
nal axis); and (c) brightness has linear structure with two endpoints, and it is represented by the 
vertical axis.  
                                                                                                                                       
dimensions of salt, bitter, sweet, sour and maybe another fifth dimension (Gärdenfors 2014, p. 21), it 
is not clear which topological structure might tie together those five dimensions, nor the fact that they 
all are integral (i.e., non-separable) dimensions. 
39 Many times it is argued that separable dimensions fit better with a city-block metric, while a Euclidean 
metric is preferable with integral dimensions (Hyman and Well 1968). 
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PROPERTIES AND CONCEPTS 
Next, based on the notion of domain, Gärdenfors summarizes his definitions for (nat-
ural40) properties and concepts in what he calls CRITERIA P and C41: 
CRITERION P: A natural property is a convex region of a domain in a conceptual space. (Gärden-
fors 2000, p. 71) 
CRITERION C: A natural concept is represented as a set of regions in a number of domains togeth-
er with an assignment of salience weights to the domains and information about how the regions in 
different domains are correlated. (Gärdenfors 2000, p. 105) 
Therefore, according to Gärdenfors properties and concepts are two different families of 
the same conceptual class (i.e., the class whose elements are represented by regions in a 
mental space). So, while the notion of property is used to denote information in only one 
domain, the notion of concept might be applied to information based on one or more 
domains42, 43. Consequently, under this view properties are a special case of concepts in 
particular, properties are concepts determined by regions based on only one domain. 
For instance, in Gärdenfors’ approach color terms such as “red” and “blue” express 
natural properties or, in other words, RED and BLUE are natural properties, because 
they can be represented by means of the three constitutive dimensions of the color do-
main. In fact, a programmatic thesis in Gärdenfors’ work is that the properties conveyed 
by simple words (i.e., adjectives) in natural languages are natural properties: 
Single-domain thesis for adjectives: The meaning of an adjective can be represented as a convex 
region in a single domain. (Gärdenfors 2014, p. 136) 
Clearly, this is a very strong and controversial thesis, since it entails that the meaning of 
any adjective may be characterized by means of a set of dimensions constitutive of one 
particular domain whose values can be set independently of the values assigned to the 
 
40 Although these two definitions are for natural properties and concepts, as a matter of fact Gärdenfors 
applies them almost universally. Indeed, he does not distinguish between natural and non-natural 
properties/concepts, except in order to discriminate artificial non-convex properties/concepts, such as 
those associated with Goodman's (1955) term grue (i.e., green before a given date and blue after that 
date). 
41 This definition of property was originally introduced ten years earlier by Gärdenfors (1990), and both 
of these two definitions may be found in nearly the same terms in his most recent book (Gärdenfors 
2014, pp. 24 and 124). 
42 Obviously, the distinction between properties and concepts is only relevant if the notion of domain is 
accepted, by virtue of which properties may be defined in terms of the dimensions of only one domain. 
Nonetheless, and given that such a notion plays no role in my proposal, here I will depart from Gär-
denfors’ position and follow the traditional view according to which properties and concepts belong 
to the same class. 
43 This contrasts with the equivalent role played by properties and concepts in other areas (e.g. in first or-




dimensions of any other domain. Nonetheless, under a contextualist perspective like the 
one adopted in my doctoral thesis, the single-domain thesis for adjectives simply cannot be 
the case, given that if concepts and properties always depend on context, then it is not 
possible to identify a closed set of dimensions, belonging to only one domain, which 
allow to determine every possible context. For instance, observe the strong differences 
between the adjective “tall” a clear case of single-domain adjective, and the adjective 
“handsome” a good candidate for (context-dependent) multiple-domain adjective. 
With regard to his definition of concept, in Gärdenfors’ view concepts are not mere 
bundles of properties (i.e., convex regions in a number of domains), since information 
about the weights of and the correlations between the distinct domains is also con-
sidered. For instance, the concept APPLE could be represented by the set of convex regions 
associated to following properties (Gärdenfors 2000, p. 102; Fiorini, Gärdenfors and 
Abel 2014, p. 132): 
 RED, YELLOW and GREEN in the color domain; 
 EPICYCLOID in the shape domain; 
 SWEET and SOUR in the taste domain; 
 SMOOTH in the texture domain; 
 SUGARS, FIBER, VITAMINS, etc. in the nutrition domain; and 
 SEED-STRUCTURE, FLESHINESS, PEEL-TYPE, etc. in the fruit domain. 
The concept APPLE could also involve a strong and positive correlation between the 
domains of taste and nutrition, in particular between the properties SWEET and SUGARS 
(i.e., sugar-content) (Gärdenfors 2014, p. 25). Additionally, the distinct domains might 
be differently weighted, so that color and shape were the two most salient domains, and 
taste and nutrition the two least salient ones. 
Lastly, another specific element in Gärdenfors’ proposal is the requirement of con-
vexity on the geometric structure of the regions representing properties and, conse-
quently, concepts. However, since section 4.2.5 below is especially devoted to the de-
scription of Gärdenfors’ convexity constraint, and section 4.3  contains a detailed discus-
sion of the difficulties associated with such a requirement, at this point I will say no more 
about the convexity issue. 
4.2.3 Notion of concept 
In the previous section I have described Gärdenfors’ original definition of concept, as 
formulated in Conceptual Spaces (2000) which merely applied to object categories. 
Nevertheless, in his latest book The Geometry of Meaning (2014) Gärdenfors extends his 
notion of concept from object categories to action and event categories. Since my work 
will be mainly focused on the first group namely, object categories, it seems advisable 
to see how that notion of concept (i.e., concepts as object categories) has varied through 
those last fifteen years. 
First, let us recall Gärdenfors’ definition of concept by means of CRITERION C, which 
only applied to concepts in the form of object categories: 
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CRITERION C: A natural concept is represented as a set of regions in a number of domains togeth-
er with an assignment of salience weights to the domains and information about how the regions in 
different domains are correlated. (Gärdenfors 2000, p. 105) 
From then on, Gärdenfors’ notion of concept has suffered a significant change, as it is 
evident when we read his most recent definition of it: 
An object category is determined by 
(i) a set of relevant domains (may be expanded over time) 
(ii) a set of convex regions in these domains (in some cases, the region can be the entire domain) 
(iii) prominence weights of the domains (dependent on context) 
(iv) information about how the regions in different domains are correlated 
(v) information about meronomic (part-whole) relations. (Gärdenfors 2014, p. 124) 
In regard to the latter definition, it must be said that criteria (i) to (iv) are essentially 
contained in his original proposal, and allow an interpretation of concepts as convex 
regions criteria (ii) and (iv), whose dimensions are differently weighted depending on 
domain criterion (iii), and where criterion (i) constitutes a specification of the con-
ceptual hyperspace that contains the region associated to the considered concept. 
Finally, in accordance with the general framework, Gärdenfors’ concepts are the re-
sult of splitting the similarity space into (convex) regions constituted by sets of points 
which represent the objects that exhibit the properties characteristic of those regions. 
And, again, these (convex) regions are identified with concepts. 
4.2.4 Extensions and applications of the conceptual space framework 
Besides, in his most recent work, Gärdenfors and collaborators have tried to extend the 
original framework from the case of properties and concepts or, alternatively, from 
adjectives and nouns to the representation of changes, actions and events; through 
these, to the semantics of verbs, adverbs and prepositions; and ultimately to apply it to 
the case of human communication (Gärdenfors and Warglien 2012; Warglien et al. 
2012; Warglien and Gärdenfors 2013; Gärdenfors 2014). Very briefly sketched, Gär-
denfors takes as a starting point the thesis that verbs typically express dynamic properties 
of objects which as parts of events use to involve actions that may be described in terms 
of forces commonly exerted by agents. By virtue of this, his proposal for verbs consists 
of a holistic model of actions, forces and events, characterized by means of convex regions 
in conceptual spaces. In such a framework, verbs express changes in properties (that is, 
movements in the representation of objects or concepts within the conceptual space), 
and are represented by convex regions of vectors. 
Furthermore, some supporters of Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces have already tried to 
extend this framework to areas beyond theories of concepts. For example, some of them 
have proposed Gärdenfors’ theory in order to model the phenomena of meaning negotia-
tion and of “meeting of minds” (Warglien and Gärdenfors 2013, 2015; Gärdenfors 
2014), both of them within the debate about human communication. Others have sug-
gested the possibility of applying the conceptual spaces framework to the field of sensory 
cognition, in particular to the areas of the sensory perception of vision, smell, taste and 
touch (Paradis 2015), and also to the case of music perception (Chella 2015). Lastly, 
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research has been undertaken to model changes in scientific frameworks, when their 
elements are described in terms of spatial structures like those proposed in the conceptu-
al spaces theory (Gärdenfors and Zenker 2013; Zenker and Gärdenfors 2015a)44. 
4.2.5 The convexity requirement 
As is evident from previous sections in this chapter, the requirement for the convexity of 
regions runs through all the conceptual space theory defended by Gärdenfors. Not only 
properties and concepts or object categories, but also the semantics of verbs, adverbs 
and prepositions (Gärdenfors 2014) are conceived and represented within his theory by 
convex regions. 
The convexity requirement can be thought of as a generalized definition of the con-
ception of natural kind as a qualitatively spherical region (Quine 1969, p. 119). How-
ever, when characterizing the geometrical structure of natural properties and concepts, 
three possible criteria may be distinguished in order to constrain the geometry of a region 
(see Fig. 4.5): 
 Connectedness constraint: it must be possible to reach every point in the region 
from every other point by following a continuous path consisting only of points 
belonging to the region. 
 Star-shapedness constraint (with respect to a point P): for every point x in the re-
gion, all the points between45 x and P must belong to that same region. 
 Convexity constraint: the region must satisfy the star-shapedness constraint with 
respect to all the points in the region, that is, for every two points x and y in the 
region all the points between x and y must also belong to that same region. 
The strength of these three criteria increases in order (i.e., every star-shaped region is a 
connected region, and trivially every convex region is a star-shaped region). 
Gärdenfors opted for the strongest of those criteria (i.e., the convexity constraint), 
mainly due to these three reasons46: (a) mutual dependence with the prototype theory; 
(b) cognitive economy; and (c) perceptual foundation. 
 
44 For a more exhaustive list of the possible extensions and applications of Gärdenfors’ conceptual space 
theory, see Zenker and Gärdenfors (2015b). 
45 Although the second and third constraints do use the notion of betweenness, whose axiomatic defi-
nition may be found in Gärdenfors (2000, p. 15), I will not address that issue in my thesis. 
46 Since section 4.3.2 below contains an exhaustive critical discussion of Gärdenfors’ arguments in favor 
of the convexity of conceptual regions, at this point I merely enumerate those main reasons. Addition-
ally, in section 4.3.2 I will hold that none of Gärdenfors claims is a compelling reason to accept convex-
ity as a compulsory requirement for the geometry of conceptual regions. 


































Fig. 4.5. Representation of the three different criteria for the geometry of conceptual regions (i.e., connectedness, 
star-shapedness and convexity). Paths containing exclusively points belonging to the considered re-
gions are represented by solid lines, while paths containing also points outside the regions are repre-
sented by dashed lines. The problematic points not belonging to the regions are represented by 
means of crosses(): (a) Representation of a disconnected region R1 where the point x is not reacha-
ble from the point y through a continuous path of points belonging to R1. (b) Representation of a 
connected region R2 where every point x in R2 is reachable from every other point y in R2, following a 
continuous path of points belonging to R2. (c) Representation of a connected but non-star-shaped 
region R2 the same as in graph (b), where there is no point with respect to which R2 satisfies the 
star-shapedness constraint; for instance, Pc cannot be that point because between Pc and x there are 
points not belonging to R2). (d) Representation of a connected and star-shaped region R3, where 
there is a point Pd in R3 such that, for every other point x in R3, all the points between Pd and x also 
belong to R3. (e) Representation of a star-shaped but non-convex region R3 the same as in graph 
(d), where there are points x and y in R3 such that not all the points between them also belong to 
R3. (f) Representation of a star-shaped and convex region R4, where for every two points x and y in 
R4, all the points between x and y also belong to R4. 
4.3. The role of convexity in conceptual spaces 
As seen in section 4.2, one of the main theses involved in Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces 
is that the regions associated with properties, concepts, events, verbs, etc. are convex. 
Indeed, the convexity constraint is the crucial condition which distinguishes Gärdenfors’ 
conceptual spaces from any other geometric articulation of the prototype theory of con-
cepts. Or, in other words, given that Gärdenfors’ proposal adds nothing to the (geomet-
ric) similarity-based theories of concepts excepting the convexity demand on the shape 
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of conceptual regions; without such a condition, his theory of conceptual spaces is 
equivalent to a contextualist similarity-based approach to concepts like that of the pro-
totype theory characterized by means of a geometric model47. Therefore, if it could be 
proved that convexity is an unnecessary condition on the shape of conceptual regions, 
then we could speak of conceptual spaces with no reference to convexity (in a purely 
general geometric characterization of the prototype theory of concepts), just as I will do 
in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. 
The aim of this section is to show that the convexity constraint on the geometry of 
conceptual regions is: (a) unnecessary, from a theoretical perspective; and (b) problematic, 
when some particular applications of the theory are considered (Hernández-Conde 
2017b). First, I show that all the arguments provided by Gärdenfors in favor of the con-
vexity of regions rest on controversial assumptions. Next, I claim that his argument in 
support of a Euclidean metric, based on the integral character of conceptual dimensions, 
is weak, and under a non-Euclidean metric the structure of regions can be non-convex. 
Furthermore, even if the metric is Euclidean, the convexity constraint may be not satis-
fied if concepts were differentially weighted. Lastly, I hold that Gärdenfors’ convexity 
constraint is brought into question when considering some particular applications of his 
conceptual spaces since: (i) some of the allegedly convex properties of concepts are not 
convex; (ii) the conceptual regions resulting from the combination of convex properties 
can be non-convex; (iii) convex regions may co-vary in non-convex ways; and (iv) his 
definition of verbs is incompatible with a definition of properties in terms of convex 
regions. 
By virtue of all this, and since the acceptance of non-convex conceptual regions has 
little or no influence on the cognitive efficiency and explanatory power of the theory, I 
will claim that mandatory character of the convexity criterion in the conceptual space 
theory must be reconsidered. In such a case (i.e., if the convexity criterion were aban-
doned), the conceptual spaces theory would be no more than a contextualist geometric 
articulation of the prototype theory of concepts, and that is exactly the kind of position 
assumed by me through the rest of my thesis. 
4.3.1 Voronoi tessellations in Gärdenfors’ theory 
My aim in this section is to show that Gärdenfors’ theory implicitly accepts the thesis 
that the shapes and boundaries of conceptual regions48 are produced by means of a Vo-
ronoi partition of the conceptual hyperspace, whose inputs are the prototypes of the 
relevant concepts. (From here on I will call it THESIS V49.) This is important because, as 
 
47 Both of them i.e., Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces and a (contextualist) geometric articulation of the 
prototype theory  explain the same phenomena (e.g., concept acquisition and change, categorization, 
inference, conceptual vagueness, etc.) based on the same input data, and they do it in the same way. 
48 Here I use the expression “conceptual regions” in a general sense, in order to refer to the regions associ-
ated to concepts, but also to properties, verb meanings, etc. 
49 THESIS V is a thesis commonly assumed by most advocates of the dimensional approaches to the proto-
type theory of concepts and, more particularly, assumed by me in chapters 5 and 6. 
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said in section 4.3.2 below, THESIS V is compatible both with convex and with non-con-
vex conceptual regions. 
Firstly, THESIS V is tacitly present when explaining how significant elements of the 
theory work. For example, Gärdenfors’ account of categorization, conceptual learning, 
conceptual change, communication and language, and conceptual vagueness are all of 
them based on THESIS V (Gärdenfors 2014, ch. 2 and appendix). And, since no alter-
native explanation is considered for all those processes and phenomena, different from 
the one based on Voronoi tessellations, it may be claimed that: although Gärdenfors 
never openly expresses his commitment to THESIS V, this thesis is tacitly accepted by his 
theory of conceptual spaces. 
Nonetheless, the regions produced by a Voronoi tessellation are only convex under 
very specific assumptions, namely if the metric is Euclidean and if distances are not dif-
ferently weighted for each particular concept (see sections 4.3.4 y 4.3.5). Thus, Gär-
denfors could try to defend the convexity constraint through two different strategies: 
either arguing directly in favor of the convexity of the conceptual regions; and/or arguing 
for the assumptions which guarantee that the regions resulting from a Voronoi partition 
are convex. In the next subsections I will try to show that: [I] Gärdenfors’ direct argu-
ments in favor of convexity are not conclusive. [II] The assumption of a Euclidean metric 
is not guaranteed. [III] It is not implausible that the distances to the prototypes of dis-
tinct concepts are differently weighted. 
4.3.2 Gärdenfors’ arguments for the convexity constraint 
In his work, Gärdenfors does not provide any definitive argument in favor of the con-
vexity constraint, but he offers a series of reasons that suggest a high degree of plausibility 
for it. My aim in this section is to show that none of those arguments (i.e., mutual de-
pendence with the prototype theory, cognitive economy, and perceptual foundation) 
compels us to accept convexity as a compulsory requirement for the geometry of concep-
tual regions50. 
 
50 Although in Gärdenfors (2000) he distinguished between properties defined as convex regions and 
concepts defined as sets of convex regions, it is not possible to find there an explicit assertion about 
the convexity or non-convexity of concepts. However, things change in his latter works, where we find 
statements like “as proposed in Gärdenfors (2000), concepts can be modeled as convex regions of a 
conceptual space” (Warglien and Gärdenfors 2013, p. 2171), or “the convexity of concepts is also cru-
cial for ensuring the effectiveness of communication” (Gärdenfors 2014, p. 26). Nonetheless, it is not 
clear that in these last quotes Gärdenfors is referring with the term concept the same as in Gärdenfors 
(2000), because in Gärdenfors (2014) the notion of object category began to play the role played by the 
notion of concept in Gärdenfors (2000). Withal, in Gärdenfors (2014), he does not explicitly assert 
that object categories are represented by convex regions. 
Notwithstanding this, in these recent works (Warglien and Gärdenfors 2013; Gärdenfors 2014) he 
tries to explain human communication via a “meeting of minds”, using a fix-point argument. Such an 
argument requires the convexity of concepts: “the concepts in the minds of communicating individu-
als are modeled as convex regions in conceptual spaces (...) If concepts are convex, it will in general be 
possible for interactors to agree on joint meaning even if they start out from different representational 
spaces” (Warglien and Gärdenfors 2013, p. 2165). But, this argument is expected to apply at least to 




MUTUAL DEPENDENCE WITH THE PROTOTYPE THEORY 
As seen in section 4.2.1, one of the six tenets that Gärdenfors considers to be embodied 
by his cognitive approach to semantics is that concepts show prototypical effects which 
cannot be explained from the standpoint of the classical approach to concepts. Indeed, 
one of the major advantages of Gärdenfors’ proposal was that his theory provides a natu-
ral explanation of prototypical effects for many concepts51. Let us see why. 
As said above in this chapter, Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces are a particular type of 
the dimensional approach to the prototype theory of concepts. Due to this, an object o is 
categorized or not under a particular concept C in terms of the similarity between the 
object o and the concept C. Additionally, that similarity is determined by virtue of their 
shared properties. Besides, prototypes are acquired through a process of maximization of 
similarities between the evaluated objects and the tentative prototype, and as a conse-
quence the prototype of a given category will be its most typical member whether real, 
or not52. Thence, Gärdenfors’ approach is able to explain typicality effects like those 
identified by Rosch and Mervis (1975) because, the more prototypical53 a member of a 
category is (a) the more attributes it shares with other members of that category, and (b) 
the fewer features it has in common with the members of other categories. 
With regard to this first claim, Gärdenfors defends the idea that those who adopt the 
prototype theory should expect a representation of concepts and properties as convex 
regions; and contrariwise, that if concepts are characterized as convex regions, then pro-
totypical effects must be expected (Gärdenfors 2000, pp. 86-87; 2014, pp. 26-27). 
It is my view that this is the main argument offered by Gärdenfors in support of the 
convex geometry of regions. However, neither of these two assertions constitutes a rea-
son in favor of the convexity requirement, given that both of them could also be applied 
to a star-shaped region resulting from a Voronoi partition, as I now explain: 
[A] If properties and concepts were defined as star-shaped regions (produced by a Vo-
ronoi tessellation of the conceptual space) then prototypical effects would also be ex-
pected: in this case the typicality of an object with regard to a given category is also 
a function of the distance between the point representing that object and the pro-
totype of its category. 
[B] The only thing that should be expected by a consistent prototype theorist is the star-
shapedness of conceptual regions54: a prototype theorist should expect that if an ob-
                                                                                                                                       
represented by convex regions. On my view, this proves that Gärdenfors is committed to the convexity 
of both properties and concepts. 
51 See section 2.2.1. 
52 That is, with or without a real instance or exemplar of it. 
53 I recall that, under this view, prototypicality can be characterized as a measure that is inversely pro-
portional to the distances between prototypes and/or objects. 
54 This is valid for the case of a standard metric (i.e., non-weighted metric), where all prototypes are 
equally-weighted. For a discussion of the case of a non-standard (Euclidean) metric, see section 4.3.5. 
(Other examples of partitions of a conceptual space by means of non-standard metrics may be found in 
Figs. 5.4 and 5.5 of chapter 5.) 
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ject belongs to a certain category, then all the objects with the same proportional 
distances from the prototype but more similar to it that is, all the objects be-
tween the object under consideration and the prototype, should also belong to 
that category. This is exactly what happens under the star-shapedness constraint55. 
Therefore, the assumption of the prototype theory does not entail the convexity 
of regions, but only makes desirable their star-shapedness. 
Thus, Gärdenfors’ alleged mutual dependence between the prototype theory and the 
convexity of regions in a conceptual space approach articulated by means of Voronoi 
partitions, also takes place between the theory of prototypes and the star-shapedness of 
regions. Consequently, such a relationship cannot be a crucial reason in favor of the con-
vexity constraint56. 
COGNITIVE ECONOMY 
When Gärdenfors originally defined properties in terms of convex regions, he mainly 
based his decision on the argument provided by Shepard (1987, p. 1319). Shepard argued 
that evolution would have led to consequential regions (within our psychological space) 
in a way such that the boundaries of those regions were not oddly shaped. Next 
Gärdenfors (2000, p. 70) claimed that such evolutionary preference could be supported 
by a principle of cognitive economy in terms of memory, learning and processing. 
Nonetheless, the cognitive economy argument depends on the assumption that the 
handling of convex sets of points requires less memory, learning and processing resources 
than the handling of regions with capricious forms. In this case, Gärdenfors’ argument 
can be structured as follows: 
 
55 The argument which connects the prototype theory articulated by means of Voronoi tessellations 
with the star-shapedness of regions can be summed up as follows: 
PREMISE 1: If an object o belongs to a concept C (characterized by a prototype P), this entails that 
the ball B (o, oP) centered at o and with radius oP does not contain any other prototype 
distinct from P. [PREMISE 1 is equivalent to the thesis that concepts are the result of a 
Voronoi tessellation (THESIS V).] 
PREMISE 2: Minkowski metric with p  1 and non-weighted prototypes. 
CONCLUSION: Conceptual regions are star-shaped. 
The general idea is that for every object a between o and P, it is possible to prove that the ball B (a, aP) 
is included within B (o, oP). Therefore, P is the nearest prototype to a; that is, the object a also belongs 
to C and, in consequence, conceptual regions are star-shaped. (For the specific details of this proof see 
Lemma 5 in Lee (1980, p. 608).) 
56 Withal, this should not be seen as a defense of a mandatory star-shapedness requirement, since I am 
disposed to accept a different weighting of concepts / prototypes and in such a case the conceptual re-
gions might be non-star-shaped (as shown in Fig. 4.7b); in contrast with others who propose to sub-
stitute the convexity criterion by the star-shapedness one. (By instance, Bechberger and Kühnberger 
(2017) put forward to substitute convex regions / sets by star-shaped regions / sets, on the basis of the 
fact that the convexity criterion prevents a geometric representation of the correlations between di-
mensions; a geometric representation that may be carried out by means of star-shaped sets.) 
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(i) Properties and concepts are determined by convex regions within a conceptual 
hyperspace. (CRITERIA P and C) 
(ii) Those convex regions can be the result of a Voronoi tessellation starting with a set 
of prototypes57. (THESIS V) 
(iii) Voronoi tessellations provide cognitively efficient explanations of psychological 
processes such as memory, concept learning and categorization (see section 4.1.4). 
(iv) Therefore, the handling of convex regions can explain cognitive efficiency in all 
those tasks and processes. 
The problem is that, as shown in sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 below, the conceptual regions 
could be non-convex and yet compatible with a Voronoi tessellation. That is, if Voronoi 
partitions are the source of the cognitive economy in the argument above, but they can 
produce both convex and non-convex conceptual regions; then, convexity cannot be ob-
tained by abduction from the premise of evolutionary preference for cognitive economy, 
but only a characterization of concepts based on Voronoi tessellations. 
All in all, cognitive economy is common to any conceptual space theory which as-
sumes that concepts are represented by the regions resulting from a Voronoi partition, 
independently of the geometrical structure either convex or non-convex of those con-
ceptual regions. In consequence, cognitive efficiency cannot be a crucial reason to sup-
port the convexity requirement. 
PERCEPTUAL FOUNDATION 
Gärdenfors also alleges that many perceptually grounded domains, such as color, taste, 
vowels, etc., are convex based on evidence in favor of the convexity of the regions asso-
ciated with numerous typical properties of all those domains (Fairbanks and Grubb 
1961; Sivik and Taft 1994). Indeed, the color domain seems to be his preferred example. 
However, the problem of the color domain when used as evidence of convexity is that 
it is entirely associated with sensory dimensions, and there is no guarantee that things 
work in the same way in non-perceptual domains. This last point is explicitly recognized 
by Gärdenfors (2014, p. 137) when he acknowledges that such evidence mainly associ-
ated with the color domain does not provide automatic support for the convexity con-
straint in other domains. 
     
Thence, the problem is that none of these reasons is compelling enough to accept con-
vexity as a mandatory constraint on the geometry of regions. In fact, all of them are high-
ly questionable: (a) the argument based on the mutual dependence with the prototype 
theory could also apply to any (non-convex) star-shaped region resulting from a Voronoi 
tessellation; (b) the cognitive economy one depends on the controversial assumption 
that handling a Euclidean metric is computationally less demanding than handling other 
sorts of metric; and (c) the claim of perceptual foundation relies on the presumption that 
 
57 In order that the resulting regions may be convex, the Voronoi tessellation will have to meet some 
conditions (i.e., Euclidean metric and non-weighted prototypes). 
Conceptual space theories 
115 
perceptual and conceptual (i.e., non-perceptual) domains share the same geometric struc-
ture.  
All in all, on the one hand, under the assumption of THESIS V neither the mutual de-
pendence with the prototype theory of concepts, nor the cognitive economy argument, is 
a definitive reason in favor of convexity. This is so because those arguments are equally 
valid for any conceptual division produced by a Voronoi tessellation, independently that 
their shapes are convex or not. On the other hand, the other argument for convexity (i.e., 
perceptual foundation) does not urge to engage with the thesis that concepts have to be 
convex. 
4.3.3 Integral dimensions, Euclidean metric, and convexity 
As stated above, Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces rest on the assumption that regions are 
convex and, if the underlying metric were the standard Euclidean metric (that is, if dis-
tances were Euclidean and non-weighted), then the convexity of regions would be guar-
anteed (Gärdenfors 2000, p. 88; Okabe et al. 1992, p. 57). By virtue of this, the theory 
requires that the metric underlying our psychological space is Euclidean. On this occa-
sion, the main argument in favor of a Euclidean metric is that, for the case of integral 
dimensions58, the Euclidean metric is more suitable than the city-block metric. (By con-
trast, the latter would be more appropriate for the case of separable dimensions.) And, 
because Gärdenfors’ definitions of property and concept are for domains constituted by 
sets of integral dimensions, it may be alleged that the conceptual spaces underlying them 
function with a Euclidean metric and, consequently, that their associated regions are 
convex. 
However, this argument presents several problems, mainly due to the adduced mutual 
dependence between integral dimensions and the (standard) Euclidean metric: 
 First, Gärdenfors alleges a sort of co-implication between integral domains and 
the Euclidean metric: “If the Euclidean metric fits the data best, the dimensions 
are classified as integral; (...) when the dimensions are integral, the dissimilarity is 
determined by both dimensions taken together, which motivates a Euclidean met-
ric” (Gärdenfors 2000, p. 25). The first implication is true, since if the metric is 
not city-block, the dimensions are non-separable (i.e., they are integral). Nonethe-
less, the second conditional is false, inasmuch as the non-separability of dimen-
sions does not necessarily imply that the metric is Euclidean59. 
 
58 Remember that, as said in section 4.2.2, dimensions are integral if they are those processed in an unan-
alyzable way (i.e., in a way such that assigning a value to any of them requires giving a value to the oth-
ers). 
59 On the one hand, the city-block metric is accepted when dimensions are separable because, in such a 
case, the dimensions are the most meaningful element: they contribute independently to the total dis-
tance, and must remain invariant (i.e., unrotated) to keep the same conceptual space structure (Garner 
1974, p. 119). On the other hand, the Euclidean metric is proposed when dimensions are not analyza-





Thus, the Euclidean character of the metric structure cannot be based on the inte-
gral character of domains. Gärdenfors assumes that dimensions are integral, but 
that is not sufficient to guarantee that the metric is Euclidean. Therefore, the Eu-
clidean structure of a metric space needs empirical evidence independent from the 
one associated to the non-separability of its constitutive dimensions. 
 Secondly, and even assuming, as Gärdenfors does, that the co-implication between 
integral dimensions and the Euclidean metric were the case, the empirical evi-
dence referred to in favor of the integral or separable character of a particular set 
of dimensions is tied to perceptual domains60, such as color, sound, size, shape, etc. 
(Garner 1974; Maddox 1992; Melara 1992). All that work faces a threefold diffi-
culty, when taken as evidence in favor of Gärdenfors’ theses, as I now explain: 
[A] The experiments were developed over a small number of perceptual domains, 
so accepting them as evidence of the geometry of conceptual spaces requires 
the assumption that the behavior of the metric structure is the same across all 
perceptual and conceptual domains61. That is, it is necessary to assume that 
such behavior extends, not only from the studied perceptual domains to all 
other perceptual domains, but also to all conceptual domains in general not 
related to any of the perceptual domains studied, which might not be the 
case. 
[B] This kind of work is used to contrast the Euclidean metric with the city-
block metric, and shows that the former fits integral sets of dimensions bet-
ter, while the latter provides a better fit when dimensions are separable. In 
the case in hand, however, the problem is that both metrics provide good fits, 
but not perfect fits. For instance, Handel and Imai (1972, p. 110) showed 
that the optimal parameter p for integral dimensions in a general Minkowski 
metric is 1.7, which means that the best metric is neither the Euclidean nor 
the city-block one, but something between these two62. 
Therefore, what can be derived from Handel and Imai’s work is not that the 
(standard) Euclidean metric is warranted for integral dimensions, but only 
that the expected metric for integral domains will be closer to the (standard) 
Euclidean metric than to the (standard) city-block metric. 
                                                                                                                                       
However, it is possible that (i) although the dimensions did not contribute independently to the value 
of distances (and, therefore, distance were the most meaningful element); (ii) it happened that, despite 
(i), the conceptual space structure were not irrelevant, and distances were not invariant under rota-
tions of dimensions. In that case, dimensions will be non-separable by virtue of (i) but, at the same 
time, they will not be secondary by virtue of (ii). Therefore, the non-separability of dimensions does 
not imply the Euclidean structure of the underlying conceptual space, whose metric could be non-Eu-
clidean (for instance, with p equal to 1.7 or 3) and still able to explain the non-separability of domains. 
60 As happened with the perceptual foundation argument for the convexity constraint (see section 4.3.2). 
61 This behavior of the metric structure can be summed up as follows: separable dimensions are better 
characterized by a city-block metric, while the Euclidean metric is the best for integral dimensions. 
62 And, for a parameter p=1.7 the conceptual regions are still non-convex. (See section 4.1.3 for the 
meaning of the p parameter within the standard Minkowski metric; and see Fig. 4.6c for a chart which 
shows that conceptual regions are not convex for a parameter p equal to 1.7.) 
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[C] It is doubtful that the integral character of a group of dimensions is some-
thing innate or immutable, not even in the case of perceptual dimensions. 
Indeed, there is evidence that such integrality may be altered by high-level 
cognitive processes; and even that it can be the remains of a developmental 
trend toward more and more differentiated i.e., separated dimensions. By 
instance, it has been proved that by means of training saturation can be 
differentiated from brightness (Burns and Shepp 1998; Goldstone 1994b); 
and also that dimensions easily isolated by adults e.g., brightness and size 
are handled as joined together by 4-year old children (Kemler and Smith 
1978; Smith and Kemler 1978)63. 
In summary, all this evidence appears to be controversial; both that supporting the in-
tegral character of conceptual dimensions, and that which allegedly backs up the rela-
tionship between the integral character of dimensions and the Euclidean metric. The 
result is that, in both cases, the underlying metric could be non-Euclidean and, in conse-
quence, conceptual regions could be non-convex. 
4.3.4 Conceptual spaces under a non-Euclidean metric 
Nonetheless, merely attending to the basic requirements of a similarity space theory of 
concepts, it can be seen that the convexity constraint is unnecessary. Indeed, nothing in 
the general conception of these theories demands a Euclidean metric, and under a non-
Euclidean metric the conceptual regions resulting from a Voronoi tessellation can be 
non-convex. Anyhow, a constant throughout all of Gärdenfors’ work is that he explicitly 
adopts a Euclidean metric which apparently guarantees the convexity of the concep-
tual regions. The problem is that if the conceptual space metric is non-Euclidean, then 
regions may be non-convex, so the aim of this section is to describe what the consequenc-
es would be under the assumption of a non-Euclidean metric. 
As introduced in section 4.1.3 above, the formula for the (standard) distance, given a 
generic Minkowski metric, between two objects and/or prototypes of concepts a and 
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where the value of p determines the type of distance (e.g. p=1, Manhattan; p=2, Eucli-
dean), and it may take any positive real value not only integers greater or equal to 1. 
The boundaries of the regions will then depend on the chosen metric, and so will do 
their convex or non-convex character (as illustrated by the graphs in Fig. 4.6). 
As is evident from Fig. 4.6, only the (standard) Euclidean metric satisfies the convex-
ity requirement64, while all the other metrics produce conceptual regions that are more or 
 
63 For a review of the evidence in favor of the developmental trend in the direction of increasingly sepa-
rable dimensions, see Goldstone and Steyvers (2001). 
64 For a formal demonstration of this, see Okabe et al. (1992, p. 57). 
Chapter 4 
118 
less non-convex. In consequence, if the metric of conceptual spaces is not Euclidean in a 
strong sense, then the convexity constraint on the shape of regions cannot be mandatory 
























Fig. 4.6. Boundaries of the conceptual regions resulting from a Voronoi partition for four possible distinct metrics. 
The final prototypes are represented by the four black dots, whose coordinates are (1.5,1), (1.8,2.7), 
(2,1.5) and (3,1). The boundaries of the conceptual regions are drawn as dotted grey lines. (a) 
Boundaries for the city-block metric (parameter p=1). (b) Boundaries for the Euclidean metric (pa-
rameter p=2). (c) Boundaries for a conceptual space that fits the Euclidean metric better than the 
city-block one (parameter p=1.7) as proven in Handel and Imai’s (1972, p. 110) experiments. 
(d) Boundaries for a higher-order Minkowski metric (parameter p=3). 
4.3.5 Conceptual spaces under a weighted Euclidean metric 
Nevertheless, even if the metric of conceptual spaces was Euclidean, it is possible that 
conceptual regions were not convex. Certainly, this could not be case, as just explained in 
the section above, under the standard Minkowski distance which, for the Euclidean case 
(parameter p=2), is defined as follows: 

  [ ] [ ] 2
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But let me first remind how, in Gärdenfors’ theory, concepts are produced. To begin 
with, if a given concept is not innate, then it should have been learnt sometime in the 
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past from a set of particular examples. Besides, it may be argued that the number of ex-
amples has an effect on how objects are categorized. 
Consider, for instance, a subject S who had been exposed to hundreds of instances of 
the concept DOG, but only a few cases of the concept FOX. It could be thought that if that 
same subject were exposed to one new instance of FOX, different from all the foxes al-
ready encountered e.g., an arctic fox, but with a certain resemblance to the concept 
DOG already acquired, S might categorize the new instance under the concept DOG, and 
not under the concept FOX (see Fig. 4.7). The reason would be that, in a conceptual space 
theory of the mind, the weight uDOG ascribed to the concept DOG can be different and 



















Fig. 4.7. Boundaries of the conceptual regions resulting from a Voronoi partition for different weightings of 
concepts. The three considered concepts are DOG, CAT and FOX, whose prototypes are represented by 
the black dots, with coordinates (3.5,2), (0.5,0.5) and (3,1). The boundaries of the conceptual re-
gions are drawn as dotted grey lines. The point k, with coordinates (2.5,1.4), represents a case of 
arctic fox. (a) Boundaries for the standard Euclidean space, where the weights of all the prototypes 
are equal to 1. In this case the arctic fox represented by k is categorized under the concept FOX. (b) 
Boundaries for a non-standard prototype-weighted Euclidean space, where the distances-of-
comparison for the concepts DOG, CAT and FOX are multiplicatively-weighted by 0.25, 0.4 and 1 re-
spectively. (This could happen if the subject had been exposed (i) to a great number of instances of 
dogs, (ii) to a smaller number of cats, and (iii) only to a very few number of foxes.) In this second 
case, the arctic fox represented by k is classified under the concept DOG. 
A phenomenon like this could occur even under a Euclidean metric that is, even if the 
underlying conceptual space were Euclidean, where base distances were calculated using 
the above formula for d (a,b). If objects were categorized as just been described, the dis-
tance associated with each concept would be differently weighted depending on the 
number of examples on which that concept were based66. Besides, those differently 
weighted distances would correspond with the non-standard multiplicatively-weighted 
 
65 Obviously, the phenomenon of differently-weighted concepts is different from, and should not be 
confused with, the phenomenon of conceptual vagueness. 
66 A distinct weighting of concepts by the number of instances of each concept would be consistent 
with the frequency effects observed for the case of exemplars (Barsalou 1985; Nosofsky 1988b; Barsa-
lou, Huttenlocher and Lamberts 1998). 
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distance introduced in section 4.1.3. In consequence, the formula for the distance-of-
comparison ( , )C Cd o P  in categorizations of a particular object o with regard to a given 
concept C (represented by the prototype PC) would be: 
( , ) ( , )C C C Cd o P u d o P  
Here, the value of the parameter uC represents the weight associated with the concept C, 
which would be a function of the number of examples nC on which such a concept is 
based. Indeed, the greater the number of examples nC, the greater the relative similarity 
between o and PC or, in other words, the lower the distance-of-comparison ( , )C Cd o P , 
and hence, the lower the weight of the distances uC. The weight uC could be, for example, 
a function ranging from two (if the number of examples is very small) to one (when that 





0 10 20 30 40 50











Fig. 4.8. Representation of the weight function 1 1/C Cu n  , which could underlie a non-standard multipli-
catively-weighted Euclidean space. 
My point is that a conceptual space which functioned in this way would produce con-
ceptual regions whose shapes are different from the ones produced by the standard Eu-
clidean metric. Those shapes will be commonly non-convex, which contradicts the as-
sumption regarding the convexity constraint. The graphs in Fig. 4.7 contrast the bound-
aries of convex regions in the standard Euclidean space, with the boundaries of non-
convex regions in a prototype-weighted Euclidean space. 
Thence, if concepts were differently weighted depending on the sizes of their sets of 
examples then, even within a Euclidean space, conceptual regions could be non-
convex67. Of course, the foregoing requires empirical contrast through psychological 
 
67 For a summary of the properties of a weighted conceptual space, see Okabe et al. (1992, pp. 120-123). 
One of those properties is that the regions resulting from a multiplicatively-weighted Voronoi tessella-
tion do not need to be convex as shown in Fig. 4.7, nor even connected; and that they can also con-
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research, which will have to decide whether concepts are differently weighted or not. In 
spite of this, at least from a theoretical outlook, the size of the set of examples from which 
a certain concept is learnt could influence the reliability of such a concept. On my view, 
this possibility is significant by itself, beyond the fact that at present there exists or not 
conclusive empirical evidence about it. 
Consequently, there are important reasons to think that not every concept has the 
same weight in the conceptual space structure. And if this were the case, then those dis-
tinct weights would lead to a non-standard Euclidean space, which would result in non-
convex conceptual regions. 
4.3.6 Problems of the convexity criterion in the working of Gärdenfors’ theory 
So far I have shown the following. [1] None of the arguments provided by Gärdenfors 
for the convexity constraint constitutes a compelling reason in favor of that requirement, 
given that all of them rest on controversial assumptions. [2] His argument for the inte-
gral character of conceptual dimensions in support of a Euclidean metric is weak, and 
under a non-Euclidean metric, the structure of regions will be non-convex. [3] Even if 
the metric were Euclidean the convexity constraint might be not satisfied if, for exam-
ple, distinct concepts were differently weighted in terms of the number of examples on 
which each of them is based. 
However it could be the case that, despite all of this, conceptual regions are in fact 
convex (as assumed by Gärdenfors). In this section, I show that Gärdenfors’ convexity 
constraint is brought into question by his own characterization of conceptual spaces. On 
the one hand, I will show that in some cases the regions associated with the properties of 
a concept are not convex either taken individually, or as the result of their combination 
in that concept; while in other cases, the composition of convex regions associated with 
properties can lead to non-convex concepts depending on how the properties co-vary 
over those concepts. On the other hand, I will show that Gärdenfors’ definition of 
properties in terms of convex regions is not compatible with his characterization of verb 
meanings as convex regions of vectors from one point to another. 
ON THE CONVEXITY OF PROPERTIES AND CONCEPTS 
One of the most recent papers co-authored by Gärdenfors provides a detailed descrip-
tion, absent from previous work, of how his conceptual spaces work (Fiorini et al. 2014). 
In that paper, Gärdenfors and collaborators represent the inner structure of the APPLE 
concept by the product space resulting from the properties in those quality domains that 
form such a conceptual space (as shown in Fig. 4.9). 
                                                                                                                                       
tain holes. Additionally, according to this kind of approach, the region associated with a particular 
concept C will be convex if and only if the weights of all its adjacent regions are greater than uC (in Fig. 
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Fig. 4.9. Inner form of the APPLE conceptual space, as a product space of different (quality) properties. The 
APPLE space is represented by the bigger rounded rectangle. Quality properties (i.e., RED, GREEN, EPI-
CYCLOID, etc.) are convex regions represented by the ellipses; for example, the property GREEN corre-
sponds with a convex region in the color space or color domain. Quality domains (i.e., color, shape, 
taste, etc.) are represented by the smaller rounded rectangles. (Adapted from Fiorini et al. 2014, p. 
132). 
Difficulty 1  Some of the properties are not convex. 
This difficulty could be summed up as follows. There are non-convex physical properties, 
and it is not easy to conceive a convex approach for the representation of some of those 
non-convex properties. The first point is largely uncontroversial, since the physical shape 
of many objects is not convex, as happens with the shape of an apple. 
With regard to shape properties, Gärdenfors proposes different models for repre-
senting them, which are suitable for different kinds of shapes. Nevertheless, none of 
those models is proper for the characterization of general shapes and, in particular, for 
the convex representation of the shape of an apple, as it is shown in the next points: 
(A) The approach followed in order to represent the concept RECTANGLE (Gärdenfors 
2000, pp. 93-94; 2014, pp. 35-36) by means of the conditions satisfied by their 
quadruples of points in 2 can only be applied to very basic geometrical shapes 
(not including the epicycloid). 
(B) The model proposed for the analysis of general shapes (Gärdenfors 2000, pp. 95-
96; 2014, pp. 121-122), based on the work of Marr and Nishihara (1978), may be 
more or less applicable to the case of the shapes of animals68, but not to the shapes 
of arbitrary objects. 
 Therefore, neither model (A) nor model (B) allows us to represent the shape of 
the concept APPLE, distinguishing it from the shape of the concepts LEMON, PEAR 
or MELON. And, even though model (B) is useful for characterizing movements 
and actions, none of them is compelling as a model for general shapes. 
 
68 As a combination of cylinders associated with their different parts, together with information about 
how those cylinders are joined together. 
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(C) His approach to locative prepositions (Gärdenfors 2014, pp. 205-214) leads to an 
accurate formalization of the meaning of NEAR, FAR, INSIDE, OUTSIDE, BESIDE, etc. 
in terms of a polar coordinate system. In light of this, it seems that Gärdenfors’ 
aim is to transfer how these prepositions are applied to shapes in the physical 
world, to the shapes of their associated conceptual spaces69. And the same can be 
said regarding his description of the meaning of BUMPY, as a structure in the physi-
cal space constituted by “an even (but continuous) distribution of values on the 
vertical dimension of a horizontally extended object” (Gärdenfors 2014, p. 246). 
However, a direct translation of shapes from the physical space to a convex rep-
resentation within a conceptual hyperspace is only possible if the shape of the con-
sidered object is convex. The problem is that the shape of a huge number of ob-
jects is not convex, as happens with the EPICYCLOID70 for the case of apples. An ep-
icycloid is a plane curve generated by the path of a point on a smaller circle with 
radius r as that circle rolls around a larger fixed circle with radius nr. The epi-
cycloid curve is determined by the following parametric equations: 
( ) ( 1)cos cos[( 1) ]
( ) ( 1)sin sin[( 1) ]
x r n r n
y r n r n
  
  
   
   
 
Therefore, an apple shape could be associated with an epicycloid with a value of n 
equal to 1 or 2 (see Fig. 4.10). However, none of those 2D curves and con-
sequently, none of their associated 3D surfaces is convex, since in both cases it is 
possible to find pairs of points within the regions they bound such that some 
points between them do not belong to the same region71. 
Finally, this problem extends from the apple example to many other object categories 
whose shapes are not convex. And, even though the fact that Gärdenfors is not able to 
provide a method for the convex representation of non-convex shapes such as the shape 
of an apple does not constitute a proof that no method exists; the lack of a method for 
the convex representation of non-convex shapes (e.g., the shape of apples) is evidence for 
 
69 The problem is that, for the convexity constraint to be met by the regions characterizing those prepo-
sitions, the convexity of the objects to which they apply is also necessary. 
70 Although Fiorini, Gärdenfors and Abel (2014) describe the apple’s shape as a cycloid, in fact that shape 
corresponds to an epicycloid. 
71 Regarding this, it could be claimed that, if the radius r is the only parameter in those equations, then 
the representation of the shape of apples by means of the epicycloids parametric equations proposed 
here by me produces a class of shapes that is convex in the shape domain. In such a case, it would be 
true that that class of shapes is trivially convex, because if r1 and r2 are radii whose associated epicy-
cloids A and B are shapes of apples, then every epicycloid E produced by a radius rk, such that r1< rk< 
r2, also represents the shape of an apple. Unfortunately, there exists another parameter in those equa-
tions, namely n, which determines the number of cusps of the epicycloid. Consequently, it might be 
objected that the class of shapes produced by the epicycloid equations does not form a convex region in 
the shape domain since, although the epicycloids with n equal to 1 or 2 are shapes of apples, there are 
values of n between 1 and 2 (i.e., 1.2, 1.25 or 1.5), whose associated epicycloids cannot be identified 
with the shape of an apple. 
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the difficulty of conceiving a natural way of representing a non-convex shape by means of 
convex conceptual regions. 
(a) (b)
 
Fig. 4.10. Epicycloid curves representing the ideal two-dimensional (2D) contour of an apple. The ap-
ple’s ideal shape will be the three-dimensional (3D) surface resulting from the rotation of 
any of these curves around the horizontal axis. (a) Epicycloid curve with ratio n=1. (b) Ep-
icycloid curve with ratio n=2. 
Difficulty 2  The conceptual region resulting from the combination of convex properties 
(belonging to the same domain) can be non-convex. 
The characterization of the APPLE conceptual space (shown in Fig. 4.9) sheds a great deal 
of light on how conceptual spaces are supposed to work, especially regarding the fol-
lowing point: different properties in the same domain can be associated with the same 
concept (for example, the properties RED and GREEN in the color domain, or SWEET and 
SOUR in the taste domain, for the case of the APPLE concept). 
Here the problem is that two properties from the same domain for instance, RED 
and GREEN cannot be composed into a product space. Let us recall that the product 
space R of a set of constitutive quality properties Q1, Q2, …, Qn, is equal to the set of ob-
jects72 belonging simultaneously to Q1, Q2, …, and Qn. For instance, if the APPLE space 
were constituted only by the domains of shape and texture, then a particular object would 
be an apple if it were EPICYCLOID and SMOOTH. Or, from a logical point of view, for an 
object to be categorized as an apple, it is necessary but not sufficient that the following 
conjunction of properties is satisfied over those quality domains: 
EPICYCLOID SMOOTH( ) ( )shape texture    
All this works if the properties considered belong to different domains. The problem is 
that when two or more properties belong to the very same domain, they cannot be 
 
72 It may be thought that the conceptual region R was equal to the (not a) set of objects belonging simul-
taneously to Q1, Q2, …, and Qn. However, that is not the approach followed by Gärdenfors (2014, p. 
29), who accepts the possibility of non-rectangular conceptual spaces, which do not contain the whole 
sets of points belonging simultaneously to all their constitutive properties as is the case of the graphs 
shown in Fig. 4.12. That is the reason why the following logical conditions are necessary, but not suf-
ficient. 
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composed into a product space, because in this case the product space would not include 
the desired set of objects. If we now included the color domain for the case of the APPLE 
concept, the resulting product space would have to satisfy the following condition: 
1 2RED GREEN EPICYCLOID SMOOTH( ) ( ) ( ) ( )color color shape texture        
This condition certainly includes all the red-and-green apples73, but not the green (but 
not red) apples, nor the red (but not green) apples. This is so because the kind of com-
position required when two or more properties belong to the very same domain is not 
the product space, but the addition space, that is, the region resulting from the union of 
the regions associated with those properties. This kind of composition could be identi-
fied with a logical disjunction, so the condition associated with the APPLE space could be 
better expressed (with a unique color dimension) as follows: 
RED GREEN EPICYCLOID SMOOTH[( ) ( )] ( ) ( )color color shape texture        
The difficulty is that the conceptual space resulting from the addition of the RED and 
GREEN properties is not convex, because ORANGE establishes a discontinuity between 
them; as is obvious from their representation in the color spindle (see Fig. 4.11). In con-
sequence, the resulting color space associated with the APPLE concept is not convex. 
Lastly, an even clearer case is that associated with the SWAN conceptual space, which 
would be constituted (following Gärdenfors’ approach) by the product space resulting 
from a set of properties in the quality domains of color, shape, etc. In this case, two differ-
ent properties (i.e., BLACK and WHITE) are represented in the color domain. Those two 
properties would be represented by convex regions in fact, points within the color 
domain, but there is no path within the color spindle between them that only passes 
through points representing the colors of a swan. In this case, the combination of the 
BLACK and WHITE properties determines a disconnected region, so it cannot be convex 
(or even star-shaped)74. 
 
73 At the expense of considering two different color dimensions (i.e., color1 and color2) as constitutive of 
the APPLE conceptual space, given that if both color dimensions were the same, the set of objects satisfy-
ing the condition would be void. Here I will not discuss the problems associated with such implica-
tions. 
74 Therefore, the SWAN conceptual space is a problem for any theory which attributes a mandatory char-
acter to the connectedness requirement for the geometry of conceptual regions. Obviously, this applies 
to any criterion stronger than the connectedness one as is the case with the star-shapedness and con-
vexity requirements. 
Nevertheless, I must recall that my work in this chapter should not be seen as an apology for a manda-
tory star-shapedness constraint, so cases like this are not a problem for my view. In fact, this sort of cas-
es could be explained by means of the multi-prototype approach already mentioned in section 2.3.2 
(Komatsu 1992), which is perfectly compatible with a (dimensional) similarity-based articulation of 




















Fig. 4.11. Representation of the domain of color and its constitutive dimensions (i.e., hue, saturation and bright-
ness) (adapted from Churchland 2005, p. 536). The relevant colors for the examples provided are 
denoted by their initials: B=black, W=white, G/G’=green, Y=yellow, O=orange, R=red.  
Difficulty 3  The conceptual region resulting from the covariation of convex regions can be 
non-convex. 
Even if a concept C is constituted by properties represented by convex regions (as Gär-
denfors assumes), depending on how the properties of the instances or particular cases 
of C covary, the conceptual region R associated to C might be convex or not. 
Let us now consider a concept C composed by two properties or features F1 and F2. 
If F1 and F2 were properties located in domains constituted by only one dimension (e.g. f1 
and f2, respectively), then the region R representing C would be situated in a conceptual 
space composed by those two dimensions f1 and f2. That is the case of the MOUNTAIN con-
cept, whose properties (i.e., WIDTH and HEIGHT)75 are represented by one-dimensional 
domains (whose constitutive dimensions are width and height, respectively) (Adams and 
Raubal 2009, p. 258; quoted in Gärdenfors 2014, p. 29). 
 
75 Let me highlight the need of distinguishing between the width or height dimension, and the WIDTH 
or HEIGHT property. On the one hand, the width dimension is one of the coordinate axes which 
constitute the considered domain (namely, in this case the only coordinate axis of the homonymous 
one-dimensional domain of width or height). On the other, the WIDTH or HEIGHT property is a 
region within the conceptual space determined by the value or range of values taken by an object / 
concept in the width or height dimension. 
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Let me assume further that the properties F1 and F2 are represented by the regions 
more specifically, intervals Q1 and Q2 within the dimensions f1 and f2, respectively. In 
the particular case of the MOUNTAIN concept, if f1 and f2 represent the width and height of 
the mountain, respectively, those regions could be expressed in meters by the intervals Q1 
= (1500, 13000) and Q2 = (1200, 8000). 
Nonetheless, it could happen that the concept C were represented by a region R 
which did not cover completely the Cartesian product Q1Q2 of its constitutive prop-
erties. In that case, there will exist pairs of points (q1, q2) which belong to Q1Q2, but do 
not belong to R, that is, 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2( , )(( ) ( ) (( , ) ))q q q Q q Q q q R      . For instance, the 
MOUNTAIN conceptual region might not be rectangular, but triangular (see Fig. 4.12a): 
If a formation is very high, its width will not matter much; it will still be a mountain. However, a 
lower and very wide formation might not be called a mountain. Thus, the region in the product 
space that represents mountain has more or less a triangular shape. (Gärdenfors 2014, p. 29) 
In such a case, an upward projection of the earth’s surface whose WIDTH and HEIGHT 
were given by the pair (9000, 4000) represented as k in Fig. 4.12a, would belong to 
Q1Q2, but would not be called a mountain. 
Withal, if the conceptual space associated with MOUNTAIN is triangular, the convexity 
of the MOUNTAIN's conceptual region is guaranteed. 
Nevertheless, if the region R (representing C) did not cover completely the Cartesian 
product Q1Q2 of the constituent properties of C, it could happen that R is not convex. 
For instance, in Adams and Raubal’s example the hypotenuse of the triangle which de-
limits the conceptual region of MOUNTAIN might not be a straight line, but a concave 
curve as shown in Fig. 4.12b. Therefore, depending on how the properties of a con-
























Fig. 4.12. Different ways in which the constitutive dimensions of the MOUNTAIN concept (i.e., width and height) 
can covary. (a) Covariation resulting in a triangular conceptual region. (b) Covariation resulting in 
a triangle with a concave curve as the hypotenuse. 
ON THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE CONVEXITY OF PROPERTIES AND VERB MEANINGS 
Ultimately, when Gärdenfors extends his conceptual space theory to the semantics of 
verbs, such an extended framework introduces a general difficulty (that could be de-
scribed as structural). Such a problem is associated with his view on verb meanings, and 
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closely related to his basic conception of property. In this case, the problem is that his 
characterization of verb meanings, in terms of vectors from one point to another, is not 
compatible with a definition of properties in terms of convex regions. 
In his extended theory, Gärdenfors identifies states and changes with zero and non-
zero vectors; and based on them he defines events as changes in the state of a patient 
usually due to the action of an agent. The problem is that, strictly speaking, states and 
changes cannot be identified with points and single vectors, respectively, if properties are 
not represented by points, but by (allegedly) convex regions. In virtue of this, states 
should be represented by regions; and therefore changes ought to be represented by sets 
of vectors from every point in the region associated with the initial property, to every 
point in the region associated with the final property76. 
The same can be said with regard to the result vectors associated with a given verb. 
Gärdenfors takes as starting point that verbs usually express changes in the properties of 
objects; that is, movements in the representation of objects/properties within the con-
ceptual space. Based on this, changes are represented by means of vectors from the initial 
position of the object to its final position (i.e., from the position of the initial property to 
that of the final property). However, and given that a state is, in fact, not represented by a 
point, but by the region associated with the property described by that state, a verb may 
not be represented merely as a vector or a mapping from one point to another, but as a 
mapping from one region to another. 
Thus, a verb should not be represented by a vector or convex set of paths, with only 
one origin and one endpoint, but by a set whose elements are convex sets of paths (each 
with a different origin and/or end). 
Obviously, here I have not proved that those sets of vectors which should represent 
verbs cannot be convex. To my knowledge, it is hard to see in which sense it may be 
claimed that a set Z constituted by all the pairs of points (x, y) such that, xX and yY, 
where X and Y are convex sets, is convex. Notwithstanding this, the burden of proof lies 
on the side of Gärdenfors. If he wants (i) to provide a unifying framework for the seman-
tics of verbs, nouns and adjectives (Warglien, Gärdenfors and Westera 2012), and (ii) to 
 
76 This is the same notion of change that Gärdenfors has in mind when he says that “[i]n general, a 
change of state is not represented by a specific vector. Instead, it can be represented by a category of 
changes of state. (…) If the start point is set as the origin, one can represent a category of change events 
as a region of end points. (…) For example, going ‘upwards’ in a two-dimensional space will correspond 
to a convex region of points located in a cone to the ‘north’ of the origin.” (Warglien, Gärdenfors and 
Westera 2012, p. 162). 
However, this is not the only possible way to generalize the notion of change. Another possibility 
would be that the knowing subject S knew neither the initial point nor the final point of the change, 
and that the initial point could not be set as the origin. This would happen if John said to S, “the leaves 
were yellowed by disease”, but S does not know the tree whose leaves were referred to. In this case S 
knows neither the exact starting point (a kind of green) nor the exact end point (a kind of yellow) of 
the change expressed by “yellowed”, so he will have to represent the properties associated to those ini-
tial and final states by regions (the ones associated to the GREEN and YELLOW colors). Therefore, the 
change expressed by “yellowed” will be represented as the set of vectors going from every point in the 
region representing GREEN to every point in the region representing YELLOW. 
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explain the semantics of verbs by means of changes of states (ib.), he has to prove that a 
set Z as the one just described is convex. 
4.3.7 Conclusion 
One of the main theses of Gärdenfors’ (2000; 2014) conceptual space theory is the con-
vexity constraint on the geometry of the conceptual regions associated with properties, 
concepts, actions, verbs, prepositions and adverbs. Nonetheless, in this section I have 
proved that such a requirement is problematic, both from a theoretical perspective, and 
with regard to some specific applications of the theory. 
On the one hand, I have shown that none of Gärdenfors’ arguments in favor of the 
convexity constraint compels us to accept it as a mandatory criterion for the geometry of 
regions. [1] With regard to his first argument, everything that can be said concerning the 
co-implication of the prototype theory and the convexity of regions, may also be said re-
garding the star-shapedness constraint on regions. [2] In relation to the cognitive econ-
omy argument, it depends on the controversial assumption that handling convex regions 
requires fewer computational resources than handling regions with arbitrary forms. [3] 
Finally, regarding the perceptual foundation argument, it relied on the hypothesis that 
perceptual and conceptual domains share the same geometrical structure, which might 
not be the case.  
On the other hand, and with respect to the kind of metric underlying conceptual 
spaces, under the standard Euclidean metric assumed by Gärdenfors (i.e., Euclidean met-
ric with non-differently weighted distances), the convexity of regions is indeed gua-
ranteed. However, the question regarding the type of metric that underlies conceptual 
spaces is an empirical one; and all of the evidence provided by Gärdenfors in support of 
the standard Euclidean metric is controversial. Firstly, the Euclidean metric cannot be 
based on the integral character of domains, requiring empirical evidence independent 
from the one associated to the non-separability of dimensions. Secondly, the empirical 
evidence referred to in favor of the integral character of domains and, in consequence, 
in favor of the Euclidean metric and the convexity of regions comes from a very small 
number of perceptual domains; things might not work in exactly the same way in other 
perceptual and in non-perceptual domains. Thirdly, none of the works cited identify 
integral domains with the Euclidean metric perfectly, but rather with a metric that is 
more similar to the Euclidean than to the city-block; and such a kind of metric does not 
lead to convex conceptual regions. Considering all this, if the metric underlying concep-
tual spaces were standard, it could be that it was not Euclidean in a strong sense; and in 
such a case, it has been shown that the convexity constraint on regions is not valid. 
Additionally, it has been proved that, even if the metric underlying conceptual spaces 
were Euclidean, regions could be non-convex if the distances-of-comparison in categori-
zations were differently weighted depending, for example, on the number of examples 
on which each concept is based. That is, convexity is guaranteed only under the stand-
ard Euclidean metric, but not under a weighted Euclidean metric. The problem is that, 
even if the psychological space is Euclidean, there are good reasons in favor of a non-
standard multiplicatively-weighted determination of distances, under which conceptual 
regions could be non-convex. 
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Finally, even if none of the above problematic possibilities were the case, Gärdenfors’ 
convexity constraint is brought into question by his own characterization of the working 
of conceptual spaces. The problems could be summed up as follows. [I] Some of the al-
legedly convex properties of concepts are not convex, as happens with those associated 
with the shape domain, and it is not clear how they could be represented in a convex way. 
[II] The conceptual region resulting from the combination of two or more convex 
properties belonging to the same domain may be non-convex, and the same happens for 
its associated concept. [III] The space resulting from the covariation of different convex 
regions could be non-convex, as a theoretical possibility that needs for more empirical 
scrutiny. [IV] Gärdenfors’ definition of verb meaning, as vectors from one point to an-
other, is not compatible with a definition of properties in terms of convex regions. 
Based on all this, I conclude that since the convexity requirement can be detached 
from the theory with little impact on its explanatory capacities, the mandatory character 
of the convexity for regions in Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces should be rethought. Addi-
tionally, once the convexity requirement is given up on, it is possible to speak of a con-
ceptual space theory without mentioning the shape of the underlying conceptual regions; 
and, in consequence, to conceive conceptual spaces merely in terms of a contextualist 
geometric articulation of the prototype theory of concepts. 
4.4. Summary 
This chapter has been devoted to describe the main notions and theses of the conceptual 
space theories (as a general framework for the similarity-based geometrical representation 
of concepts), paying special attention to the case of Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces. With 
this aim in mind, I have first reviewed how the notion of similarity may be characterized 
in this type of approach namely, as a measure inversely proportional to distance, and 
how Voronoi diagrams can be used both to determine the shape and boundaries of con-
ceptual regions, and to carry out categorization tasks. 
The second part of this chapter has been focused on Gärdenfors’ theory of conceptual 
spaces, which is possibly the most influential perspective at present. There I have provid-
ed a detailed introduction of Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces, examined his motivations, 
major assumptions, theses and applications, and explained the role played by the main 
elements of his theory (i.e., dimensions, properties, concepts and domains). One of those 
basic theses in Gärdenfors’ view was the convex structure of the regions associated with 
properties and concepts. Next, in the third part of the chapter, I have tried to prove that 
the convexity constraint is unnecessary from a theoretical perspective, and problemat-
ic with regard to the working of Gärdenfors’ theory. 
On this basis, my view is that the convexity constraint may be detached from the con-
ceptual space theory with no impact on its cognitive efficiency or on its explanatory pow-
er, because the account of most phenomena (e.g., categorization, concept acquisition and 
change, communication, conceptual vagueness, etc.) relies on THESIS V, and not on the 
convex or non-convex shape of conceptual regions. Additionally, if the convexity con-
straint is abandoned, then Gärdenfors’ conceptual space theory is reduced to a 
contextualist geometric characterization of the prototype theory, so this will be my posi-
tion in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis, where I speak of conceptual spaces with no men-
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tion to convexity (nor to any other compulsory constraint on the geometry of conceptual 
regions). 
Finally, I devote chapter 5 to the investigation of issues seldom addressed in the con-
ceptual spaces literature. Firstly, I hold that two different notions of concept must be 
distinguished (i.e., stored concept and instantiated concept), which has consequences both 
for the presumed cognitive architecture, and for the ontology of concepts. Then I also 
claim that, under the assumption that concepts are always context-dependent, concepts 
lack persistence and have not representational character. Lastly, in chapter 6 I deal with 
the circularity problem that emerges in any empiricist theory of concepts, when trying to 











Chapter 5:  Concepts and categorization pro-
cesses in a contextualist framework: 




The function by which we thus identify a numerically distinct 
and permanent subject of disclosure is called CONCEPTION; and 
the thoughts which are its vehicles are called concepts. – 





People have beliefs, and those beliefs are not stable and persistent, but provisional and 
variable. It is not strange that my current beliefs about Austria are different from what 
they were five years ago. At that earlier time those beliefs could consist in that Austria is a 
German-speaking and medium-sized country in Central Europe; while now, after living 
for some time in Salzburg, they could be –in addition to those I had five years ago– that 
Austria is also a green and beautiful land, with a rainy weather. (Or, in other words, my 
concept of AUSTRIA today may be different from my concept of AUSTRIA five years ago.) 
Obviously, beliefs can change from time to time by virtue of the new environmental and 
linguistic information available to the subject, thus any theory of concepts should be able 
to provide an account for it. 
However, revision of beliefs –or conceptual change– is not the only way by which the 
same concept may vary. In particular, other very common way through which concepts 
are thought to change is contextual dependence. Remember that, as said in section 1.4, 
two main approaches may be distinguished regarding the degree of context-dependence 
of concepts. On the one hand, the traditional view –sometimes also called invariantism 
(Machery 2009)– identifies concepts with cores of knowledge stable across individuals 
and time, which allows to explain both the accumulation of knowledge about categories, 
and our ability to communicate with other subjects. On the other hand, contextualism is 
the second main view, according to which many concepts are context-dependent cons-
truals created on the fly for each particular occasion (Barsalou 1993; Sperber and Wilson 
1995; Carston 2002; Prinz 2002; Malt 2010), which would explain our adaptive behav-
ior to changing environments. For my part, as I have already said in chapter 1, I ascribe to 
the contextualist thesis and –in particular– to Casasanto and Lupyan’s ad hoc cognition 
framework, which is located in the scope of radical contextualism. 
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Looking back to the first issue, the similarity-based space theories of concepts have 
been sometimes blamed for not explaining the phenomena of belief revision (Gauker 
2007). Those criticisms, although not always well founded, usually arise from an inad-
equate distinction between two distinct senses of concepts –associated with two dif-
ferent facets in their life cycle (i.e., storage and instantiation)–, and from a poor char-
acterization of the inner workings of the adopted approaches. Due to this, in the present 
chapter I hold that a conceptual space theory can be conceived in a way such that con-
cepts are not static representations within a conceptual hyperspace, but the result of 
instantiation processes that are specific of each particular occasion. 
With that aim in mind, and after showing that the contextualist ad hoc cognition 
framework can be characterized in terms of a similarity-based space theory of concepts 
articulated by means of prototypes, I argue for the need–in a framework like this– (i) to 
shift the focus from conceptual regions to prototypes, and also (ii) to distinguish between 
two different senses of concept (Hernández-Conde 2017a). Indeed, once concepts stop 
being identified with the regions, and the notion of concept as stored information is 
differentiated from the one responsible of its external manifestation (in categorizations, 
inferences, etc.), the doubts regarding the possibility of conceptual change do not arise 
anymore. My exposition will prove that this is so by describing in detail how –in a pro-
posal like mine– concepts are acquired, how conceptual change / revision may happen, 
and how previous versions of a concept could be stored as a historical series registered 
and organized under a same mental file. 
After setting those goals, in section 5.2 I present Casasanto and Lupyan’s ad hoc cog-
nition framework –as a concrete exemplification of the contextualist view–, according to 
which there would be no context-independent concepts (i.e., all concepts are ad hoc con-
cepts construed on the fly when they are instantiated, and only exist when they are ap-
plied in categorizations, communication, inferences, etc.) There I argue for the need to 
distinguish between the prototype of a concept and its associated conceptual region in 
the psychological space, and I will point out that concepts should not be identified with 
the conceptual regions, but with the prototypes (and the latter only in a very particular 
sense). Then, I show that the ad hoc cognition framework could be characterized through 
a prototype theory articulated by means of a similarity-based conceptual space, and I 
identify four possible sources of contextual dependence, namely, relevant concepts, kind 
of metric, importance of dimensions, and weighting of the considered concepts. 
Next, in section 5.3, I explain why a proposal like mine (i.e., a contextualist approach 
characterized by means of prototypes and similarity-based geometric spaces) leads to the 
necessity of distinguishing two distinct notions of concept, namely concepts as storage and 
concepts as instantiation, which could be associated with different facets in the life cycle of 
a concept. On the one hand, the stored concept registers the location of the prototype 
associated to that category. In fact, that location is all the information needed to be per-
sistently kept by the mind about a concept for its later instantiation. The registering of 
successive versions of that information (i.e., prototype locations) under the same mental 
file guarantees the continuity of the concept, and its ability to accumulate new infor-
mation about that category. On the other hand, the instantiated concept is the result of 
those cognitive processes where the concept is applied (i.e., categorizations, inferences, 
etc.) Therefore, the instantiated concepts are the responsible of the external manifesta-
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tion of a concept, and may be identified with the notion of concept proposed by (radical) 
contextualism and, consequently, with Casasanto and Lupyan’s ad hoc concepts. 
My aim in section 5.4 is to discuss the relation of mutual dependence that exists be-
tween the notions of stored concept and instantiated concept. First of all, I will make 
explicit the structure of the life cycle of a concept assumed in my work, whose three main 
stages are associated to the acquisition, revision and application of concepts. On this 
basis I hold that the life cycle of a concept is not linear but circular, and that storage and 
instantiation play two very different roles in it. In spite of this, my point is that there is a 
strong mutual dependence between both notions. On the one hand, the instantiated 
concept depends on the stored concept because part of the information accumulated in 
the stored concept about a category is used by the cognitive processes which instantiate 
such a concept. On the other hand, because previous categorizations of objects as C re-
sulting from past instantiations of the concept C can be used by subsequent revision 
processes that change the stored concept associated to C, it may be said that stored con-
cepts depend on instantiated concepts. 
Then, in a discussion part (i.e., section 5.5), I compare my position with other similar 
views, like that of Machery, and –primarily– with Barsalou’s and Prinz’s, and try to elu-
cidate the main commonalities and differences between my perspective and those of 
these authors. In section 5.5 I also claim that one of the main advantages of my approach 
is that it gathers together virtues both from contextualism and invariantism. On the 
subject of contextualism, my proposal suitably articulates a framework that of the ad 
hoc cognition compatible with the evidence against the existence of definitions or 
conceptual cores, in which instantiated concepts are construals produced on the fly from 
a set of context-specific cues. By virtue of this, the approach advocated in this doctoral 
thesis can account for our adaptive ability to changing environments. With regard to the 
subject of invariantism, my view is able to explain how, although instantiated concepts 
are context-dependent, stored concepts are stable enough to be the means by which new 
persistent knowledge may be accumulated about categories. Lastly, since I do not assume 
anything susceptible to be identified with a stable set of membership conditions, my 
approach works perfectly well without resorting to the idea of definition or conceptual 
core. 
In section 5.6 I argue that, if concepts are assumed to be context-dependent –as hold 
by contextualism–, then instantiated concepts are non-persistent mental events and, as a 
consequence, are not a representation of their associated categories. Firstly, I show that 
instantiated concepts are the result of cognitive processes, not in the sense of products 
(i.e., persistent psychological entities stored in mental structures), but in the sense of 
phenomena (i.e., as that which happens when something is classified under a certain cate-
gory). Thus, my point will be that instantiated concepts are non-persistent mental events 
that occur in the mind. Next, I maintain that, if representations are standardly described 
as relatively stable objects that codify information, then it may be concluded that instan-
tiated concepts cannot be representations, since they do not fulfill the minimal persis-
tence condition that is always demanded of the notion of representation. 
Finally, in section 5.7 I will hold that the necessity of distinguishing between stored 
concepts and instantiated concepts may be generalized to any position that assumes a 
contextualist view of concepts. The idea is that, because none of the key elements in my 
argument decisively depends on the chosen theory on the structure of concepts, nothing 
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prevents the same considerations to be applied in other approaches, as long as a con-
textualist view of concepts is assumed. 
5.2. A conceptual space approach to radical contextualism 
In this section I introduce Casasanto and Lupyan’s radical contextualist approach, ac-
cording to which concepts always depend on context. On their view, concepts are pro-
duced on the fly –from a set of contextual cues1– whenever they are used for categoriz-
ing, communicating, drawing inferences, etc., and only exist when they are instantiated 
for these sorts of tasks. Withal, the main weakness of Casasanto and Lupyan’s view is 
that it lacks a proposal for articulating it within a theory on the structure of concepts. My 
aim here is to show that the ad hoc cognition framework can be characterized by means 
of a similarity-based approach to the prototype theory of concepts. 
5.2.1 The ad hoc cognition framework 
Casasanto and Lupyan (2015) have proposed an appealing and daring thesis: there are no 
context-independent concepts –that is, all concepts are ad hoc concepts–. They also argue 
that the seeming stability of concepts is merely due to commonalities across their differ-
ent instantiations but that, in fact, there is nothing invariant in them2. On their view, 
which is based on Wittgenstein’s discussion of family resemblances for the term “game” 
(according to which there is nothing in common to all the activities we call “games” 
(Wittgenstein 1953, §66-100)), the phenomenon identified by Wittgenstein is com-
pletely general, that is, it extends to every possible concept. And since the core3 of a con-
cept is conceived as those properties common to every object categorized under that 
concept (i.e., properties which are essential to that category, independently of the consid-
ered context), then it cannot be drawn a boundary between a concept’s core and its “pe-
riphery”, by virtue of the impossibility of identifying the core of no concept4. Casasanto 
 
1 Although different kinds of context-dependent information (CDI) may be distinguished, as Barsalou 
does when he separates CDI activated by the current context and CDI activated in recent context 
(Barsalou 1989), and even though I commonly agree with that sort of distinctions, none of them will 
be considered in my work, where I will only use the general notion of context-dependent information. 
2 Casasanto and Lupyan’s position is clearly inspired by Barsalou’s (1987; 1989) works. 
3 According to the distinction between a concept’s core and its identification procedure (Osherson and 
Smith 1981; Armstrong et al. 1983). 
4 As said in section 2.2.1, Wittgenstein’s work is usually interpreted as a critique of the classical theory 
of concepts –in particular, of the view that concepts are definitions–, since there are no necessary and 
sufficient conditions that determine the classification of something under a given category. And, al-
though some answers to this issue suggest that the replacement of the classical theory by the prototype 
theory overcomes this issue (Rosch and Mervis 1975), on my view the difficulties identified by Witt-
genstein are not restricted to the classical theory, but affect any invariantist approach to the notion of 
concept –including the invariantist interpretations of the prototype theory–. 
The reason is that the invariantist view considers that that which determines the categorization of an 
object under a particular concept must be something stable in time and shared between individuals. 
Indeed, for the case of an invariantist prototype theory, that stable information would be the location 
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and Lupyan convincingly argue that it is necessary to abandon the idea that concepts 
have stable –or default– cores accessed by people when they instantiate those concepts. 
Or, in other words, that there is nothing invariant in concepts, so there is no set of stable 
and context-independent properties accessed whenever subjects instantiate a concept. 
In agreement with this, every instantiation of a concept would be produced on the fly 
from a set of contextual cues in an occasion specific manner. In particular, Casasanto and 
Lupyan (2015, pp. 553-557) distinguish three types of overlapping contextual infor-
mation depending of the considered time scale: (I) Brain activation dynamics: the sub-
ject’s cognitive state is always changing, as a result of its own brain activity, which entails 
a continuous reconfiguration of the cognitive system in function of its acts of perception 
and conception (i.e., in terms of the currently perceived inputs and instantiated con-
cepts). (II) Local context: subjects instantiate concepts based on the cues received from 
their local contexts (i.e., physical, social, biological and neuro-cognitive), which has influ-
ence over the mental representations produced by those subjects. (III) Experiential rela-
tivity: persons are exposed to different linguistic, cultural or bodily experiences, and that 
may explain their distinct conceptualizations of time, space, movement, color, morality, 
etc. 
Based on this, Casasanto and Lupyan maintain that, given that the subject’s cognitive 
state is a part of the context, and considering that the brain is continuously changing, this 
implies that concepts are inherently variable. Hence, if Casasanto and Lupyan are right, 
concepts would only exist when they are instantiated5 (i.e., when they are applied by a 
subject in categorizations, communication, inferences, etc.), and it is for that reason that 
they sum up their view as follows: 
Concepts are not something we have in the mind, they are something we do with the mind. (Ca-
sasanto and Lupyan 2015, p. 546) 
For example, the instantiation of a concept when we categorize or make inferences is 
something we do with the mind, and not something we have in the mind. For my part, I 
sympathize with the view that where we “see” concepts, what there is in fact is the result 
of cognitive processes (i.e., categorization, comprehension, inference, etc.) However, after 
asserting that concepts are not something we have in the mind, but something we do with the 
mind, Casasanto and Lupyan focus their work on the instantiation of concepts, leaving 
aside the issue of which cognitive structures might ground those instantiations. Indeed, 
what they say regarding the information required to instantiate a concept is too vague to 
be an explanation of how that process happens: 
                                                                                                                                       
of the prototype associated with each category, so there would exist something in common to all the 
members of a given category, namely the fact that all of them fall within the region associated to that 
concept. But, that was precisely what Wittgenstein proved that did not happen for the case of the term 
“game”, so Wittgenstein’s remarks do not only call into question the classical theory, but also support 
contextualist versus invariantist approaches to concepts. 
5 From here on in my doctoral thesis I will adopt Casasanto and Lupyan’s general position, so I will as-
sume that concepts are cognitive tools used by the mind in categorization tasks. This is in line with the 
second view on the ontology of concepts referred in chapter 1, according to which concepts are mental 
abilities that allow individuals to discriminate members from non-members of a given category. 
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We will use the term concept to mean a dynamic pattern of information that is made active in 
memory transiently, as needed, in response to internally generated or external cues. (…) 
Rather than a process of accessing a preformed package of knowledge, instantiating a concept is 
always a process of activating an ad hoc network of stored information in response to cues in context. 
(Casasanto y Lupyan ib.) 
Therefore, in order to accept the theses of the ad hoc cognition framework, a characteri-
zation of the cognitive structures supporting the instantiation of concepts is demanded. 
The rest of this section is devoted to the issue of how Casasanto and Lupyan's approach 
might be articulated by a theory on the structure of concepts –and, more particularly, by 
the prototype theory–, paying special attention to the question of how the context-
dependence of every instantiated concept may be put in place. Thus, and in line with the 
positions adopted till this point of my thesis, from here on I will try to show that the ad 
hoc cognition framework may be conceived in terms of a prototype theory of concepts 
developed by means of a geometric similarity space. 
5.2.2 On the distinction between prototypes and conceptual regions 
Advocates of conceptual space theories sometimes identify concepts with the regions 
that result from a Voronoi partition of the conceptual hyperspace –taking as starting 
point the prototypes of the concepts relevant in the considered context–. Indeed, that is 
Gärdenfors’ point when he defines (natural) concepts6 as sets of convex regions in a num-
ber of domains7 (Gärdenfors 2000, p. 105)8, 9. By contrast, others have wondered what 
reasons could have the mind to draw boundaries between regions in a similarity space 
 
6 See section 4.2.2 in this doctoral thesis. 
7 This perspective is almost equivalent to that according to which concepts are represented by the 
boundaries around their respective categories (Ashby and Townsend 1986; Ashby and Gott 1988; 
Ashby 1992; Maddox and Ashby 1993), which sometimes has been referred as the category boundary 
approach to the structure of concepts (Goldstone and Kersten 2003). 
8 Churchland, in the case of his connectionist approach, also seems to attribute a strong ontological im-
port to the existence of an underlying conceptual space –with regions, boundaries and so on– when he 
says that “there really is an abstract space and it really does come to contain prototypical points, simi-
larity gradients, category boundaries or partitions, and a well-defined geometrical configuration that 
embraces all of them” (Churchland 1998, p. 16). 
9 Let me observe that, although Gärdenfors insists on the connection between his conceptual spaces and 
the prototype theory of concepts, prototypes are less essential for his theory than convex regions. First, 
he defines properties and concepts in terms of (convex) regions, not in terms of prototypes that could 
incidentally lead to the determination of their associated conceptual regions. Or, in other words, ac-
cording to the conceptual space theory held by Gärdenfors, concepts are substantially defined as con-
vex regions, which only contingently have an associated prototype. Second, only attributing a second-
ary character to prototypes it is possible an approach to concepts in terms of convex regions. This is so 
because if prototypes were predominant over regions –with regard to the nature of concepts– (as hold 
by me in section 5.2.2), then the only constraint required over the geometry of conceptual regions 
would be star-shapedness, not convexity. Hence, it is fair to say that in Gärdenfors’ theory prototypes 
are only a means to an end, and that end are the convex regions that he identifies with properties and 
concepts. 
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(Gauker 2007). Although for reasons different from Gauker’s, in this section I argue 
against the thesis that the mind draws boundaries delimiting concepts. Here my point is 
that there are no reason why having a concept involves drawing its boundary. More spe-
cifically, I will hold that –according to the conceptual space theory– it is possible to pos-
sess a concept and not having to determine its associated boundary and/or conceptual 
region10. 
In this regard the key question is: What must be identified with the notion of concept 
in a similarity space approach based on the prototype theory? There are two possible 
answers to this question: (i) the concepts are the prototypes; and (ii) the concepts are the 
conceptual regions produced from those prototypes. In principle, the issue seems innocu-
ous, to the point that in many cases concepts are identified either with the prototypes or 
with their associated regions indistinctly. The reason for this is that prototypes and con-
ceptual regions are interdefinable since: (a) given a certain set of prototypes, the regions 
associated with their respective concepts can be determined; and (b) given a set of con-
ceptual regions –resulting from a Voronoi tessellation of the conceptual space–, the loca-
tion of their respective prototypes may be established. 
Here my point is that regions and prototypes are distinct things that play very dif-
ferent roles. On the one hand, conceptual regions play mainly an explicative function, 
since it is easier to say briefly that «an object o falls within the region associated to a con-
cept C», than to say that «the distance between the object o and the prototype associ-
ated to the concept C is smaller than any of the distances between o and the prototype of 
any other concept distinct from C (and relevant in the considered context)». On the 
other hand, prototypes are the notion which intervenes in cognitive processes, such as 
concept formation and categorization, and there are significant reasons which support 
this statement: 
 That which results from the generalization of a set of (tentative) examples of a 
given category is a prototype, not a region. Indeed, conceptual regions only arise 
from the evaluation of the distances between all the points of the conceptual hy-
perspace, and the prototypes of the relevant concepts. 
 The application of conceptual regions in categorization tasks is both unnecessary 
and inefficient: (1) It is unnecessary because in order to categorize an object only 
the location of the relevant prototypes is needed11. (2) It is inefficient both in 
terms of memory and/or processing because it compels, either to store the con-
cept associated to every point of the conceptual hyperspace, or to store the whole 
boundaries and calculate the region within which the considered object is located. 
 
10 Since in this kind of discussion boundaries and regions are interdefinable and interchangeable notions 
(inasmuch as, given a certain region its boundary is defined; and given a particular boundary, its delim-
ited region is fixed), throughout the rest of this section I restrict my discourse to the case of conceptual 
regions. 
11 Obviously, those boundaries might be determined from the very same input used to categorize an ob-
ject under a given concept (i.e., from the locations of the prototypes of the relevant concepts). None-
theless, all those calculations are not needed and, consequently, very possibly not done. 
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Hence, it is an error to attribute to the conceptual regions a persistent and strong ontolo-
gical sense –as actually existing entities present in our minds– seeing that their function 
is merely explicative, and that they do not intervene in any significant cognitive task. 
Therefore, in my view concepts are associated with prototypes, and not with con-
ceptual regions produced from those prototypes12. In fact, my point is that the only in-
formation required to be stored by the mind about concepts is the location of their pro-
totypes –and not their associated regions and/or boundaries–. This is crucial in order to 
hold that a prototype theory of concepts may articulate the ad hoc cognition framework, 
since if the information stored in memory were the regions, then it could not be said that 
the (instantiated) concepts depend on context. Indeed, under a contextualist view of 
concepts a context-independent determination and storage of the region and/or bounda-
ries associated to a concrete concept is useless, because that region and boundaries will 
depend on information that varies from context to context as shown in section 5.2.3. 
In consequence, if concepts were the regions and/or boundaries, then every time the 
context changes13 a whole recalculation of the boundaries would be needed, so it would 
be nonsense both from a psychological and a computational point of view to store 
information that will be rarely reused. 
All in all, my suggestion is that it is necessary to shift the focus from conceptual re-
gions to prototypes –or, in other words, from boundaries to prototypes–. 
5.2.3 A similarity-based model for ad hoc cognition 
Let us see now how a contextualist framework –like that of the ad hoc cognition– may be 
articulated by means of a similarity space theory of concepts. As said in section 4.1.3, 
conceptual space theories define similarity as a measure inversely proportional to dis-
tance. In particular, the distance between two objects (and/or prototypes of concepts) a 
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where fi[o] is the value of the i-th dimension of the object o; wi is the weight assigned to 
the i-th dimension; and p determines the kind of metric. 
 
12 Anyhow, it could be argued that there is a sense in which concepts may be identified with regions and 
boundaries, even though the unique information stored by the mind about categories was the location 
of prototypes. The idea underlying that critique could be that the instantiation of a concept leads im-
plicitly to the application/determination of its associated region since: (a) the instantiation of a con-
cept produces the same result that would be produced from applying the information about the whole 
region in that categorization task; and (b) if instantiations were carried out for all the points of the ge-
ometric space, they would result in the regions and boundaries of all the considered concepts. 
Here my answer is that none of the previous considerations should be confused with an effective appli-
cation/determination of the regions –or boundaries– associated to those concepts. On the contrary, 
they are mere useful ways of providing a high-level description of what is happening in such instantia-
tions, and not a true explanation of how those cognitive processes really work. 
13 And, according to many contextualists, context is continuously changing. 
Concepts and categorization processes in a contextualist framework 
141 
Additionally, as said in the previous chapter, distances may be differently weighted, 
what led me to introduce the notion of distance-of-comparison ( , )C Cd o P  between an 
object o and a concept C with prototype PC, which was expressed as follows: 
( , ) ( , )C C C Cd o P u d o P  
where uC is the weighting of the distances from the prototype of C (i.e., PC). 
According to this view, an object o will be categorized under a concept G if the dis-
tance-of-comparison between o and G (i.e., ( , )G Gd o P ) is less than the distance-of-com-
parison between o and any other relevant concept in that context. Or, in other words, if 
C is the set of relevant concepts in the considered context, then when C C  it is true 
that ( , ) ( , )G G C Cd o P d o P , the object o will be categorized under the concept G. It is in 
this kind of cognitive process where the instantiation of a concept occurs, which consists 
in the evaluation of the similarities of a particular object or concept with regard to the 
set C of relevant concepts in that context14, 15. 
Thence, inasmuch as distances and similarities are a function of the parameters p, 
wi and uC, and given that the categorization of an object also depends on which the rele-
vant concepts are (i.e., set C), it can be said that there exist at least four contextual factors 
that can affect the instantiation of every concept in a characterization of the ad hoc cog-
nition framework like this: 
 the instantiated concepts set C of relevant concepts, 
 the kind of metric parameter p, 
 the importance of dimensions weights wi, and 
 the significance of concepts weights uC. 
RELEVANT CONCEPTS 
First, a categorization process will produce different partitions of the conceptual space 
depending on the set C of concepts relevant in the considered context (i.e., depending on 
the locations of the pertinent concepts), which will lead, consequently, to distinct instan-
tiations of those concepts. 
Consider the following example. Let be a subject S whose default conceptual space for 
the case of a categorization process of citruses is that shown in Fig. 5.1a, where the hori-
 
14 If such a process happened for all the points of the conceptual hyperspace, that would produce a whole 
partition of the conceptual space in regions susceptible of being identified with the instantiations of all 
the concepts in C. 
15 Sometimes it is argued that most approaches are not really full-blown categorization models, since they 
merely focus on the last two steps (i.e., similarity calculus and decision making) of a three-stage pro-
cess, and say nothing about the first stage (i.e., selection of relevant concepts) (Barsalou 1990; Machery 
2009). On my view, that is a valid critique, since a fully developed model has to explain which concepts 
are considered in any particular categorization context. Indeed, my proposal would fall within that 
kind of not-full-blown approaches, because I have not delved into the details of how concepts are se-
lected. Even though I am fully conscious of the significance of that first step, that issue lies within the 
context sphere and, as I have said previously, the problem of context (i.e., its characterization, mainte-
nance and application) is outside the scope of this doctoral thesis. 
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zontal axis might be identified with the color dimension and the vertical axis may be iden-
tified with a mixture of texture and shape. 
However, if the subject S were in a context where he did not expect that the fruit that 
grows in a tree could be a lime (perhaps because S is in a place where he knows that there 
are not lime trees, or because its presence there is quite rare), then LIME might not be a 
relevant concept in that categorization process. In that case, any object previously catego-
rized as a lime would be now classified under the concept LEMON (see Fig. 5.1b). A similar 
phenomenon may happen if GRAPEFRUIT did not belong to the set C of relevant concepts, 
and instead TANGERINE was an element of C (see Fig. 5.1c); or if the subject S thought he 








































Fig. 5.1. Example of contextual dependence of concepts due to the set of relevant concepts, for a categorization 
process of citruses where abscissas may be identified with color, and ordinates with a mixture of tex-
ture and shape. (a) Default context with prototypes of the concepts LEMON, ORANGE, GRAPEFRUIT 
and LIME located in the coordinates (2,1.5), (0.5,0.75), (0.5,1.75) and (3.5,1.75), respectively. (b) 
Context where the concept LIME is not relevant. (c) Context where the third relevant concept were 
not GRAPEFRUIT, but the concept TANGERINE, located in (0.75,2.25). (d) Context where the relevant 
concepts were LEMON, PAINTED-LEMON, PLASTIC-LEMON and WOODEN-LEMON, the last three located 
in (2,0.25), (1,1.6) and (2.2,2.75), respectively. 
KIND OF METRIC 
Nonetheless, it might happen that there exist two distinct contexts H and L such that 
their sets of relevant concepts were the same (i.e., such that CH=CL, where CX repre-
sents the set of concepts relevant in the context X), but whose metrics were not iden-
tical. In that case, different metrics will produce, even for the same set of prototypes, 
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distinct partitions of the conceptual space and, consequently, different instantiations of 
those concepts. 
Now, consider again the instantiation represented by Fig. 5.1a whose metric was Eu-
clidean instantiation reproduced in Fig. 5.2a. This could be the case of a context where 
the subject is so used to classifying citruses according to the dimensions of color and tex-








































Fig. 5.2. Example of contextual dependence of concepts due to the kind of metric, for a categorization process of 
citruses with the same set of relevant concepts as the one in Fig. 5.1a, located in the coordinates 
(2,1.5), (0.5,0.75), (0.5,1.75) and (3.5,1.75), respectively. (a) Context with Euclidean metric (p=2). 
(b) Context with city-block/Manhattan metric (p=1). (c) Context with higher-order metric (p=3). 
(d) Context with optimal metric for integral dimensions (Handel and Imai 1972) (p=1.7). 
By contrast, if the context were such that the dimensions of color and texture-shape were 
separately processed16 (perhaps because the subject is encouraged to attend to the indiv-
idual differences in those two dimensions; or at some previous time when that subject 
was not used to doing that task), then the applied metric might be the city-block (i.e., 
parameter p=1) (see Fig. 5.2b). Indeed, there is empirical evidence that the selective at-
tention to the considered dimensions may change how similarity relations are deter-
 
16 Remember that, as said in section 4.2.2, dimensions are integral if they are processed in an un-
analyzable way, and assigning a value to one of them requires giving a value to the others (Garner 
1974). When dimensions are not integral, then they are separable. 
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mined, so dimensions commonly integral (with parameter p=2) can be evaluated sep-
arately (parameter p=1), and vice versa (Melara et al. 1992)17. 
Obviously, instantiations would be different for other kinds of metric (see Fig. 5.2c 
and Fig. 5.2d for metrics with parameter p=3 and p=1.7, respectively). 
IMPORTANCE OF DIMENSIONS 
However, even though two different contexts shared the same set of relevant concepts 
and also the same kind of metric, if the importance received by the dimensions consti-
tutive of the underlying conceptual hyperspace were distinct in the limit, some weights 
could be equal to zero, that would produce different instantiations of those concepts. 
Look again at the instantiation shown in Fig. 5.1a, whose metric was Euclidean and 








































Fig. 5.3. Example of contextual dependence of concepts due to the importance of dimensions, for a categorization 
process of citruses with Euclidean metric, based on the color horizontal axis and a mixture of tex-
ture and shape vertical axis. (a) Default context with equally weighted dimensions [weights 
(1,1)]. (b) Context where color had twice the importance of the mixture of texture and shape [weights 
(2,1)]. (c) Context where texture and shape had twice the weight of color [weights (1,2)]. (d) Con-
text where texture and shape had thrice the importance of color [weights (1,3)]. 
 
17 In the same line Nosofsky (1987) proved that, if the difference of objects along their constitutive di-
mensions is very small, then a parameter of p=2 provides a better fit, even though such dimensions 
were separable. For a review of other cases where the same sets of dimensions can be distinctly pro-
cessed e.g., as a whole or separately by the very same subject, see Goldstone and Steyvers (2001). 
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Consider now the case of a context where the subject watches the scene from a certain 
distance, by virtue of which his perception of the texture and shape of objects is not too 
accurate. In that case, the subject’s cognitive system might overweight the dimension of 
color, for instance, assigning to it twice the weight of the mixture of texture and shape, 
which would produce a different instantiation of the considered concepts (see Fig. 5.3b). 
Alternatively, it could happen that in another context the color dimension had little 
importance (for instance, if the subject is in a dark environment, where the hue of color 
cannot be clearly distinguished; or if he was in a context of unripe fruits, where all of 
them were more or less greenish). In such a case, the mixture of texture and shape 
might have twice or thrice the importance of the color dimension, resulting in other two 
different instantiations of those concepts (see Fig. 5.3c and Fig. 5.3d, respectively). 
SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCEPTS 
Lastly, it could happen that although all the previous factors were the same in two par-
ticular contexts, the significance of concepts were not equal in both situations. In such a 
case, the distances-of-comparison (that are used in categorizations) would be differently 
weighted in each context, and that would produce distinct instantiations of the relevant 
concepts. 
Let’s consider again the conceptual space represented by Fig. 5.1a where the four in-
stantiated concepts (i.e., LEMON, ORANGE, GRAPEFRUIT and LIME) were equally weighted, 
which is reproduced in Fig. 5.4a. 
But, context could be such that concepts were distinctly weighted according to: (i) 
the relative frequencies of the examples observed in the subject’s life course; and/or (ii) 
the subject’s interests and/or expectations in the considered context. For instance, in the 
case of a weighting based on frequencies, if weights were (1.1,1.2,1,1)18 (that is, if orange 
is the most frequent citrus, and lemon is the second one, equally followed by grapefruit 
and lime), the instantiated concepts would be those shown in Fig. 5.4b. By contrast, if 
the subject S works in a production line of lime nets where most of the citruses are limes, 
even though sometimes unripe lemons also appear, the subject S might be especially sen-
sitive to limes, and slightly less sensitive to lemons so that the weights of concepts were 
(1.3,1,1,1.5) (see Fig. 5.4c). Finally, a fourth possible context might be one in which 
oranges and lemons were equally and significantly overweighed regarding grapefruits 
and limes, which would happen for the quadruple of weights (2.5,2.5,1,1) (see Fig. 
5.4d)19. That would be the case if the subject a child, for example had been exposed to 
a very small number of grapefruits and limes; or, in other words, if the majority of citrus-
es seen by the subject had been oranges and lemons. 
 
18 These weights –and all the other weights that will appear in this subsection– are relative to similarities, 
that is, they are the inverse of the weights uC (associated to distances) that appeared in the multiplica-
tively weighted scheme shown at the beginning of section 5.2.3. 
19 Observe that the result shown in Fig. 5.4d of these low weightings for the concepts GRAPEFRUIT and 
LIME, as well as that represented for the concept FOX in Fig. 4.7b, are functionally equivalent to the re-










































Fig. 5.4. Example of contextual dependence of concepts due to the significance of the relevant concepts, for a 
categorization process of citruses with the same set of relevant concepts as that in Fig. 5.1a. (a) De-
fault context with equally weighted concepts [weights (1,1,1,1)] (associated to LEMON, ORANGE, 
GRAPEFRUIT and LIME, respectively). (b) Context with concepts weighted by their relative frequency 
[weights (1.1,1.2,1,1)]. (c) Context for a worker in a production line of lime nets [weights 
(1.3,1,1,1.5)]. (d) Context for a child who had been exposed to a small number of examples of 
grapefruits and limes [weights (2.5,2.5,1,1)]. 
     
Obviously, all these four context-dependent factors will not usually intervene individ-
ually in the instantiation of concepts as discussed up to this point, but all of them as a 
whole in the way represented by Fig. 5.5b. 
All in all, each new instantiation of a concept in a particular context can be different, 
since the relevant concepts, the kind of metric and the importance of dimensions and 
concepts may vary from context to context. 
Lastly, a prototype theory of concepts (conceived in terms of a geometric similarity 
space) can provide a successful account of Casasanto and Lupyan’s main thesis, namely, 
that all concepts are ad hoc concepts or, in other words, that the instantiation of every 
concept depends on the context where such an instantiation happens. 






















Fig. 5.5. Example of combined contribution of four contextual factors (i.e., relevant concepts, kind of metric, 
importance of dimensions, and significance of concepts), for a categorization process of citruses. (a) 
Default context with prototypes of the concepts LEMON, ORANGE, GRAPEFRUIT and LIME located in 
the coordinates (2,1.5), (0.5,0.75), (0.5,1.75) and (3.5,1.75) respectively, for a Euclidean metric 
where all the concepts and dimensions were equally weighted. (b) Alternative context where the 
concept GRAPEFRUIT is not relevant, but the concept TANGERINE located in (0.75,2.25); for a met-
ric with parameter p=3, where the color dimension had twice the importance of the mixture of tex-
ture and shape [weights (2,1)], and concepts had different significance [weights (2.5,2.5,1,1)]. 
5.3. Two-faceted concepts 
Hitherto, two distinct notions of concept have been tacitly used in this chapter. The first 
is that associated with the information persistently stored by our mind about a given 
category I will call concepts in this sense stored concepts; while the other is that refer-
ring to the result of those cognitive processes which apply part of the information stored 
about that category20 in cognitive tasks (i.e., categorizations), for each particular context 
I will call concepts in this other sense instantiated concepts. 
In this section I will hold that it is worthwhile to distinguish those different notions 
which should not be confused, and that they may be identified with two distinct fac-
ets in the life cycle of a concept. 
5.3.1 What is “having a concept”? 
However, before that discussion, and without trying to provide a definition of what a 
concept is, I will briefly sketch out how having a concept may be understood, and the 
main difficulties associated to the distinct approaches to this question. 
A GENERAL ISSUE WITH THE IDEA OF “HAVING A CONCEPT” 
According to Putnam (1970, 1975) and Kripke (1980), to be competent with a natural 
kind concept21 cannot require knowing the conditions of application or category mem-
 
20 Together with information stored about other relevant categories in that context, and other contextu-
al parameters (e.g., the kind of metrics) and weightings (e.g., of dimensions and concepts). 
21 Although Putnam and Kripke focus their discussion in natural kind terms/concepts, there is nothing 
in their arguments that prevents them from applying to the case of general concepts. 
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bership, because in many cases we are competent without knowing those conditions 
sometimes due to ignorance and others due to error22. 
However, as said by Margolis (1994), Putnam’s and Kripke’s line of argument may be 
used, not only against the classical theory, but also against the prototype theory. His 
point is that when the assumptions of these theories are made explicit, both of them 
share a same epistemological condition: 
(3) The classical theory 
(a) All instances of a category share a set of properties singly necessary and jointly sufficient for 
membership within the category. 
(b) Having a concept involves knowing the conditions of membership within the corresponding 
category. 
(4) Prototype theory 
(a) Category membership is a matter of having some sufficiently many properties that members 
of the category tend to have. 
(b) Having a concept involves knowing the conditions of membership within the corresponding 
category. (Margolis 1994, p. 78) 
Under this view, both theories demand that subjects know the conditions for category 
membership namely, condition (3b) / (4b) so, if Putnam and Kripke are right, in the 
sense that the crucial fact is that people cannot in general specify the conditions for 
category membership, this would occur independently of whether such conditions are 
conceived in classical or in prototypic terms (i.e., in terms of a condition like (3a) or like 
(4a), respectively). In such a case, the prototype theory is no better off than the classical 
theory, since condition (3b) / (4b) is the same in both cases. 
Even more, that very same conclusion will affect any other theory on the structure of 
concepts which shared a premise like (3b) / (4b). In fact, any invariantist theory on the 
structure of concepts will have to face Putnam’s and Kripke’s line of argument, because 
what underlies the condition (3b) / (4b) is the assumption that there exists a set of invar-
iant and, consequently, free from the problems of ignorance and error conditions for 
category membership23. 
 
22 For a description of the problems of ignorance and error, see section 2.2.1. 
23 The same line of argument by virtue of which the problems of ignorance and error become irrelevant, 
allows to easily explain the existence of failures of communication: because it is not possible to know 
the membership conditions of a given category, a subject can never be sure that her utterances have 
been properly understood by the other participants in a conversation. Nonetheless, it is precisely that 
point which makes communication into a problem per se for contextualism, since the contextualist has 
to provide an account of how that thing we call “successful communication” may happen without the 
help of a set of shared and identical concepts/meanings. (And what I have said about successful com-
munication could also be said regarding other human activities such as cooperation, agreements, lan-
guage, etc.) For my part, and even though I recognize that the latter is a crucial issue, its study lies be-
yond the aim of this doctoral thesis. Anyhow, the answer to that question might be based on the satis-
faction of one’s own expectations on the basis of (apparently) shared classifications of the same exam-
ples. (That could lead the subject to conclude that one of her own concepts C is close enough to the 
concept C of other subject or set of subjects.) 
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Despite this, the prototype theory may also be conceived in non-invariantist terms (in 
line with the radical contextualist view assumed in my work), and in such a case it would 
be beyond Margolis’ generalization of Putnam’s and Kripke’s critique. The reason is that, 
according to radical contextualism, concepts require to be instantiated for each particular 
occasion or context, so it is meaningless to speak of conditions for category member-
ship without an associated instantiation process. Or, in other words, condition (3b) / 
(4b) is irrelevant in a contextualist approach where those conditions of membership are 
dynamically produced for each particular occasion and, due to this, are constantly vary-
ing from context to context. 
And, for the same reason it is also meaningless to speak of having a concept without 
considering a particular instantiation process. Under this view, and since the context may 
be continuously changing, the question of what is “having a concept” has no sense, and 
we should instead focus on the issue of competence with concepts in categorizations, in-
ferences, communication, etc. 
CONTEXTUALISM, PROTOTYPES AND THE NOTION OF “HAVING A CONCEPT” 
Anyhow, due to the difficulties described in the previous section and the tentative up-
shot towards shifting the focus to the affair of competence, we might wonder whether 
the notion of having a concept may be fixed from the field of competences. As said in 
chapter 1, we seldom face the same entity twice, and that is the reason why we depend on 
concepts in order to understand what is happening around us. Indeed, we are constantly 
classifying new objects under known categories, and attributing to them properties pre-
viously seen in other examples of those categories. Therefore, it might seem reasonable to 
think that we have a concept G if we are able to classify something under that category, or 
if we are able to carry out inferences and/or predictions about the objects categorized as 
G, or if we are able to communicate by using the word(s) associated to that concept24. 
However, as shown above, the determination of whether an object o belongs or not to 
a concept G is open to context in at least the four aforesaid factors25. This is the reason 
why a context-independent definition (or a context-independent identification proce-
dure/algorithm) cannot be used in order to carry out the categorization of something 
under a particular class.  
Thus, to the extent that the information stored of a concept is not enough in the ab-
sence of a context to classify something under that category, then the contextualist has a 
good reason to call into question that the mere information stored about a category may 
count as having that concept. Therefore, in the same way that Wittgenstein held that the 
 
24 Obviously, my perspective is also quite close to Barsalou’s, when he argues in favor of reserving the 
term concept for the temporary constructions in working memory that control our behavior and per-
formance in categorizations (Barsalou 1993, p. 34). 
25 Remember that the categorization of an object o under a concept G depends, not only on the informa-
tion stored about G (i.e., the location of its associated prototype PG), but also on the information 
stored about other concepts relevant in that context (i.e., the location of their prototypes that is, the 
location of every prototype PC such that C belongs to the set of relevant concepts C in that context), 
together with other contextual factors (i.e., kind of metric, weight of dimensions and importance of 
the relevant concepts). 
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meaning of a word is for a large number of cases, though not all its use in the language 
(Wittgenstein 1953, §43), as part of a form of life, a contextualist might argue that the 
concept associated to a particular category is its application (e.g., in categorizations, in-
ferences, communication, etc.) in a given context. Thence, it could be thought that for a 
contextualist the question of whether somebody has a concept is nonsense without an 
application of that concept in a certain context; as well as the question about the 
meaning of a word is nonsense for Wittgenstein, without a use of that word in a particu-
lar form of life. Consequently, under this view the contextualist thesis that «concepts are 
constructed ad hoc when they are instantiated» (i.e., are applied in a given context) could 
be better understood26. 
5.3.2 Concepts as storage 
The first notion of concept is that associated with the information stored within our 
cognitive systems about a given category. From here on I will refer them as stored concepts 
or concepts as storage. 
As stated above see section 5.2.2, in the case of a proposal like the one defended in 
my thesis (i.e., a prototype theory of concepts built over a geometric similarity space), the 
only information which has to be registered by the mind is the location of the prototype 
associated to each concept. Those locations were the only thing required to instantiate a 
concept within a particular context that is to say, to determine the distances and simi-
larities between a concept and any other object or concept. Therefore, stored concepts 
are the information persistently registered by our minds about the location of the proto-
types of their respective categories27, 28. 
The notion of stored concept presents virtues commonly associated to the invariantist 
approach to concepts. The reason is that this first sense of concept may be thought to be 
persistently backed by a certain structure either informational (e.g., record system, neu-
ral network, etc.) or physical (e.g., potential level, electrochemical gradient, etc.), which 
guarantees the continuity required in order to accumulate new information over time 
about a certain category. For instance, if as a result of subsequent executions of the learn-
ing processes new properties are identified as relevant features of a particular category, 
 
26 This is consistent with the minimal empirical commitment that the only thing we observe about con-
cepts are those tasks they allow us to carry out (e.g., to categorize), and points to a view of concepts as 
mental abilities (i.e., as cognitive tools used by the mind in categorization tasks). 
27 Obviously, this is not too much information to be stored. In fact, and since not all the hyperspace 
structure has to be registered, a history of the past prototypes of each concept might be maintained in 
their associated mental files. 
28 When I hold that stored concepts are stable and persistent, I do not betray Casasanto and Lupyan’s 
principle that “concepts, categories and meanings (…) only exist as theoretical abstractions” (Casasan-
to and Lupyan 2015, p. 543), since such a principle just applies to the notion of instantiated concept (as 
that which is responsible of the external manifestation of categories). Anyhow, Casasanto and Lupyan 
might not be disposed to accept my notion of stored concept by virtue of their inclination towards 
connectionism and, consequently, their rejection of the notion of “mental file”. However, that would 
be a divergence in how information is stored (e.g., in a mental file, in a neural network, etc.), but not a 
divergence with respect to the existence of stored information from which concepts are instantiated. 
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such new properties can be simply added under the same mental file29 where the stored 
concept (i.e., location of the prototype) was registered by the mind. Hence, if the stored 
concept is conceived as a set of information (about a given category) registered under a 
given mental file, then the informational / physical structure that supports such a stored 
concept warrants the aforementioned continuity over time of the information main-
tained about categories. The advantage of this is that, from a radical contextualist ap-
proach, it is possible to explain a typically invariantist ability to wit, the accumulation of 
new knowledge by individuals. 
Nevertheless, it would be an error to confuse the information stored about a category 
with the storage of the sense of concept responsible of its external manifestation name-
ly, in categorizations, inferences, etc., seeing that the notion of concept which inter-
venes in those phenomena is not the stored concept, but the concept instantiated in each 
particular context. In fact, although the stored concept is the starting point for any ins-
tantiation of a concept which may take place in cognitive processes such as categoriza-
tion, the stored information of a concept cannot determine the output of those pro-
cesses by itself, since additional contextual factors are involved. Remember that, as shown 
in section 5.2.3, the instantiation of a concept requires calculating the distances / similar-
ities between the evaluated object and the prototypes of all the concepts relevant in that 
context; and that such a computation depends, not only on the kind of metric and the 
importance of dimensions, but also, and more importantly, on the locations of the proto-
types of all those relevant concepts, and on their significance for the considered context. 
By virtue of this, the information stored about a category should not be identified 
with the invariantist notion of concept in the sense of body of knowledge stored in long 
term memory, and used by default in the processes that underlie our higher cognitive 
abilities (Machery 2009, p. 12). In fact, the main difference between that what I have 
called concepts as storage and Machery’s default bodies of knowledge, is that the latter 
are assumed to be always relevant for the subject regardless of the considered context, 
what is hardly compatible with a radical contextualist approach like the one adopted in 
my work30. 
5.3.3 Concepts as instantiation 
The second sense of concept is the result of cognitive processes such as categorizations 
and inferences, and it is the notion responsible of the external manifestation of catego-
ries. Hereafter I will refer them as instantiated concepts or concepts as instantiation. 
 
29 In the sense of Recanati’s mental files (Recanati 2012). A quite similar notion is used by Margolis 
(1998) when he discusses the acquisition of concepts. 
30 It could be thought that Machery’s view might be articulated in terms of a general or neutral con-
text which worked by default. However, as argued by Casasanto and Lupyan, there are significant ar-
guments against the thesis that such default context might exist. More specifically, Casasanto and 
Lupyan (2015, p. 554) mention three kinds of evidence: (a) The representations produced by people 
in response to linguistic stimuli are a function of their social and physical environment. (b) Thinking 
and language understanding are partially determined by the situation and perspective of people regard-
ing space and time. (c) The efficiency of memory retrieval depends on the subject’s state of motion. 
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THE INSTANTIATED CONCEPTS ARE AD HOC CONCEPTS 
My first point is that the notion of instantiated concept may be identified with the ad hoc 
concepts proposed by Casasanto and Lupyan (2015), that is, they can play the role at-
tributed to concepts by a radical contextualist approach. It should be stressed, however, 
that contrary to Casasanto and Lupyan’s view who do not specify how a proposal like 
theirs may be deployed by a theory on the structure of concepts, the instantiated con-
cepts proposed in this chapter are fully articulated in terms of prototypes and similarity 
spaces. 
Besides, the sense of ad hoc concept set up by my instantiated concepts has significant 
differences with regard to the usual ways in which the former is conceived. Thus, and 
even though there is no unitary view of what an ad hoc concept is, most of the authors 
that employ this notion hold that the ad hoc concepts are representations pragmatically 
produced for each particular context in tasks such as categorizations, inferences, com-
prehension, etc., and susceptible of being identified with mental entities present in the 
subject’s working memory (Barsalou 1987; Carston 2002; Allott and Textor 2012). 
Against this position, my thesis is that ad hoc concepts (i.e., instantiated concepts, in my 
terminology) are just the result of psychological processes, characteristically produced in 
each specific occasion31. 
In an approach like the one here proposed, instantiated concepts can be thought to be 
mental events not mental entities, since they are that which happens at the end of the 
cognitive process that instantiate a concept (in a particular context). And, for instance, 
that which results in the case of a categorization is the classification of an object o 
under a category C. Obviously, that result could be registered under the mental file asso-
ciated to the object o, which attributed the property C to the object o (i.e., which said 
that «o is a C» according to a past categorization of o32). At this point it could be argued 
that, because the property C is stored in a registry under o’s mental file, then C might be 
identified with a mental entity in the subject’s mind. However, that registry should be 
viewed, not as the instantiation of the concept C, but as a mere static attribution of a 
label (i.e., that associated to the property of being a C). Indeed, a crucial difference is that 
while the instantiated concept depends on a context specifically produced on each occa-
sion; the information stored about a past categorization is independent of context or, at 
best, associated to a poorer context and, consequently, different from that which pro-
duced that instantiation. 
Now, since the idea of instantiated concept is much more slippery than the notion of 
stored concept, I think that it is useful for the purpose of this section to consider the 
 
31 Could instantiated concepts be identified with the cognitive processes which produce them? Here my 
answer is no. In my view that which unifies distinct objects classified in different occasions under 
the same category C is the fact that the information about C used in all those categorization processes 
was stored under the same mental file even though the stored information might have changed from 
one categorization to another. 
32 The storage of a past categorization of o (e.g., that of «o is a C») would allow the subject to quickly at-
tribute the property of being a C to the object o, without having to carry out a whole new categoriza-
tion process. 
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analogy that may be drawn between those two notions of concept and the case of genes. 
In particular, such analogy can be made on the basis of the distinction between genetic 
information and expressed gene, and of the following correspondence33: 
 Genetic information or gene as (unit of) information: the genetic information 
may correspond with the notion of stored concept, because in the absence of a pro-
cess which provides the context (i.e., the instantiation process in the case of con-
cepts, and the expression process in the case of genes) both of them are mere data 
or information registered in a physical medium34. 
 Expressed gene: which corresponds with the notion of instantiated concept, since 
the expression of a gene (i.e., production of a protein and appearance of the phe-
notype associated to that gene) at a particular time may be modulated by specific 
factors that alter or regulate the expression process, which resembles the occa-
sion-specific production of instantiated concepts on the basis of a set of contextu-
al factors. 
Here my point is that the instantiation or expression of a concept is as eventive as the 
expression of a gene. On the one hand, the expressed gene (in the form of the production 
/ appearance of a certain protein / phenotype) is an event that results from an expression 
process. Therefore, the expression of a gene is something that happens, and not a kind of 
genetic entity produced from genes as units of information. On the other hand instan-
tiated concepts are events that result from instantiation processes (in the form of catego-
rizations, inferences, etc.). Likewise, the instantiation of a concept is something that 
happens, and not a kind of mental entity produced from information stored in memory 
about categories. 
Thence, my thesis is that concepts as instantiation should be understood as events 
that result from their associated cognitive processes (e.g., categorizations, inferences, 
etc.), in spite of which they are the sense of concept responsible of the external manifes-
tation of categories35. 
Finally, my claim is in line with Casasanto and Lupyan’s lemma quoted in section 
5.2.1 according to which concepts are not something we have in the mind, but some-
thing we do with the mind. In particular, I maintain that instantiated concepts are not 
something that exist (in the mind), but conversely, they are something that occur at the 
end of their respective instantiation processes36. 
 
33 Thanks to Laura Nuño, whose comments at the 8th Research Workshop on Philosophy of Biology and 
Cognitive Science (Complutense University of Madrid, May 2018) led me to be aware of the parallel 
between the case of concepts and that of genes. 
34 Remember that, as said above in section 5.3.2, stored concepts may be thought to be backed by a cer-
tain mental structure (both informational and physical); a claim that it is not true for the case of in-
stantiated concepts. 
35 In fact, the result of those cognitive processes is the only sort of empirical evidence that we have about 
what we call “concepts”. 
36 Additionally, in the line of the conclusions drawn in section 5.3.1, I think that it cannot be said that 




INSTANTIATED CONCEPTS AND INFERENCES 
But if instantiated concepts are mental events in the sense of results of cognitive pro-
cesses, how could they uphold inferential processes? My answer is that they do it as far 
as the classification of an object o under a category C as result of an instantiation pro-
cess can be an input of other subsequent cognitive processes. Or, in other words, instan-
tiated concepts can support inferences because such inferences could work over the out-
put of the former processes of categorization. 
With regard to this, the temporal non-persistence of instantiated concepts or, in 
Casasanto and Lupyan’s terminology, the illusion that ad hoc concepts are stable over 
time does not prevent that that those instantiated concepts may uphold inferences. The 
reason is that, in a framework like this, an inferential process is the result of two sequen-
tial stages: 
(1) Classification of an object o under the category C a process which results in the 
instantiation of the concept C, and a subsequent categorization of o under C. 
(2) Attribution to o of some of the properties of C about which the subject had no 
previous information for the case of o37. 
And, although these two stages are indispensable for an inference, only the second may 
be properly identified with an inferential process (i.e., with drawing a conclusion from a 
set of premises). Therefore, even though ad hoc concepts or instantiated concepts are 
unstable due to their dependence on context (and the fact that context varies from occa-
sion to occasion); and even if that instability infected the classifications and inferences 
based in such instantiations38, this does not prevent the existence of categorizations 
 
37 This inference/attribution of a property P (located in a dimension f, where the value of o is unknown 
for the subject) from a category C to an object o may be at least conceived in three different ways: 
(a) It may be attributed the location of the prototype of C in the dimension f. 
(b) It may be attributed the interval of values that the object o can take in the dimension f, based on 
both the actual instantiation of the concept C, and the location of o. How would that interval be 
determined? In the case of a concept with n relevant dimensions, and an object o with m known 
components (where m<n), for each unknown dimension f the object o is located, in a (m+1)-
dimensional space, on the line L that (i) is orthogonal to the hyperplane determined by the axes 
of the m known dimensions, and that (ii) goes through the point representing o in that 
hyperplane. The interval of values that o can take in f is determined by the part of the line L con-
tained by the region representing C. For example, in a case with 2 dimensions (x, y), and an ob-
ject o with a known value ox=3 and an unknown value oy, the interval of possible values for oy is 
the part of the line L, (i) orthogonal to the x-axis and (ii) that goes through the point (ox, 0), 
contained by the 2-dimensional surface representing C. Unfortunately, a process like this re-
quires the determination of the region or boundaries associated to C, something that as ar-
gued in section 5.2.2 is computationally very costly and, by virtue of this, psychologically im-
plausible. 
(c) It may be attributed, on the basis of the stored exemplars of that category C (see footnotes 27 
and 33 in chapter 2), the mean or median of the f-components of the nearest exemplars to o. 
In contrast to (b), the computational cost of this alternative is much smaller. 
38 By virtue of this, a same object could be classified under various categories depending on context, 
and distinct properties could be attributed to it in function of those different categorizations. 
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standing on those instantiations and, subsequently, of inferences based on those classifi-
cations. 
5.4. Storage and instantiation: There and back again 
In this section I discuss the relation of mutual dependence that exists between the no-
tions of stored concept and instantiated concept. Then I examine how is the process by 
virtue of which the instantiated concepts of a given category have an influence on its 
associated stored concept. However, before all this I will have to make explicit the kind 
of life cycle of a concept assumed in my work, and where I frame the aforementioned 
relations and processes. 
5.4.1 Scheme of the life cycle of a concept 
The structure of the life cycle of a concept in a subject’s mind is a key element for the 
characterization of the existing relationships between the stored concept and the instan-
tiated concept of a certain category. The aim of this part is to sketch the main stages of 
such life cycle, through which concepts are acquired, modified and applied in cognitive 
tasks: 
(1) Initial acquisition of a concept: independently of the adopted approach, the first 
stage in any life cycle of a concept is always its initial acquisition (or formation). 
As a result of the acquisition process, our cognitive system stores certain infor-
mation about that category. In particular, if the prototype theory is assumed as 
done by me in this work, concept acquisition takes place through a similarity 
maximization process that abstracts the underlying properties in a set of examples. 
Because of this, a prototype is produced for the new concept, whose location is 
registered in memory. 
(2) Subsequent revision (or conceptual change): then, after the previous first acquisi-
tion of a concept, if the subject is exposed to new exemplars or knowledge, the 
information stored by the mind about that category may change as a result of con-
ceptual readjustment processes. In the case of my view, the location of its associat-
ed prototype might be modified through a resemblance maximization process sim-
ilar to that which gave rise to the original formation of the concept. Due to this, 
the information stored about that category will be updated with a new version of 
its associated prototype39. 
(3) Application of a concept: lastly, the information accumulated about each category 
will be used by the mind in cognitive tasks (i.e., categorizations, inferences, etc.) 
when that category is one of the relevant concepts in the considered context. In 
my view, the retrieved information about that category, together with informa-
 
39 I am disposed to accept that a mental file may gather an historical of past versions of the information 
stored about a given category. Indeed, the fact that those historical versions were recorded under a 
same mental file is what would provide the continuity/stability required in order to explain our ability 
to accumulate new knowledge over time about categories. 
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tion about other concepts significant in that context, and other contextual pa-
rameters, will produce the application or instantiation of the concept in each 
particular occasion/circumstances. 
It must be stressed that the previous general scheme is neutral, in the sense of valid for 
every empiricist view of concepts. That is, the three aforesaid stages are necessary phases 
of the life cycle of a concept, independently of the adopted assumptions on the nature 
and grade of contextual dependence of concepts although I have described them for the 
particular case of a contextualist view of the prototype theory. 
5.4.2 Mutual dependence between storage and instantiation 
And, even though my thesis is that storage and instantiation are two different notions 
or senses of concept, associated to distinct facets in their life cycle, I also think that 
there exists a strong mutual dependence between both notions: 
 Dependence of instantiation on storage: as I have explained throughout this entire 
chapter, when a concept C is used in cognitive tasks such as categorizations, in-
ferences, etc., some of the information stored about C (i.e., part of its stored con-
cept) is read from memory and applied together with data about other relevant 
categories and other contextual factors.  
Consequently, the instantiated concept depends on the stored concept because 
part of the information accumulated relative to that category is used by the cog-
nitive processes which instantiate such a concept. 
 Dependence of storage on instantiation: as said in the previous section, as a result of 
the initial acquisition of a concept C some information is stored about it. In my 
view, that information or stored concept, in my terminology is the location of the 
prototype associated to C call it PC. The stored concept is maintained in a sta-
ble and persistent way until new information triggers a revision of it. As a result of 
that revision, the location of the new prototype *CP  may be different and, in such a 
case, *CP  will be registered as a new version of the stored concept associated to that 
category. 
However, the important point here is that any subsequent revision which pro-
duced a new prototype *CP  (i.e., a new version of the stored concept) would be the 
result of a maximization process whose input might contain objects recently classi-
fied under that category by the subject in past applications of that concept. The 
idea is that the classification of a new object under a category results in a new ex-
emplar that have to be considered by the learning processes40 that determine the 
location of the prototype associated to C. But, because the members of that cate-
gory have changed since the last execution of the learning processes either in the 
original acquisition of the concept or in a future recalibration of it, a new loca-
tion of the prototype could be produced. As a consequence, the information rec-
 
40 For a description of how those processes work, see section 4.1 in this doctoral thesis. 
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orded in the mental file of that category has to be amended with a new (version of 
that) stored concept41. 
Therefore, since former categorizations of objects as C resulting from past in-
stantiations of the concept C may be used by subsequent readjustment processes 
that will modify its associated stored concept, it is fair to say that stored concepts 
can, and usually do, depend on instantiated concepts. 
Having said this, it should be clear that the life cycle of a concept described in section 
5.4.1 is not linear, but circular. There the registered information remains stable in the 
stored concept until its next occasion of use, when the concept is instantiated again. 
However, after new instantiations of that concept, and as a result of the classification of 
new objects under that category, its associated prototype would be updated through a 
process of conceptual readjustment. Consequently, after the initial acquisition of the 
concept, its life cycle consists in a loop between successive revisions and applications or 
instantiations of that concept. 
5.4.3 On the process of conceptual readjustment 
Throughout this chapter it has been explained how instantiated concepts can be pro-
duced from the information stored by the mind about their associated categories, by 
virtue of which I have held that instantiations depend on storage. However, little has 
been said about the processes of conceptual readjustment owing to which the stored 
concepts also depend on previous instantiations of their respective categories. Because of 
this, the aim of this section is to account for how the instantiated concepts have an influ-
ence on the information registered in memory about categories. 
To take a toy example, let me consider the case of two categories A and B whose asso-
ciated prototypes PA and PB were initially acquired42 on the basis of the two sets of exem-
plars IA and IB, whose members are represented in Fig. 5.6a by means of ’s. The locations 
















where e represents an exemplar belonging to the set IC of members of the category C. 
As a consequence, the conceptual space is partitioned into two regions, which are de-
limited by the boundary also shown in Fig. 5.6a. After that, new objects may be cate-
gorized under A or under B, like those represented in Fig. 5.6b by means of ’s, as a 
result of later instantiations of A or of B. Because of this, it is possible to say that the 
set EA of new examples categorized as an A is a function of past instantiations of the con-
cept A; and the same may be said regarding the dependence of the set of new exemplars 
EB on past instantiations of B. 
 
41 For more on this, see section 5.4.3 below. 



















Fig. 5.6. Example of conceptual change (I): original acquisition and classification of exemplars, for a Euclidean 
metric where all the concepts and dimensions were equally weighted. (a) Original acquisition of the 
concepts A and B, from two sets of exemplars IA={(0.6,1.05),(1.2,0.75),(1.35,1.35), (1.7,1.15)} and 
IB={(2.6,2.15),(2.7,1.7),(3.2,1.95)}, whose locations are represented by ’s. The resulting proto-
types of those categories, PA=(1.213,1.075) and PB=(2.833,1.933), are represented by means of 
black dots; and a grey dotted line represents the boundary between their associated regions. (b) 
Categorization of new exemplars represented through ’s under the category with the closest 
prototype. In particular, the examples in EA={(0.4,0.7),(0.7,0.8),(0.75,1.2),(0.8,0.6)} are classified as 
cases of A, while the ones in EB={(1.95,2.2),(2.2,2.1),(2.3,1.8)} are categorized as cases of B. 
At this point, the sets of exemplars of A and B known by the subject (i.e., IAEA and 
IBEB, respectively) are greater than the original ones (i.e., IA and IB). Taking all this into 
account, and since a subsequent revision of the concept A or of the concept B will be 
based on the extended set IAEA or IBEB, for the case of B, that later revision will 
usually produce a prototype *AP  distinct from PA or a prototype *BP  distinct from PB in 
the case of B. Those new prototypes *AP  and *BP  are represented in Fig. 5.7a by grey 





















Consequently, the boundary which delimits the regions associated to A and B (which is 
represented in Fig. 5.7a through a grey dashed-and-dotted line) will be different from the 
one produced by the initial prototypes. As a result, cases previously categorized as A (e.g., 
o1 and o2, represented in Fig. 5.7b by triangles) are now classified under the category B. 
Finally, the locations of the new prototypes (i.e., *AP  and *BP ) will be registered as new 
versions of the stored concepts associated to the categories A and B. And, because their 
locations are a function of the instantiations of A and B for the objects in EA and EB, 
respectively, it is fair to say that stored concepts depend on instantiated concepts. 




















Fig. 5.7. Example of conceptual change (II): new prototypes and reclassification of exemplars, for a Euclidean 
metric where all the concepts and dimensions were equally weighted. (a) Subsequent revision of 
concepts A and B, from the extended sets of exemplars IAEA and IBEB. The new prototypes of 
those categories, *AP =(0.938,0.95) and *BP =(2.492,1.983), are represented by grey dots; and a grey 
dashed-and-dotted line represents the new boundary between the conceptual regions of A and B. 
(b) Categorization of the exemplars o1=(1.1,2.8) and o2=(1.5,2.1) represented by means of black 
triangles, on the basis of the new prototypes *AP  and *BP , under the concept B; in contrast with 
their classification as A, on the basis of the original prototypes AP  and BP . 
5.5. Intermediate discussion 
In this section I will consider some issues related with the topic of this chapter. In the 
first place, I compare my approach with other leading perspectives (for instance, those of 
Machery, Casasanto & Lupyan, Prinz and Barsalou), in order to clarify as neatly as possi-
ble where my view and conclusions agree and disagree with the ones of these authors. 
Next, I highlight the major strong points of my proposal, for example, its ability to com-
bine invariantist virtues within a contextualist framework, and the absence of a concep-
tual core or membership conditions associated to categories. 
5.5.1 Comparison with similar views 
In the previous sections of this chapter I have occasionally compared my point of view in 
this thesis with other prominent positions in the field, with the aim of delimiting how 
my perspective differs from those other approaches. 
For instance, I have argued that my stored concepts should not be identified with 
Machery’s (invariantist) notion of concept understood the latter as bodies of knowl-
edge in the long term memory that are used by default by our cognitive processes (see 
section 5.3.3). In particular, Machery’s view has the problem of postulating the exis-
tence both of default bodies of knowledge and of a neutral context which works by de-
fault in those kinds of cognitive tasks. Unfortunately, there is no evidence of the ex-
istence of default bodies of knowledge used in categorizations, nor of the existence of a 
neutral context in all those cognitive processes (see footnote 30 in this chapter). 
Anyhow, more interesting is the comparison with other views, neither in complete 
opposition nor in whole alignment, but which share a more or less family resemblance 
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with my perspective. That is the case of Barsalou’s (1987) and Prinz’s (2002)43. In partic-
ular, these latter together with Casasanto and Lupyan’s are related proposals, with ele-
ments in common, so it will be useful to contrast my view with those of these authors44: 
 On the one hand, according to Prinz a concept consists in a set of mental repre-
sentations (called by him proxytypes) stored in long term memory, that are acti-
vated or copied in working memory for representing a given category. In this 
approach, the context determines which proxytype (from among all the proxy-
types associated to that concept) is activated in each particular occasion. 
Firstly, my view resembles Prinz’s in that both approaches distinguish the storage 
of information (associated to a concept) in long term memory, from the use of 
that information or of part of it by the working memory in tasks such as cate-
gorization and other similar ones in a context-dependent manner. 
Nevertheless, two key differences distinguish both proposals: (1) Regarding the 
information assumed to be stored in long term memory, Prinz’s proxytypes are 
different versions of the same concept, each of them specific of a particular con-
text. By contrast, I do not argue for the existence of various stored concepts (i.e., 
one for each context), but for only one unique stored concept for each category, 
which will be differently instantiated depending on context. (2) With regard to 
how the stored information is applied in cognitive tasks such as categorization, 
Prinz’ activation of proxytypes is a mere copy from long term memory to working 
memory of the information recorded under a given proxytype. In contrast, my 
view proposes a process of instantiation not of copy of that information which, 
together with other context-dependent factors, will produce what I have called 
the instantiated concept. 
Thence, my proposal in contrast to Prinz’s avoids the difficulties due to the as-
sumption that a different version of each concept (i.e., a different proxytype, in 
Prinz’s terminology) is stored for each possible context, and the subsequent mul-
tiplication potentially unlimited of the number of stored proxytypes. 
 On the other hand, my approach is quite close to Barsalou’s, as long as his graded 
structure of concepts is the result of processes of similarity comparison (Barsalou 
1983; 1987). In respect to this, the main difference is that while Barsalou (1983, 
p. 212) seems to conceive similarity in line with Tversky’s feature model (1977), 
my view is more general, since it is based on dimensional models45. 
 
43 There are other discriminations in the literature that, although on the surface they resemble my dis-
tinction between stored concepts and instantiated concepts, in reality they are much less close to my 
view than Prinz’s or Barsalou’s positions. For example, regarding Carey’s (2009; 2011) distinction be-
tween concept and conception, and even though his idea of concept as that which determines the 
meaning might be charitably identified with my instantiated concepts; his notion of conception as 
that we believe about categories can be no way identified with my stored concepts. 
44 Since the similarities and differences between my view and that of Casasanto and Lupyan have already 
been elucidated in section 5.2, they will not be discussed again in the present section. 
45 And recall that as said in section 4.1 the feature models are a particular case of the dimensional 
ones. 
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Barsalou’s main point (1987; 1993) is that concepts are not invariant structures 
stored in long term memory and waiting to be intactly retrieved or copied in 
working memory when needed; but provisional constructs produced in working 
memory (specifically for each occasion), taking as input information stored in 
long term memory. In respect to this, my proposal is completely equivalent to 
Barsalou’s. 
Nonetheless, whilst Barsalou (1987, p. 114) does not accept that our mind can 
contain invariant cognitive structures associated to categories46; the existence of 
stored information that remains stable between consecutive reviews of a certain 
concept constitutes the cornerstone of my stored concepts. Another difference is 
that Barsalou (ib., pp. 116) only includes within information relevant for the con-
struction of a concept in working memory, information which provides ex-
pectations about that category, but he does not include information associated 
with other relevant concepts in that context –something that has a key role in my 
proposal–. 
Lastly, when Barsalou claims that “the same concept is rarely if ever constructed 
for a category” (Barsalou 1987, p. 101), the idea reminds us of my instantiated 
concepts. However, my notion of instantiated concept does not seem to be present 
in his work, as evidenced when he introduces the idea of concept as follows: 
[C]oncept will refer to the particular information used to represent a category (or ex-
emplar) on a particular occasion. (Barsalou 1987, p. 116) 
That is, according to Barsalou concepts are the instantaneous inner information 
or, in Clark’s (1993, p. 93) terminology, occurrent states that determines the 
categorization performance in a particular context. By contrast, on my view in-
stantiated concepts are the result of applying that information, not such infor-
mation per se. Thus, the main difference is that Barsalou (1987; 1989) seems to at-
tribute an ontologically strong character to the construals produced in working 
memory (as something that is, in fact, there and over which the mind can operate), 
and that is not the way I think about instantiated concepts47.  
5.5.2 Advantages of this approach 
One major advantage of my approach is that, although it characterizes a strong version of 
contextualism as it is the ad hoc cognition framework, it is likewise able to explain, 
from that contextualist standpoint, a phenomenon typically identified with the invari-
antist perspective. Indeed, on the one hand the proposed model articulates a contex-
tualist framework compatible with the evidence against the existence of definitions or 
 
46 Anyhow, Barsalou is not completely clear regarding this issue. In fact, sometimes he claims that there 
exists relatively stable knowledge about categories in long term memory (Barsalou 1989), while in oth-
er cases he rejects the existence of a set of invariant structures used recurrently by the mind (Barsalou 
1987; 1989). 
47 See above for the difference between concepts as mental entities and concepts as mental events. 
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conceptual cores, and thus able to provide an account of our adaptive abilities to chang-
ing environments. But, on the other hand, my proposal is also able to explain how, alt-
hough instantiated concepts are absolutely context-dependent, stored concepts are stable 
enough to be the means by which new information about concepts can be collected over 
time. 
Secondly, there is nothing in my approach that could be identified with a conceptual 
core (nor, as a result, with the conventional meaning of a concept or term), so it is 
meaningless to ask for the conditions of application of a certain concept. In fact, since all 
there is in my proposal are mental processes classifying objects into categories in an 
absolutely occasion-specific way, the model works perfectly well without having to 
resort to the idea of definition (or to a stable set of membership conditions). 
Finally, the presumed theory on the structure of concepts and its cognitive deploy-
ment (i.e., a prototype theory characterized by means of a geometric similarity space, 
where different versions of the prototype of a concept may be stored within the same 
mental file) allows to explain, not only how concepts are learned/acquired and, after-
wards, are reviewed/modified; but also how distinct (previous) variants of the same con-
cept may be present in the mind. 
5.6. Instantiated concepts, persistence, and representationality 
Throughout this chapter, I have claimed that only stored concepts can be conceived in 
terms of persistent entities, even though those responsible of the external manifestation 
of categories are the instantiated concepts. I have also held that instantiated concepts 
should be thought to be mental events dependent on the actual context that occur at 
the end of the cognitive processes (i.e., categorizations, inferences, etc.) which display 
them, and that, in consequence, they have no minimal persistence. The aim of the pre-
sent section is to clarify this latter thesis namely, that instantiated concepts are not 
persistent, and to analyze its implications for the representational (or non-repre-
sentational) character of that notion of concept. 
As said in chapter 1 regarding the question of representationality, one dominant 
strand in cognitive science considers that concepts are representations, that is, mental 
particulars with semantic properties. That is the view of classical computationalism, 
which –rooted on the Representational Theory of the Mind– presumes that psycho-
logical states and processes occur within an inner representational system. If, as said by 
Fodor “there is no computation without representation” (Fodor 1981b) and, if concepts 
are conceived within a computational framework –as I have done in my doctoral thesis–, 
then concepts would have to be representations since, otherwise, the calculations re-
quired by the cognitive processes involving those concepts (e.g., by categorizations, infer-
ences, etc.) are not possible. 
However, since the advent of connectionism the notion of mental representation has 
been called into question by many supporters of this perspective48, who maintain that in 
 
48 More recently, mental representations have also been questioned by advocates of enactivism and em-
bodied cognition. 
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most neural networks semantic properties cannot be attributed to any individual ele-
ment (i.e., unit or node) of the network, so representations could not be located beyond 
the input layer of the neural network. The point is that, under this last view, concepts 
cannot be mental representations. 
By contrast, my thesis in this section is that the key reason to reject that concepts are 
mental representations is not the connectionist –or classicist– architecture of the brain, 
but the minimal persistence condition demanded of representations, which cannot be sat-
isfied in a contextualist view of the mind. Thence, I will show that, under the assumption 
of contextualism, instantiated concepts lack minimal persistence and, as a consequence, 
that they cannot be a representation of their associated categories. 
5.6.1 The issue of persistence 
In section 5.3.3 I suggested that instantiated concepts might be thought to be mental 
events that happen at the end of the cognitive processes which instantiate them in each 
particular context. The aim of the present section is to clarify, and argue in favor of, the 
thesis that instantiated concepts are non-persistent mental events. 
My point is that instantiated concepts should be viewed as the result of cognitive pro-
cesses, not in the sense of products –i.e., minimally persistent psychological entities stored 
in mental structures–, but in the sense of phenomena –as that which happens when 
something is categorized under a given category–. Thus, they should be identified, not 
with stable mental states or entities, but with punctual psychological events. 
THE PRODUCT/PHENOMENON DISTINCTION 
Here I contend that processes –whether cognitive/computational or not– may culmi-
nate in two types of result, namely, products and phenomena. (I will also suggest that the 
product/phenomenon distinction is graded, since the boundary between products and 
phenomena depends on the subject’s perspective and interests, and –more particularly– 
on their temporal horizon.) On the one hand, products would be minimally persistent 
results, which can typically be accessed in a future time49. On the other, phenomena are, 
conversely, non-persistent results, which cannot be accessed beyond their occurrence 
time. 
However, the product/phenomenon distinction becomes clearer when analyzing ex-
amples outside the field of cognition. Regarding the notion of product, let me examine 
the case of an algorithm that calculated the square root of a number n, and stored the 
result within a memory register at time tp, when the computations end (see Fig. 5.8). In 
this case, the result of the process can be identified with the physical state of a set of tran-
sistors b1, b2, b3, …, which codify the outcome of the square root algorithm. Such a result 
can be called a product because the logical states of b1, b2, b3, …, can be accessed beyond 
 
49 Although in general products are minimally persistent, they may sometimes be punctual results. For 
instance, this would be the case of the non-minimally-persistent intermediate results in a computer 
system. For my part, even though I do not exclude that possibility, such cases are not relevant for my 
discussion. [Thanks to Robert Goldstone for highlighting this point at the Workshop on Concepts in 
Action: Representation, Learning and Application (Osnabrück University, August 2018).] 
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the instant tp when the computation process ended. Or, in other words, since those logi-
cal states are persistent, they can be subsequently accessed by other processes different 








Fig. 5.8.  Example of a process whose result is a product: algorithmic computation and storage. 
By contrast, with respect to the notion of phenomenon, a controller system which pe-
riodically received a temperature level from a thermal sensor, and then emitted a flash of 
light when a threshold is surpassed (see Fig. 5.9), would be a process whose results are 
phenomena. The result of this process can be either the emission state e0 –if the thermal 
threshold has not been exceeded, and no emission occurs–, or the emission state e1 –if 
temperature is above the threshold, and a light/sound signal is emitted–. In this second 
case, the result of the considered process is a non-persistent phenomenon –for example, a 
millisecond photon emission–, which happens at time tp, and cannot be accessed a couple 
of seconds after the end of the process. That is, it is not possible to consult the result of 








Fig. 5.9.  Example of a process whose result is a phenomenon: thermal control and alarm. 
This distinction –although not expressed in terms of products and phenomena– is also 
present in the inner workings of a computer. There we find some states which may be 
called persistent, for instance, the information stored in hard disks, in random-access 
memory, or in cache memory; while other states should be called non-persistent, like 
program memory and, to a lesser extent, processor registers (i.e. CPU instruction regis-
ters). Thence, even though we could speak of persistent states when referring to data 
stored in registers of the first kind, that is not possible for the state of a CPU, which 
could not be called “persistent” because the program memory is continuously changing. 
Nonetheless, the product/phenomenon distinction is a graded one, given that the 
boundary between products and phenomena is vague and depends on the subject’s per-
spective and interests. In this sense, there is no product –resulting from a process– abso-
Concepts and categorization processes in a contextualist framework 
165 
lutely stable, and there is no phenomenon absolutely non-persistent. The reason is sim-
ple: no product has infinite duration, and no phenomenon has zero duration. The idea is 
that this distinction is always relative to a concrete temporal horizon and, for the particu-
lar case of computational –and cognitive– systems, is relative to their clock rates. For 
example, if the duration of the inner result R of a computer device is not greater than 
twice, thrice, or a few more times its clock frequency, then such a result will not be avail-
able beyond those processing cycles. Because of this, R should be called a phenomenon, 
given that it is non-accessible to other processes different from the one which produced 
R –and those immediately subsequent to the generating process–. 
The graded character of this distinction is also evident when we look at the result of 
processes in nature. For instance, rain, lightning, mist, frost, storms, hurricanes, and so 
on, are all called (weather –or meteorological–) phenomena; earthquakes and volcanoes 
are also called (geological) phenomena. By contrast, mountains, caves, faults, etc., are 
called (geological) formations/structures –or, in my terminology, products of geological 
processes–, because they are invariant in our lifetime. Nonetheless, the results of other 
geological processes (i.e. periodic displacements of orogenic regions or formation of met-
amorphic minerals), when evaluated in geologic time scale, can be called phenomena. 
Finally, a peculiar feature of computational and cognitive processes is the fact that 
their inner states are only accessible to its own computational/cognitive system. That is 
the reason why in this sort of processes the product/phenomenon character of their re-
sults must be determined according to the temporal horizon of the own system. Or, in 
other words, the own computational/cognitive system is the only possible reference to 
determine whether the results of its processes are either products or phenomena. 
INSTANTIATED CONCEPTS ARE PHENOMENA 
Here my thesis is that instantiated concepts are the result of mental processes of the se-
cond kind –i.e., they are phenomena–, which build them for each occasion-specific con-
text. At this point, it is worth comparing the temperature controller example with the 
case of instantiated concepts, in order to show why the latter should be also called phe-
nomena: 
 Both are context-dependent processes: On the one hand, the thermal threshold can 
depend on season, on the moving average of n past temperatures, etc., which act as 
the context of this control system. On the other, instantiation processes can be in-
fluenced by the relevant properties –what may depend on circumstances–, by the 
situation –i.e., concepts considered in a near time interval–, etc., which would 
play the role of the context of instantiation. 
 Both are occasion-specific construed: Regarding the controller system, light/sound 
alarm signals are specifically produced in each particular occasion, depending on 
the current thermal threshold. In the case of concepts, instantiated concepts are 
specifically created on each occasion of use, in function of the current relevant 
properties –and other contextual factors–. 
 Both are one-time evaluated: In the first case external temperature might be eval-
uated according to a schedule –or on demand– and in such a case the controller 
would not be continuously working. Analogously, concepts are instantiated only 
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when subjects categorize, draw inferences, communicate, etc., so instantiation 
processes are not continuously running. 
All in all, the flash of light/sound emitted by the thermal controller is a non-persistent 
phenomenon because it is produced in a context-dependent way and its duration is less 
than the temporal horizon of the alarm system (i.e., the inverse of its schedule frequency). 
By virtue of this, it can be said that the flash signal resulting from this system only exists 
when the controlling process ends, and its emission happens. Almost the same may be 
said regarding instantiate concepts. They are produced in a context-dependent way by 
instantiation processes (e.g., in categorization tasks), and their duration is less than the 
temporal horizon of the cognitive system, because after the end of the instantiation pro-
cess context may change and, in consequence, the result of any other subsequent instan-
tiation process could be different. Thus, it can be said that the instantiated concept re-
sulting from a categorization task is a non-persistent / punctual phenomenon50, susceptible 
of being identified with a mental event, which only exists at the moment when its instan-
tiation process ends. 
To sum up the discussion regarding the persistence of instantiated concepts, and un-
der the non-problematic assumption that (instantiated) concepts are the result of mental 
processes, first I have shown that the result of a process can be either a product or a phe-
nomenon, and then I have argued that instantiated concepts are phenomena. On this 
basis, and given the non-persistent / punctual character of phenomena, I have concluded 
that instantiated concepts are non-persistent / punctual mental events that occur in the 
mind. 
5.6.2 The issue of representationality 
Now I will argue that if instantiated concepts lack minimal persistence, as I have held in 
the prior section, then they cannot be considered a representation of their respective 
categories. 
REPRESENTATIONAL AND NON-REPRESENTATIONAL APPROACHES TO CONCEPTS 
As said in chapter 1, one dominant view in psychology and cognitive science is that con-
cepts are mental representations, that is, particulars with semantic properties (i.e., truth 
values/conditions, satisfaction values/conditions, reference, content, etc.). This approach 
is rooted on the Representational Theory of the Mind (RTM), according to which all 
the different kinds of psychological states and processes occur in an internal representa-
tional system (i.e., any kind of thinking involve mental representations). One popular 
 
50 My use of the term “phenomenon” should not be confused with other similar ones like, for instance, 
the expressions “occurrent state” and “instantaneous internal state” used by Clark (1993, p. 93) in or-
der to describe Barsalou’s sense of concept, as “the particular information used to represent a category 
(…) on a particular occasion” (Barsalou 1987, p. 116). However, even though I sympathize with both 
expressions –because they might describe the phenomenal character of instantiated concepts–, my 
view of them is very different from Barsalou’s one, so the differences are not merely terminological. 
The reason is that Barsalou seems to think that those concepts represent categories, but that is precise-
ly the opposite of my argument’s conclusion. 
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way of characterizing RTM is in terms of a language-like syntax and a compositional 
semantics, just like Fodor51 (1987) does with his view of RTM as a symbol system formed 
by mental representations where (i) propositional attitudes are conceived as bearing com-
putational relations to mental representations; and (ii) mental processes are causal se-
quences of tokenings of those mental representations –or, in other words, causal interac-
tions among representations–. 
Surely the foremost contemporary version of RTM is the Computational Theory of 
Mind (CTM). On this view, the mind is conceived as a sort of computer; mental processes 
as computations; and mental states as results of the occurrence, transformation and stor-
age of informational structures (Pitt 2017). Under this approach mental states can again 
be seen as computational relations to mental representations, and mental processes as 
sequences of those mental states. However, there is a significant disagreement among 
advocates of CTM regarding the implementation of cognitive states and processes, in 
particular about whether it should be classical or connectionist. On the one hand, the 
proponents of classical architectures hold that mental states –or mental representations– 
are symbolic structures constituted by semantically evaluable objects, and that mental 
processes are operations ruled by sequences of those representations (Turing 1950; 
Fodor 1975, 2000, 2008; Newell and Simon 1976; Marr 1982). On the other, the de-
fenders of connectionist architectures hold that mental representations are carried out by 
patterns of activation in a network of nodes –or units–, and that mental processes con-
sist in the formation and spreading of those patterns of activation (McCulloch and Pitts 
1943; Smolensky 1988; Rumelhart 1989). 
Nowadays RTM remains the primary view in many areas of cognitive science. It is the 
core of a strong and influential model of thinking, mental states and processes, and the 
position against which many others discuss (Margolis and Laurence 2007; Ramsey 2017; 
Rowlands 2017). Even some advocates of connectionism seem either to accept the idea 
of representation (McClelland and Rumelhart 1985; Smolensky 1988, 1991; Hinton 
1989, 1990; Elman 1990b, 1991) –sometimes under the label of distributed, in the sense 
of non-localist, representations52–, or to be reluctant to its complete repudiation (Clark 
 
51 Fodor’s view of RTM is personified in his language of thought hypothesis (Fodor 1975), to the point 
that the inner representational system presumed by RTM could be identified with the language of 
thought. 
52 When connectionists describe the notion of representation in terms of distributed codification of in-
formation, they usually say that entities are represented by patterns of activity distributed over multi-
ple cognitive/computing elements –i.e., nodes or units– (Hinton, McClelland and Rumelhart 1986, p. 
77; Elman 1990b, p. 351; 1991, p. 210); and that the network’s ability to meet a goal condition –or to 
solve a particular task– in a particular environmental situation allows to identify the network’s associ-
ated internal state with a veridical representation of the corresponding environmental state (Smolens-
ky 1988, p. 15; Elman 1991, p. 195). 
However, such a view of representation is controversial because, even if we accept that a pattern of ac-
tivity able to identify a particular entity constitutes a representation of that entity, it remains the ques-
tion of whether those patterns may be considered a representation for the case of categories. Regarding 
this last point it could be argued that a pattern of activity cannot be a representation of a whole catego-




1993; Clark and Toribio 1994). By contrast, other connectionist approaches to CTM 
maintain that there are no mental particulars susceptible to be identified with repre-
sentations53 (Ramsey, Stich and Garon 1990; Ramsey 1997, 2017). Under this last view, 
nodes –or units– are not taken to be semantically evaluable and, consequently, infor-
mational structures are not conceived as constituted by semantically evaluable objects. 
Therefore, the defenders of this perspective hold that it should not be spoken of mental 
representations, but of distributed codification of information by means of levels, weights 
and nodes. 
My view is closer to these last connectionists –according to whom concepts are not 
mental representations–. Notwithstanding this common endpoint, in the rest of this 
section I will try to show that this very same conclusion can be reached taking as starting 
point an assumption, not about the computational/neuronal architecture of the mind –
as those connectionists do–, but about the degree of contextual dependence of concepts. 
In fact, my thesis is that the key reason to reject that (instantiated) concepts are represen-
tations is not the connectionist or classicist architecture of the mind, but the minimal 
persistence condition demanded of representations –which, as said above, is not satisfied 
by the sense of concepts as instantiation–. 
ON THE NOTION OF REPRESENTATION 
Concerning the notions of representation –in general– and mental representation –in 
particular–, it is important to observe that the idea of mental representation is not a com-
monplace in ordinary discourse, but an assumption within a theoretical framework. 
Therefore, as noticed by Cummins (1989), it is naïve to expect that such a notion is the 
same for classic computationalism, connectionism, folk psychology, neuroscience, and 
many others who make use of such an idea. Nevertheless, my aim in this section is not to 
provide a definition of it common to all those fields, but to show that –independently of 
the considered framework– minimal persistence is a condition tacitly present in the ma-
jority –or maybe even all– of them54. Thence, it does not matter how mental representa-
tions are conceived (i.e., as something localized or distributed; continuous or discrete; as a 
                                                                                                                                       
(1) If patterns of activity are context-dependent, then there will not be a unique pattern for each 
category, but a set of patterns –one for each particular context–, so none of them could wholly 
represent that category. 
(2) A pattern of activity working as a classifier –i.e., able to determine whether a concrete entity 
meets a set of conditions– evaluates, not the whole universe of possible entities, but only the 
particular entity a considered. Thence, that pattern will be –at best– a representation of the en-
tity a, but not of its entire associated category, since the pattern of activity applied to identify 
another entity b, belonging to the same category, might be different from that required for the 
identification of a. 
53 Indeed, the discussion between representationalists and anti-representationalists is the core of a prom-
ising and fruitful debate, as evidenced by the abundant literature on this issue (Stich 1983, 1992; 
Brooks 1991; Clark and Toribio 1994; Sutton 2004; Margolis and Laurence 2007; Ryder 2009; Egan 
2014; Ramsey 2017; Rowlands 2017). 
54 Given that there are few who explicitly recognize the role played by persistence as a required condition 
of any representation (Shagrir 2012; Danks 2014). 
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binary or ternary relation; or in causal, informational or teleosemantic terms), because 
the only thing which is required by my argument is the attribution of a minimal persis-
tence to whatever is called “mental representation”. 
As said above, possibly the most prominent view in cognitive science is that according 
to which mental representations are internal psychological states with semantic proper-
ties. Nevertheless, there are very different ways in which those mental states might be 
conceived. They can be thought –for instance– as continuous or discrete, as distributed 
or local, etc. (Pitt 2017). This notwithstanding, a minimal persistence seems to be pre-
sumed in all these cases. Indeed, a good approach is to discuss one by one, first those dif-
ferent alternatives, and then the other distinct ways in which the idea of representation 
may be understood. In that way, regarding the distinction between continuous/analog 
and discrete/digital representations (Goodman 1968; Lewis 1971; Pylyshyn 1980; 
Dretske 1981; Haugeland 1981), nothing in that distinction suggests that the underlying 
states are non-persistent55. This is particularly true when cognition is conceived as gov-
erned by rules acting on a symbolic system or scheme, regardless of whether representa-
tion is deployed in engineered or biological terms (Eliasmith and Anderson 2003). 
A more interesting distinction is the one between localized and distributed repre-
sentations, which emerge in the debate between connectionists and classical computa-
tionalists56. According to the classical view, mental representations are symbolic struc-
tures ruled by operations sensitive to their constituents (Turing 1950; Newell 1980; 
Marr 1982; Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988). This approach may be summed up as follows: 
Representation is simply another term to refer to a structure that designates: 
X represents Y if X designates aspects of Y, i.e., if there exist symbol processes that can take X as 
input and behave as if they had access to some aspects of Y. (Newell 1980, p. 176) 
A representation is a formal system for making explicit certain entities or types of information, 
together with a specification of how the system does this. (Marr 1982, p. 20) 
Having said this, all of the elements in this perspective demand a minimal persistence. 
On the one hand, mental representations are localized in representational structures, 
schemes or states available to be invoked –or manipulated– in computations by those 
operations that involve them. On the other, mental processes are specified as informa-
tion-processing machines that determine the inner workings of the system. Thence, it 
seems that classical computationalism tacitly assumes that mental representations are 
minimally persistent structures –able to encode properties about their represented ob-
jects– ready to be accessed by the cognitive processes working on them. 
By contrast, connectionists maintain that mental representations are carried out by 
patterns of activation in a neural network, and that mental processes consist in the for-
 
55 This is so independently of whether the pairs of notions continuous-analog and discrete-digital are dis-
tinguished or not (Maley 2011). 
56 Concerning this, classicists consider that representations are local –with regard to computation–, while 
connectionists hold that representations are distributed across large populations of units –none of them 
corresponding to the represented objects alone– (Thorpe 2003). 
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mation and spreading of those patterns (Smolensky 1988; Rumelhart 1989). In this case 
it is said that mental representations are distributed because they are not located in a 
particular node or unit, but spread across large sets of nodes. However, this is precisely 
the reason why many argue that connectionist networks have no mental objects that 
might be identified with representations; i.e., because there are no inner content-bearing 
particulars in the network that can play the role of representations (Ramsey, Stich and 
Garon 1990; Ramsey 1997)57. Against this criticism, it is often claimed that such pat-
terns of activation can be described as states of the system –encoding either concepts or 
properties– (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988; Rogers and McClelland 2004). According to 
this, there would be a sense in which a pattern of activation may “represent” a concept 
when that pattern classifies something under a category. Here my point is that, under 
connectionist representationalism, although representations were conceived as distribut-
ed patterns of activation, those patterns of activation are a kind of distributed coding of 
information which remains stable across time (Thorpe 2003)58, so minimal persistence is 
also a condition required for them.  
We could continue reviewing other different approaches to the notion of represen-
tation –i.e., causal theories, informational theories, historical/teleosemantic perspectives, 
etc. (Rowlands 2017)–. However, on my view such an effort would be unnecessary at this 
point, given that all these and other forms of contemporary representationalism typically 
conceive representations as neural states that stand in an appropriate relation to some-
thing else59 (Fodor 1980b; Millikan 1984; van Gelder 1995) and, again, it seems that the 
assumption of a minimal temporal persistence is a condition required for all those states 
to be a representation. 
ARGUMENT AGAINST THE REPRESENTATIONAL CHARACTER OF INSTANTIATED CONCEPTS 
At this point, if representations can be described as relatively stable and persistent objects 
that codify information –because, as argued above, it seems that minimal persistence is a 
condition demanded of representations by any cognitive theory–, then my conclusion is 
that instantiated concepts cannot be representations since they do not encode stable 
information. 
Therefore, the main reason to reject the presumed representational character of in-
stantiated concepts would be the minimal persistence requirement demanded of the no-
tion of representation (which is not fulfilled in a contextualist view of concepts), and not 
the structure/architecture –either classicist or connectionist– of the mind. 
 
57 Sometimes it is argued that these arguments against the notion of representation in connectionism 
constitute a challenge for a much wider range of approaches (Bechtel 1998). 
58 In the same line, Rogers and McClelland (2004, p. 50) remind us that one of the strong points of con-
nectionist networks –demonstrated by Hinton (1981; 1986)– is their ability to store/represent a 
proposition by means of a stable pattern of activity. 
59 Those states might be called either a representation, or a detector/classifier, or an indicator, of the con-
sidered external object (Ramsey 2007; Ryder 2009). 
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5.7. Generalized argument 
In this chapter I have focused my discussion in the approach chosen by me in order to 
characterize the idea of concept, namely, a geometric similarity-based framework artic-
ulated by means of the prototype theory of concepts. In spite of this, none of the key 
elements in my argument for the need to differentiate two distinct notions of concept 
crucially depends on the selected framework. Based on that, in this last section I will 
briefly sketch how such an argument may be generalized to any position that assumes a 
contextualist view of concepts. 
In the first place, remember the main thesis of radical contextualism, namely, that 
concepts have to be instantiated for each particular context. This proposition is the main 
premise of my argument; a premise that can be broken down in three subsidiary theses 
all of them more or less explicitly accepted by most advocates of contextualism: 
(1) Concepts have to be instantiated for each particular occasion. 
(2) The instantiation of a concept depends on the considered context. 
(3) Since those instantiations depend on context, they can lead to different external 
manifestations (e.g., categorizations) in function of the relevant context. 
Therefore, for any contextualist approach to concepts, there is a sense of concept that (a) 
it is responsible of the external manifestation of each category, and (b) it may vary from 
one occasion or context to another. This sense of concept would correspond with my 
notion of instantiated concept or concept as instantiation. 
Having said this, if the notion of instantiated concept is the result of a modulation 
or instantiation specific of context, thence it ought to exist something to be modu-
lated. Indeed, for the case discussed in this chapter (i.e., a similarity-based framework 
characterized through a prototype theory), the thing that is modulated are the locations 
of the prototypes of the relevant concepts in each context. That is what I have called 
concepts as storage or stored concepts. 
Nevertheless, this second notion of concept is not exclusive of prototype-based ap-
proaches since, as argued above, in any contextualist view there must exist something that 
is modulated by the instantiation processes60. Indeed, it is possible to test this assertion if 
we examine some other theories on the structure of concepts, like the classical and the 
exemplar views. Firstly, the case of the exemplar theory of concepts is very similar to the 
prototype-based view analyzed up to this point of the chapter. The idea is that, since the 
similarities between prototypes/exemplars and objects are determined through the very 
same computational scheme (namely that described in section 5.2.3) both for the proto-
type theory and for the exemplar theory, both of them will depend on the same contex-
tual factors (i.e., relevant concepts/exemplars, type of metric, importance of dimensions, 
and weighting of concepts/exemplars61). On this basis, that which is modulated in the 
 
60 Certainly, this is not a consequence of the contextualist view, but of the fact that in order to modulate 
something in a particular context, the “something” that is modulated must exist beforehand. 
61 Observe that the contextual factors relevant concepts/prototypes and weighting of concepts/prototypes, in 
the case of the prototype theory, correspond with the factors relevant exemplars and weighting of exem-
plars respectively in the case of the exemplar theory. 
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case of the exemplar view are the locations of the exemplars of the categories that are 
used in categorizations, inferences, etc. Secondly, in the case of the classical theory the 
modulated thing would be the set of stored rules associated to a certain category, which 
might be applied or not depending on the context62. That would result in a partition of 
the universe of things between those belonging and not belonging to the considered 
category, a partition that could vary from occasion to occasion. 
In all those cases, the element that undergoes modulation (i.e., prototype, exemplar, 
or set of rules) may be identified with my notion of stored concept, given that they are the 
only information that needs to be persistently registered by the cognitive system. And, 
although they are part of the input of the cognitive processes by means of which concepts 
are instantiated, they do not wholly determine the result of those instantiations in a par-
ticular context. 
In consequence, even though the discussion in this chapter was focused on the case of 
the prototype theory of concepts, nothing prevents the same considerations to be applied 
in approaches based on other theories on the structure of concepts, as long as a contex-
tualist view of concepts is assumed. Therefore, my conclusion is that the mere acceptance 
of contextualism leads to the need to differentiate two distinct senses of concept, the first 
associated to the notion of storage, and the second associated to the notion of instantia-
tion. Additionally, the same can be said of my argument and discussion in section 5.6, 
that is, since none in them depends on the assumed structure of concepts, the conclusion 
that instantiated concepts are non-persistent and non-representational is valid for every 
contextualist approach. 
5.8. Conclusions 
In this chapter I have firstly tried to show that Casasanto and Lupyan’s ad hoc cognition 
framework can be characterized by means of a prototype theory of concepts that deploys 
a geometrical similarity space. Such a proposal is compatible with Casasanto and Lu-
pyan’s thesis that there are no context-independent concepts, and in the pages above I 
have identified four possible sources of contextual dependence (i.e., relevant concepts, 
kind of metric, importance of dimensions and weighting of concepts). 
At that point, and based on the different roles played by regions and prototypes in the 
conceptual space theory, I also argued for the need to shift the focus from regions to 
prototypes. That was a significant change, since a definition of concepts in terms of re-
gions as Gärdenfors does is misleading, because it could make us falsely attribute to 
concepts a much more static character than that they really have in the theory. Indeed, if 
 
62 Clearly, it might be replied that the original definition call it “definition of level 1” together with 
the rules of modulation-by-context constitutes another definition call it “definition of level 2”; and 
that, by virtue of it, we should not speak of modulation, since we could always resort to the (un-
modulated) definition of level 2. Anyhow, not everybody would accept that such definition of level 2 
could be called “definition”. In fact, its acceptance opens the door to the claim that non-classical the-
ories of concepts (e.g., the prototype and the exemplar views) may be reduced to the classical view, to 
the extent that their associated categorization processes can be expressed by means of a complex set of 
rules. And the latter is something that very few would be willing to accept. 
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concepts were identified with static regions within a similarity space, then concepts could 
not be differently instantiated for each particular context, so at least a moderate 
invariantist position would have to be adopted. By contrast, when the focus is shifted 
toward the prototypes, then a same concept can be differently instantiated from the same 
location of the prototype, depending on the rest of contextual factors. (Or, expressed in 
terms of regions, different conceptual regions may be produced in each particular instan-
tiation, depending on which the relevant context is.) 
Next, two different senses of concept were distinguished, associated with two distinct 
facets in their life cycle. On the one hand, concepts as storage were identified with the 
information persistently registered by the mind about categories, which remains stable 
between different executions of the concept-acquisition processes. On the other hand, 
concepts as instantiation were said to be the ones responsible of the external manifestation 
of concepts (i.e., in categorizations and inferences), and were described as non-persistent 
mental events that happen at the end of those cognitive processes. I also claimed that 
those two notions of concept should be seen as different facets in the life cycle of a con-
cept, and that this life cycle has a circular structure (what explained the mutual depend-
ence between the notions of stored concept and instantiated concept for each given catego-
ry). 
One major advantage of this approach is that it brings together virtues both from the 
contextualist and the invariantist views. In regard to contextualism, my proposal satisfac-
torily articulates a framework that of the ad hoc cognition compatible with the evi-
dence against the existence of definitions or conceptual cores, in which concepts are 
construals produced on the fly from a set of occasion-specific cues. The main benefit of 
this is the framework’s capacity to explain our adaptive abilities to changing environ-
ments. Regarding invariantism, and putting aside the question of whether it is possible 
the mutual comprehension of the messages interchanged by the participants in a conver-
sation (an issue that goes beyond the aim of this doctoral thesis), my proposal holds that 
in spite of the context-dependence of instantiated concepts stored concepts are stable 
enough to accumulate new information on categories. 
After arguing for the need to distinguish those two different notions of concept, I 
held that instantiated concepts should be viewed as non-persistent mental events that 
result from cognitive processes, not in the sense of products, but in the sense of phe-
nomena (i.e., non-persistent results that cannot be accessed beyond their occurrence 
time). This was in line with my thesis that instantiated concepts must not be identified 
with psychological states –or entities– stored within mental structures, but with some-
thing that happens when their instantiation processes end63. Next I concluded that, since 
representations are commonly conceived as relatively stable and persistent objects which 
encode information, then the instantiated concepts posed by contextualism are not rep-
resentations, because they do not codify stable information (so they do not fulfill the 
minimal persistence requirement demanded of any representation). 
 
63 Or, in other words, all that was in line with the view that instantiated concepts are non-persistent mental 
events that occur in the mind. 
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Finally, I have shown that, since none of my assumptions in this chapter depends on 
the chosen theory on the structure of concepts, my conclusions regarding the need of 
distinguishing between stored concepts and instantiated concepts, and in regard to the 
non-persistent and non-representational character of instantiated concepts, would apply 
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One of the main problems of concept empiricism is to account for the acquisition of 
primitive concepts (i.e., the most basic constituents of concepts) without resorting to 
preexisting innate elements. According to nativism, an innate representational repertoire 
(on which later learning is based) must be one of the key elements in any theory of con-
cept acquisition. However, this is not a choice for a consistent empiricist, since it compels 
to the acceptance that concept learning consists in the production of complex concepts 
from a set of innate elements. Therefore, a response from empiricism is required to the 
reasons provided by nativists (Fodor 1975, 2008; Carey 2009) against the thesis that 
primitive concepts may be learned. 
My aim in this chapter is to prove that the uppermost nativist arguments against the 
acquisition of primitive concepts rest on the assumption that the constituents of con-
cepts must be available beforehand, as an input of the learning process. I call it the prece-
dence assumption. Nevertheless, I will claim that there is no obligation to accept such a 
hypothesis, because the constitutive elements of a concept C may result from the same 
learning process by virtue of which that concept is acquired. To support my perspective, 
a model of this view is provided. That model will consist in a three-step iterative acquisi-
tion system, constituted by two general-purpose abilities (i.e., dimensionality reduction 
and pattern recognition) and one last stage of evaluation and readjustment of the model. 
Having said this, in section 6.2 I introduce the acquisition problem in concept em-
piricism. There, I firstly place the empiricism-nativism distinction in the present debate, 
which allows empiricist approaches to incorporate some degree of nativism. In line with 
this, my (empiricist) proposed model will be compatible with the existence of inherited 
elements –in the form of a set of (innate) initial seeds– which, in any case, should not be 
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identified with fully developed concepts. After that I remind some of the major difficul-
ties of concept empiricism, and I focus on Fodor’s argument –and Carey’s reformulation 
of it– for the thesis that primitive concepts cannot be learned. Next I show that the na-
tivist argument can be generalized, so that it is expressed independently of the kind of 
learning mechanism –or, more particularly, without assuming that learning is always a 
process of hypothesis formation and testing–. My conclusion is that there is a circularity 
threat whenever concepts and their constitutive elements are thought to be acquired 
through the same kind of cognitive process, because that process ends up with an infinite 
regress when explaining how the most basic constituents of concepts are learned. 
Then, in section 6.3, I hold that the crucial problem of empiricism is not due to the 
Fodor’s or Carey’s premise that all learning mechanisms may be reduced to hypothesis 
formation and confirmation, but to an assumption present in most of empiricist and 
nativist learning approaches. I will give it the name of the precedence assumption, ac-
cording to which the perceptual or conceptual constituents of a concept C have to be 
available as an input of the process that leads to the acquisition of that concept. In this 
case my point will be that the acceptance of the precedence assumption constitutes a 
mistake for the empiricist, since no model built on it can account for the acquisition of 
general concepts in a non-circular way. 
Lastly, in section 6.4 I claim that all is not lost for the empiricist, since it is possible 
that our repertoire of primitive concepts have been acquired in a non-circular way. The 
idea is that if the most basic elements of concepts are ready at the end of the learning 
process although not from the start, then the precedence assumption becomes un-
necessary and, consequently, the circularity threat when explaining concept acqui-
sition disappears. There I will describe an acquisition model built on the basis of a 
three-step iterative learning system, which is able to produce concepts and their constitu-
tive elements as result of the same execution of the acquisition process. That system will 
be based on two domain-general computational competences (i.e., dimensionality reduc-
tion and pattern identification), followed by a final stage where the results are evaluated 
and the system/model is readjusted accordingly. The dimensional reduction module will 
produce new relevant and reduced factors / dimensions / properties which rule out as 
much redundant information as possible, while retaining as much variability (of the orig-
inal data) as doable. The pattern recognition module will search for regularities in the 
reduced data, and will generate for an approach based on a cluster analysis the cen-
troids that, in chapter 5, were identified with the notion of stored concept, and from 
which instantiated concepts are produced. Finally, an iterative system is necessary because 
nothing guarantees that the obtained factors and patterns are the most predictive ones, 
and this is also the main reason for the (third) stage of evaluation and readjustment of 
the model. 
6.2. The acquisition problem in concept empiricism 
Where do concepts come from? As said in chapter 1, this is one of the critical issues fac-
ing, not only present cognitive science, but also ancient, modern and contemporary phi-
losophy. Independently of the ontological status attributed to concepts, two major re-
sponses to the question on the origin of concepts can be distinguished: (a) nativism, ac-
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cording to which many/most/all concepts are innate; (b) empiricism, which claims that 
concepts are a product of experience, and that few of them are innate. 
In this section, and after situating the empiricism-nativism distinction in the con-
temporary debate, which allows empiricist models to accept some degree of nativism, I 
will show that my (empiricist) proposal is compatible with the existence of inherited 
elements that, anyway, cannot be identified with fully developed concepts. Then, I recall 
some of the main problems of concept empiricist, paying special attention to Fodor’s 
argument (and Carey’s reformulation of it) in favor of the thesis that primitive concepts 
cannot be learned. Lastly, I prove that Fodor’s argument may be re-expressed in such a 
way that it is independent of the assumed kind of learning. 
6.2.1 The empiricist-nativist debate revisited 
One prominent position in the (contemporary) empiricist-nativist debate is the one 
defended by Margolis and Laurence (2013), who argue that the discussion should not be 
focused on the innateness of concepts, but on the general-purpose or domain-specific 
character of the cognitive systems that guide the acquisition of those concepts1. 
In Margolis and Laurence’s view, both nativists and empiricists are committed to 
innatist assumptions. On the one hand, the main thesis of nativism is that most, if not 
all, concepts are innate. On the other hand, it is also true that empiricists tend to accept 
the existence of innate processes, mechanisms or dispositions, on the basis of which con-
cepts are acquired. Therefore, it seems that both nativists and empiricists include innate 
elements in their cognitive models. 
Nevertheless, that is only one of the two hypotheses that characterize a position 
which can be wholly described as follows: 
[A] Both nativists and empiricists accept the existence of innate learning systems so, in 
consequence, nativism cannot be defined by the thesis that most of concepts are 
innate (in the sense of being acquired by means of an innate psychological base). 
[B] Both nativists and empiricists may be disposed to accept that (some) concepts can 
be learned from experience together with a certain acquisition base. Therefore, 
empiricism cannot be defined by the thesis that concepts come from the accumu-
lation of sense experience. 
Their point is that, if the nativism-empiricism distinction cannot be based on the in-
nateness of the underlying acquisition systems, nor on the acceptance that concepts are 
learned from experience, then it may be thought that the focus should be put on the 
different character of the cognitive systems which constitute the acquisition base. 
On this basis, Margolis and Laurence hold that the main point of disagreement be-
tween nativism and empiricism is not about the existence or not of innate cognitive ele-
ments –because both nativists and empiricists accept them alike–, but about the specific 
or general character, respectively, of such innate systems. Thence, according to them it is 
necessary to distinguish the nativist acquisition base, which would be constituted by a set 
 
1 This is a fairly widespread view in the contemporary debate (Godfrey-Smith 1996; Spelke 1998; 
Cowie 1999), which can be traced back to early modern rationalism (Descartes 1647; Leibniz 1765). 
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of domain-specific modules, from the empiricist acquisition base, which would consist in 
a set of general-purpose systems. 
From here on, I will assume Margolis and Laurence’s distinction between nativism 
and empiricism, based on the character –specific or general, respectively– of the under-
lying acquisition systems. In particular, my proposal in this chapter fits in their definition 
of empiricist approach, because it is based on a set of general-purpose acquisition systems. 
At the same time, it does not conform to other stronger views of empiricism, since I ac-
cept both that those learning systems are innately given to the subjects, and that some 
innate informational elements can intervene in them –as I will describe in the following 
section–. 
6.2.2 Innate elements in empiricist models 
According to Carey (2009; 2011), any theory of concept development should address the 
three following questions: (a) the innate conceptual repertoire; (b) the differences be-
tween such innate concepts and the ones of an adult; and (c) which learning processes 
lead to the transformation of the first into the latter. 
And, even though my (empiricist) proposal is very different from Carey’s nativism, 
on my view she is right when claiming that the three mentioned issues have to be ad-
dressed by any theory on the acquisition of concepts. Hence, my work in this chapter 
deals with the problem of concept learning from an empiricist perspective, taking care of 
some innatist demands. The idea will be to accept innate elements in the empiricist mod-
el in such a way that they do not constrict the model, nor prevent its adaptation to 
changing environments. 
In regard to the first issue –i.e., the innate conceptual repertoire–, and though my 
model will fit in the empiricist cannon, according to which the only innate structures are 
general purpose mechanisms on whose basis the acquisition of any concept may be ex-
plained (Laurence and Margolis 2002, p. 51)–, my proposal can also include an innate 
repertoire in the form of a set of (innate) initial seeds used by the pattern recognition 
module –which will be characterized by means of cluster analysis–. Anyhow, such initial 
seeds2 are not genuine concepts, but pre-concepts tentatively used as a starting point by 
the cognitive processes that lead to the identification of patterns then associated to con-
cepts. Thus, although the role played by those initial seeds is far from the common no-
tion of (innate) concept –because they are just a vector to guide the pattern recognition 
processes–, they might explain why different people produce similar concepts for many 
categories. Additionally, since the initial seeds do not have to be associated to a particular 
set of dimensions3 (for instance, in a conceptual space), I am not accepting a particular 
innate conceptual repertoire which could hardly account for conceptual variability from 
one person to another and, also, from one generation to the next. 
 
2 Or locations of the first centroids for the processes of cluster analysis. 
3 Indeed, my thesis is that in general we inherit the initial seeds that guide the acquisition process, but 
not the dimensional space within which those seeds are located. Notwithstanding this, I agree that in 
some cases dimensions can also be inherited when they are very close to sensory experience, as happens 
in the case of colors, shapes, etc. 
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Obviously, the idea of (innate) initial seeds in an optimization process differs from 
the notion of innate concept which some empiricists could –at best– accept (that is, it is 
very different from an innate stock of conceptual primitives restricted to sensory or per-
ceptual representations) (Piaget 1937; Quine 1969). And, it is also distinct from the 
innate conceptual representations accepted by moderate nativists, even when the latter 
are conceived as the product of (innate) input analyzers which are not the result of learn-
ing (Carey 2011, 2015). By contrast, the kind of innate element considered in my model 
is a much weaker notion, since it is not directly related to a particular set of dimensions, 
not even through an innate input analyzer. Consequently, my view is neutral on the issue 
of whether learning in a given domain is based on innate information about that domain. 
Therefore, although an approach like mine is compatible with the existence of innate 
elements which guide the learning of concepts, it does not require them in order to pro-
vide an explanation of how concepts are acquired (so, in this respect, my proposal is max-
imally flexible). Indeed, my perspective is consistent with the empiricist hypothesis that 
subjects do not inherit fully developed concepts, and also with the nativist evidence that 
there is a kind of biological preparedness to quickly acquire cognitive abilities for carrying 
out mental tasks crucial from an evolutionary point of view (Seligman 1971; Cummins 
and Cummins 1999). 
As a result, and in regard to Carey’s second issue, the differences –in my view– be-
tween the innate elements and the concepts of an adult are significant. Firstly, I reject 
that the aforementioned (innate) initial seeds are genuine concepts, because –as said 
above– they are not framed in a certain set of dimensions. Secondly, those seeds need to 
be both specifically adapted to the subject’s experiences, and enclosed in a dimensional 
framework that allows applying them in cognitive tasks (i.e., in categorizations). Finally, 
in connection with Carey’s third question, section 6.4 is devoted to the description of 
the acquisition processes which lead to the production of final concepts from experience 
information and a set of innate (and tentative) initial seeds. 
6.2.3 Empiricism and its opponents 
As stated in chapter 1, perhaps the most serious objection to concept empiricism are Fo-
dor’s (1975, 1981) arguments for nativism –and against empiricism–. According to 
them, concepts cannot be learned since their constituents should be available beforehand 
the acquisition process (in order to be used as input of the computational apparatus), 
what ends up with an infinite regress when trying to explain how the constitutive fea-
tures of concepts are acquired4. And, although I deal with Fodor’s argument in section 
6.2.4 below, now it is worth considering how that criticism has been applied to contem-
porary empiricism. 
 
4 Another distinct, although related, problem is that of how the constraints that guide the learning pro-
cess are acquired. In regard to this, it may be thought that it is the same problem as the one that rose 
from Fodor’s arguments against empiricism, to the extent that it seems necessary a non-circular expla-
nation of how those learning restrictions are initially acquired. Having said this, in this chapter I will 
focus on Fodor’s arguments, since I consider that the sort of response provided here to these latter can 
also be applied to the case of the learning constraints. 
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Let me consider, for example, Marcus’ (1998) critique against the proposal of Elman 
et al. (1996) that connectionist models can explain the acquisition of new concepts with-
out resorting to a previous innate repertoire5. On my view, the most interesting aspect of 
Marcus’ critique is that, even though his work is designed against the connectionist ap-
proach, he focuses his arguments on the most problematic element of concept construc-
tivism (and, consequently, of concept empiricism6). 
Marcus’ main idea is that the largest problem of constructivism is that there has never 
been a concrete computational explanation of how a learning system could produce con-
structivist conceptual redescriptions –that is, new concepts not based on a previous set of 
already existing concepts–. His conclusion is that Elman et al. do not prove that connec-
tionism is able to provide that kind of explanation, because the input and output 
schemes used by their connectionist models are also concepts. Indeed, the underlying 
problem identified by Marcus is the potential inability of the empiricist models to pro-
duce real conceptual emergence (i.e., their potential failure to “develop new concepts 
where there were none”) (Marcus 1998, p. 161). The key issue is that most constructivist 
models do not produce new concepts, but correspondences between predefined sets of 
concepts, which are presupposed by all those models7. This is ultimately the issue that 
underlies Fodor’s main argument against empiricism. 
Certainly, Marcus’ point is closely connected with the main argument for nativism, 
and against empiricism, already mentioned in chapter 1, according to which the stimuli 
from environment are so poor that concepts could not be produced merely from them. 
Indeed, the poverty of the stimulus argument ultimately is an objection based on the lack 
of a concrete cognitive model, powerful enough to process stimuli richer than commonly 
expected8. Here the point is that, if such a model existed, then the domain-specific sys-
tems proposed by the nativist could have been acquired by means of domain-general 
mechanisms, and that would tip the balance to the empiricist side. 
Nevertheless, when the empiricist tries to formulate concrete cognitive models to ex-
plain the acquisition of new concepts, he stumbles on the constructivist problem of pro-
ducing new concepts without assuming a set of predefined and primitive elements. As 
Marcus argued, the main constructivist/empiricist problem is that they do not explain 
how a new concept can be acquired from none. And, again, this is essentially Fodor’s 
argument against concept empiricism. 
My purpose in this chapter is to show that a multivariate-analysis learning system, 
based on a combination of (a) dimensionality reduction –conceived in terms of a factor 
analysis or principal component analysis (PCA)–, (b) pattern identification –envisaged as 
 
5 For a previous and clearer discussion –from connectionism– against Fodor’s nativist argument, see 
Molenaar (1986). 
6 Throughout the rest of this section, everything said about constructivism will also apply to empiricism. 
7 And although Marcus recognizes that some constructivist models (Hinton et al. 1995) seem to be able 
to explain the unsupervised acquisition of new concepts (in the form of output units in a neural net-
work), he then dismisses them because of not being robust enough to explain the acquisition of general 
features across a wide range of environments. 
8 For instance, this was precisely Laurence and Margolis’ (2001) critique to Cowie (1999). 
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a cluster analysis–, (c) and a set of end conditions, is a kind of domain-general cognitive 
architecture able to produce new concepts in an unsupervised way, without presuming 
the existence of a previous set of innate conceptual elements. As said above, this approach 
is compatible with the existence of innate, although not dimensionally structured, in-
formation (e.g., the seeds of a cluster analysis, which might be inherited and stored as 
mere series of numbers9). Nevertheless, before dealing with these issues, I will carefully 
analyze Fodor’s argument –and Carey’s reformulation of it–, and try to show that one 
common hypothesis underlies to any generalization of that kind of argument. 
6.2.4 Fodor’s and Carey’s arguments 
According to nativism, an innate representational repertoire –on which later learning is 
based– is one of key elements in every theory of concept formation. In other words, con-
cept learning entails the production of complex concepts based on a set of other primi-
tive and innate conceptual elements. This view is sometimes called the building blocks 
model of concept learning and, as stated by Margolis and Laurence (2011b), it is a per-
spective openly accepted both by radical nativists (Fodor 1981), and by moderate na-
tivists (Pinker 2007); and also tacitly assumed by almost all empiricist explanations of 
concept acquisition. 
Therefore, by virtue of the definition of concept empiricism –according to which all 
concepts are learned, not innate–, every empiricist theory has to face the problem of 
providing an account of the acquisition of general concepts, without resorting to a preex-
isting innate repertoire. (In other case, it would be some kind of moderate nativism, but 
not an empiricist theory of concepts.) Or, in other words, it is required an answer to the 
reasons provided from nativism against the thesis that primitive concepts can be learned. 
As it is well known, Fodor has cogently argued against the acquisition of primitive con-
cepts, and –less convincingly– against the learning of complex concepts10. The aim of the 
present section is to review the argument provided by Fodor against the acquisition of 
concepts, and also Carey’s reformulation of it. 
FODOR’S ARGUMENT AGAINST EMPIRICISM 
According to Fodor, every empiricist theory of concept learning is tacitly committed to 
some kind of nativism. However, Fodor’s position has not remained unchanged, so dif-
ferent versions of his argument against concept empiricism may be found throughout his 
work11. 
 
9 Consequently, these seeds do not need to be associated to any particular dimensional space. 
10 The other main conclusion of Fodor’s works against empiricism is that most concepts do not have any 
internal structure. This would explain the lack of success of the research program carried out by empir-
icists in order to reduce complex concepts to their primitive constituents. On my view, Fodor’s inter-
pretation of the failure of the reductionist program is not mandatory, since such a failure could also be 
due to the influence of context on any application –or instantiation, in my terminology– of a concept. 
11 Critical discussions of Fodor’s arguments –and of their consequences– from other points of view may 
be found in Molenaar (1986), Samet and Flanagan (1989), Boom (1991), Margolis (1998), Laurence 
and Margolis (2002), Recanati (2002), Margolis and Laurence (2011c), and Rey (2014). 
Chapter 6 
182 
The earliest version of this argument goes back to The Language of Thought, where 
Fodor argued for the impossibility of changes in the conceptual system of an organism 
(i.e., in favor of the thesis that a conceptual system cannot be produced by a weaker one 
by means of hypothesis formation and confirmation). Such an argument could be 
summed up as follows (Fodor 1975, p. 93; 1980, p. 148): 
[P1] Learning is a process of hypothesis formation and confirmation (HF). 
[P2] In order to formulate a hypothesis on a concept, the learning system must be 
able to represent such a concept. 
[P3] A concept cannot be represented by a system before that concept is learned. 
[P4] Thence, concepts either primitive or complex cannot be acquired by HF. 
[P5] There is no other general learning method (Fodor 1975, p. 58; 1981, p. 269). 
[C1] Concepts cannot be learned. 
Before continuing, one clarification is needed regarding proposition [P4] in this first 
argument. In latter works Fodor is more conservative, and restricts proposition [P4] to 
the case of primitive concepts12 (Fodor 1981, pp. 270-272). In such a work, Fodor ex-
pressed that proposition in the following sense: 
[P4'] Primitive concepts cannot be learned by HF. The primitive concept Cp being 
learned is the concept whose acquisition has to be explained, so Cp will have to 
be available in order to formulate the tested hypothesis, even in order to identify 
the experiences fixed by such a concept. Therefore, the hypothesis required for 
the learning of Cp cannot even be formulated. 
Hence, attending to Fodor’s previous cautions, proposition [P4] may be thought to be 
not applicable to complex concepts since, in the case of the acquisition of a complex con-
cept Cc, the hypothesis might be formulated in terms of an empty concept –which would 
act as a void label (e.g., stimulus-1)–, and of the rest of primitive concepts constituting 
the observational statement (e.g., stimulus-1 is green). This empiricist reply is not possible 
if the learned concept is primitive, so Carey’s subsequent restriction of [PIII] to the case of 
primitive concepts seems to be a good decision13. 
All this considered, a second weaker version of the argument that is, the one for 
primitive concepts may be expressed as follows: 
[P1'] Learning is a process of hypothesis formation and confirmation. 
[P2'] If [P1'], then to learn a concept C is to produce a hypothesis “x is a C iff x is f1, f2, 
… fn” (HF-rule), and to check it against experience. 
[P3'] In order to begin the learning process, the system has to be able to represent / 
recognize the constitutive elements f1, f2, … fn of C. 
[P4'] Concepts f1, f2, … fn (or concepts in the right side) can be learned or unlearned. 
 
12 Even though later in his work consider, for instance, LOT2 (Fodor 2008), Fodor re-extended again 
proposition [P4] to complex concepts (as he did in this first version of the argument). 
13 See her argument below in this section. 
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[P5'] Not all concepts available for the right side may be learned, since HF requires 
projecting a HF-rule. (Otherwise, concept learning could never begin.) 
[C1'] Concept learning presupposes an innate stock of concepts. 
Thus, Fodor concludes that the empiricist thesis that concepts result from assembling 
their definitional constituents requires the existence of an innate repertoire of primitive 
concepts, which contradicts the empiricist hypothesis that most, if not all, concepts are 
learned. In this case, Fodor’s conclusion is not that concepts both primitive and com-
plex cannot be learned (that was the conclusion [C1] of the first version of his argu-
ment); but only that primitive concepts cannot be learned, since they are presupposed by 
the empiricist acquisition models. 
Finally, a third version results when the second argument is extended from the con-
clusion [C1'] or premise [P6'] in the third argument that primitive concepts cannot be 
acquired, to the conclusion that complex concepts are also innately specified. Such an 
argument can be expressed as follows: 
[P6'] Primitive concepts cannot be learned, and thus must be innate. 
[P7'] The set of all available concepts is the closure of the primitive ones under the 
combinatorial mechanisms14 (which are supposed to be innate) (Fodor 1981, p. 
264). 
[C2'] So, every potential complex concept is innately specified. 
According to this third version of the argument, any complex concept is a function of a 
set of innate primitives, and of what can be built from them by means of the logical re-
sources available to the learner15. Therefore, the expressive power of our conceptual sys-
tem would be innately determined, and could not be increased through learning. 
CAREY’S REFORMULATION OF FODOR’S ARGUMENT 
Some years later, Susan Carey re-expressed Fodor’s argument for the thesis that primitive 
concepts are innate (or, in other words, for the thesis that primitive concepts cannot be 
learned) in a much clearer way16 (Carey 2009, p. 513): 
[PI] All learning mechanisms reduce to hypothesis formation and testing. 
[PII] Hypotheses that play a role in learning new concepts need to be formulated in 
terms of the available concepts, and the principle of compositionality. 
[PIII] Primitive concepts are not formulatable definitionally nor probabilistically in 
terms of other concepts. 
[CI] Therefore, primitive concepts cannot be learned. 
 
14 Or, in other words, the expressive power of our conceptual system is determined by its primitive con-
cepts and the combinatorial principles that rule them. 
15 A similar kind of discourse is present in many others, like Rips et al. (2008) and Rey (2014). 
16 From here on, I shall mainly focus on Carey’s reformulation of Fodor’s argument. 
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At this point, it is worthwhile to recall Carey’s own view regarding her formulation of 
Fodor’s argument17: 
Learning is a computational process that operates on representations, and therefore if we believe 
that learning plays a role in the construction of representational resources, we are committed to 
there being some innate representations: those that are the input to the initial episodes of learning. 
(…) Remember, I am using “innate” to mean “not learned.” (Carey 2011, p. 152) 
Carey’s idea is that, because learning operates on concepts, and given that concepts are 
the result of learning processes, then there must exist some primitive concepts used as an 
input of, at least, the first episodes of learning. And, since those primitive concepts can-
not be produced by the referred acquisition processes due to circularity reasons, then 
it can be said that they are innate (or, in other words, that they are not learned). This is 
an important issue, seeing that Carey explicitly states an assumption which, as I hold in 
section 6.3 (where I call it the precedence assumption), is implicitly present in all models of 
concept learning. 
In regard to Carey’s formulation of the argument, premise [PI] is equivalent to the 
conjunction of the premises [P1] and [P5] in Fodor’s first version of the argument18. In 
fact, premise [PI] or a variation of it plays a key role in any of Fodor’s and Carey’s ar-
guments. And, although the premise that all learning mechanisms may be reduced to 
hypothesis formation and testing (i.e., [PI] and its variations) has been severely criticized 
as I describe in the next subsection, my thesis will be that HF is not a condition re-
quired in order to build this kind of argument against concept empiricism (see section 
6.2.5 below). 
HYPOTHESIS FORMATION AND TESTING 
As shown in the previous pages, although Fodor’s arguments against empiricism and 
the thesis that concepts are the result of assembling their most basic elements have 
slightly changed over time, all of them can be fairly summarized by the next scheme: 
[Pi] Concepts, either primitive or complex, cannot be acquired by hypothesis for-
mation and confirmation. 
[Pii] There is no other learning method. 
[Ci] Thence, concepts cannot be learned. 
Regarding premise [Pii] which is equivalent to Carey's premise [PI] Fodor has tradi-
tionally argued for it as follows: every theory of concept learning requires the inductive 
fixation of beliefs, a task in which the formulation and confirmation of hypotheses is a 
must (Fodor 1975; 2008). The present section is devoted to this assumption. 
 
17 The reader must keep in mind that there where Carey says “representation” I will read “concept”, even 
though as said in chapter 5 in my view (instantiated) concepts have non-representational character. 
18 In subsequent versions of the argument, Fodor did not make premise [P5] explicit, so it can be said that 
premise [PI] in Carey’s formulation is also implicitly equivalent to premise [P1'] in Fodor’s second and 
third versions of it. 
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One of Fodor’s main reasons in favor of HF is the claim that learning mechanisms 
have to be rational, which allows to support a kind of internalist justification, against 
other authors like Margolis and Laurence (2011c) who think that an externalist justi-
fication is enough. Leaving aside the issue of justification, Fodor holds that HF is the 
only type of learning where concepts are rationally acquired. However, on my view the 
focus on rationality is misguided. Most authors would subscribe that learning is a com-
putational process, but computation is neither rational nor non-rational. Indeed, compu-
tation is mere calculation. Fast, efficient, optimized, and others are adjectives that could 
apply to computation, but rational is not one of them, and the same can be said about 
non-rational. Therefore, the rationality or non-rationality of a cognitive process is not 
a reason to accept or discard it as a potential learning mechanism19. 
Additionally, Fodor’s arguments have been criticized by moderate nativists, such as 
Margolis and Laurence (2001b), who claim that both premises, [Pi] and [Pii], are mis-
taken. Firstly, premise [Pi] used to be questioned for the case of complex concepts. But, 
this is in line with the doubts brought up by Fodor himself on that issue, which moved 
him back and forth from one version of the argument to another. Because of this, and 
since as said above I will focus my discussion on Carey’s reformulation of Fodor’s view 
(which is constrained to the case of primitive concepts), no more will be said on these 
objections to premise [Pi]. 
Secondly, premise [Pii] has been put into question by many who think that not all 
learning mechanisms may be reduced to hypothesis formation and confirmation. For 
instance, Margolis and Laurence (2011c) argue that [Pii] is patently wrong for the case of 
complex concepts since, for them, there are many other kinds of learning different from 
HF, such as rote learning, communication-based learning, or automatic associative learn-
ing. In regard to this critique, it should be noticed that it is addressed against the argu-
ment for complex concepts, so they have a minor influence in the argument constrained 
to primitive concepts. 
Even worse, it is not clear whether any of those alternative learning methods both ac-
counts for the general acquisition of concepts which is the issue disapproved by Fodor, 
and is free from HF: 
 In respect of rote learning and communication-based learning, it is doubtful that 
these methods lead to the acquisition of concepts in a general sense, because in 
both cases the learned concept is fixed by a list of instructions (or a set of features) 
provided by other subject. In this case Fodor could reply that this is not the spon-
taneous (unsupervised and sub-personal) type of learning that seems to lead to the 
acquisition of most of concepts. 
 As regards automatic associative learning (AAL), it is the only alternative method 
versatile enough to explain the acquisition of concepts (not objects), in such a way 
that their constitutive properties are not to be explicitly given by an instructor. In 
this case the problem is that, there is evidence that AAL could be a case of hidden 
HF. Indeed, according to Yu et al. (2007), both HF and AAL could be special cas-
 
19 For a discussion about whether “rational” is, or not, a notion that may be applied to cognitive subper-
sonal processes, see Evans and Stanovich (2013, p. 229). 
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es of the very same set of learning mechanisms, since the election of the strongest 
associations in AAL may be identified with the formulation of hypotheses in HF. 
Having said all this, on my view there are still strong reasons for Fodor’s premise [Pii] or 
Carey’s premise [PI], at least in the case of primitive concepts. Notwithstanding this, its 
acceptance is not necessary to make empiricism get into trouble since, as will be shown in 
section 6.2.5, Fodor’s and Carey’s arguments can be generalized so that they are inde-
pendent of the kind of learning. 
6.2.5 Generalization of the criticism 
As noted in the last section, the nativist argument against the thesis that concepts can be 
learned may be formulated in multiple ways. Nevertheless, all those distinct expressions 
depended on the controversial thesis that all learning can be reduced to HF. 
My aim here is to show that Carey’s formulation of Fodor’s argument can be gen-
eralized, so that it is expressed independently of the assumed kind of learning mechanism 
or, in other words, without presuming that there is no other learning methods different 
from HF. Such a generalization may be expressed as follows: 
[PI'] Concept acquisition is the result of learning processes. 
[PII'] The perceptual or conceptual constituents of concepts should be available be-
fore the beginning of the learning process, in order to be used as an input of its 
computational apparatus. 
[PIII'] Thence, those constituents should have been acquired at an earlier time. 
[PIV'] A model M like this cannot explain the acquisition of such constituents without 
falling into circularity20. (Those constituents should result from a learning pro-
cess in whose beginning another set of more basic elements must be available, 
and so on and so forth.) 
[CI'] Therefore, primitive concepts cannot be learned. 
The structure of this generalization is analogous to the one of Carey’s argument. First, 
complex concepts result from a certain kind of learning (i.e., main empiricist assump-
tion), so premise [PI'] generalizes premise [PI]. Second, their constituents should be avail-
able before the beginning of the learning process, so [PII'] generalizes premise [PII]. But, 
premises [PI'] and [PII'] lead directly to the circularity problem, through propositions 
[PIII'] and [PIV'], which were summarized by Carey in one only proposition [PIII]. (The 
issue is that there is a circularity threat if both concepts and their constitutive properties 
are acquired by means of the very same kind of cognitive process, since the process ends 
up with an infinite regress when trying to explain how the constitutive elements of con-
cepts are acquired.) Lastly, both conclusions are exactly the same. 
And because premises [PI'] and [PII'] are weaker than premises [PI] and [PII], respec-
tively, this later formulation of the argument against empiricism is more general than 
those of Fodor and Carey, and, consequently, includes all the cases included by them. 
 
20 And the same can be said about any other model M' which included M (and, consequently, were big-
ger than M) and functioned under the aforementioned conditions. 
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6.3. The precedence assumption 
Now, in this section I will prove that the crucial problem of empiricism is not due to 
Fodor’s premise [P1] or Carey’s premise [PI], that all learning mechanisms can be re-
duced HF (which led to the innateness of both primitive and complex concepts), but to 
an assumption common to most of empiricist and nativist learning models. 
Indeed, once the nativist argument is generalized, as I did in section 6.2.5, it is clear 
that the origin of the circularity problem is the premise [PII'] or, more specifically, the 
precedence assumption underlying [PII']: 
[PA] The perceptual or conceptual constituents of concepts must be available as an 
input of the cognitive processes that lead to the acquisition of those concepts. 
This is a common assumption of both empiricist and moderate nativist approaches. Cer-
tainly, that is the very precise idea which underlies Fodor’s reasons against concept em-
piricism, when he argues that if a primitive concept Cp is available to a subject S for hy-
pothesis formation, then S already has that concept, since in the absence of Cp the subject 
would not able neither to formulate the tested hypothesis nor to recognize the experi-
ences21 associated with Cp. 
The reasons provided by many other authors for their tacit acceptance of [PA] are 
quite similar to those of Fodor. For example, when Carey expresses her view regarding 
this point, it seems clear that she assumes that a set of representations is required as an 
input of the learning process or, in other words, she takes for granted the [PA]: 
(…) if we believe that learning plays a role in the construction of representational resources, we 
are committed to there being some innate representations: those that are the input to the initial epi-
sodes of learning. (Carey 2011, p. 152) 
However, this common sense assumption seemingly trivial and unproblematic is a 
mistake for the empiricist22, since no model built on it can provide an explanation of the 
acquisition of general concepts free from the circularity threat. The consequence seems 
to be that under the [PA], and in order to avoid circularity, the empiricist has to accept 
the innateness of primitive concepts, which explains the usual shift of empiricism to-
wards moderate nativism. 
 
21 In this second case, I think that Fodor is essentially right because, in order to identify and manage the 
observational experience(s) linked with Cp, the perceptual data associated with Cp should have been 
previously stored within our cognitive system. 
22 Nevertheless, the [PA] is a problem not only for the empiricist, but also for the moderate nativist, be-
cause once it is concluded that primitive concepts cannot be learned, this may lead, through proposi-
tion [P7'] see section 6.2.4 above, to the radical nativist conclusion that every potential concept in 
our cognitive system is innately determined. 
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6.4. A non-circular model for concept learning 
My aim in this section is to prove that all is not lost for the empiricist, since it is possible 
that our repertoire of primitive concepts has been acquired in a non-circular way. My 
thesis will be that it is enough that the most basic elements of concepts are ready at the 
end of the learning process although not from its beginning, which avoids the prece-
dence assumption and, in consequence, the circularity threat when explaining concept 
acquisition. 
On that basis, I propose a learning model where the constitutive elements of a con-
cept can result from the very same cognitive process by virtue of which that concept is 
acquired. That model will consist in a three-step iterative learning system, constituted by 
two kind of general-purpose learning abilities, to wit, dimensionality reduction and pat-
tern recognition; followed by one last stage that evaluates and readjusts the model. 
6.4.1 A different kind of learning 
At this point, should the empiricist give up and accept that primitive concepts cannot be 
learned? From my point of view, there is a way out for empiricism, since there is no obli-
gation to accept [PA]. In this section I will claim that a different kind of learning is pos-
sible. Thence, the thesis I will argue for is that, for a model (of concept acquisition) to be 
able to function, it is not necessary that its constitutive elements are available from the 
very beginning. In fact, my proposal is an empiricist acquisition model where the most 
basic constituents of a concept result from the very same learning process by virtue of 
which such a concept is acquired. Consequently, this kind of learning model could ex-
plain the acquisition of general concepts (i.e., both of concepts and their primitive con-
stituents) in a non-circular way, that is, without resorting to a preexisting innate reper-
toire of primitive concepts. 
The model consists in a three-step iterative acquisition process, constituted by two 
kinds of general-purpose learning abilities (i.e., dimensionality reduction and pattern 
identification23), which will be characterized by means of multivariate analysis (MVA) 
techniques (see Fig. 6.1): 
(1) Dimensional reduction: since a reduced perceptual input will be more efficiently 
stored and processed by the subsequent cognitive systems. This first step will pro-
duce the most basic constituents of concepts. 
(2) Pattern recognition: regularities in the (reduced) data input are singled out in or-
der to pinpoint similar future stimulus in comparable circumstances. Such reg-
ularities may be identified with the concepts of our mental system. 
(3) Evaluation and readjustment of the model: the resulting dimensions and patterns 
or alternatively, the resulting features and concepts will be evaluated in terms of 
their predictive power and, based on it, the iterative learning process will be rear-
ranged accordingly. 
 
23 These two learning modules are conceived to work in an autonomous and unsupervised way. 














Fig. 6.1. General structure of a non-circular model for the acquisition of complex and primitive concepts. The 
model is constituted by a three-step iterative learning process formed by three sequential stages: (i) 
dimensional reduction; (ii) pattern recognition; and (iii) evaluation and readjustment of the model. 
This scheme is inspired by the traditional view in pattern recognition literature, of di-
viding the learning system into a feature extractor (dimensionality reduction) followed by 
a classifier (pattern identification) (Jain et al. 2000; Webb 2002; Fichet et al. 2011). 
In the literature on concept acquisition there are works which make use at least 
partly of some of those three elements. On the one hand, and though the application of 
MVA techniques to concept learning and categorization is common (Diday 2005; Napo-
li 2005; Vanpaemel and Storms 2010), the general structure of those approaches does 
not usually include a previous dimensionality reduction in contrast to the one here 
proposed to explain the acquisition of new features. On the other hand, many times the 
cognitive abilities intervening in concept acquisition are conceived as modules working 
one after another, and not as different stages within one unique iterative learning pro-
cess. And regarding those proposals which conceive concept learning as an iterative mod-
el (e.g., Bloch-Mullins 2018), they usually and tacitly accept a set of preexisting rep-
resentations and, due to it, they do not account for how such innate elements could have 
been learned. As a consequence, none of those approaches is able to provide an answer to 
Fodor’s circularity objection24. 
6.4.2 Basic assumptions of the model 
In the following sections I provide a detailed description of the motivations, articulation 
and strengths of the three main elements of my proposal, explaining why this approach 
constitutes a non-circular explanation of concept learning. 
However, before beginning any exposition, I will make explicit the assumptions of 
this model, paying special attention to those regarding the most basic input provided by 
our perceptual modules, as well as those associated to the issue of how the perceptual 
input can be temporarily stored before moving on to the acquisition system: 
 
24 By contrast, neural networks seem to fall under the same group as my perspective, since they are able to 
extract in an unsupervised way statistically relevant features by means of self-organizing learning 
mechanisms (Von der Malsburg 1973; Kohonen 1982; Ritter and Kohonen 1989; Schyns 1991), so 
they would not be committed to [PA] and would not be threatened by circularity. Unfortunately, 
neural networks face to the hard problem of interpreting their results, which is something much less 
tricky in the case of a MVA-based approach like the one here proposed. 
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(I) Let it be a set of n perceptual inputs, { a1, a2, ... an }, extended over n continuous do-
mains. This point is quite uncontroversial, since sensorium provides analog per-
ceptual outputs over continuous (electrochemical) potential levels. 
(II) Additionally, I will assume that all the information provided by the sensorium is 
stored as raw data. This presumption is unproblematic both in terms of what to 
store because everything is stored, and in terms of how to record the data since 
it is enough to register a continuous value, which may be done over an analog stor-
age medium (e.g., an electric potential level or difference). 
My point here is that those raw data may be recorded and managed without re-
quiring a previous conceptual structure. However, the data should be stored in a 
way such that it reflected the simultaneity (or non-simultaneity) and temporal or-
der of storage25, for example, by means of a kind of time stamp26. 
(III) The model is assumed to be constituted by two kinds of innate general-purpose 
learning mechanisms, namely, a system able to carry out a reduction in the num-
ber of dimensions of the raw perceptual input, and a system able to recognize 
regularities within data sets. Both these abilities are purely computational com-
petences that is, they merely operate on numbers, and hence do not require the 
existence of a prior conceptual system. 
And, although in my work those two abilities (i.e., dimensional reduction and pat-
tern recognition) are articulated through MVA techniques (i.e., factor anal-
ysis/PCA and cluster analysis, respectively), they can also be conceived in terms of 
other alternative approaches. For instance, both the dimensional reduction and 
the pattern recognition stage may be described by means of neural networks (Car-
penter 1989; Bartsch 1996; Hinton and Salakhutdinov 2006)27. 
(IV) Finally, the system in charge of the evaluation and readjustment of this iterative 
learning process is also assumed to be an innate cognitive module in our mind. 
I agree with Fodor, and also with many contemporary empiricists, that most or even 
all of the aforementioned systems may be considered innate; from the perceptual sys-
tems (and the subsequent modules carrying out the automatic post-processing of the 
perceptual input), to the cognitive systems that articulate both dimensional reduction 
 
25 This temporal information is crucial when looking for temporal associations within the raw data i.e., 
diachronic regularities over which evaluate the results of the model. 
26 Time stamps may be conceived as electric potentials stored by analog devices with an exponential de-
cay rate. A time stamp like this would be very precise in relative evaluations for the short term, and 
much less accurate for registers stored long time ago. 
27 Other approaches to dimensionality reduction would be the non-negative matrix factorization (NMF) 
(Lee and Seung 1999; 2001), and the singular value decomposition (SVD). For a review of the history 
of the SVD, see Stewart (1993). 
By contrast, multidimensional scaling (MDS) cannot be said to be a real alternative to factor analysis / 
PCA, as a method for dimensionality reduction. As said in section 3.3.2, MDS allows reducing the di-
mensionality of information, but it uses as starting point the dissimilarities/distances between the con-
sidered objects. Unfortunately, that is not the kind of information that can be thought to available as 
an input of our acquisition processes. 
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and pattern recognition, I am disposed to accept that those systems are surely innate28. 
Nonetheless, this has no influence on my view, given that the two intervening learning 
systems (i.e., those associated to dimensional reduction and pattern identification) are 
general-purpose mechanisms so, according to the nativism-empiricism distinction pro-
posed by Margolis and Laurence (2013) (see section 6.2.1 above), my perspective quali-
fies as an empiricist model of concept acquisition. 
6.4.3 Dimensionality reduction 
Concept learning is commonly identified with the recognition of patterns and similar-
ities in the objects of the world. Nevertheless, many times little is said about how the 
constitutive properties/dimensions of those objects are determined. That is called the 
selection problem (Goodman 1972; Machery 2009). And, even worse, the size of the data 
provided by sensorium is so huge that it is hard to imagine how they can be processed 
without a previous informational reduction.  
The aim of this section is to prove that dimensionality reduction constitutes an an-
swer to both of those questions. On the one hand, it explains how redundant infor-
mation can be ruled out from perceptual input. On the other, it makes clear how the 
relevant dimensions might be chosen in an automatic and unsupervised way, which 
solves the selection problem29. 
REASONS FOR A REDUCTION OF DIMENSIONS 
Many times it is suggested that the domain-general learning systems presumed by em-
piricism are highly sophisticated statistical mechanisms, able to recognize subtle regu-
larities and patterns (Prinz 2002). All those approaches have to face the issue of how to 
analyze the information provided by the sensorium. Here the problem is that the 
amount of perceptual data is so huge that it cannot be persistently stored in memory, nor 
directly analyzed by the pattern recognition mechanisms. This is so since the task of find-
ing statistical relations becomes more difficult as the number of dimensions increases; 
and the dimensionality of perceptual data may be very high. A way of addressing this 
issue is by means of a reduction in the number of dimensions which describes most of the 
original data variability in terms of a reduced number of factors, removing as much re-
dundant information as possible30, 31. 
 
28 In regard to the third stage of my proposal (i.e., that associated with the evaluation and readjustment 
of the model), I prefer to remain silent about its innate or learned character. 
29 For a detailed description of how dimensionality reduction constitutes an answer to the problem of 
feature selection  and extraction , see Webb (2002, ch. 9). 
30 Dimensionality reduction is a special kind of information reduction which, as a practice largely estab-
lished in cognitive psychology (Posner 1964) and neural computation (Redlich 1993) at times also 
called information compression (Wilkenfeld, forthcoming), is carried out by means of a transfor-
mation that produces an output informationally smaller than its associated input. (Even though con-
cept learning is sometimes identified with an information reduction (Hunt 1962), it is more accurate 
to say that some intervening modules in concept acquisition play an informational-reduction role.) 
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The idea is that, given that many sensorial inputs are highly correlated, it is feasible a 
description of most input data variability by means of fewer dimensions. In other words, 
if an aggregation of external stimuli e (susceptible to be identified with an object or a 
concept) is composed by n perceptual inputs, such a combination of stimuli can be char-
acterized and, subsequently recognized through a space with dimensionality much 
smaller than n. This view is a common idea in the analysis of real images, where each 
image is decomposed in a set of constitutive elements, which are in turn constituted by 
particular sets of features32 (Morgan 2016). Inasmuch as the final number of variables is 
fewer than the number of variables in the original data, its processing will be less resource 
demanding in terms of memory and computational power. Additionally, a dimensional 
reduction provides a set of relevant dimensions (free from redundant information), 
which will increase the effectiveness of the classifiers and analyzing processes working on 
them. 
Obviously, if dimensional reduction happened at the beginning of the acquisition 
processes, all the rest of the considered cognitive systems would work with the trans-
formed and reduced input, not with the original one. 
FACTOR ANALYSIS / PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
Factor analysis (FA) and principal component analysis (PCA) are two different MVA 
techniques used to determine the correlation structure among a set of n observed vari-
ables x1, x2, ... xn, in order to describe their variability in terms of a lower number k of 
unobserved variables called factors or components, respectively. Thence, both FA and 
PCA can produce a reduction in the number of dimensions of the input data set. Both 
methods are based on the analysis of the covariance matrix of the initial dimensions and, 
although in practice the results of the two approaches use to be very similar, there are 
reasons to distinguish one from the other (Fabrigar et al. 1999). 
Firstly, FA is based on the common factor model proposed by Thurstone33 (1931; 
1947), according to which each variable xi is a linear combination of a set of common 
factors { f1, f2, ... fn } and a unique or specific factor ui: 
1 1 2 2i i i ik k ix f f f u        
Or, in matrix terms: 
 X ΛF U  
where ij  are the factor weights or loadings, and Λ is the weight matrix34. 
                                                                                                                                       
31 Because of this, these techniques have been widely applied in intelligence research and cognitive sci-
ence (Barlow 1959; Edelman and Intrator 1997; Edelman 1998; Jensen 1998; Tenenbaum et al. 2000; 
Sternberg 2005). 
32 The reason why a reduced-dimensional space is enough to recognize stimuli originally located in a 
much larger dimensional space is the great redundancy present in the external input. 
33 Even though Thurstone was the first who used the expression factor analysis, Spearman (1904; 1927) 
had previously used the term factor. 
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The difference between a common factor and a unique factor is that the former can in-
fluence over more than one observed variable, while the later influence only over one 
particular variable. The aim of the common factor model is to describe the variability of 
the observed variables by estimating the relationships between the common factors and 
the observed variables. Or, in other words, FA distinguishes between common variability 
associated to several variables and unique variability associated to only one variable, 
and tries to find a new set of dimensions which is able to describe as much common vari-
ability as possible. 
There exist two main fitting methods for estimating the factor loadings: 
 Maximum likelihood: this method assumes that data come from a multivariate 
normal distribution, and estimates the factor loadings by maximizing the likeli-
hood function of the k-factor model, by means of an iterative process. 
 Principal axis factoring: this approach applies a PCA to the reduced covariance 
matrix, which is equal to the covariance matrix except for its diagonal values, 
which have been replaced by the communalities35 of the observed variables.  
Because the principal axis method does not assume normally distributed data which 
cannot be guaranteed for the case of perceptual inputs, this could be a reason for pre-
ferring the latter method in the case of concept acquisition. 
     
By contrast, PCA does not discern between common variability and unique variability. 
This model, originally proposed by Pearson (1901) and Hotelling (1933), defines each 
observed variable as a linear function of a set of linearly uncorrelated variables { z1, z2, 
... zn }, known as principal components. Each principal component zj is defined as the line-
ar combination of the observed variables with maximal variance, subject to being uncor-
related with all the previously obtained principal components z1, z2, ... zj-1. On this basis, 
it can be proved that the vector of principal components Z is related to the vector of 
observed variables X by means of the matrix of eigenvectors A of the covariance matrix 
of X: 
Z XA  
Therefore, the calculation of the principal components is equivalent to applying an or-
thogonal transformation A to the observed variables X (in order to obtain a set of uncor-
related dimensions Z). Lastly, the dimensionality reduction takes place when the first k 
principal components Zk are chosen: 
k kZ XA  
                                                                                                                                       
34 For a comprehensible introduction to modern FA, see Harman (1967), Lawley and Maxwell (1971), 
and Yates (1987). 
35 The communality of a variable xi is the part of its variance that is explained by the common factors F. 
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where Ak is the matrix A, truncated to the first k eigenvectors sorted by decreasing or-
der36. 
In both cases (i.e., FA and PCA), the statistical processes produce a number k of fac-
tors, or components, lower than the number n of original variables. This notwith-
standing, since FA tries to maximize the captured common variability in contrast to 
PCA, which tries to maximize the total variance, it seems that FA is a more suitable 
candidate in order to identify the features shared by the members of a given category. 
Lastly, in PCA, but above all in FA, the set of reduced dimensions can be, and usually 
is, rotated, in order to find a more optimal result. That better solution would be one in 
which the coefficients that relate the reduced factors to the original dimensions are as 
simple as possible (i.e., either very close to zero, or very far from zero). This has a signifi-
cant influence on the resultant model since: (a) a smaller number of rotated factors ex-
plain a larger amount of the variability in the original data; and (b) the resulting factors 
are more easily interpretable. 
APPLICATION CASE 
Let us consider a visual perceptual input. In this case, the external stimulus might be 
constituted by a two-dimensional mm array of intensity values, one for each retinal 
point. (In a similar way, if an auditory perception had been considered, the perceptual 
stimulus could be identified with a one-dimensional array of n values with frequency 
information.) 
If, for instance, the visual input of the acquisition system were constituted by a set of 
images of faces, then a dimensional reduction could be carried out over those images. 
Turk and Pentland (1991) performed this kind of research, and analyzed a group of face 
images by means of PCA, obtaining a set of k best eigenvectors (principal components) 
from a total of m2 eigenvectors. Those k best eigenvectors can be thought of as the consti-
tutive features of the set of face images37. 
And because this sort of analysis may be carried out on any set of images or, more 
generally, on any kind of input, in order to produce a reduced set of variables, then the 
application of successive dimensional reductions over the chosen input will lead to the 
progressive identification of its constitutive factors properties or features. 
Consider, for example, the data set shown in Table 6.1. A principal component analy-
sis carried out over those data would produce a set of factors such that the first four of 
them explain the 81.5% of the variability i.e., variance in the input data (see Table 
6.2). This means that it is possible to explain more than 80% of the variability in the 
data, and reduce by 73% the information required for it. 
 
36 For an introduction and review of PCA in modern data analysis, see Jackson (1991), Jolliffe (2002). 
37 For a review of many other applications of both FA and PCA in the fields of cognition and perception, 
see Carroll (1993). 
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AUTOMATIC FEATURE EXTRACTION 
In consequence, a dimensionality reduction system working over a set of raw data may 
automatically produce new features in the absence of a previous conceptual structure. 
This is so because those data analysis methods (i.e., FA and PCA), merely operate on 
numbers (that is, the values contained in the input data), from which they generate a set 
of resulting reduced factors on the basis of their ability to remove redundancy from the 
input data. Therefore, it is fair to say that these approaches are feature extractors, able 
to transform a high-dimensional input space into a low-dimensional one constituted by a 
reduced set of non-redundant variables factors or components relatively invariant to 
transformations, and which might be identified with the features or most basic ele-
ments of our conceptual systems. 
Obs. x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14 x15 
1 9 10 8 9 9 10 9 8 10 9 9 9 9 8 9 
2 5 3 8 3 3 1 4 1 2 6 3 3 2 4 3 
3 6 6 6 3 8 3 8 4 4 8 8 6 2 4 7 
4 2 10 3 9 10 5 7 9 5 10 8 4 10 0 8 
5 8 9 9 9 10 5 10 10 10 5 9 9 8 8 8 
6 0 2 10 2 5 0 6 0 0 10 0 0 0 1 0 
7 4 6 10 5 8 3 10 5 5 7 9 2 6 9 7 
8 8 7 10 6 8 2 8 5 9 7 9 4 8 8 9 
9 3 8 7 8 10 2 7 8 7 10 10 4 10 4 10 
10 8 5 10 5 8 2 5 3 3 4 4 5 4 7 3 
11 6 5 10 6 8 9 7 5 6 7 7 7 6 6 8 
12 6 4 8 2 6 2 8 2 3 5 6 9 6 5 5 
13 5 5 8 4 5 3 8 2 6 7 4 7 5 8 6 
14 0 0 2 2 2 10 7 0 10 8 1 10 0 0 3 
15 5 3 10 5 7 2 3 3 2 5 9 3 5 7 7 
16 3 10 7 10 10 3 7 10 10 10 10 4 9 2 10 
17 3 1 5 2 2 6 4 3 8 9 4 3 3 8 3 
18 7 3 10 3 9 1 6 3 3 5 4 4 2 6 2 
19 6 5 9 4 5 4 9 4 8 8 4 6 7 10 4 
20 4 3 10 5 5 7 8 2 6 8 4 4 6 7 6 
21 0 0 0 0 1 10 3 0 10 8 1 10 0 0 0 
22 8 9 9 9 9 4 8 7 10 3 8 7 6 6 8 
23 10 10 10 10 9 10 6 10 10 9 10 10 10 10 10 
24 5 7 10 6 8 3 8 5 8 6 8 3 8 8 8 
25 5 4 0 4 3 0 3 0 0 4 0 4 0 3 0 
26 10 9 10 9 9 3 10 10 8 7 9 7 9 9 10 
27 10 8 10 10 9 3 8 10 8 7 10 9 8 8 10 
28 5 4 9 4 4 2 9 3 4 7 5 6 4 7 4 
29 6 7 8 8 8 8 9 9 10 6 9 6 8 7 6 
30 3 9 8 3 10 1 9 9 2 6 8 4 5 4 7 
31 5 6 5 2 7 4 7 4 4 8 8 6 3 4 8 
32 7 8 8 7 9 6 7 6 8 7 5 8 6 7 6 
33 4 7 10 5 7 1 8 3 4 10 9 9 9 10 9 
34 0 2 10 2 5 0 7 0 0 10 0 0 0 3 0 
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35 7 5 9 5 4 8 8 5 7 8 4 6 8 8 8 
36 5 3 5 3 5 0 3 0 0 5 3 6 0 3 0 
37 5 2 9 0 3 1 7 0 3 4 0 6 1 3 3 
38 4 5 10 5 7 1 6 2 5 10 7 9 8 9 7 
39 7 9 8 8 8 3 7 8 10 2 7 6 5 5 7 
40 5 3 10 2 7 2 3 3 2 5 9 2 4 7 6 
41 8 10 8 8 8 10 9 8 10 8 8 9 9 8 8 
42 5 10 7 2 9 1 9 9 2 6 9 4 5 6 8 
43 10 7 10 9 8 2 8 10 8 7 10 9 9 10 9 
44 5 6 8 2 6 5 9 2 6 8 3 8 7 9 6 
45 6 5 9 4 6 8 6 2 5 8 5 5 7 5 8 
46 8 9 8 8 8 9 9 5 10 7 8 9 8 8 8 
47 10 8 10 10 9 10 6 10 10 9 10 10 10 10 10 
48 6 10 8 8 9 8 7 6 5 7 8 7 8 6 8 
Table 6.1. Principal component analysis: example data set, with 48 observations characterized by means of 15 
observed variables xi, which vary from 0 to 10. 
 z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 z7 z8 z9 z10 z11 z12 z13 z14 z15 
eigenvalue 7.51 2.06 1.46 1.20 0.74 0.49 0.35 0.31 0.26 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.04 
% of var. 50.1 13.7 9.7 8.0 4.9 3.3 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.3 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.2 
% accum. 50.1 63.8 73.5 81.5 86.4 89.7 92.0 94.1 95.8 97.1 98.1 98.8 99.4 99.8 100.0 
Table 6.2. Principal component analysis: variability explained by each factor or principal component: the 
first row shows the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of X; the second row presents the varia-
bility in the data explained by each component zi; and the third row represents the accumulated 
variability explained by zj and all the previous factors zi (with i < j). 
This kind of techniques extract the relevant information contained in the original varia-
bles, by capturing as much input data variability as possible in a set of reduced di-
mensions38. Thence, they are an approach based merely on experiential input, and able to 
produce new features (i.e., the resulting factors or principal components) without resort-
ing to previously existing conceptual or perceptual elements39. By virtue of all this, di-
 
38 Although in order to provide an explanation of concept acquisition the only mandatory processes are 
those of pattern recognition, the seemingly optional character of dimensionality reduction shifted to 
compulsory when other questions are taken into account. On the one hand, the reduction in the num-
ber of dimensions was useful from a computational point of view since it largely reduced the size of the 
original raw data, which made their processing and storage into less resource demanding. From a cogni-
tive point of view, a lower number of dimensions increased the efficiency of the pattern identification 
processes working on them. Therefore, from here on I will consider dimensionality reduction as de fac-
to mandatory. 
39 Indeed, my proposal should be viewed as an existence proof of an empiricist learning mechanism which 
refutes nativist arguments against the acquisition of primitive concepts; and not as an advocacy of the 
psychological plausibility of the particular proposed model. In fact, although I have a strong belief 
about the general structure of the described approach (that is, a kind of iterative learning system, 
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mensional reduction provides a simple and natural answer to the selection problem 
aforementioned in section 2.3.1, according to which concept theories need to explain 
how the set of relevant properties is chosen. On my view the answer is that the relevant 
dimensions are those which rule out as much redundant information as possible. Addi-
tionally, in an approach like the one here proposed, they can be determined in an auto-
matic and unsupervised way. 
All in all, this is the first and main cognitive module by means of which an answer to 
the circularity threat in concept empiricism may be provided. Consequently, it may be 
said that dimensionality reduction is the place where the features come from. 
6.4.4 Pattern recognition 
Up to this point the proposed approach has merely produced a reduced dimensional 
space, within which the original positions of objects can be relocated, through a trans-
formation of the original variables into the reduced ones. However, that is of no use for 
classifying those objects into categories relevant for the subject. By virtue of this, a pat-
tern recognition system is required. In this case the cognitive system must produce a 
computationally-efficient classification function, able to robustly map objects into cate-
gories useful for the subject. Obviously, those categories will not be known before the 
end of the learning process or, in other words, the subject’s mind has no a priori knowl-
edge about the pursued categories. 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IDENTIFYING-PATTERNS AND ACQUIRING-CONCEPTS 
Once a category has been learned, the pattern recognition module will apply its associ-
ated classification function in order to produce a positive response in the presence of the 
right stimulus. And, because the input of the pattern recognition step could be constitut-
ed both by (dimensionally reduced) sensorial data and by patterns previously acquired, 
the output resulting from that process may be identified: (a) either with the most basic 
elements of our cognitive system if the input of the process were merely composed by 
sensorial data; (b) or with complex concepts, wholly or partly constituted by other 
simpler concepts. 
This second type of cognitive ability (i.e., pattern identification) articulates what is 
commonly referred to as concept acquisition. Independently of how it is deployed in the 
mind, the main goal of a pattern recognition process is to identify regularities and pat-
terns in the data input (either in the original ones, or in those resulting from the dimen-
sionality reduction step). The most basic output of this kind of process would be a dis-
criminant function (or, alternatively, the parameters of a discriminant mechanism40) able 
to single out similar stimulus experienced in comparable circumstances. 
                                                                                                                                       
where a dimensional reduction is followed by a pattern recognition stage), I am far more circumspect 
in regard to the MVA techniques (i.e., FA/PCA and cluster analysis) by means of which I have charac-
terized dimensional reduction and pattern recognition respectively, since these two general-purpose 
modules could be articulated otherwise as I have repeatedly said throughout all this chapter. 
40 Although both a discriminant function and a parameterized discriminant mechanism (PDM) can play 




Ultimately, in order to be an explanation of how the general formation of concepts 
happens, the learning process must be unsupervised, in the same way that the human 
concept acquisition system seems to work. This opposes to the working of supervised 
learning systems, where patterns are acquired from sets of labeled examples and learning 
is guided by prior knowledge. By contrast, when learning is unsupervised, data input is 
unlabeled and there is no a priori guidance of the learning process. This is the reason 
why, on my view, it is appropriate an approach based on a purely statistical dimensional 
reduction, followed by a “blind” search of patterns, whose validation happens at the end 
of each iteration (of the process) in terms of the temporal associations successfully pre-
dicted from all those present in the stored historical data. 
Consequently, the stage of pattern recognition should not be identified with the 
whole concept acquisition process, although it might be tempting to do so, as many times 
it is done. Maybe the reason of this misunderstanding is that such identification is valid 
in the sense that the obtained pattern either in the form of a discriminant function or 
in the form of a PDM is what determines the classification of an object under a certain 
category. However, even though the categorization of something as a particular concept 
happens through the application of a previously obtained pattern, things are different 
when we consider how a concept is acquired. In the latter case, the recognition of a pat-
tern is not equivalent to the acquisition of a concept, because it is possible that many 
provisional patterns have to be obtained (and that many dimensional reductions have to 
be tested) before one pattern is definitively chosen and assigned to a given category. That 
is, concepts result from the whole iterative process, and not only from one execution of 
its second (pattern recognition) stage. 
CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
The earliest precedents of cluster analysis (CA) techniques are found in the field of an-
thropology (Czekanowski 1911; Driver and Kroeber 1932), although those ideas were 
soon applied in psychology (Zubin 1938; Tryon 1939; Cattell 1943)41. In a nutshell, 
cluster analysis refers to a set of multivariate statistical models whose goal is to group 
objects with similar properties into the same clusters, and dissimilar objects into different 
clusters, being a well-established paradigm both in supervised and unsupervised learn-
ing42. From here on I will mainly focus on the unsupervised approaches to cluster analy-
sis. And although there are multiple clustering algorithms, which could be differently 
                                                                                                                                       
hand, it may be said that a function f is discriminant if the equation ( ) 0f x   defines a decision sur-
face dividing the space into regions associated to the considered patterns. On the other hand, a PDM 
could be described as a decision mechanism which might be innately given to the subject (e.g., a sys-
tem able to determine the distances between different points within a conceptual hyperspace), togeth-
er with a set of parameters that determine how the PDM works. 
41 For a brief summary of the history of cluster analysis, see Wilmink and Uytterschaut (1984). For a re-
view of contemporary cluster analysis, see Bailey (1975), Blashfield and Aldenderfer (1988), Grab-
meier and Rudolph (2002), Jain (2010), and Everitt et al. (2011). 
42 Sometimes unsupervised clustering is also called intrinsic classification, since no category labels are used 
in order to carry out the partitions of the objects. In supervised clustering labels are considered when 
partitioning data, and classification is called extrinsic (Jain and Dubes 1988, pp. 56-57). 
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parameterized, all of them are iterative optimization mechanisms whose parameters and 
preprocessed data input often need to be revised43. In order to assess the quality of the 
resulting groups, two kinds of approaches may be applied: (a) internal, when the evalua-
tion is based on the same data used by the cluster analysis; (b) external, when groups are 
evaluated with information not used by the clustering. 
Cluster analyses take as starting point a set of p observed variables about the set of n 
considered objects. Such information may be represented by a matrix X whose rows 
stand for the objects 1 2( , , , )
i i i i
px x xx   (where xi represents the i-th object, with com-
ponents xji), and whose columns stand for the variables 1 2( , , , )nj j j jx x xx   (that is, the 
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Additionally, cluster analysis can be viewed as a geometrical model of similarity, where 
distances are determined as was said in section 4.1. Nevertheless, in cluster analysis it is 
necessary to take into account, not only distances between particular objects, but also 
distances between-group and distances within-group: 
 Within-cluster distance: it is determined as a measure (i.e., sum, average, maxi-
mum, or minimum) over one of the three following sets: (a) distances between all 
the pairs of points in the cluster; (b) distances between the centroid and all the 
points of the group; or (c) distances between the medoid and all the points of the 
cluster44. 
 Between-cluster distance (for two clusters): it can be characterized through dif-
ferent approaches: (a) distance between the centroids / medoids of the considered 
clusters; (b) average distance between all the pairs of objects that may be formed 
with the elements of the considered groups; or (c) distance between the closest or 
furthest points of those groups. 
And, because the aim of cluster analysis is to classify objects into homogeneous groups 
and different to other produced clusters, that objective is achieved when within-
cluster distances are minimized, and between-cluster distances are maximized. 
 
43 By contrast, in my approach parameter calibration is carried out by the third stage of the iterative 
learning process (in which the model is evaluated and readjusted), while the preprocessing of the input 
data would correspond with the dimensionality reduction stage. 
44 The centroid of a cluster is the mean position of all the points in the group, which leads to a point 
whose dissimilarity to all the points of the cluster is minimal. The notion of medoid is analogous to 
that of centroid, with the difference that it must be a point belonging to the cluster (i.e., the medoid of 




Nonetheless, by virtue of their heuristic character, there is a wide variety of cluster 
analysis techniques. In particular, it is possible to distinguish the following three main 
approaches (Bailey 1975; Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984):  
[A] Hierarchical methods: this kind of approach can be traced back at least to the 
works of Cox (1957), Fisher (1958), and Sokal and Sneath (1963), and tries to ac-
complish the goal of CA by producing a sequence of partitions, through one of 
the following procedures (Gordon 1987, 1999): (i) agglomerative algorithms, 
which begin with n singleton groups, with n equal to the number of considered 
objects, and in each step combine the two closest groups into one only new clus-
ter; (ii) divisive algorithms, which take as starting point a single class, and in each 
step divide it (or another already produced class) successively into two new 
clusters, until singleton groups are achieved; (iii) incremental (or constructive) algo-
rithms, which work sequentially adding new objects to the analysis. 
In all these cases, hierarchical clustering produces a series or tree of partitions 
that may be represented by means of a dendrogram, where the height of the lines 
represents between-cluster distances or, inter-group dissimilarities (see Fig. 
6.2). Lastly, the partition trees produced by hierarchical clustering represent dis-
joint final clusters, and the intermediate clusters wholly contain the subgroups un-
der them. (This is the reason why they are called hierarchical methods.) 
[B] Nonhierarchical methods (or partitional clustering methods): in contrast to hier-
archical approaches which produce partition trees, the result of nonhierarchical 
clustering is a set (not a tree) of nonoverlapping clusters45. The best-known non-
hierarchical approach are k-means algorithms, which have its origins in the works 
of Steinhaus (1956) and Lloyd (1957), even though the name “k-means” was first-
ly used by MacQueen (1967)46. And, even though many algorithms for k-means 
have been proposed, all of them use to begin with an initial set of centers or ini-
tial “means”47 of the groups, which are moved from one step to the next trying to 
maximize between-cluster distances and/or to minimize within-cluster dissimilar-
ities. For instance, Lloyd’s (standard) algorithm tries to minimize the following 











x   
where k is the number of tentative subgroups or clusters, xi represents the i-th 
object, Sj represents the j-th subgroup, and mj is the centroid of Sj. 
 
45 Other difference between hierarchical and nonhierarchical approaches is that partitional clustering 
tries to determine all the clusters at the same time and not step-by-step, one after another. 
46 For a review of the history of k-means algorithms see Bock (2007) and Jain (2010). 
47 These initial means –or initial seeds– could be innate information used by the pattern recognition 
stage of an empiricist approach to concept learning (as was argued in section 6.2.2 above). 
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Nonhierarchical methods in general and k-means algorithms in particular 
have less computational complexity, and are more efficient (i.e., faster) than hi-
erarchical methods, so they are more appropriate for analyzing huge amounts of 
data like those present in the problem of concept acquisition. 
[C] Other clustering approaches: in addition to hierarchical and nonhierarchical clus-
tering, there are other possible procedures that can lead to the classification of ob-
jects into homogeneous groups: (i) overlapping clustering, where objects may be in-
cluded in more than a cluster at the same time, as happens in models of additive 
clustering (Shepard and Arabie 1979; Mirkin 1987); (ii) fuzzy clustering, where 
the membership of an object xi in a cluster Sj is a matter of degree, and due to this 
partial character it can take any real number between 0 (i.e., no membership) 
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Fig. 6.2. Example of dendrogram for a hierarchical clustering. The final objects xi are represented by 
the leaves of the tree in the lower part of the graph. The vertical axis is proportional to the 
distances between the daughter clusters (i.e., the between-cluster dissimilarities of the un-
derlying nodes). 
AUTOMATIC PATTERN IDENTIFICATION 
Thus, a pattern recognition system based on CA can produce the centroids which in a 
similarity-based theory of concepts articulated by means of prototypes were identified 
with the notion of stored concept, and from which instantiated concepts were generated 
(see chapter 5 of this thesis). 
However, any clustering algorithm can produce a variety of resulting groupings, so it 
is necessary to determine which of those groupings is more appropriate in the subject’s 
context and circumstances. And, although this is the topic of section 6.4.5 below, some-
thing has to be said at this point regarding how the groups resulting from CA are eval-
uated. Firstly, as described in footnote 42 of this chapter, depending on whether the 
learning process is supervised or unsupervised, the evaluation of classification will be 
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extrinsic or intrinsic, respectively. I have also said that the pattern identification module 
must be viewed as an unsupervised process, so I will focus on how the groups produced 
by CA can be intrinsically evaluated. Secondly, although intrinsic classification resorts 
only to the information on distances in order to carry out the CA, the resulting groups 
may be evaluated in two different ways: 
 Only on the basis of distances: in this case the quality of partitions is evaluated by 
means of an appropriate homogeneity measure given by instance in terms of 
the within-cluster sum of squares, and the final number k of clusters48. Because 
different initial seeds and/or different numbers of clusters will produce distinct 
partitions, such a kind of homogeneity measure would allow to internally compare 
each grouping result with the others. Nonetheless, one disadvantage of internal 
evaluation is that a high score on an internal measure does not entail that the re-
sulting clusters will be practically useful/effective for the subject49. Or, in other 
words, even though this approach tests the internal quality of the model, it does 
not guarantee the identification of patterns relevant for the subject. That is the 
reason why a second kind of evaluation is needed. 
 On the basis of both distances and a priori labels/information: if the evaluation is 
based on data which are not used for the clustering, it is usually called external 
evaluation. That kind of external data includes a priori category labels that pre-
classify some groups of objects, and which can be the starting point for measuring 
how close a particular clustering is to a predetermined set of classes. Unfortu-
nately, a set of a priori labels is not something that is available to guide us in the 
acquisition of new concepts. By virtue of this, an additional kind of evaluation and 
readjustment of the model is demanded, and that is the subject of the next section. 
6.4.5 Evaluation and readjustment of the learning process 
Now I will show how the two aforementioned learning abilities may work together in a 
unique and integrated cognitive process, which explains how the acquisition of concepts 
both primitive and complex takes place. Here my first and main thesis is that the 
global learning process must be conceived as an iterative one, stepping sequentially 
through the three following stages: (i) dimensionality reduction, (ii) pattern identifi-
cation, and (iii) evaluation of results in terms of the predictive power of the final pat-
terns, and global readjustment of the iterative process. 
Nevertheless, why should an iterative process be necessary? It might be argued that 
the processes of dimensional reduction and pattern recognition are more than enough to 
explain how concept acquisition happens and, consequently, that the introduction of a 
three-step iterative system is an unnecessary artifice. On my view, there are two mains 
reasons to support the thesis that an iterative process is required. The first is that nothing 
guarantees that the factors resulting from a particular dimensionality reduction are the 
 
48 In this case, the homogeneity value would be inversely proportional, both to the within-cluster sum of 
squares, and to the number of final clusters. 
49 For a review of internal evaluation methods of CA, see Manning et al. (2008, chs. 16-17). 
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best for the subsequent pattern recognition stage50. The second is that there is no guaran-
tee that the patterns obtained in a certain realization of the learning process are the most 
predictive possible ones from the available sensorial data. The question at this point is 
how the third stage i.e., evaluation and readjustment of the model of the acquisition 
process could work. 
With regard to the evaluation of results, both the reduced factors and the obtained 
patterns have to be judged in order to determine their appropriateness in practical and 
cognitive terms. If both of them are acceptable, then the reduced dimensions up to this 
point, with tentative character will be confirmed as features provisionally valid or 
effective, and the same holds of the patterns resulting from CA, which will be con-
firmed as concepts provisionally51 valid at that point. By contrast, if results are not suita-
ble, the reduced dimensions and identified patterns remain tentative, and the iterative 
process returns to stages (1) or (2) (i.e., the dimensionality reduction or pattern recogni-
tion stages52, respectively (see Fig. 6.1)), until a more apt solution is accomplish or the 
iterative process ends once considered any possible alternative, or once a certain num-
ber of iterations is surpassed. 
But, how factors and patterns can be internally evaluated (without resorting to any 
set of a priori information)? The idea is to judge the appropriateness of results on the 
basis of their ability to successfully predict temporally ordered associations present in the 
original data. Indeed, if data are stored in a way that reflects their simultaneity and tem-
poral order (i.e., if data are temporally structured), as was assumed in section 6.4.2, then it 
is possible to search for temporal associations53 between the previously identified factors 
and/or patterns. 
This approach has two main advantages: (a) on the one hand, the only considered in-
formation are the original input data, which allows an internal evaluation of results in 
line with the claimed kind of (unsupervised) learning; (b) on the other hand, diachron-
ic associations are something that has not been taken into account up to this point of the 
process, so it is information genuinely new that may be conveniently used as a bench-
mark for the obtained factors and patterns. On those bases, the evaluation process might 
run as follows: 
(1) Calculation of the obtained factors and patterns for different moments in a par-
ticular time interval. 
 
50 Even worse, nothing guarantees that the reduced factors or (tentative) obtained features will be use-
ful for higher-level cognitive processes, like those of the pattern recognition stage (Mozer 1994). 
51 Provisionally in the sense of valid from the end of the iterative learning process till the next execution 
of it, which will happen on the basis of new and old perceptual data available to the subject. 
52 Depending on whether the non-suitable character of the achieved result is due: (i) to the reduced fac-
tors, (ii) to the recognized patters, or (iii) to both of them. 
53 These temporal associations should not be confused with the patterns that resulted from the second 
stage of the proposed model. The difference is that, while the regularities identified by the pattern 
recognition module are synchronic, since they were produced from one set or multiple sets of trans-




(2) Search of temporal associations between those factors and patterns; or, in other 
words, search of recurrent relations of precedence/antecedence between the fac-
tors and patterns previously identified54. 
(3) Computation of the objective function, which serves as an appropriateness or 
fitness metric for the achieved solution. This objective function is a quantitative 
measure which acts as an evaluation criterion of the success of the learning pro-
cess, not only on the basis of the number of obtained associations, their fre-
quencies, and degree of complexity55; but also on the basis of the subject’s needs, 
goals, and interests, which may be either innately given (e.g., those associated to 
biological functions) or learned/acquired. 
Lastly, with regard to how the proposed iterative process can evolve in function of the 
adequacy of results, two kinds of readjustment may happen: 
 A total or partial change of the dimensionality reduction: this could be due to dif-
ferent reasons: (a) problems with the factors resulting from the dimensional re-
duction, if some of them played little or no relevant role in the characterization of 
patterns; (b) problems because the reduced factors did not produce a predictive 
enough set of patters in terms of the above-mentioned temporal associations; 
(c) a new search of solutions, in order to determine if other alternative dimension-
al reductions can lead to the recognition of more predictive patterns. 
 New search for relevant patterns: in a process that could retain or not some of 
the patterns identified in previous iterations, from the same or from a different 
dimensional reduction, depending on whether the first adjustment was applied or 
not. The main causes of this second adjustment are the same as the last two rea-
sons pointed out for the first adjustment that is, reasons (b) and (c) of the previ-
ous point. 
As a result of those readjustments the iterative process may: (i) return to the dimen-
sionality reduction stage, in order to obtain new reduced factors56; (ii) return directly to 
the stage of pattern recognition, if no change is needed in the resultant factors; or (iii) 
 
54 The identified temporal associations might give rise to or be interpreted in terms of causal Bayes 
nets. For accessible expositions on causal Bayesian networks, see (Glymour and Cooper 1999; Gly-
mour 2001; Sloman 2005; Gopnik and Schulz 2007). 
55 When contrasting different solutions, the greater the number of associations, the better the solution; 
the lower the degree of complexity, the better the solution. 
56 This first kind of feedback is in line with (a) the functionality principle (Schyns et al. 1998), according 
to which the learned categorizations (i.e., the regularities, or tentative categories, identified by the pat-
tern recognition stage) should have an influence on the set of extracted factors; and also with (b) the 
substantial evidence of top-down effects (Rolls 2008; Gilbert and Li 2013; Zhang et al. 2014), accord-
ing to which lower brain regions may be modulated by higher regions (where lower and higher must be 
understood in terms of their place in the processing hierarchy). For other examples of the influence of 
high-level cognition over lower level conceptual / perceptual processes, see Goldstone (1994; 1995), 
Schyns and Rodet (1997), Schyns et al. (1998), and Goldstone et al. (2015). 
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finish, if a termination condition happens57. In this third case, the best solution reached 
up to this moment is confirmed, and moved from tentative to definitely valid for that 
realization of the learning process. From then on, the confirmation of the reduced factors 
and classification patterns leads to their effective application by the subject’s cognitive 
system until the next execution of the learning process. 
6.4.6 Final remarks 
An iterative process like the one described above has significant implications for the 
underlying cognitive system. Firstly, the external raw data are not the most basic con-
stituents of the conceptual system, since that they cannot even be persistently stored 
beyond their daily processing and analysis. Second, those most basic elements of concepts 
are the factors that result from the dimensional reduction, so against Fodor’s argu-
ments they are not innately determined. And, inasmuch as the constitutive elements of 
concepts are not an input, but an output of the learning process, the proposed model 
proves that it is possible to provide an account of concept acquisition both of concepts 
and of their primitive constituents, by means of a general-purpose learning mechanism 
(in line with empiricist thesis) without falling into circularity. 
My proposal shows that primitive concepts (i.e., the most basic elements of concepts) 
can be the mere result of a process of redundancy reduction, in which no a priori infor-
mation about the pursued categories is given. Then tentative patterns will be recognized 
on the basis of the factors resultant from the dimensionality reduction stage, and both of 
them (i.e., factors and patterns) will be evaluated through their predictive power meas-
ured in terms of the temporal associations identified from those factors and patterns. In 
this type of approach, the precedence assumption is not needed by the model. As a con-
sequence, its explanation of how primitive concepts are acquired is free from the threat 
of circularity. 
Additionally, my perspective also enjoys other significant advantages over other al-
ternative approaches. Firstly, the proposed model takes as starting point perceptual in-
formation, which is available to the subject as sensory input data; in contrast to other 
views where the data required by the analyses are not available to the subject as an input 
of the learning process e.g., the approaches based on multidimensional scaling, MDS, 
which need as an input the (dis)similarity matrix of the considered objects (see sections 
3.3.2 and 3.3.3). Secondly, even though my proposal is an empiricist acquisition model, 
it allows to accept innate elements in the form of the initial seeds of the CA which do 
not constrict the empiricist character of the model, nor prevent its adaptability to chang-
ing environments. 
In the third place, an approach like the one here proposed constitutes a response to 
the selection problem which affected any similarity-based theory of concepts (see section 
2.3.1). Indeed, under this kind of view the selection problem is a pseudo-problem. As 
 
57 There can be multiple termination conditions, but the three main ones are the following: (1) that the 
processing time or biological devoted slot is over; (2) that every possible readjustment of the dimen-
sional reduction and pattern recognition stages had been tested; and (3) that the marginal improve-
ments of the last n iterations did not exceed a certain threshold. 
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repeatedly said by psychologists, our concepts only express some of the many properties 
typically present in the members of each category. However, that is only a problem if a 
concept is viewed as something to be a posteriori characterized in terms of a subset of the 
properties common to all or most of its members. Or, in other words, the selection of 
properties is only a problem if concepts are considered as something given (e.g., as catego-
ries present in the world), and we wondered about the set of features that binds their 
members together. However, from an empiricist point of view, doing that is to put the 
cart before the horse, because concepts are not something that preexist their constitutive 
properties. Indeed, in this kind of approach the most basic constituents of concepts are 
the result of a first process of dimensionality reduction; and only then a pattern recogni-
tion process is run over the set of (tentative) reduced factors, whose result will be a set of 
provisional categories. Thus, properties are not something to be looked for once a certain 
category has been obtained, but the elements from which that category is produced. 
6.5. Conclusions 
Throughout this chapter I have claimed that one of the main problems of empiricist 
theories of concepts is to explain how the most basic constituents of concepts may be 
acquired, without resorting to a preexisting innate repertoire. In fact, that was the origin 
of Fodor’s nativist critiques against concept empiricism, and of many other reformula-
tions of Fodor’s argument. 
I have also shown that the crucial problem of concept empiricism is not due to the 
Fodor’s or Carey’s premise that all learning mechanisms may be reduced to hypothesis 
formation and testing, but to an assumption tacitly present in most of empiricist and 
nativist learning models, to which I gave the name of precedence assumption. According to 
it, the perceptual or conceptual constituents of a concept have to be available as an input 
of the learning process that leads to the acquisition of such a concept. My point was that 
the acceptance of the precedence assumption is a mistake for the empiricist, because no 
model built on it may explain the acquisition of general concepts in a non-circular way. 
However, I have argued that the precedence assumption is an unfounded premise, be-
cause the constitutive elements of a concept may result from the same learning process by 
virtue of which that concept is acquired. In that case, it would be enough that the most 
basic elements of concepts were ready at the end of the acquisition process, and not from 
its beginning, so the precedence assumption is not needed, which prevents the threat of 
circularity when explaining how concepts are acquired. 
Finally, in the last section of the chapter I have described a learning system which, on 
the basis of a three-step iterative approach, was able to produce concepts and their con-
stitutive properties as result of the same execution of the learning process. Such a system 
was based on two general-purpose modules, namely, dimensionality reduction and pat-
tern identification, followed by a final stage that evaluated the obtained results and read-
justed the model. 
On the one hand, the dimensionality reduction module was able to produce new rel-
evant (and reduced) factors which ruled out as much redundant information as possible. 
That is, the new tentative features / properties, in general, and the most basic constitu-
ents of concepts, in particular, may be produced in an automatic and unsupervised way, 
as those which minimize redundant information while retaining as much variability (of 
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the original data) as possible. On the other hand, the pattern recognition module will 
find regularities in the set of reduced factors, and as a result will generate for an ap-
proach based on cluster analysis the centroids that were identified with the notion of 
stored concept, and from which instantiated concepts are produced. 
In consequence, once the precedence assumption is surpassed by this kind of model, 
the circularity threat disappears, and innateness is no more a necessary condition in order 
to explain the acquisition of primitive concepts, which refutes Fodor’s claim that empiri-















But the fact that Utopia is a long way off does not mean that 
daily life should come to a screeching halt. There is plenty for 
us to investigate, in our sloppy and impressionistic fashion, 
and there are plenty of real results to be obtained. – 







The main goal of this thesis has been to show that concept empiricism has a way out of 
the nativist critiques against the thesis that primitive concepts can be learned without 
relying on a preexisting innate set of concepts. More precisely, the final aim was to pro-
vide an empiricist model which explained the acquisition of primitive concepts in a non-
circular way. The result, on my view, is more than acceptable. 
The first three chapters were the introductory part. First, in chapter 1 I described the 
different theories on the nature, origin, internal structure, and context-dependence of 
concepts. Then, in chapter 2 I examined the principal theories on the structure of con-
cepts, which were mainly based either on definitions, similarities or explanations. Lastly, 
chapter 3 was devoted to the idea of similarity and the various similarity-based approach-
es to the structure of concepts. In each of those chapters I made explicit my assumptions 
regarding all those issues. More in particular, I opted for an empiricist-contextualist ap-
proach articulated by means of a geometric similarity-based model of the prototype theo-
ry of concepts. 
With that framework in mind, in chapter 4 I discussed the notion of conceptual 
space, as a way of characterizing concepts and knowledge. There I focused on Gärden-
fors’ theory of conceptual spaces, and I showed that the convexity requirement on the 
geometry of (conceptual) regions is both unnecessary and problematic. On this basis I 
concluded that, if the convexity constraint is given up to, then Gärdenfors’ conceptual 
spaces can be reduced to a (geometric) contextualist particularization of the prototype 
theory of concepts. 
The last two chapters were devoted to develop my main proposals in this doctoral 
thesis. First, in chapter 5 I investigated how the approach assumed by me in this work 
(i.e., a contextualist similarity-based conceptual space theory) can join together virtues 
both from the invariantist and from the contextualist sides. In that chapter, I showed 
that two different notions of concepts must be distinguished, which were associated with 
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two distinct facets in the life cycle of a concept (i.e., storage and instantiation): (a) stored 
concepts contained the information needed to be –persistently– maintained by the mind 
of a concept for the subsequent instantiation of it; (b) instantiated concepts were the 
result of the cognitive processes which applied concepts in categorizations, inferences, 
etc. As a consequence, stored concepts could account for significant invariantist phe-
nomena, while instantiated concepts were able to explain aspects typically explained by 
contextualism. Finally, I argued that, if concepts are thought to be context-dependent, 
then instantiated concepts lack minimal persistence and, consequently, cannot be a rep-
resentation of their associated categories. 
Then, chapter 6 researched whether the acquisition of primitive concepts could be 
explained by means of an empiricist approach, without relying on an innate repertoire of 
elements. There I proved that the uppermost nativist arguments against the acquisition 
of primitive concepts depend on the precedence assumption, that is, on the hypothesis 
that the constitutive elements of a concept must be an input of the learning process 
which leads to the acquisition of that concept. In this case my proposal was a model 
where the constituents of a concept C resulted from the same execution of the learning 
process by virtue of which the concept C was acquired. The model consisted in a three-
step iterative process, constituted by two general-purpose learning abilities (i.e., dimen-
sional reduction and pattern recognition), and one stage of evaluation and readjustment 
of the model.  
All in all, I think I have presented a plausible explanation of how the acquisition of 
primitive concepts may happen in a non-circular way. Having said that, this view has left 
unanswered a range of challenging questions that call for future examination: How plau-
sible is this model from a psychological point of view? Is it possible to provide a charac-
terization of context that articulates the demands of this kind of approach? Or, can be 
explained the phenomenon of successful communication in a contextualist approach like 
the one here described? In regard to all this, future research is required, but I am optimis-
tic that forthcoming investigation will give us a deeper understanding of how context 
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